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finnish summary
Onko nuoruuden pidentyminen todellinen ilmiö? Lykkäävätkö nuoret 
aikuistumistaan? Nyky-yhteiskunnan muutokset vaikuttavat nuorten 
tapoihin siirtyä nuoruudesta aikuisuuteen, mutta ovatko vaikutukset 
samanlaiset kaikille nuorille?
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan nuorten naispuolisten yliopisto-
opiskelijoiden siirtymää aikuisuuteen ja heidän sosio-taloudellista 
integraatiotaan yhteiskuntaan. Tutkimuskohteena ovat opiskelijat 
Suomesta ja Ranskasta. Näillä eurooppalaisilla mailla on tietyiltä osin 
erilainen yhteiskunnan rakenne, poliittinen kulttuuri ja historia. 
Keskeiset tutkimuskysymykset ovat: Millä tavoin suomalaisten ja 
ranskalaisten naisopiskelijoiden siirtymä aikuisuuteen eroaa? Mitkä 
ovat heidän integroitumisensa strategiat? Seuraavatko he vanhempi-
ansa tässä suhteessa? Millaisia uusia ratkaisuja he tekevät?
Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan aikuistumista kiinnittämällä eri-
tyistä huomiota korkeakoulujärjestelmään, työmarkkinoihin ja per-
heeseen. Tutkimuksen kohde ei siten ole ranskalaiset tai suomalaiset 
naisopiskelijat, vaan yhteiskunnallisten instituutioiden toiminnan 
tarkastelu yhteen ryhmään kuuluvien yksilöiden näkökulmasta. Ver-
tailtavuuden varmistamiseksi tutkitut opiskelijat ovat suunnilleen 
samanlaisia sukupuolen, iän, koulutustason, oppialan (yhteiskunta-
tieteellinen ja humanistinen) ja sosiaalisen taustan osalta.
Aineisto koostuu 22:sta 21–30-vuotiaiden naispuolisten yli-
opisto-opiskelijoiden teemahaastatteluista Ranskasta ja Suomesta 
vuonna 2008. 11 haastattelua tehtiin Lyonissa, ja 11 Tampereella. Ha-
astateltavat olivat lopettelemassa opintojaan ja siirtymässä työelämään. 
Haastatteluaineistoa tuetaan erilaisilla tilastoaineistoilla.
Aineiston analyysi tuottaa uutta tietoa nuorten naisten uu-
denlaisesta yhteiskuntaan integroitumisesta. Teemahaastatteluista 
selviää, nuoret suomalaisnaiset ovat tyytyväisiä yliopistojärjestelmään 
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ja mahdollisuuksiinsa sijoittua työmarkkinoille valmistumisen jälkeen. 
Ranskalaiset ajattelevat, että järjestelmä on aikansa elänyt, eikä se 
anna tarpeellisia työkaluja sijoittumista varten. Molempien maiden 
haastateltavat odottavat työltä ammatillista tyydytystä.  He eivät suun-
nittele työuraansa rahan ansaitsemiseksi. He korostavat myös sitä, 
miten työ sopii yhteen heidän intressiensä ja arvojensa kanssa. He 
ovat tietoisia vaikeuksistaan työelämään siirtymisessä – ranskalaiset 
nuoret naiset ovat huolissaan ja melko pessimistisiä.  He kokevat 
kahtalaisen haasteen: perheen perustaminen ja työelämän yhteen 
sovittaminen on vaikeaa. Lähellä lasten hankkimisen ikää olevien 
naisten syrjintä työmarkkinoilla askarruttaa heitä. Suomalaisille 
opiskelijoille kotoa muuttaminen ja itsenäistyminen ovat helpom-
paa. Tämä johtuu paremmin toteutetusta opintotuesta ja mahdol-
lisuudesta työskennellä osa-aikaisesti opiskelun ohessa. Ranskalaiset 
nuoret tukeutuvat taloudellisesti suomalaisia enemmän vanhempiinsa. 
Ranskassa opiskelijan tulot muodostuvat vanhempien avustuksesta 
ja palkasta, kun taas Suomessa opiskelijan tulot koostuvat opinto-
tuesta ja palkasta. Tutkimus osoittaa, etteivät nuoret naiset kiirehdi 
lasten hankkimista.  He haluavat kokea elämää ensin. He lykkäävät 
tietoisesti ja tarkoituksellisesti äitiyttään, jotta olisivat kypsiä siihen. 
Kokonaisuudessaan tutkimus osoittaa, ettei aikuisuus ole enää sa-
malla tavalla merkkipaaluihin sidottu. Sen pohjana ovat yhä enem-
män psykologiset tekijät, kuten kokemukset omasta kypsyydestä ja 
vastuullisuudesta. Nykynuoret eivät venytä nuoruuttaan, he pyrkivät 
entistä enemmän löytämään uusia tapoja yhteiskuntaan astumiseksi. 
Aikuiseksi kasvamisen prosessi vaatii siten tutkimukselta uudenlaista 
ajattelua, uusia käsitteitä ja lähestymistapoja. Muutoksessa saattaa 
olla aikuisuus nuoruuden sijaan. 
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french summary
La prolongation de la jeunesse est-elle un phénomène réel ? L’entrée 
dans l’âge adulte est-elle différée ? Le contexte socio-structurel des 
sociétés occidentales a subi de grands bouleversements ces dernières 
années. Cela a simultanément provoqué des perturbations dans le 
processus de passage à l’âge adulte. Cependant, tous les jeunes ont-ils 
été touchés de la même manière par ces changements ?
Le but de cette recherche comparative est l’analyse de la transi-
tion à l’âge adulte et du processus d’insertion sociale et économique 
qui en découle, au travers de l’exemple de jeunes femmes qui étu-
dient dans des universités françaises et finlandaises. Malgré des si-
militudes infrastructurelles et une appartenance commune à l’Union 
Européenne, la France et la Finlande se différencient notablement 
sur le plan de l’organisation socio-structurelle et politique ainsi qu’en 
termes d’histoire. 
L’étude s’est basée sur les questions suivantes : Quelles sont les 
différences et similarités dans le passage à l’âge adulte des jeunes 
étudiantes en France et en Finlande ? Quelles sont leurs stratégies 
d’insertion ? Suivent-elles un chemin menant à l’âge adulte qui diffère 
de celui emprunté par leurs parents ? Si oui, quel nouveau modèle 
de transition adoptent-elles ?
Le processus actuel de transition à l’âge adulte est analysé au 
travers de certaines institutions : le système d'enseignement supérieur, 
le marché du travail, et les politiques familiales. Cette étude observe 
néanmoins les divergences entre les institutions des deux pays du point 
de vue d’un groupe d’individus, plutôt que d’examiner les différences 
entre plusieurs sous-groupes de jeunes. Les personnes interrogées ont 
donc été sélectionnées sur la base de leurs caractéristiques communes, 
tels que leur sexe, âge, niveau d’éducation, discipline d’étude (sciences 
humaines et sciences sociales), et origines sociales.
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J’ai donc conduit des entretiens avec des jeunes femmes âgées 
de 21 à 30 ans, en fin de cursus universitaire et bientôt prêtes à inté-
grer le marché du travail. Vingt-deux entretiens approfondis ont été 
menés en 2008, dont onze en France à Lyon, et onze en Finlande à 
Tampere. Une analyse quantitative basée sur des statistiques vient 
compléter les données fournies par les entretiens. 
Les entretiens approfondis ont permis d’apporter de nouvelles 
informations pertinentes concernant les stratégies d’intégration sociale 
et économique des jeunes femmes. Premièrement, les jeunes Finlan-
daises sont plutôt satisfaites du système universitaire finlandais et des 
possibilités d’insertion sur le marché du travail après l’obtention de 
leur diplôme. Les jeunes Françaises considèrent le système français 
comme désuet et lui reprochent de ne pas les préparer à une insertion 
équitable sur le marché de l’emploi. 
Deuxièmement, les jeunes femmes des deux pays souhaitent 
obtenir un emploi qui leur procure de la satisfaction. Elles ne désirent 
pas avoir un travail simplement pour gagner un salaire ; cet emploi 
doit répondre à leurs valeurs et centres d’intérêts personnels. Toute-
fois, elles sont conscientes des difficultés pour entrer sur le marché du 
travail, surtout les jeunes Françaises, qui expriment leur inquiétude et 
leur pessimisme à ce sujet. Toutes les participantes ont néanmoins fait 
part des contraintes sociales, économiques et individuelles partagées 
par les femmes qui souhaitent travailler et fonder une famille. Les 
femmes sont en effet victimes de discrimination lors de la recherche 
d’emploi, par rapport aux possibilités de maternité. 
Troisièmement, le départ de chez les parents et le processus 
d’indépendance semblent s’effectuer plus facilement en Finlande 
qu’en France grâce aux aides financières équivalentes attribuées aux 
étudiants, et les meilleures circonstances pour associer travail et études. 
Alors qu’en France la plupart des étudiants assurent leurs revenus 
avec l’aide de leurs parents et d’un emploi, en Finlande, le marché du 
travail et l’état sont leurs sources principales de revenus. Concernant 
la fondation d’une famille, les jeunes femmes interrogées ne désiraient 
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pas avoir d’enfants dans l’immédiat. La plupart souhaite devenir mère, 
mais seulement quand elles se sentiront prêtes et assez matures. 
Enfin, concernant le passage à l’âge adulte, elles insistent sur 
le fait qu’être adulte de nos jours ne se limite plus à acquérir des 
repères sociaux, mais c’est avant tout posséder certaines caractéris-
tiques psychologiques, notamment être mature et responsable. Les 
jeunes d’aujourd’hui ne prolongent pas leur jeunesse mais tracent 
de nouvelles routes d’insertion dans la sphère sociale. De nouvelles 
recherches plus approfondies sont nécessaires pour comprendre les 
changements au niveau du passage à l’âge adulte et du concept de 
l’âge adulte. En effet, ce qui en train de changer n’est pas autant la 
jeunesse que l’âge adulte lui-même.
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PrefaCe
The structural climate in which the majority of young people ex-
perienced their youth in the 1990s sounds very gloomy. Twenty-six 
per cent unemployment among 15–24-year-olds in France; constant 
threats of an economic downturn; a breakdown in family struc-
ture, with a continuously rising divorce rate; the demand for more 
educational credentials, but no guarantee of being able to join the 
labour market, even with advanced diplomas; and the feeling of a 
bleak future. Today, the term Génération Précaire (Precarious Gen-
eration) is often used by French experts, and even by young people 
themselves, to refer to the situation of youth. Young people’s socio-
economic conditions have not changed much since 1995; indeed in 
some respects they have worsened. While I was growing up, I really 
wondered how this situation could be possible, what the roots of 
these predicaments were, and what the solution to socio-economic 
stability could be. Many sleepless nights and years later, the call to 
explore young people’s situation in depth was stronger than ever. I 
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analysed the contemporary phenomenon of the prolongation of youth 
for my Masters thesis, and decided to carry the investigation further 
into doctoral research comparing Finland and France. To narrow the 
scope of the study, I decided to concentrate my analysis on young 
academic women studying at university. 
Young people are at the heart of many debates today. Discourses 
from policymaking to youth research focus on the current process of 
the transition to adulthood and the prolongation of youth. However, 
it often seems that young people themselves are not directly involved 
in the discussions. Debates about youth do not always refer to young 
people’s own perspectives on the situation, and therefore might fail 
to distinguish the key issues. Young people express their views by 
participating in demonstrations or in dialogue on Internet forums, 
but rarely seem to be in direct contact with experts in the field.
As a member of the Génération Précaire, I felt called to explore 
the reality behind the discourses: in particular, what young people 
genuinely thought and felt, and how they perceived their transition 
to adulthood. When I started this research on youth transition, it 
felt logical to include some young people in the study, and to base 
my work on their experience. I wanted to investigate whether the 
process of transition was being prolonged; whether young people 
were deliberately rejecting adulthood, and if so, why; and whether 
they were affected by the ‘Peter Pan Syndrome’.
On a practical level this theme was difficult to tackle. It was 
necessary to break the abstract topic down into a more accessible and 
tangible design. I decided to analyse and compare the extent of the 
phenomenon in two European countries, Finland and France. The 
present European Union setting, alongside standardising European 
policies that apply to member states, increasingly encourages cross-
national examination. I conducted 22 in-depth qualitative interviews 
with female university students from the humanities and social sci-
ences who were about to experience the transition to working life 
in the two countries. This dissertation is based on the analysis of 
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interview material, and simultaneously refers to wider cross-national 
perspectives. The scope of the study therefore covers young women’s 
situations and attitudes, but also extends to the larger societal context 
experienced by young people in Finland and France. 
The highlight of the study was when I met and interviewed the 
young women. Getting into the field provided access to the young 
people’s reality, world and vision. This palpable aspect of the research 
also emphasised the purpose and importance of my work. It became 
a study about young people, through some young people’s eyes, and 
for young people as well as youth experts. Being in touch with the 
young people, and becoming immersed in their societal reality, em-
phasised my duty as a social researcher. This study offers up-to-date 
knowledge and understanding of young people today.
This dissertation traces the new patterns of transition followed 
by the young, highly educated women I interviewed, and contextu-
alises them in the wider societal frameworks of Finland and France. 
Micro- and macro-level aspects and factors constantly overlap with 
and influence each other. This dissertation highlights how the wider 
environment shapes young people’s process of transition, with a focus 
on young academic women. It also examines how many of them react 
to the fluctuating socio-economic structure, what coping strategies 
they use, and how those strategies in turn help to reshape the current 
process of transition.
This study has been conducted within a cross-national frame-
work. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical perspectives on young peo-
ple’s transitions to adulthood that were used as research background. 
Chapter 2 offers a detailed overview of the research questions, the 
research design, the decision to conduct a cross-national analysis, 
and the methods used to explore the processes of youth transition in 
Finland and France. This chapter also gives an insight into the field-
work and conduct of interviews. Chapter 3 gives a general overview 
of the two countries’ historical and societal backgrounds, as well as 
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an account in figures of the process of youth transition, referring to 
the main markers of adulthood. The four subsequent chapters focus 
on empirical findings. Chapter 4 explores young women’s perceptions 
of their respective university systems. It also provides an overview of 
the educational systems in Finland and France, and the welfare sup-
port offered to students. Chapter 5 concentrates on young women’s 
expectations of working life, their strategies of integration into the 
labour market, and the assessment of the dilemmas faced by female 
workers. Chapter 6 explores patterns of independence and semi-inde-
pendence across the two societies. It focuses on young women’s living 
arrangements, their strategies to become financially autonomous, 
and their plans to start a family. The final empirical chapter, Chapter 
7, assesses young women’s perceptions of their own transition, the 
prolongation of their youth, and their conceptions of adulthood. 
The discussion concentrates on the subjective and mental aspects of 
adulthood. Chapter 8 summarises the process of transition to adult-
hood among Finnish and French female students, and proposes new 
patterns of transition that increasingly apply to many young adults 
today. Finally, Chapter 9 offers a vibrant discussion of the emergence 
of new models of transition, and suggests a reconceptualisation of 
the notion of adulthood. Structural factors, concepts and models 
are malleable, and are both a response to and an instigator of wider 
socio-historical transformations. As such, wider forces such as the 
globalisation of the economy affect current societal structures. When 
the societal equilibrium alters, the internal organisation is likely to 
be shaken. As a consequence, old archetypes, such as the transition 
to adulthood experienced by the previous generation, is strongly li-
able to modifications. This study offers a fresh insight into current 
developments in the process of transition, and the confusion around 
the phenomenon of the prolongation of youth. It might indeed be 
sensible to ask whether the transition is really being prolonged, or 
is simply evolving.
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according to her own terms,
Aurélie Mary
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1.
The neW PaTTerns of TransITIon To aDulThooD: 
a TheoreTICal InTroDuCTIon
 
 I think being an adult is (…) being responsible for 
yourself, (…) admitting your own mistakes, and 
being responsible for your actions.
 Piia (24, Finland)
What is being an ‘adult’ today? ‘Eighteen years old’: this age symbolises 
the first concrete step into the status of adulthood in many countries. 
Turning 18 is the first of several legal and social qualifications for 
adulthood. More than a mere rite of passage, reaching this age offi-
cially entitles young people to civil rights and additional opportunities 
and responsibilities, from voting to getting married, but also brings 
new socio-cultural expectations, such as entering work or starting a 
family, or being accountable for inconsiderate behaviour.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2011), an adult 
is a) a grown up being, having reached the age of maturity, and b) 
a person characteristically mature in attitude, outlook, etc. From a 
contemporary socio-cultural perspective, a fully fledged adult is a per-
son who has completed his or her studies, has left the parental home, 
has attained residential and financial independence, has obtained a 
28 – Aurélie Mary
permanent job, is married or in an intimate relationship, and has a 
family and children (e.g. Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Jones 1995). 
However, do all young people turning 18 feel adult? Do they 
think that the accepted qualifications for adulthood really make 
them eligible for adult status? Age and normative social prescriptions 
play a great role in defining and determining social categories such 
as adulthood. However, a growing number of young adults aged 
18 and over do not meet the norms attached to their social status. 
Indeed, many of them still live at home, study, depend financially on 
their parents, are single, and experience great difficulties in entering 
the labour market and finding a stable job. Reaching 18 is the first 
indicator in the change of status, yet young people aged 13 to 19 are 
categorised as teenagers. Thus in terms of age, the status of young 
adults begins with an overlapping contradiction. Socially constructed 
classifications, young people’s life conditions and opportunities, and 
socio-politico-cultural expectations overlap, diverge and contradict 
each other. One might wonder how the young people manage to 
cope with such a tangle. 
These statements lead to a famous question that many youth 
experts have pondered during recent decades: ‘When do young people 
become adult, then?’ (e.g. Shanahan et al. 2005). This question was 
one of the starting points of the present study. The debates around 
young people focus on the phenomenon of the extension of youth 
and the lengthening transitional path to adulthood. Several experts 
claim that young people delay their entry into adulthood and even 
reject the status. They prolong their youth well into their 20s or some-
times early 30s. Nonetheless, if this is the case, it might be sensible to 
readdress the question. Rather than wondering when young people 
become adults, asking why young people ‘choose’ to become adult 
later seems more appropriate, assuming that they do ‘want’ to access 
the next stage of their life later. Finally, the issues attached to young 
people are generally considered by adult experts who experienced 
youth and the transition to adulthood in a different socio-historical 
context. Their view of young people’s situation might no longer be 
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accurate or relevant. However, the present societal apparatus offers 
young people limited space to defend their viewpoints. Thus it will 
be pertinent to interrogate the concept of adulthood itself, to exam-
ine what constitutes an adult these days, and to explore how young 
people perceive their own processes of transition. 
1.1 Birth of a new Transitional stage?
The life course starting from infanthood, continuing into child-
hood, adolescence, adulthood and then to old age (including the 
gerontological categories of the third age, or active independent life 
after retirement, and the fourth age, when elderly people become 
increasingly at risk of physical and psychological dysfunction and 
increasingly dependent upon others), represents the standard lifespan 
in advanced societies (Giddens 1997: 40; Pilcher 1995: 89). People 
simply go through these specific stages during their existence. These 
concepts are taken for granted, and rarely questioned. Yet they have 
not always existed. 
ambiguous social status
According to Philippe Ariès (1962), the first recognition of and 
interest in childhood emerged in the 16th century, resulting from 
alterations in the perception of children among higher social classes. 
The status of childhood was socially constructed alongside the de-
velopment of the modern world and new theories propelled by the 
Enlightenment. Similarly, John Gillis (1981: 98) explains that ado-
lescence as a segment of life for people aged 14–18 developed at the 
end of the 19th century. The industrialisation process led to profound 
socio-economic transformations, mainly the shift from agriculture to 
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manufacturing, upon which the economy became dependent. These 
changes led to further deep socio-cultural changes. One of these was 
the extension of childhood and the simultaneous ‘invention’ of the 
adolescent (Stevens-Long and Cobb 1983: 36). The new legislation 
around compulsory schooling contributed to these developments and 
the recognition of the new life stage of adolescence.
The statuses of childhood and adolescence are now deeply an-
chored in the foundations of society. Youth as a concept developed 
later, reaching a peak in the 1950s and 1960s. The societal frame-
work at that time engendered new socio-cultural transformations 
such as the women’s and environmental movements, and also youth 
emancipation and changes in the importance given to the status of 
youth. New sectors developed around the status of youth in terms 
of socio-politics, industry, consumption, education and popular 
culture (Galland 1990). However, unlike adolescence, youth is a 
social concept which lacks a physiological base. It covers a broader 
period, from the teenage years to the mid-20s, but the physiological 
and social processes of maturation overlap with and contradict each 
other (Furlong and Cartmel 1997: 42).
Following these arguments, several authors (e.g. Arnett 2004; 
Heath and Cleaver 2003) suggest that a new transitional stage is 
emerging, located between adolescence and adulthood. Such state-
ments are at the heart of current debates. The acknowledgement of a 
new phase of development implies further socio-political changes and 
adaptations around the new status. Current legislation and societal 
arrangements are not designed for such a transformation. A growing 
number of young people are in an ambiguous position, being neither 
adolescents nor adults, because they do not meet the appropriate 
markers associated with any of the available statuses. Their social 
identity is filled with ambiguity: their age entitles them to be adults, 
but like adolescents they might still be financially dependent on their 
parents, study, live at home and be single. Many young people are 
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located in an undetermined social category. It seems, in fact, that the 
process of transition to adulthood itself is undergoing a transition.
Arnold van Gennep distinguished three phases during rites of 
passage: separation, margin (or limen), and reaggregation (cit. Turner 
1992: 48). The first stage separates social beings from their initial 
status, the second involves a period of liminality, when they belong to 
neither status, and the third confers them with the new status. One 
might argue that many young people in advanced societies today are 
caught in an extended period of liminality, experiencing a prolonged 
period of void, belonging to the sphere of neither adolescence nor 
adulthood. 
Several youth experts have acknowledged young people’s increas-
ingly delayed transition to adulthood. This claim generates the idea 
that young people are hedonistic individuals who prefer to enjoy 
the state of youth and reject adult responsibilities. The boundaries 
between youth and adulthood are blurred: youth seems to extend into 
the early adult years, although young people legally become adults in 
their late teenage years. According to some studies, an ‘in-between’ 
period, or separate stage, is taking shape within the life course, be-
tween the stages of adolescence and adulthood – for instance, ‘youth-
hood’ (Heath and Cleaver 2003) or ‘emerging adulthood’ (Arnett 
2004). The transition to adulthood has lengthened and become more 
complex, and follows unpredictable patterns. Rather than being syn-
chronised into consecutive sequences, many young people’s routes 
deviate from the post-war pattern. Their transition is unconventional, 
fragmented, unsteady, and might follow a reversal of circumstances 
(see Bradley and van Hoof 2005; Jones 1995; Walther et al. 2006). 
They no longer follow the sequence of markers of adulthood that was 
typical of the last decades of the 20th century, i.e. leaving school, get-
ting a permanent job, becoming financially independent, leaving the 
parental home, settling down, getting married and starting a family. 
Compared to previous generations, they become autonomous later, 
study for longer, and postpone marriage and family formation. They 
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fulfil all the characteristics of adulthood eventually, but in a deferred 
and/or unconventional order. For instance, some work and live as 
a single-person household, and some start a family while studying 
at the same time (see Bradley and van Hoof 2005; Holdsworth and 
Morgan 2005; Miles 2000). 
Contemporary context of transition
Young adults’ life courses are entangled in a web of external structural 
forces. The post-industrial transformations that advanced societies 
have undergone at the social, political, economic, educational and 
cultural levels since the 1960s have generated new situations that chal-
lenge young individuals’ life prospects. Recent economic restructuring 
and fluctuations no longer guarantee young people’s stable position 
on the labour market. Ulrich Beck (1992) depicts the present societal 
framework as ‘risk society’, resulting from modernisation, postmod-
ern changes and global forces. In earlier times, life trajectories were 
foreseeable because they were anchored in a stable and constant 
societal framework. Today the future has become unpredictable, 
outcomes hazardous and life insecure, which has engendered the 
notion of risk. 
The cyclical patterns of the life course, in which consecutive 
cohorts used to follow each other through the same predictable and 
familiar routes, can no longer be viewed as the only model (Roberts 
1996: 232). The ‘normative’ patterns of transition, when people 
find a job, leave home and get married, were actually created during 
the 1950s and 1960s, when economic prosperity provided a secure 
framework and encouraged independent lifestyles (Jones 1995). Dif-
ferent generations have different needs and priorities, depending on 
their position within the social structure (Mannheim 1952). Whereas 
the 1960s generation rebelled against a variety of socio-cultural and 
political structures that were no longer suitable to their requirements, 
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today’s youths seem trapped in the framework instituted by their 
elders. Individuals from the previous generation – who are also the 
parents of today’s young people – are referred to as the baby boomers. 
In Finland, baby boomers generally correspond to the cohort born just 
after the Second World War, during the spike in birth rates that took 
place in 1945–1950. In France, the baby boomer generation refers to 
individuals born between the end of the Second World War and the 
mid-1960s (Daguet 1996). In Finland too the birth rate remained 
fairly high until the mid-1960s; after 1965 it started to decline, and 
it stabilised from 1975 onwards at a much lower level than in the 
1950s or early 1960s (Karisto 2005: 18). The same general pattern 
occurred in France, although less rapidly than in Finland (Koskinen 
et al. 2007: 87). For this reason, in the present study baby boomers 
refer to the generation born between 1945 and the mid-1960s. 
As a generation, baby boomers grew up in a radically different 
political and socio-economic context. They completed their transi-
tion to adulthood at a time when advanced societies were experienc-
ing exceptional economic prosperity and provided secure economic 
conditions, full-time employment and significant opportunities for 
upward professional and social mobility. In parallel with the economic 
boom, important social, political and cultural transformations took 
place, such as the implementation of strong welfare systems, new 
social values, women’s rights, the spread of higher education, and the 
development of youth culture (Chauvel 2002). The baby boomers 
were nonetheless the children of a ‘sacrificed’ generation that had suf-
fered a variety of socio-economic upheavals related to the two World 
Wars, national restructuring, and the economic recession between the 
wars. The generation born between the wars and the baby boomers 
were thus brought up in a society where deprivation was common 
at first but then came to be replaced by abundance (Chauvel 2002: 
201; Häkkinen et al. 2005). 
34 – Aurélie Mary
By contrast, the baby boomers’ children – in other words, today’s 
young people – were born into abundance, an established welfare 
state that provided for citizens’ needs, and the idea that they would 
attain a social position equal to or higher than their parents’. How-
ever, today’s youth are caught in economic upheaval and industrial 
restructuring, and their independence is being compromised by the 
fixed-term contracts, low-paid and part-time work generated by the 
service-based economy. They are trapped by the consequences of 
ongoing economic stagnation, and have great difficulties entering 
the labour market or attaining stable social positions. The present 
generation is experiencing the discrepancy between the ideologies 
generated during ‘The 30 Glorious Years’ after the Second World 
War and the current structural climate resulting from the economic 
downturn of recent decades (Chauvel 2002; 2006: 44). 
The labour market has become increasingly demanding in terms 
of competencies. Sue Heath and Elizabeth Cleaver (2003) acknowl-
edge that the spread of the single lifestyle is a response to the incon-
sistent market, which requires young people to be geographically 
mobile, flexible and temporarily available workers. Employment 
opportunities increasingly dictate young people’s living arrangements 
and residential independence. As such, many young professionals 
prioritise their career and delay starting a family, even though liv-
ing as a couple and founding a family are their ultimate goals in life 
(Bynner et al. 1997; Heath and Cleaver 2003).
A growing polarisation among the young population in terms 
of prospects and success on the labour market has been observed 
by several authors (e.g. Bradley 2005: 99–113; Bynner et al. 1997: 
119–128). The gap between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ has widened. A 
significant proportion of young people manage to acquire a high 
level of education and social and cultural capital, whereas others, 
mainly those from disadvantaged social backgrounds, often attain 
inadequate educational qualifications and skills, live on very low 
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income, and are at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Nonetheless, 
intermediate economic groups of young people take shape between 
‘losers’ and ‘winners’, for some apparent winners also face problems of 
insecurity and low income. The gap between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ on 
the labour market extends to the sphere of consumption, as a stable 
and well-paid job provides the financial resources necessary to access 
the consumer lifestyle. Therefore, disadvantaged young people are 
deprived not only of socio-economic integration, but also of access 
to cultural capital and cultural participation (Bradley 2005). 
Since the 1960s, the number of students has considerably ex-
panded in advanced societies, resulting in the phenomenon of mass 
education and the multiplication of the number of young people 
obtaining higher-education qualifications. Simultaneously, this proc-
ess has initiated the development of student culture (Galland 1996). 
Patterns of education have been prolonged into young people’s late 
20s, even early 30s. Student status is increasingly an indicator of 
transition, often marking young people’s first departure from the 
parental home. It is increasingly coming to represent a normalised 
stage between adolescence and working life (Heath and Cleaver 2003: 
71). A large number of young people thus do not leave home because 
they can afford financial independence or are getting married, but 
in order to study. However, students often rely on their parents for 
financial support and therefore remain in a ‘semi-dependent’ position 
(Galland 1996; Van de Velde 2008). 
Steven Miles (2000: 60) argues that the staying-on rate in higher 
education and training has been increasing as an alternative to unem-
ployment in the labour market. Many young adults choose to invest 
in the academic path both as an attempt to enhance their chances 
of entering their preferred profession and as a shelter from labour 
uncertainty (Furlong and Cartmel 1997: 27). At the same time, 
continuing higher education is being promoted and facilitated by 
education policies in many European countries (Reiter and Craig 
36 – Aurélie Mary
2005). Nevertheless, access to higher education varies in each coun-
try, depending on tuition fees, entrance exams and the availability 
of study grants (Vossensteyn 2004).
With regards to living arrangements, for Heath and Cleaver’s 
(2003) respondents in the United Kingdom, the single lifestyle was 
associated with independence and commitment to a particular way 
of life, rather than merely being an intermediary stage of life. Shared 
accommodation among young single adults is now widespread in 
several advanced societies. The authors add that prolonged depend-
ency and changes in domestic and housing transition patterns are also 
closely linked to the rise in housing costs, labour market upheavals 
and cuts in welfare expenditures. In many European countries, hous-
ing costs have risen as a result of both inflation and privatisation. 
Having a place to live and a job are not enough. Steady employment 
and housing are preconditions for young adults’ independence and 
ability to start a family (Jones 1995).
Different welfare systems operate across advanced societies, ac-
cording to the historical and socio-cultural background on which 
those societies are founded. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) distin-
guishes three main types of welfare regime: liberal, conservative-cor-
poratist and social-democratic. Young people receive different types 
of support and benefits according to the regime operating in their 
country. This consequently helps to shape their life trajectories and 
processes of transition (Anxo et al. 2010).
Multiple transitions
A variety of structural factors influences young people’s patterns of 
transition and life trajectories, from socio-economic restructuring 
to welfare regimes. However, more inherent characteristics, such as 
social class, gender, ethnicity, religious background or geographical 
locality, also impact on their life direction, and might exacerbate the 
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dilemmas perpetuated by wider structural dynamics. Hence both 
micro- and macro-level structural factors affect transition processes 
(Müller and Gangl 2003: 6–7). These are also sources of inequalities 
within the youth population. Pathways to adulthood are thus multiple 
and heterogeneous rather than uniform (Miles 2000: 11).  
There is a strong association between social status and the degree 
to which people’s lives follow either their parents’ transition type or 
a ‘de-standardised’ transition (see Bynner et al. 1997; Heath and 
Cleaver 2003). Harriet Bradley (2005) claims that working-class 
young people are ‘losing’ on the market, both in the workplace and 
in respect of the quality of their jobs. Mainstream middle-class men 
tend to be the ‘winners’ in the ‘new economy’. Deprivations inherited 
from childhood continue to exercise a powerful effect on individual 
chances and occupational outcomes in adulthood, as well as further 
participation and inclusion in wider society. The impact of social class 
varies across societies, depending on the societal structure and welfare 
systems. Class structure also exerts an influence in terms of ideologies, 
for instance in relation to parental support (Holdsworth and Morgan 
2005). Depending on social class origins, young people receive more 
or less assistance from their family. Parental support varies according 
to the level of welfare support and the type of family structure (e.g. 
single-parent vs. two-parent families). The considerable variations 
regarding the way family resources are conceptualised and provided 
deserves closer observation, for it plays a major role in young people’s 
processes of transition and life prospects. 
Although the trend of apparently postponed transition applies 
to both males and females, the age of leaving home differs by gender. 
While young men live in the parental home for a longer time than 
young women do, women are more dependent upon their partners 
than upon their parents. Both young men and women, however, 
tend to leave home for the first time to study or work rather than 
to engage in a relationship (Holdsworth and Morgan 2005). Young 
women tend to lose out on the labour market, being more often in 
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non-permanent and part-time jobs than men, and also more at risk of 
unemployment. Both sexes hold similar values regarding work, related 
to their specific social backgrounds. However, the growing number of 
women entering the labour force is increasing the competition faced 
by young men (Bradley 1996; 2005). The major dilemma for young 
women lies in the conflict between work and family life. Their dual 
identity as mothers and members of the labour force is difficult to 
combine in the face of increasingly demanding requirements from the 
labour market. Popular culture exacerbates the problem by promoting 
contradictory messages concerning women’s success with regards to 
their occupational status and their responsibilities as mothers. Young 
women thus experience internal conflict over whether to commit their 
energies to a career or a family. Those who wish to have children are 
also constrained by the biological issue of age (Arnett 2004).
Furthermore, the predicaments arising from differences in young 
people’s ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds remain an impor-
tant feature that needs attention. Young people from ethnic minorities 
often lose out on the labour market in comparison to the mainstream 
population (Bradley 1996; Craig et al. 2005). The combination of 
young people’s cultural origins with their social class origins and 
geographical location is often likely to worsen their disadvantaged 
position and engender social exclusion. Social background can also 
compromise educational attainment, for instance in countries with 
significant tuition fees (Arnett 2004; Vossensteyn 2004). Finally, 
cultural background influences parental support, values, attitudes, 
and ultimately pathways to adulthood. 
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1.2 Premises for new Theoretical Perspectives
The process of youth transition has apparently been scrutinised exten-
sively. Yet it seems that some aspects of this context have been omit-
ted, misunderstood and neglected. The awareness of this theoretical 
flaw was another starting point for the present study. This subchapter 
offers an overview of the divergences between the generation born 
after the Second World War and today’s youth. It also introduces the 
routes into adulthood taken by a growing number of young people, 
leading to new models of transition. 
generations and generational divergences
The present study is linked to the issue of generation, since it dis-
cusses young people and their common experiences of socio-historical 
circumstances such as socio-economic restructuring. According to 
Mannheim (1952), a generation comes into shape when individu-
als of the same age and belonging to the same cohort participate in 
an intense shared historical experience, such as war, when they are 
young. In such cases they also share a common trajectory. However, 
the concept of generation in such a specific sense is difficult to apply 
at the population level. For instance, baby boomers are widely recog-
nised as a generation that experienced tremendous historical changes 
and participated in building a new societal structure. Nevertheless, 
according to Matti Alestalo (2007: 153), not every individual sup-
posed to belong to the baby boomer generation took equal part in that 
socio-historical reconstruction. Some had different goals and identi-
fied with different ideologies. Indeed, the baby boomer generation 
includes several subgroups that benefited from or were affected by 
those events in different ways. In reality, only a small group of baby 
boomers participated in the social movements of the 1960s and can 
be identified as the ‘1960s generation’ (Purhonen 2008). Similarly, 
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not all young people today are equally affected by socio-economic 
fluctuations. Many struggle to enter the labour market, but some 
have adapted quickly to the new situation and benefited from the 
changes, such as some young entrepreneurs.
Antti Karisto (2005: 25) argues that the term ‘generation’ is 
mainly sociological rather than genealogical in meaning. A sociologi-
cal generation is a social concept which only potentially represents a 
generation per se. The concept of generation in terms of cohort and 
common experience therefore remains difficult to apply. It might seem 
that an entire generation is involved in the major events of its socio-
historical context, when in fact only some groups of individuals are 
really being affected by those events. As a consequence, the concept 
of generation in Mannheim’s terms is not applicable to my study. I 
refer to the concept of generation from a broader perspective, and I 
assume that most young people are concerned with wider structural 
transformations. Nonetheless, I cannot presume that the latter equally 
affect all young people. Different groups of young people react dif-
ferently to the same events, and draw on different resources to deal 
with their circumstances. 
The baby boomers nevertheless experienced their transition 
to adulthood in a radically different socio-economic context than 
their children. They benefited from advanced societies’ exceptional 
structural affluence and secure conditions. By contrast, young peo-
ple today are enduring the consequences of economic restructuring. 
The outstanding development of several advanced societies after 
the Second World War gave the impression that full employment, 
economic prosperity, generous welfare systems and an abundance of 
natural resources were standard conditions that would last long into 
the future. In reality this phase was specific to a particular epoch, 
and available only to the generation born after the Second World 
War. However, the exceptional trajectory of this generation became a 
normalised cultural model that still predominates today, even though 
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it is increasingly irrelevant to many young people’s opportunities for 
achievement (Chauvel 2002). 
Experts’ discourses generally portray the prolongation of youth 
as a threat to the established order, as young people are expected to 
take responsibility for sustaining and continuing the present system. 
However, their difficulties in the labour market, and further in society 
itself, compromise their ability to maintain such a system. Young 
people are therefore considered more as a social burden than as active 
citizens. They are also depicted as a rather ‘passive’ generation with 
hedonistic characteristics who prefer living in the present to actively 
preparing for the future. Yet planning is impossible for many young 
people, because of economic fluctuations and upheavals. Conse-
quently, in order to avoid hazardous outcomes, they prefer to wait for 
events to come to them, rather than engaging in risky decision-making 
(Hutson and Jenkins 1989: 106). Young people also appear passive 
and indifferent because of their lack of engagement in the political 
sphere. As a matter of fact they do participate, but they direct their 
involvement to different sectors, such as environmental activism, street 
demonstrations, or grassroots movements (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002: 157–159). Today’s youth’s apparent lack of interest in politics 
and weak social commitment is regarded and analysed according to 
the values and situation of the previous generation. However, young 
people’s apparent socio-political withdrawal might be a strategy to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the present societal model with regards 
to their needs and expectations. Indeed, the present establishment 
was built to respond not to their requirements, but to those of their 
parents. Their ‘active’ elders rejected the previous generation’s societal 
framework and thoroughly participated in the construction of a new 
one according to their own needs. The present system now fails to 
offer suitable solutions to improve young people’s situation, as it is 
not adapted to current socio-economic dilemmas. Nor can it provide 
them with a clear sense of social identity, and this results in feelings 
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of alienation (Edmunds and Turner 2002). The generations following 
the baby boomers have been made destitute by the comparative lack 
of structural opportunities. Today’s young people grew up in a sphere 
of socio-economic instability, uncertainty and intensive competitive-
ness on the job market. Ironically, cultural heritage perpetuates the 
ideology of achieving higher socio-professional positions than one’s 
own parents. The system does not always match today’s young people’s 
potential for accomplishment (Bourdieu 1980; Chauvel 2002). The 
present structural context hence compels them to follow new routes 
to integration into society.
emergence of distinctive pathways to adulthood
Olivier Galland (1990: 56) points out that youth was already ex-
tending into the early adult years as early as the 1980s, and that this 
period of life was increasingly becoming a time of experimentation. 
For a growing number of young people, early adulthood is now an 
intermediary status in which they prolong their studies, experience 
precarious employment for an indeterminate period, still live in the 
parental home, delay partnership and parenthood, and invest in the 
exploration of identity and personal experimentation (Arnett 2004). 
In doing so they are setting the pace for a new process of transition, 
establishing new qualifications for adulthood, and engendering a need 
to redefine the concept of adulthood itself (Blatterer 2007a; 2007b; 
2010). Concepts and patterns of transition tend to be considered 
fixed features. Today’s authorities, policymakers, youth experts and 
socio-cultural ideologies are still shaped around the definition and 
the markers of adulthood that took shape mainly in the 1950s and 
1960s. However, the recent structural transformations, as well as 
the construction of childhood and adolescence prior to and during 
the industrial revolution, prove that neither societal apparatuses nor 
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social concepts are permanent edifices. They are malleable, and can 
change alongside wider transformations. 
The transition process too might simply be taking a new turn, 
rather than being extended. Young people adapt and react to their 
structural environment, rather than intentionally choosing to disrupt 
their own entry into adulthood. They find ways to cope which then 
divert their life trajectories onto unexpected paths. Youth experts 
consider this problematic. One might nonetheless question whether 
it really constitutes a problem if patterns of transition diverge from 
those set by the previous generation. In any case, are young people 
actually prolonging their youth? It might be wise to explore their vi-
sion of adulthood and their positions in the current societal context. 
Adulthood is defined by the attainment of socio-cultural landmarks. 
However, where do the moral, psychological and subjective aspects 
of adulthood fit in this definition? It may be sensible to investigate 
whether young people view themselves as immature because they do 
not qualify for their parents’ social definition of adulthood (Blatterer 
2007a; 2007b; 2010; Westberg 2004).
exploring innovative models of transition
The most influential studies on contemporary patterns of transition 
to adulthood and of the prolongation of youth come from the United 
Kingdom (e.g. Bynner et al. 1997; Furlong and Cartmel 1997; Jones 
1995) and North America (e.g. Arnett 2004; Booth et al. 1999; 
Côté 2000; Kiley 1983; Settersten et al. 2005; Shanahan 2000). The 
extended transitional model occurring in these countries is generally 
presumed to be young people’s pathway to adulthood in other ad-
vanced societies too. The global impact of socio-economic, political 
and cultural changes on young people’s lives encourages a belief in 
the standardisation of youth transition across all advanced countries. 
But is the period of youth transition to adulthood prolonged in other 
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societies too? Assuming this is valid, are the same factors causing the 
phenomenon? Seen from a distance, all industrialised societies have 
a somewhat shared structural apparatus and living standard. Nev-
ertheless, each national structure presents specific societal variations 
that greatly influence young people’s patterns of integration into the 
wider establishment. In parallel with a focus on the recent enlarge-
ment of the European Union, the implementation of increasingly 
uniform policies directed at individual European countries tends to 
overlook member states’ structural divergences. For such reasons, a 
social phenomenon, such as the prolongation of youth, that appears 
to be common to all advanced societies deserves deeper investigation 
within individual societal structures, in order to elucidate its actual-
ity, source and extent.
A variety of national and comparative studies have discerned 
different patterns of transition to adulthood across advanced so-
cieties and between European countries (e.g. Heath and Cleaver 
2003; Holdsworth and Morgan 2005; Oinonen 2004). The differ-
ent politico-cultural ideologies prevailing in each country continue 
to regulate young people’s lives. For instance, social origins have a 
stronger impact on life prospects in the United Kingdom, while in 
Scandinavia the universal distribution of welfare counterbalances 
their effects. Likewise, entering the Finnish higher-education system 
entitles each student to financial benefits, whereas in France financial 
support is means-tested and based on parents’ rather than students’ 
income (see Vossensteyn 2004). In-depth comparative examinations 
of different societies is likely to yield surprising insights concerning 
patterns of transition.
New European policy directives related to young people in-
creasingly aim to standardise their life trajectories. For instance, the 
purpose of the Bologna Process (2007–2010) is to found a standard-
ised European Higher-Education Area (EHEA) in order to simplify 
international student and staff cooperation and academic mobility. 
However, such a procedure implies that individual member states’ 
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wider structural backgrounds are sufficiently flexible to adopt the 
new directives. It also suggests that young people’s patterns of transi-
tion and living conditions are homogeneous across Europe. Yet clear 
distinctions between European countries are visible at the social, 
political, economic and cultural levels. These affect young people’s 
living arrangements, their integration into the wider system, and 
indeed their pathways to adulthood. For instance, labour regulations, 
training schemes and programmes to encourage educational participa-
tion vary across European societies (Müller and Gangl 2003). This 
indicates the necessity to examine how individual countries’ societal 
backgrounds and structural factors affect young people’s transition 
and integration.
The present study concentrates on two European countries, 
Finland and France. The purpose is to identify how structural factors 
specific to each country influence patterns of youth transition. The 
research focuses more precisely on female university students’ proc-
esses of socio-economic integration in these societies. It simultane-
ously investigates the differences and similarities in young women’s 
transitions, living arrangements and strategies of integration, and their 
own assessment of their current and future socio-economic situation 
and opportunities. Twenty-two young women provided insightful 
accounts during qualitative in-depth interviews conducted in the 
two countries. The study is framed around the post-war markers of 
adulthood. Young women therefore evaluated their country’s higher-
education system, their chances of entering the labour market, their 
plans to become independent and start a family, and their processes 
of transition to and perceptions of adulthood. This research is the 
outcome of their invaluable contributions. 
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2. 
CoMParIng fInlanD anD franCe: 
MeThoDologICal ConsIDeraTIons
This chapter offers an account of the methods used in this study to 
examine the process of youth transition in Finland and France. This 
research is thus based on cross-national comparison. I also combine 
qualitative and quantitative empirical strategies, and in-depth inter-
viewing. The chapter further provides an insight into the fieldwork 
and the practical aspects of conducting research with informants in 
two countries.
2.1 research strategies
Research results tend to be regarded as the main part of social re-
search. However, the other part of a research project’s output, which 
involves methods of analysis, is no less significant. Research findings 
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arise from the choice of appropriate methodological approaches for 
a given study, such as qualitative or quantitative strategies or cross-
country comparison. 
research design
This dissertation focuses on young academic women experiencing 
the transition to adulthood in two European countries, Finland and 
France. The goal of this study is to add to our knowledge and un-
derstanding of the transition to adulthood, from a group of young 
people’s own point of view. The research investigates four distinct 
questions: 1) What are the differences and similarities between female 
students’ transitions to adulthood in Finland and France? 2) What 
are their strategies for social integration? 3) Do they follow different 
transitional routes to adulthood than their parents? 4) If yes, what 
new model of transition do they adopt?
One of the roles of sociology is to challenge ‘common-sense’ 
assumptions, to break myths, and to either construct new theoreti-
cal ideas or build upon existing ones (Cartmel 2003: 99–100). This 
study discusses whether the prolongation of youth is predominant 
outside the Anglo-American and English-speaking countries where 
the most influential studies on current patterns of transition have 
been done. Comparative research is an appropriate way to investigate 
this issue, and particularly so within the European Union, in light 
of the latter’s current plans to increase the standardisation of policy 
across member states. Charles Ragin (1987: 3–5) discusses case-ori-
ented comparative research and its use of macrosocial units in his 
explanatory statements on comparative social science’s goal to both 
explain and interpret macrosocial variations. Case-oriented methods 
generally stimulate the development of new substantive theories on 
the basis of an analysis of why different cases or units experience 
similar outcomes (Ragin 1987: 45). John Stuart Mill established 
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several methods related to empirical social research in the 19th cen-
tury. One of these was the ‘method of difference’. This method can 
be used to compare social or political systems that share a number of 
common structural features, in order to neutralise some differences 
while highlighting others. The cases share particular characteristics, 
but vary with respect to the presence or absence of some key explana-
tory factors. The ‘method of difference’ is used in four different types 
of comparative research: comparisons over time, over areas, within 
nations, and in counterfactuals. One kind of application sets up a 
certain number of contextual variables by selecting states or policies 
that are relatively similar with respect to key variables, such as wealth, 
regime type, religion or culture (Allardt 1976: 79–86; Eskola 1966: 
125–135; Moses and Knutsen 2007: 98–99). 
This cross-societal study investigates the patterns of youth transi-
tion in two non-English speaking European countries, Finland and 
France. Mill’s ‘method of difference’ is suitable to the study of these 
two countries. Although France is considered to be at the centre of 
Europe and Finland at the periphery, they present sufficiently similar 
background structures in terms of general features such as economic 
system, governmental form or infrastructure. They also display subtle 
yet distinctive structural variations that are not immediately discern-
ible from a distance, but which have a significant impact on patterns 
of youth transition (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed account of 
Finland’s and France’s structural and institutional developments). 
In order to answer the questions outlined above and to examine 
current pathways to adulthood, the following institutions have been 
used as the basis of analysis: the higher-education system, the labour 
market, and the family structure (including state support for families). 
The main goal of this study is to examine one group of individuals’ 
perceptions of these institutions. The purpose is to observe the dif-
ferences not between individuals, but between the different societal 
institutions in Finland and France. When one is looking at the effects 
of institutional structures, it is preferable to have only the smallest 
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variation in individual characteristics in order to avoid losing the 
initial focus. Analysing individuals presenting similar characteristics 
in two different countries enables us to reflect upon the different 
institutions in these societies. It mainly highlights the differences in 
the institutions’ functioning and how those differences impact upon 
individuals. Examining cases in context is therefore crucial. It helps 
to uncover illusory differences and commonalities, and to determine 
how different combinations of conditions can have an equivalent 
causal significance and/or how apparently similar causal factors can 
pull in opposite directions (Ragin 1987: 46–49). In other words, it 
is necessary to examine the contextual background in which young 
people experience transition, in order to evaluate more accurately 
their pathways to adulthood and the similarities and differences in 
that process. The combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis 
is a suitable approach to evaluate institutional variation and how this 
influences individuals’ attitudes.
This further involves an ‘individualising comparison’, where the 
specific occurrence of a given phenomenon – in this case the prolon-
gation of the transition to adulthood – is compared and contrasted 
in order to identify the peculiarities of each case. The technique of 
looking for variations also applies within the scope of comparative 
analysis. It consists of distinguishing variation within a given phe-
nomenon by exploring differences in the contexts within which the 
phenomenon occurs (Tilly 1984: 81–82). For instance, examining 
the types of assistance offered to young people entering the labour 
market in Finland and France might reveal variations. The researcher 
can then interpret how each country’s particular variation impacts 
upon patterns of youth transition. In cross-national research, the 
countries examined can represent the objects of study, the contexts 
of the study or the units of analysis (Cartmel 2003: 86). In this study, 
Finland and France represent both the objects and the contexts of 
the study. The transition to adulthood is examined within the cases’ 
societal frameworks. Simultaneously, structural aspects are scrutinised 
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and become objects of comparison, thereby establishing patterns of 
similarities and differences between the two countries and providing 
a framework for patterns of youth transition. 
The research informants were selected according to shared charac-
teristics, so as to obtain comparable data. Most came from a lower- or 
higher-middle-class background, and they were all of the same gender 
(young women), belonged to the same age group (20–30-year-olds), 
lived in large provincial cities (Tampere in Finland and Lyon in 
France), and were academic young women studying at university 
(see Table 2.1). They were from the fields of the social sciences and 
humanities, had reached the end of their courses (either Bachelors 
or Masters programmes), and were about to enter working life or (in 
the cases of those who were just completing their Bachelors) further 
study. The research participants needed to be consistent between 
the two countries so that the comparison of institutions would be 
systematic. I am nevertheless aware that the choice of the informants 
has influenced the results of this study. Analysing another group of 
individuals, for instance upper-class young men, lower-educated 
young women or simply students from another discipline, would 
have produced different conclusions. Indeed, according to Pekka 
Räsänen and Terhi-Anna Wilska (2007), it is not only gender or age 
that impact on young people’s perceptions of specific phenomena 
or issues. Those authors analysed university students’ attitudes to-
wards commercialised sex. They noticed that gender influenced the 
variations in attitude, but that fields of study did so too. The same 
occurs with individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds. 
They display divergent attitudes, for instance towards work, and also 
follow different routes to adulthood (e.g. Jones 2002). This leads 
to a reflection on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1979; 1984) work on cultural 
distinction. The outcomes of his study might have been different 
if it had been based on a different sample. The selected individuals 
mostly belonged to the upper and middle classes. Individuals from 
poorer socio-economic backgrounds were underrepresented, and 
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farm workers were excluded from the investigation. Therefore the 
sample did not represent or describe the entire French population, 
but provided a picture of two different social classes (Bourdieu 1984: 
505). However, in order to maintain consistency in his examination 
of the institution of class, Bourdieu had to select a specific sample. 
Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches
Case-oriented comparison encourages a research design that includes 
the use of different methods of data collection, or mixed methods. 
The gathering and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data 
allows a better interpretation of the existence and diversity of a specific 
phenomenon. Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative approaches 
complement each other in producing in-depth knowledge of a specific 
issue. The quantitative approach to measurement is strongly context-
oriented, whereas qualitative research produces in-depth knowledge; 
it is case-centred, and anchored in empirical measurement and evi-
dence. Qualitative empirical research thus allows us to pay attention 
to details within the cases observed, and to make interpretations based 
on measurement (Ragin 2008: 78–81). In short, the quantitative 
approach reveals what is occurring, and the qualitative approach 
investigates why and how. In that respect, sampling and examining 
a small-scale population helps us to understand what other kinds 
of data, such as statistics and larger surveys, disclose. In the present 
study, cross-national comparison and sources of pre-existing data and 
statistics on youth transitional patterns provide a macro-dimensional 
overview of young people’s situation. The empirical dimension of 
the research, generated by interviews conducted with a small-scale 
population, offers a micro approach to the phenomenon, with a focus 
on young academic women. 
The study utilises international and standardised socio-demo-
graphic statistics produced by Eurostat, the OECD, the ILO and 
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the United Nations, and cross-national comparable surveys such as 
Eurobarometers (Melich 1997: Young Europeans; Christensen 2001: 
Europeans Opinion Research Group) and the ESS (European Social 
Survey) Round 3 – 2006. Engaging in cross-national research implies 
an equivalence of research design between the countries regarding 
measurement, sampling and dissemination (Cartmel 2003: 92). 
National statistics from Finland and France, produced by Statistic 
Finland and INSEE respectively, helped me to analyse national events 
within those countries that international data sets did not cover. Ex-
isting sources of data and literature provided contextual information 
regarding the socio-economic situation of young people in Finland 
and France. This allowed me to examine the main differences and 
similarities related to the characteristics of youth transition across the 
countries, and provided the basis for the questions to be addressed 
during the empirical process of interviewing. It is necessary, however, 
to be aware of the appropriateness of a particular method for particular 
issues (see Bryman 1988). In this research, interviewing was a means 
to investigate the issues raised by the literature on youth transition 
and the various data sets. Interviewing was also a means to give a 
voice to one particular ‘object’ of contemporary policy debates, that 
is, highly educated young women. 
giving a voice to youth
I chose to conduct qualitative in-depth interviews in order to give 
space and freedom to the informants to express their points of view. 
This technique is flexible in terms of the questions asked and the 
length and depth of reflection. It also produces rich, insightful and 
detailed answers. The interviews were semi-structured, and I prepared 
lists of questions to guide the respondents. Semi-structured inter-
viewing helps to obtain in-depth responses and uncover respondents’ 
attitudes, behaviour or perceptions (see Bryman 2001: 313–314; 
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Gillham 2000: 9–11). Many new questions emerged during the inter-
view process as I reflected upon informants’ statements. Transcribing 
the data is a tedious and time-consuming task, as is data coding and 
interpretation. However, the richness and distinctiveness of the data 
is worth the effort. 
The primary data in my research comes from 22 qualitative in-
depth interviews carried out with young female university students 
in their 20s who were at the end of their studies and approaching 
the transition to work. Eleven interviews were conducted in France 
in spring 2008 (in French), and 11 in Finland in autumn 2008 (in 
English), in two comparable medium-sized cities, Lyon in France 
and Tampere in Finland (see Appendix 1). The selected cities were 
both provincial cities, similar in size and accessible in terms of the 
practical matters of time, cost and location. Social research tends to 
be conducted in capital cities; the choice of provincial cities thus 
also allowed a change of focus from capitals. The interview questions 
(see Appendixes 2 and 3) followed the new theoretical approaches 
discussed in Chapter 1. They were organised around four themes: 
1) Young women’s evaluation of the education system; 2) Views on 
their integration in the labour market; 3) Becoming independent and 
plans for starting a family; 4) Entering adulthood, and their percep-
tion of the concept of adulthood. The questions asked were divided 
into three stages. First, the informants were asked to evaluate their 
present and near-future socio-economic situation in relation to the 
aforementioned themes. They were then encouraged to assess their 
peers’ current socio-economic situations. Finally they were asked to 
evaluate, according to their own perceptions, their parents’ socio-
economic situations and transitions to adulthood at the same age.
This research is comparative across two countries. It was not 
possible within the scope of this study to analyse institutions in 
two countries and different groups of individuals, such as men and 
women belonging to different socio-economic backgrounds or even 
to different study disciplines. Analysing both men and women would 
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have entailed a cross-gender comparison too. The presentation of 
results would have had to cover a large range of issues in a superficial 
and unwieldy manner. The focus on one gender and one group of 
young women only – in this case, academic young women – allowed 
me to deepen my examination with regard to the effect of structural 
institutions on their pathways to adulthood. In addition, a more 
complex set of comparisons would have been unrealistic in terms of 
time, material and cost. It was necessary to narrow down the popu-
lation I was going to investigate to one gender. I therefore chose to 
interview young women. 
This choice of gender focus was based on changes in women’s 
lives since the Second World War, mainly women’s entry into the 
labour force, their attainment of emancipation and new rights, their 
access to higher education, and their access to a more independent 
social status. The current socio-economic restructuring nevertheless 
concerns both men and women. Advanced societies still essentially 
function with the idea that economic fluctuations cause more dam-
age to men because they are the family breadwinners. A family with 
an unemployed husband or father is in danger of poverty and social 
exclusion. However, in many cases nowadays women’s position is as 
important as that of men concerning family provision (see Bradley 
and van Hoof 2005; Müller and Gangl 2003). This study focuses 
on young women’s opinions regarding women’s role on the labour 
market, motherhood, societal attitudes to gender-role attribution, 
and their own integration into the labour market.
The focus on university students became sensible and pertinent 
when I started to investigate the debate around the prolongation of 
schooling and the transition to working life. In addition, the number 
of higher-education students is constantly rising. Degrees are losing 
their significance on the market, since a growing number of young 
people possess tertiary credentials, and competition between graduates 
for professional positions is increasing (see Chapter 4). The common 
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belief is that the higher the educational level, the easier the integration 
on the labour market. However, this is not true for all graduates. 
Twenty-two in-depth interviews might seem limited in terms of 
the size of the studied population, but this is justified by the amount 
of information obtained, as well as by the time needed to find the 
informants, conduct the interviews, transcribe them and analyse the 
results. The interviews lasted for one to two hours (on average, an 
hour and a half ). The quality of the information provided by the 
respondents itself justifies the size of the sample chosen. Indeed, there 
is no absolute rule that dictates the number of interviewees necessary 
for any given study. The appropriate size depends on the nature of 
the population, the nature of the behaviour to be analysed, and the 
time and funds available (Armer 1973: 58–62; Chadwick et al. 1984: 
69). The goal of the research is not to generalise findings across the 
whole youth population, young women or students, as variations 
do exist across genders, social backgrounds, and educational levels, 
or even among academic women. The interviews offered significant 
perspectives on Finnish and French societal institutions, and evidence 
of contemporary young highly educated women’s social behaviour. 
Practical issues and challenges 
Conducting qualitative in-depth interviews entails a number of ethi-
cal issues. Interviewing includes informants’ agreement or consent 
to be interviewed. It is crucial to explicitly explain the purpose of 
the interview, and how, where and when the data will be used (see 
Denscombe 1998: 109, 126). Respondents must be notified that 
the data will be appropriately processed exclusively for scientific and 
academic applications. Before each interview, I therefore gave a sheet 
to the participants with information on the interview process, data 
protection, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality (see Appendix 2). 
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Preservation of the data involves meticulous protection, in particular 
regarding privacy and confidentiality. The transcripts of the Finnish 
interviews have been stored in the Finnish Social Science Data Archive 
for further scientific use after completion of this study and after any 
private information has been removed and the informants have given 
their permission. The French interviews will be archived there too in 
the near future, after editing. I recorded the interviews digitally. This 
required the respondents’ consent too, for ethical reasons. I asked 
permission to record the discussion from each participant before 
interviewing them. I also explained the reasons why I had chosen 
that method. They all agreed, and none made any objection to it. 
Recording the interviews allowed me to concentrate entirely on the 
discussion and the research participants’ comments and statements. 
Taking notes misses much valuable information, and can lead one to 
omit the most important accounts and to misinterpret the data. Tech-
nology allowed me to obtain an acute transcription of the data. 
I carried out the interviews in two different countries, and in two 
different languages. In France, I conducted them in French, which is 
also my native language. There was therefore no ambiguity concern-
ing language issues for the respondents. However, since my Finnish 
language skills were not as developed as my English, I decided to 
condcut the interviews in Finland in English. Most highly educated 
young people in Finland are very articulate in English, so I was not 
worried about potential informants’ ability and willingness to discuss 
in this language. Nevertheless, I chose to carry out the interviews with 
help from a Finnish research assistant who was a female university 
student at the time. She was present during the interview process, 
and ready to help the interviewees in case of language difficulties. 
This meant that the interviewees felt comfortable and knew that 
they could use their native language when they could not remember 
English terminology or expressions. While in France I was alone with 
the interviewees in face-to-face meetings, in Finland there were three 
of us in the interviews, the researcher, the research assistant and the 
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informant. At first I was afraid that the presence of two researchers 
would put pressure on the informants and make them feel uncom-
fortable. However, since we were also young women, students, and 
about the same age, they did not feel intimidated, and they let the 
discussion flow. They even felt reassured, since they could use Finnish 
vocabulary and specific terminology when needed. 
Although the interviews generally went smoothly in the two 
countries, I am conscious that the Finnish young women were put 
at a slight disadvantage, since they could not express themselves in 
their native language, unlike their French counterparts. The French 
respondents had more liberty to use national jargon and expres-
sions, for example. In addition, even when a non-native speaker is 
an expert in a foreign language, they may still be influenced by their 
own language in respect of ways of thinking and expressing them-
selves. Similarly, two languages might use the same word to refer to 
a specific issue, but the term might bear different connotations in 
each language. The interpretation of vocabulary, depending on the 
meaning associated with the words, can vary across societies and even 
across subcultural groups within a single country (Grimshaw 1973: 
27). Informants using a different language, such as the young women 
speaking English rather than Finnish, might use the borrowed lan-
guage in accordance with native language connotations and culture 
(see Armer 1973: 51). For instance, the term ‘family’ has a different 
conceptual definition in Finland than in Spain. In Finland it refers 
to the nuclear family (parents and their children) living in the same 
household, while in Spain it might refer to a larger group of relatives 
not necessarily living under the same roof (Oinonen 2004: 49).
Bearing these issues in mind, I had first of all to carefully formu-
late the interview questions. In order to avoid biases, it is necessary, 
for instance, to translate questionnaires or interview questions into 
equivalent cultural and conceptual terminology. It is not enough 
to focus on the wording (Cartmel 2003: 92; Temple and Edwards 
2006). Since my research was to be conducted and written in Eng-
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lish, I wrote the questions in this language. I translated them into 
French rather easily, knowing the cultural conceptual equivalences. 
The research assistant also translated the questions into Finnish, in 
case we might need them when carrying out the interviews in Finland 
(all the interview questions are included in Appendix 3). The same 
process occurred when I translated quotes from the French inter-
views (included in Chapters 4–7). It was not sufficient to translate 
expressions and vocabulary. Interpreting and translating the meaning 
of what the informants said, the conceptual ideas and the feelings 
they expressed, was just as crucial. The interviews would otherwise 
lose their value and provide rather shallow evidence. At first glance, 
language might appear to be a secondary characteristic, but it is a 
central aspect of cross-national research. Conducting interviews with 
non-native English speakers, and being myself a non-native speaker, 
could be a disadvantage in some circumstances. However, the goal of 
the interviews was to engage not in discourse analysis, but in content 
analysis. Forms of expression, vocabulary used, time taken to answer 
the questions, hesitations and so on were not the focus of this study. 
The research concentrates essentially on what the young women had 
to say and what they thought of the issues discussed. The emphasis 
remained on the informants’ messages, rather than on particular 
ways of transferring the information. Although the young Finnish 
women could not express themselves as native speakers, they had 
enough skills in English to convey their attitudes and communicate 
their opinions. 
Being an outsider-insider
I was aware that the researcher’s identity has a considerable impact 
on the interview process. The age, gender, status and ethnicity of the 
researcher matter (Denscombe 1995: 116). Researchers who are close 
in age and able to participate in their subjects’ milieu are advantaged, 
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as they can better understand the participants’ behaviour and atti-
tudes by virtue of belonging to the same age group (Roberts 2003: 
24). In this study, the interviewees were roughly the same age as or 
a little younger than myself. They were aged between 21 and 30 at 
the time of interview, and I was 29–30. Several times they implied 
that they felt I could understand their situation, thanks to the age 
factor, my experience of the same socio-economic context, and my 
being a young woman from the university milieu. My belonging to 
the academic world and therefore sharing the same status than them, 
albeit at a higher stage (that of a doctoral student), also facilitated my 
interaction with the research participants. As for ethnicity, I was a 
French woman among French informants in France, and a European 
citizen who had lived several years in Finland. The Finnish inter-
viewees knew that I was not a newcomer to Finland, which I believe 
had an unconscious impact on their trust in me. Finally, gender can 
have an impact on the information respondents may reveal. Gender 
similarity can encourage informants to express their views, whereas 
the opposite might prevent them from disclosing information. Several 
studies have proven that same-sex interviewer-interviewee relation-
ships ease the interview process. In some cases, female researchers 
have found it easier to interview women, with whom the reciprocity 
in interaction was higher thanks to a sense of having a more equal 
relationship. The same goes for male researchers interviewing men. 
The impact of gender nonetheless depends on the research subject 
and whether it touches ethical and sensitive issues (Alasuutari 1995: 
87–89; Song and Parker 1995).
Finally, in some cases it is challenging to gain access and obtain 
adequate cooperation from individuals in ‘host societies’ (Armer 1973: 
58). However, this study was based in Finland, the ‘host’ country 
with which I was comparing France, my country of origin. It was thus 
easier to negotiate access with research participants in both cases: being 
French on the one hand, and living in Finland, my ‘host’ country, on 
the other. This facilitated my access to knowledge of Finnish societal 
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structure, culture and language. It accelerated the process of approach-
ing informants and conducting the interviews. Neither country was 
foreign to me. In neither of them was I an outsider, but at the same 
time I was not a full insider either, as a French citizen living in Fin-
land. In addition, I lived and studied in Great Britain for four years. 
I studied for my Bachelors and Masters degrees there, before moving 
to Finland to pursue my doctoral studies. This position gave me the 
advantage of distance from both Finland and France, and also from 
Great Britain. Living outside one’s own society provides a perspective 
on the societal peculiarities of one’s own country. The same occurs 
when a foreigner lives in a new socio-cultural framework. Indirectly, 
by merely living in Finland while belonging to France, I became a 
participant-observer in both societies. The method of participant 
observation is primarily used in ethnographic research. It mainly 
consists in analysing and discovering the meanings of existence in 
a given country or ethnic group as from an insider’s position (see 
Jorgensen 1989). Moreover, the experience of young people within 
a single societal context makes it difficult to generalise conclusions. 
However, cross-societal analysis gives space to a wider approach and 
broader perspectives (Cartmel 2003: 87–88). This study design gave 
priority to neither the ethnographic approach nor the technique of 
participant observation. Nonetheless, indirectly, this position gave 
me access to societal knowledge, and at the same time sufficient 
detachment to identify particular issues that local researchers might 
not immediately distinguish.
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2.2 Into the field: 
Conducting Interviews and Data Description
Building the research design, choosing methods of analysis and em-
pirical strategies are but one important part of investigating a phe-
nomenon. The practical sides of empirical work are no less central. 
However, they remain too often hidden in the shadow of the research 
results. Findings represent the essential part and goal of a study. Yet 
without preliminary empirical enquiry, results would not materialise. 
This subchapter highlights the concrete steps of conducting research 
in the field, carrying out interviews and interpreting the material. 
field intervention
Before starting interviews, one must take two important steps: formu-
lating clear, unambiguous and explicit questions, and finding research 
participants. Outwardly, these stages appear to be logical and simple. 
However, when engaging in empirical qualitative interviewing, every 
step of the process is equally crucial. The conduct of a successful in-
terview starts with thinking about the background theoretical issues, 
producing suitable questions, finding the informants, and remaining 
alert throughout the process. It depends on the researcher’s abilities 
and, as I explained previously, his or her age, gender and ethnic 
origins, as well as on the interview topic. This is all part and parcel 
of qualitative data collection: the process is bound to remain rather 
unpredictable, since it relies exclusively upon interactions between 
individuals. Before going into the field, I thoroughly considered the 
interview questions, and tested how they were understood among my 
circle of colleagues and acquaintances at university. I also did a pilot 
interview in order to test the questions, the length of time needed 
to conduct the interview, and the respondent’s reaction, as well as 
merely to practise interviewing. 
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I went to Lyon in France in April–May 2008 in order to find 
young women to participate in my study and become part of my 
wider comparative analysis. The young women I met were studying 
at different universities or technological university institutes in Lyon. 
To recruit the first participant, I visited one of the universities and 
randomly asked a young woman if she would be interested in answer-
ing a few questions, explaining my position and the purpose of my 
research. She agreed, and we met later to carry out the interview. I met 
the other young French women through interviewees’ acquaintances 
and the students I encountered in Lyon. I decided to use the snowball 
technique to find random informants within a short period. Relying 
on social contacts between individuals is a good way to find additional 
respondents (see Bryman 2001: 323). I also contacted young female 
students who were members of the hospitality exchange and social 
network CouchSurfing. Several of them responded positively to my 
request. People who subscribe in the CouchSurfing network tend 
to be open to other people and cultures, and usually travel a lot. It 
might sound biased to select informants from a hospitality exchange 
network; however, I expected to have more chance of finding respond-
ents willing to contribute to my study that way than to keep asking 
random students in the university courtyard and obtaining negative 
answers. I was in Lyon for a limited time period, and therefore had to 
collect the data as fast as possible. Using different techniques to recruit 
respondents was highly efficient; in a few weeks, I had completed 
the interviews in France. I transcribed the interviews after my return 
from France, as I had neither the time nor the adequate software to 
proceed there. Transcribing was not difficult per se, but it is a slow, 
long and tedious process, demanding a high level of concentration. 
It took me the best part of the summer.
In autumn 2008, I started working with a research assistant. 
She assisted me during the interviewing process, mainly for language 
reasons. Immediately we became a good team. I consider this aspect 
one of the main reasons why the interviews were successful. It was a 
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pleasure to work together, and share ideas, impressions and insights 
when reflecting upon the interview material. The Finnish interviews 
took place in October–November 2008 in Tampere. I recruited the 
informants by a similar method to that used in France. A sampling 
equivalence across the two countries was necessary to provide an 
equal level of information (see Armer 1973: 62). However, this time 
I could also access student email lists. I did not use this system in 
Lyon because I was not a member of any university. Several young 
women found in this way agreed to participate in the study; indeed, 
these consituted most of the interviewees. I found a few informants 
by using the snowball technique and sending messages through 
CouchSurfing too, but this was less successful than in France. The 
research assistant transcribed the Finnish interviews and translated 
the fragments of Finnish speech into English. 
After each interview, I wrote a diary entry with memos on the 
interview process and my impressions, and noted the key aspects 
that stood out. Writing fieldnotes helped me to pick up on relevant 
information that the mp3 recorder could not, such as the interview 
venue, the atmosphere, non-verbal communication, the general 
context, and other clues (see Denscombe 1998: 120).
Breaking the ice
In France I conducted most of the interviews in the informants’ 
homes. I completed some of them in the place I was renting in Lyon, 
and two in a café. The café setting did not disturb the interview 
process, as the informants were very relaxed. However, on one oc-
casion the atmosphere was rather noisy. The interview transcription 
was tedious, because some parts were difficult to hear, and a few 
fragments of speech were inaudible. In Finland too I carried out a 
few interviews in the informants’ homes. Most were conducted in 
my office at the university. The informants felt comfortable coming 
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there, since they were on campus during the daytime. I thought the 
choice of venue was a little austere at first, so I added decorations and 
altered the room’s layout prior to the interviews. The participants felt 
comfortable in such an informal-looking and friendly atmosphere. It 
turned out to be pleasant to conduct the interviews there. In Lyon 
I had decided to offer the research participants fresh pastries before 
starting the interviews. In Tampere I maintained that little ‘tradition’, 
and offered pastries, biscuits and sweets. I wanted to thank the young 
women for helping me with my study, but it also became a very good 
icebreaking technique. We would have tea or coffee, a piece of cake, 
and a little chat before proceeding. The informants became more 
relaxed, as did I. The atmosphere became friendly, comfortable and 
very pleasant. The interview process generally went smoothly, like 
a conversation.
The informants who replied to my request showed considerable 
willingness to contribute to the research. Most of them provided 
fruitful information. However, it seemed a little more difficult in 
Finland than in France to recruit participants. It took me only three 
weeks to find interviewees in France, and about the same time to 
interview them. In Finland it took over two months. The fact that 
the interviews were conducted in English certainly dampened some 
of their motivation to get involved in the study. However, background 
culture can play a role too. People are generally more introverted in 
Finland. While most French informants eagerly divulged their opin-
ions and sometimes tried to change the interview subject, it felt that 
some Finnish interviewees were afraid of revealing too much. Some 
young women were shy and seemed to prefer to merely answer my 
questions, without elaborating too deeply. I had to delve, by using 
probes and asking additional questions, to encourage them to make 
more insightful observations. Nonetheless, in general the interviews 
proceed very well. The young women were happy to provide their 
help, and revealed their ideas freely. The young French women seemed 
especially happy to share their perceptions, mainly of the topics that 
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they contested. They seemed to derive satisfaction from divulging 
their critical opinions to an official social researcher. Some were also 
willing to help me with my study in other ways, mainly by finding 
new informants. They provided me with contact details of potential 
interviewees or acquaintances, who in turn helped me to meet fur-
ther participants. Their initiative surprised me. I have never studied 
in a French university and hence felt a little apprehensive about 
entering the field there at first. Overall meeting the informants and 
conducting the interviews was a very fruitful, successful and enrich-
ing experience. In both countries, I continued to meet some of the 
young women after completing the interviews, and have stayed in 
touch with them.  
opening the treasure chest
After the period in the field, it was time to start examining the data. 
Conducting and transcribing interviews is but one fragment of the 
process. Coding and interpreting the data is the largest part of the 
task. I proceeded with the necessary systematic analytic coding, 
breaking the data down into units and categorising the fragments. 
Coding differs from the analysis process; it consists in breaking the 
data down and generating an index of terms and concepts, which 
helps one to reflect upon and interpret the material, before engaging 
in thorough content analysis and theory building (see Bryman 2001: 
398–399; Denscombe 1998: 210–211). However, I soon realised that 
technique alone is not sufficient in the process of data scrutiny and 
theory construction. It takes practice, extreme concentration, and 
almost a meditative state of mind to let the hidden meaning of the 
data emerge. Once the coding steps were achieved, I felt suddenly 
overwhelmed by the data; it seemed that I could not reach the true 
essence of the interviews. I therefore started to take some distance 
from the huge amount of information I now possessed and tried to 
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understand the process that was going on. The interviews were like a 
large chest with a treasure locked inside. The fragments of interviews 
were simply a riddle, a mysterious puzzle, and their meaning was 
the real ‘treasure’. In order to open the chest, I needed to answer a 
variety of riddles. I needed to be able to see through the words as if 
they were transparent, so as to get the necessary keys and tools that 
would allow me to access the ‘treasure’, that is, the true meaning of 
what I was searching for when I started this study. Coding gave me the 
keys and tools that helped me solve the riddles and open the treasure 
chest. The next step consisted in organising the ‘treasure’, in other 
words, categorising and classifying all the segments and units under 
new concepts. The last stage was the selection of quotes to include 
in this dissertation (in the empirical Chapters 4–7). I translated the 
French quotes into English. The process was tedious, as I had to 
translate not just the words used, but also the expressions, feelings 
and conceptual ideas, so that the message would be equivalent to the 
original statement (see Armer 1973: 51–52). 
Going into the field consisted in meeting ‘real’ people and being 
in contact with some of the young people I was examining for the 
purpose of my research. My work became more substantial when it 
became connected to the reality portrayed by surveys and literature. 
Interviewing is based on social exchange and sharing. Immersing 
myself in this process proved that I was truly involved in social 
research.
Presenting the informants
This study is constructed upon the information the research partici-
pants, all female university students, offered. Throughout this dis-
sertation, especially in the chapters based on empirical data analysis 
(Chapters 4–7), I present theories built from informants’ statements. 
I include illustrative quotes that reveal the young women’s opinions. 
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In order to give a better picture of who the respondents are, Table 2.1 
provides general information about them. All the names used in this 
study are fictitious, for reasons of ethics and confidentiality. Table 2.1 
includes the interviewees’ ages, educational levels, living arrangements 
and marital information, their parents’ occupational background, as 
well as their working situation at the time of the interviews. 
The Finnish informants were a little older than the French. 
Most of the Finns were in their mid- to late 20s, while the French 
were in their early to mid-20s. This is related to the organisation of 
the university system in the two countries (discussed in Chapter 4). 
Some informants were completing their Bachelors, and others their 
Masters or equivalent degree, such as CAPES (Certificat d’Aptitude au 
Professorat de l’Enseignement Secondaire – Secondary Schoolteaching 
Qualification), the teaching degree in France. Those finishing their 
Bachelors degree could decide to start working or engage in further 
studies, such as pursuing on a Masters. Those completing a Masters 
or equivalent degree were preparing to enter the labour market. One 
informant was taking a gap year before starting a Masters degree. If 
we take their parents’ occupations as the criterion, the majority of 
young women came from the lower- and upper-middle class. A few 
were from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Interestingly, only one 
had a parent who had been a farm worker. Most of the young Finnish 
women were living alone or in shared accommodation, some with 
their partners. In France, most of the respondents were living with 
their partners, some on their own or in shared accommodation. Two 
young women were married, and one had a baby. Most respondents 
had a part-time job. Some young French women were working as part 
of their Professional Masters degree, for training purposes. In France a 
distinction is made between an academic Masters degree and a Profes-
sional Masters, which includes a work-based curriculum. Some of the 
informants were pursuing a Professional Masters, either at university 
or within a professional university institution. The respondents were 
from the fields of the humanities and social sciences.
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3 . 
In The CenTre anD aT The PerIPherY
Finland’s and France’s national structures are founded upon demo-
cratic ideologies, both countries are advanced societies, and both are 
members of the European Union. At first glance these two Western 
European societies seem to share many features at the social, politi-
cal, economic, educational, cultural, religious and historical levels. 
They have shared various historical developments in Europe, such 
as industrialisation, the development of capitalism, the shift from an 
industrial to a service-based economy, and important socio-structural 
transformations after the Second World War. 
Yet on closer inspection, there are differences between them 
on all structural levels, from history to religion to welfare. Finland 
and France share common historical traits, yet the two countries 
have been shaped from almost opposite directions. While France 
has been an empire, Finland has belonged to other empires. There 
are diverging traditions in the two societies regarding internal func-
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tioning and organisation. In addition, they have adopted different 
types of welfare system, based on ideologies and principles specific 
to their socio-historical traditions. The next subchapter offers a his-
torical glimpse of the internal structural developments of Finland 
and France. The subsequent subchapter presents data on several 
aspects of youth of transition in the two countries, as well as in other 
European countries. 
3.1 an overview of social structures
It is necessary to examine the societal context in which young peo-
ple become adults in order to understand the particularities of their 
processes of transition. This subchapter explains some of the socio-
historical factors that led to the present shapes of the case-countries 
and the welfare regimes they implemented.
historical developments
Since the Second World War there has been a marked process of 
social and economic convergence among the countries of western 
and northern Europe. However, Finland’s and France’s present soci-
etal frameworks are rooted in diverse historical transformations and 
fluctuations, in some cases pulling in opposite directions. France is a 
central European country that has always held strong sovereign power 
within Europe. Finland is a peripheral country that has been ruled 
by other powerful nations. While Finland belonged to the Swedish 
and then the Russian empires, France built its own colonial empire, 
conquered lands and established colonies in Africa, America and Asia. 
The French colonial empire reached its peak in the 19th and early 
20th centuries, and then declined (Goubert 1988). Finland was part of 
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the Kingdom of Sweden from the Middle Ages onwards, and existed 
merely as a territory. During the 19th century the Russian empire 
conquered several territories that belonged to Sweden, including 
Finland in 1809, when the country gained the status of an imperial 
Grand Duchy with governmental, financial and religious autonomy 
(Alapuro 1988: 22–23). Almost all Swedish civil laws continued in 
Finland. The country thus functioned with a combination of the old 
Swedish system and the new agreements conferred by the Russian 
empire. Finland gained independence in 1917, and was proclaimed 
a republic in 1919. 
Finnish class structure came from the Swedish model and was 
built upon a free peasantry. The nobility dominated through the 
bureaucracy rather than through land ownership. As a result, relations 
between the different social classes were not based on feudalism or a 
strong hierarchy (Alapuro 1988: 20). In addition, most members of 
the upper classes were Swedes and Russians. When Finland gained 
independence, the Finnish-speaking upper class represented only a 
minor group. By contrast, France’s social structure was essentially 
feudal from the Middle Ages until the French Revolution in 1789. The 
population was divided into three main hierarchical strata. The clergy 
and nobility comprised the first and second estates, corresponding 
to the upper classes. The third estate included those at the bottom 
of the feudal pyramid, such as artisans, bourgeois, peasants and the 
poor (Goubert 1988: 7–8). The clergy and nobility held considerable 
power and control over the third estate, and possessed most of the 
land on which the peasants worked. The feudal system, along with 
the French monarchy, collapsed during the French Revolution. The 
church lost its power and privileges when France was transformed 
into the French Empire under Napoléon I (Goubert 1988: 183–190). 
France’s religion remained rooted in Roman Catholic traditions, but 
the church and state thenceforth functioned separately. To this day, 
the church does not interfere in political decisions. The Catholic 
church nevertheless retained its educative role in France, and provided 
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instruction until the foundation of the modern Republican School 
in the 1880s. These laws imposed the secularisation of the school 
system and the separation of education from religious instruction. 
Teaching staff had to obey the principle of ‘laïcité’ (secularisation) 
and conceal any religious affiliation (see Cousin 1998; Langan 2008). 
The French Revolution abolished the feudal hierarchical pyramid, 
but parts of the structure persisted, including the stratification of 
social classes. Bourdieu’s work (1979) fundamentally concerned 
the French class structure, and demonstrated that classes continued 
to distinguish themselves from one another with regard to cultural 
and consumption habits. Here we can also refer to Sweden, whose 
social structure bears close similarities with Finland (see Alestalo 
and Kuhnle 1987). Research on class mobility in different countries 
shows that upward mobility appears to be lower in France than in 
Sweden (Erikson et al. 1979). In the early 1980s, it was easier for 
Swedish men from poorer economic origins to achieve upward social 
mobility into service-class positions than their French counterparts. 
France also had the largest petit bourgeoisie (Erikson et al. 1982: 23, 
27). One might therefore argue that the French Revolution did not 
eradicate the class structure, but merely obscured its apparatus. Fin-
land, which was a part of the Swedish empire, was greatly influenced 
by the Swedish class structure and political apparatus. Even under 
the rule of the Russian empire, Finland preserved its autonomy and 
its Swedish-based societal apparatus. 
Like other Nordic countries, Finland adopted the Protestant 
faith, before converting to Lutheranism in the 16th century during 
the Protestant Reformation. The church in Finland held an important 
position at both the religious and the political levels until the 19th 
century, when the Nordic nation-states were established. Following 
the Reformation, the church and state played complementary roles. 
While the governing estate aimed to maintain peace and order, the 
religious estate worked to educate the people of Finland. The church’s 
role comprised both educative and social functions (Thorkildsen 
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1997: 138–139). The church exerted control over education until 
1869, when the church and state separated (Opetushallitus 2009). 
Finland is a secular society in which church membership remains 
optional. Church members are nevertheless required to pay a tax as 
a financial contribution to the church.
Both Finland and France had agricultural economies before 
the take-off of the industrial revolution; however, the two countries 
modernised at different paces. France had the advantage of rich 
agricultural production, and some parts of the country started to in-
dustrialise shortly after the rapid changes in Great Britain in the early 
and mid-1800s. France had already been involved in international 
trade from early in its history. Colonialism and industrial develop-
ments accelerated the process, and helped the economy to develop 
greatly at both the national and international levels (see Goubert 
1988). During that time Finland’s main resources were agrarian. 
The Finnish economy remained weak, both within and outside the 
country. Its participation in the market for industrial products in 
particular remained small. Furthermore, industrialisation began later 
in Finland than in France, in the second half of the 19th century, at 
about the same time as in Eastern European countries. However, the 
Finnish non-feudal class structure differed from that of the Eastern 
European agrarian economies. Indeed, the peasants were essentially 
the upper stratum, and owned and profited from the majority of the 
country’s main industrial resources, which consisted in wood and 
forestry. Finnish peasants managed to retain a good position dur-
ing the industrialisation process, thanks to the exploitation of these 
resources (Alapuro 1988: 29–33). 
Finland’s and France’s structural development after the Second 
World War is comparable. The service and information sector greatly 
expanded, and overtook the manufacturing sector. The processes of 
modernisation at the social, political, economic and cultural levels 
followed a parallel course. Finland underwent major economic restruc-
turing from the 1950s onwards, and started to prosper sufficiently 
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to be able to compete strongly on the international market. Until 
the 1970s, the Finnish economy was primarily based on agriculture, 
forestry and the paper industry. During the 1970s and 1980s the focus 
of production shifted to technology, high-quality design and service 
provision. Small peripheral states like Finland retained an unequal 
position, and were politically, economically and culturally oppressed 
by more powerful nations. They therefore had to modernise rapidly 
and invest in innovative sectors in order to compete on the interna-
tional market (Alapuro 1988: 88). In 1973, a trade agreement with 
the European Economic Community (EEC) nonetheless provided 
Finland with the economic advantages of membership, while allowing 
it to maintain its neutrality without any serious political implications 
(Singleton 1989: 153–156). Finland’s economic prosperity is closely 
linked to European economic expansion. However, rather than be-
coming a ‘colonised’ supplier of raw material to more powerful and 
advanced countries, Finland retained a strong position on the market. 
Industrialisation started rather late, after the leading societies had 
already experienced the first phases – and both the constructive and 
the harmful effects – of the process. Latecomers benefited from the 
second industrial revolution, with cleaner energies, enhanced tech-
nologies and better social awareness (Pollard 1981: 232–234).
France actively participated in the construction of the European 
Union, starting with post-war European integration and especially 
the Rome Treaty of 1957. France and Germany played a crucial role 
in furthering the development of the European Union (see Burgess 
2000). The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 200 years after the 
French Revolution, marked an important stage in the expansion 
of the European Union. The 1992 Maastrich Treaty followed this 
event. It included 12 member states, but not Finland. Finland kept 
its neutrality. In 1995, three new member states joined the European 
Union, including Finland (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003). In 2001, 
both Finland and France converted their national currency to the 
common European curreny, the euro.
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Post-war prosperity and economic recession
After the Second World War, Finland and France, as well as other 
advanced societies, experienced an unprecedented period of economic 
prosperity that lasted for about 30 years, from 1945 to 1975, and 
was dubbed ‘Les Trentes Glorieuses’ (‘The 30 Glorious Years’) by Jean 
Fourastié (1979). Angus Maddison (1982: 126) describes this phase 
as the ‘Golden Age’ of capitalism and economic growth. During 
this period, every level of society underwent major transformations. 
Standards of living and healthcare services greatly developed and 
expanded, welfare regimes were implemented, national infrastruc-
tures were modernised, and transport, technology and information 
mechanisms enjoyed unparalleled progress. The societies’ economies 
began to shift to a service-based economy. The service sector overtook 
the manufacturing sector, with the focus shifting to the production 
of services rather than end products. In short, these transformations 
involved a shift from Fordism to post-Fordism (Walther et al. 2006: 
22). Alongside these developments, other aspects of society changed 
at the socio-economic, political, educational and cultural levels. Mores 
and values became more permissive, women became emancipated, 
and children gained further rights and protection. Moreover, the 
social framework characterising the concept of youth altered con-
siderably. Youth emancipation and changes in the status of youth 
led to an inversion of the traditional forms of social organisation in 
which adults dominate the structure and ideologies. The youth of 
the 1960s constructed themselves in terms of politics, industry (with 
the huge development of products and services aimed at children and 
young people), popular culture, education and social recognition 
(see Galland 1990).
The era of ‘The 30 Glorious Years’ was mainly characterised by 
full-time employment, a very secure economic context, and unprec-
edented opportunities for upward mobility (see Chauvel 2002). Young 
people could therefore expect to reach higher levels of professional 
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occupation than their parents, and they could simultaneously rise to 
higher social classes. Louis Chauvel (2002: 212, 233) identifies this 
period of economic boom as a historical exception, and as a lifepath 
model for one generation only. However, it is necessary to point out 
a difference between Finland and France in this process. While in 
Finland the sons of farmers, agricultural workers and lower-skilled 
manual workers alike attained higher-level qualifications and higher 
levels of professional occupation than their parents, in France it was 
mainly workers’ sons from the lower social strata who moved upwards 
(Pöntinen et al. 1983: 52). In addition, this flourishing period gave the 
illusion that a bright socio-economic future was guaranteed. However, 
‘The 30 Glorious Years’ did not eradicate the laws of capitalism and 
economic cycles. The economic boom started to slow down after the 
oil crises of the 1970s, which provoked a destabilisation of the newly 
established socio-economic edifice. Economic growth continued to 
decline in the 1980s in several advanced societies. After any peak, 
the economy tends to turn downwards, often as the result of a fall 
in demand, leading to a fall in production and a rise in unemploy-
ment (Lipsey et al. 1984: 568–569). Economic fluctuations are also 
accelerated by the phenomena of globalisation and international 
competition. Although today’s crises are not as sudden or brutal as 
earlier crises like the Wall Street Crash of 1929, they last longer. They 
are characterised by ‘creeping’ inflation as prices continue to rise and 
living standards to diminish for a large part of the population. Pro-
ductivity remains high, but only a few groups of individuals reap the 
benefit (Aglietta 1976: 311). New categories of jobs are created, but 
the threat of unemployment spreads. Rather than being limited to 
a specific and predictable section of the population, such as manual 
workers, unemployment now touches everyone, regardless of age, 
sex, educational credentials or profession. 
Both Finland and France were affected by the worldwide eco-
nomic slowdown following the oil crisis of the 1970s, but in France 
the economic decline continued into the 1980s, whereas the Finnish 
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economy continued to grow. The public sector developed further, as 
did the level of social security and services offered to the population. 
However, Finland’s economy was greatly affected by the collapse 
of communism, which led to the breakdown in Soviet trade (see 
Alestalo and Flora 1994; Oinonen 2004: 59–60). The fall of com-
munism in the early 1990s caused signficant turmoil in the worldwide 
economic structure too. France was not so harshly affected by the 
consequences of the fall of communism, but the lasting worldwide 
economic recession continues to have a harmful impact. The cycli-
cal fluctuations of the capitalist system in patterns of prosperity and 
depression gave way to the crisis of Fordism, and ended the ‘golden 
era’ (Lipietz 1992: 14–17). 
Alain Lipietz (1992: 35; 1997) compares advanced societies with 
an hourglass, in which the proportion of people located in both the 
higher and lower social strata is increasing, while the middle stratum 
is shrinking and being squeezed. The population in the middle, rep-
resenting the middle class, is likely to decrease, while the number of 
poor people is rising. This leads to further increases in social division 
and exclusion. The worldwide stagnation in economic growth has 
simultaneously put strong pressure on welfare systems in advanced 
societies (Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987: 38). Today’s prolonged recession 
is threatening the socio-economic structural apparatus introduced 
in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in terms of welfare provision 
and individuals’ integration into the labour market. Indeed, welfare 
systems’ efficiency and performance depend heavily on a strong and 
stable economic apparatus. According to Esping-Andersen (1999), 
industrialised societies’ welfare systems are slowly eroding, and are ex-
periencing difficulties of reorientation. The systems are being squeezed 
between the requirements of a growing population in need, the 
necessity to improve the economy, and welfare state ideologies. The 
stagnating economic apparatus has greatly weakened and challenged 
the Finnish and French welfare systems. Economic decline and high 
rates of unemployment have led to a growth in total social insurance 
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expenditure to provide for people in need, while the number of tax-
payers has continued to fall (Alestalo and Flora 1994: 66). 
Advanced societies are caught in the globalisation process in 
relation to economic development, fluctuations and financial provi-
sion. They struggle to maintain increasingly fragile welfare systems 
on which a growing number of people continue to depend. In the 
Fordist period, pathways to work were prestructured, predictable, 
and ensured access to regular paid employment. In the post-Fordist 
era, the future has become uncertain: young people’s transition to 
work is no longer linear, but follows individual orientations and is 
constantly threatened by risks and instability (see Beck 1992). Labour 
markets require workers’ flexibility, and simultaneously generate a 
diversification of career paths and structural risks. Such risks in-
volve unemployment, the uncertainty of getting work, and insecure 
working lives. In addition, part-time and temporary employment 
has spread, and youth unemployment in particular has become a 
generalised phenomenon slowing down young people’s access to a 
stable adult life (Walther et al. 2006: 23). Today’s young adults, such 
as the young women I interviewed, grew up in a context described 
as a ‘risk society’ by Beck (1992). At the time of the interviews in 
2008, they had only just started to become aware of the financial 
crisis, and of the new wave of economic instability that was about to 
disrupt advanced societies’ economic apparatus even further – and 
also to disrupt patterns of transition to adulthood.
3.2 Patterns of Youth Transition
Patterns of youth transition, including the phenomenon of the pro-
longation of youth, have been studied intensively in the last few 
decades. Diverse sources and data sets offer a valuable overview 
of young people’s present situations and transitional pathways to 
adulthood. This subchapter provides general information on Finnish 
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and French youths’ living arrangements, patterns of leaving home, 
financial resources and family orientations, and refers to the Euro-
pean context.
 
legal rights
Finland and France share similar legislation concerning age require-
ments to access various civil rights, such as the age of majority and 
rights to marry, drive, vote or work. In both countries, young people 
reach majority and can obtain a driving licence, vote, get married 
and receive a full salary from the age of 18. There are slight differ-
ences regarding the age of consent (16 in Finland, 15 in France) and 
legislation related to work and wages (see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1.  Age requirements for different legal rights in Finland and France 
in the first decades of the 2000s. 
The table is based on information from the following sources: Finlex (2001; 2002); 
Legifrance (2010); Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Santé (2010a); Työmin-
isteriö (2005); Työsuojeluhallinto (2011).
living arrangements
Several studies have pointed out that in many advanced societies, 
young people today move out of the parental home later than the 
previous generation did. However, in Finland and France young 
people still leave the parental home relatively early compared to the 
EU average. Existing data even shows that they tend to move away 
from home at similar ages in the two societies, with a median age of 
20 for women and 21 for men in Finland, and 21 for women and 
Rights Finland France
Majority 18 18
Driving licence 18 18
Voting 18 18
Age of consent 16 15
Marriage 18 18
Work 15 (after completion of com-
pulsory school curriculum)
- Between 13 and 15: only 
light and part-time work that 
does not disturb schooling
- Between 15 and 17: can 
work full-time, but restric-
tions concerning overtime
16 (after completion of com-
pulsory school curriculum)
- Between 14 and 16: only 
light and part-time work that 
does not disturb schooling
Salary - Full wage: 18
- 70–90% of the minimum 
wage for workers younger 
than 18. The variation de-
pends on collective labour 
agreements in different sec-
tors.
- Full wage: 18
- 80% of the guaranteed mini-
mum wage (SMIC) for work-
ers younger than 17
- 90% of the guaranteed mini-
mum wage (SMIC) for work-
ers aged 17–18
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23.5 for men in France. This is lower than the EU 25 average, which 
is 23 for women and 27 for men (Eurostat 2008: 26). 
In Finland, the proportion of young people leaving home at an 
early age actually seems to have increased in the last 20 years. The 
change in student status in 1994 affected this trend. Before 1994, 
even if they studied in one municipality and lived in another, stu-
dents could not register as permanent residents in the town where 
they attended higher-education institutions. They continued to be 
registered in their home town, most likely at their parents’ home. 
After a change in the law concerning students’ home registration in 
1994, more young people appeared in the statistics to have left the 
parental home earlier, but this does not mean that students were 
not living independently before 1994. In fact the rate is likely to be 
similar and stable (Nikander 2009). 
The median age for leaving home in 1982 among young French 
women was between 20 and 21, and among young French men be-
tween 22 and 23 (Galland 1990: 63). These figures are nearly identical 
to the current figures. The age of leaving home in France has thus 
remained fairly stable. Catherine Villeneuve-Gokalp (2000) confirms 
this, but adds that gaining full independent status now occurs later. 
Young people can attain residential independence because they receive 
financial support from their parents. However, they are financially 
dependent for longer on their family, because they study for longer 
and experience a longer period of precarity and job instability before 
accessing their first permanent job. 
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However, the proportion of young people in their 20s living at 
home with their parents, especially those in the 20–24 age group, 
remains higher in France than in Finland (see Table 3.2). In both 
countries, more young men than women live in the parental home. 
Young females tend to move out earlier. More young Finns also tend 
to live alone than young French people, since more young French 
people still live with their parents. More Finnish young people live 
as a couple, especially in the 20–24 age group. The figures for the 
two countries are similar for the 25–29 age group. Nonetheless, in 
both Finland and France, a greater proportion of females than males 
live in a couple. In addition, more Finnish young people lived in a 
union in 2005–2007. 
accessing the housing market
Young Europeans’ main reasons for not moving out of the parental 
home were a lack of financial resources and affordable housing (Flash 
Eurobarometer 2007: 72). This applies to Finland and France, with 
slight differences. Finnish youths gave three major reasons why young 
people might continue to live with their parents (see Table 3.3) (the 
young age of some of the informants also might have had an impact 
on the figures). They stated almost equally that young people could 
not afford to move out, could not find affordable lodging, or simply 
enjoyed home comforts. The latter statement was not widely sup-
ported in France. French youths stated that they simply could not 
afford to move out, and also gave as a dominant reason that they 
could not find affordable accommodation. Most European youths 
insisted on the unaffordability of moving out. The housing market 
itself is thus causing young people’s prolonged residential dependency. 
However, in respect of welfare state provision and support for young 
people moving out, the situation slightly differs in the case-countries. 
In addition, because of the high housing costs, choice of accommoda-
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tion can sometimes compromise employment opportunities. Young 
people generally have more opportunities to find work in capital cities. 
However, large cities such as Paris or Helsinki are also the places with 
the most expensive accommodation. The lack of affordable accom-
modation thus might hinder access to work in some cases. Young 
people are caught between the contradictory demands of the labour 
market, which requires great flexibility in terms of adaptability to 
economic restructuring and geographical mobility, and the housing 
market, which is economically demanding and inflexible (Kesteman 
2010: 118). 
Table 3.3.  Reasons for living in the parental home for longer among young 
people aged 15–30 in Finland, France and the EU 27, 2007. 
Finland France EU 27
Main reasons for living 
with parents for longer                                                
                     
Percentages
Can’t afford to move out 36 30 44
Not enough affordable 
housing available 31 43 28
Home comfort without responsibilities 27 16 16
The data comes from Flash Eurobarometer (2007). Other reasons are not listed here, 
because they are not relevant in this context.
The Finnish housing market rests on a dual model that supports both 
supply and demand. It functions through cooperation between public 
actors (the state, the housing fund, municipalities) and market actors 
(owners, developers, construction companies, banks) (Huovinen 
et al. 2005: 6). Home ownership has been promoted in Finland 
through tax relief on mortgage interest. The stock of rental housing 
is rather limited, which tends to lead to an increase in demand for 
owner-occupied housing. Half of the rental dwellings in Finland are 
state-subsidised. Municipalities and companies own most of them. 
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The rest of the rental market comprises free-market rental dwellings 
that belong to private individuals and/or households. In recent years, 
construction of private rental housing has been limited. There is also 
a social-housing rental sector in Finland for low-income households 
(Asumisen rahoitus- ja kehittämiskeskus, ARA 2009). The private 
rental sector supply has decreased, while demand has remained stable. 
Consequently, demand has proportionally increased, and prices have 
risen. This is a problem for students, who need to work more in order 
to afford the higher rents (Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition 
– Metro 8 August 2008).
French housing prices have significantly increased since the mid-
1990s. This has also been caused by low supply and high demand. 
As in Finland, the housing system has shifted to an owner-occupier 
model, with an increase in availability of social housing for low-in-
come groups. The social-housing market represents 17% and 16% 
of dwellings in Finland and France respectively. The private rental 
sector is therefore squeezed in the middle. State involvement is strong 
in the French housing system too, both in renting and owner-oc-
cupation, with the provision of subsidies, benefits, tax breaks and 
various policies (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, RICS 
2007: 37). Owner-occupation has been strongly encouraged by the 
government through subsidy schemes and low-interest loans, mainly 
for low-income households and first-time buyers. 
Table 3.4. Occupied housing stock by tenure (percentages) in Finland and 
France, 2002.
Finland France
Dwelling stock according to tenure           Percentages
Owner-occupied 64 57
Rented 32 37
Other 4 6
Total 100 100
The data is taken from National Agency for Enterprise and Housing (2004: 39).
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Table 3.4 indicates that rental-sector occupancy is similar in the 
two countries, but that the owner-occupied sector is slightly larger 
in Finland. The average number of persons per dwelling in Finland 
and France in 2002 was 2.2 and 2.4 respectively (National Agency 
for Enterprise and Housing 2004: 42). The increase in single-person 
and lone-parent households has had an impact on the demand for 
housing too, especially in the rental sector. The increase in single-
person households is due to a change in attitudes to living alone, a 
shift in living arrangements, and a change in economic resources 
(Heath and Cleaver 2003: 111–112). Living arrangements include 
delayed marriages, higher rates of divorce and single-parent families, 
and childless individuals living alone. The proportion of young 
people living alone has greatly increased among the professional and 
intermediate classes.
Welfare states
Finland’s and France’s societal apparatuses are the results of divergent 
historical occurrences and developments. The different traditions and 
ideologies in the two countries greatly contributed to the construc-
tion of their present structural edifices. Two different types of welfare 
regime therefore operate in the case-countries.
Esping-Andersen (1990) has analysed the existing types of welfare 
systems in advanced societies and distinguished three major types: 
liberal, conservative-corporatist and social democratic. Liberal wel-
fare states, such as the United Kingdom, depend on the market as 
the main source and provider of assistance. State support is modest, 
means-tested and mainly distributed to low-income individuals. 
This model is based on a liberal work ethic, according to which the 
limited provision of welfare persuades people to seek work instead 
of relying on benefits. Liberal regimes aim to minimise the role of 
the state, increase individual responsibility and promote market 
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solutions. The regime discourages eligibility for welfare assistance 
(Esping-Andersen1990: 26; 1999: 75–76). 
The continental or conservative-corporatist regime emphasises 
both status segmentation and familialism. The states maintain indi-
viduals’ status differences in the distribution of welfare. Eligibility 
for assistance is means-tested. The state also encourages the family 
unit to remain the main provider of support for its members. France 
has adopted this regime. However, familialism is less dominant in 
France than in the other countries belonging to this type of regime, 
because France’s welfare ideologies are partly guided by republican and 
anticlerical principles. The family is perceived as a central caregiver, 
but the state places an emphasis on compulsory social insurance 
too. It has been demonstrated that family policies are less generous 
in countries where familialism is very strong. By contrast, in France, 
families receive generous benefits. Nonetheless, this maintains the 
family unit as the major source of support for individuals (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 27; 1999: 81–84, 92–93). 
The third type of welfare regime is the Scandinavian type, or 
social-democratic system. The system promotes equality, as it is 
founded on universal and egalitarian principles in terms of social 
support. Everyone is entitled to the same rights and benefits. The 
purpose is to offer each individual the opportunity to attain self-suf-
ficiency and independence without having to depend on the family 
unit (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27; 1999: 78–81). Finland’s welfare 
regime is founded on social-democratic principles, which favour the 
universal distribution of support and services, egalitarianism between 
individuals, comprehensive risk coverage for all, and generous benefits 
(Alestalo and Flora 1994).
Finnish young people therefore have direct access to public serv-
ices and benefits when they move out of the parental home and start 
studying or working. In France, the state generally provides support 
to young people on the basis of their parents’ income and allocates 
the benefits to the young person’s family, which then redistributes 
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the aid to its members. Aid and allowances for young people include, 
for instance, student benefits, study grants, study loans, housing al-
lowances and unemployment benefits.
starting a family
Trends in family formation are similar in the two countries. In the 
ESS Round 3–2006, the 18–29 age group answered that the ‘Average 
ideal age to get married and live with a husband/wife’ would be 24 
or 26 in Finland and France respectively, and that the ‘Average ideal 
age to become a mother/father’ would be 25 or 26 in Finland and 
France respectively. In both countries, the mean age at first marriage 
and birth of first child (for women) has increased throughout the 
years (see Table 3.5). In 1980 in Finland, women were 24 and men 
26 at their first marriage. In 2008, women were 30 and men 33. In 
France in 1980, women married for the first time at 23, and men at 
25. In 2008, they married at 30 and 32 respectively. The age at first 
marriage has increased throughout the decades in the EU 27 too, 
but not as much. Delays in marriage might be occurring because 
people are entering relationships later than before, but also because 
many couples cohabit before marrying. The age of women at first 
childbirth has also risen, reaching 28 in Finland, 29 in France, and 
27 in the EU 27 in 2008. Nonetheless, fertility rates have remained 
fairly constant in Finland and France, and are higher than the EU 27 
average. The figures for new socially accepted trends such as births 
outside marriage are noteworthy. In France, more than half of births 
occurred outside marriage in 2008, which is more than in any other 
country. One might consider France a pioneer with regard to this 
tendency.
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More Finnish than French young people were in a union in 
2006. However, in both countries, more youths lived in a consensual 
union than in a formal marriage (see Table 3.6). Also, more young 
women than young men lived in a couple. The EU 27 rates con-
cerning married young people were similar to those in Finland and 
France; however, the level of cohabitation was much lower than in 
the case-countries. In that sense, the trends in Finland and France 
are somewhat parallel. 
Table 3.6. Share of young people (percentages), among 15–29-year-olds, 
living in a consensual union, with or without legal basis, by gender, in Fin-
land, France and the EU 27, 2006.
Finland France EU 27
Females Males Females Males Females Males
Type of union Percentages
Formal 
marriage 17 9 15 10 16 8
Consensual 
union 32 26 25 21 13 10
The data comes from Eurostat (2009d).
On the basis of survey data collected in the 1990s, Patrick Heuve-
line and Jeffrey M. Timberlake (2004: 1226–1228) indicate that 
the percentage of cohabiting couples who went on to marry was 
lower in France than in Finland. In Finland, 81% of cohabiting 
couples subsequently married, compared with 46% in France. Co-
habitation in Finland might replace marriage in some cases, but in 
most instances it represents a stage prior to marriage. By contrast, in 
France cohabitation is increasingly becoming the norm and replac-
ing marriage. In Finland there are two forms of consensual union: 
marriage (avioliitto, legal union through marriage) and registered 
partnership or cohabitation (avoliitto). Registered partnership has 
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been established for same-sex couples. It has also become common 
practice for heterosexual couples to cohabit rather than marry, and 
to be considered registered partners. However, legally they are not 
recognised as such. Registered partners are entitled to similar rights, 
protections and legal obligations as married couples in specific areas, 
such as maintenance, inheritance, relationship breakdown or wid-
ows’ pensions. However, they have fewer rights in other areas; for 
instance, they cannot adopt children (Ministry of Justice, Finland 
2001; Oikeuslaitos 2011a; 2011b; Oinonen 2008: 95). In France 
there are three forms of consensual union: marriage, Civil Union Pact 
(Pacte Civil de Solidarité, PACS), and registered partnership or co-
habitation (union libre or concubinage). The PACS came into effect in 
1999. It is a legal contract leading to officially registered partnership, 
which entitles partners to similar rights and obligations to married 
couples. It is also independent of the partners’ genders; thus same-sex 
partners cannot get married, but they can get ‘pacsed’. The PACS 
recognises the diversity of lifestyles and the principle of equality in 
the law, but it gives fewer rights than marriage in some areas, such 
as adoption (Legifrance 1999;	Le Site Officiel de l’Administration 
Française 2007; 2011). Registered partnership in France is a de facto 
union between two partners, regardless of gender. It is not legally rec-
ognised, although it has become common practice prior to or instead 
of marriage. Partners’ obligations, rights and protections are limited 
in comparison to married or pacsed couples. A growing number of 
couples choose to get pacsed rather than married. The number of 
marriages has therefore slightly decreased. More and more couples 
who choose to cohabit also choose to make their union official with 
a PACS. In 2009, for every three marriages contracted, two PACS 
were signed (Pla and Beaumel 2010). The majority of PACS were 
contracted by young couples aged 27 to 31. A total of 3% of 18–39-
year-olds got pacsed in 2009 (Davie 2011). 
The increase in births outside marriage accompanies the increase 
in cohabitation. The figures have continued to rise since the 1980s, 
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as shown earlier in Table 3.5. In 2008 in France, there were more 
births outside than inside formal marriage – 53%. This trend is thus 
becoming the new norm there. In Finland, a significant proportion 
of births also take place outside official union, but this is not yet 
dominant – 41% in 2008. Compared to the EU 27 average, the 
rates in the two countries are much higher, as the EU 27 average 
only reached 35% in the same year. 
Young people’s attitudes towards the family are rather similar 
in Finland and France. They do not strongly perceive the family as 
the foundation of society. The figures are lower than the European 
average. This could be explained by the welfare regimes that oper-
ate in the case-countries, which provide a rather protective social 
framework for individuals. However, Finnish and especially French 
young people perceive the family as an important element of their 
life development and achievement. More than 70% of Finnish and 
French young people plan to have children. The trends are comparable 
with the European average (see Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7. 16–29-year-olds’ attitudes towards the family in Finland and 
France, 2007.
Finland France Europe1
Attitudes towards the family 
(agreeing with the statements)
Percentages of the corresponding 
age group
Family is the foundation of society 39 35 47
A good life means having a family 62 72 65
Planning on having a child in the 
next 15 years 70 72 67
1 No details provided regarding which European countries or group of European 
countries. 
The data comes from Ciccheli (2008: 95). The percentage of agreement is calcu-
lated on the basis the persons who gave the scores six or seven (on a scale from 
one to seven). 
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3.3 national Contexts still Matter
Superficially the two countries appear similar, but on closer inspec-
tion subtle differences emerge at every level of their societal orders, 
from infrastructure to ideologies. The socio-economic and cultural 
apparatuses described above represent the contexts in which Finnish 
and French young people experience the transition to adulthood, 
and the framework upon which the informants reflected during the 
interview process. Young people in Finland and France are offered 
different opportunities and responses to their needs and predicaments. 
One cannot ignore the implications this might have for their patterns 
of transition and routes of integration into the wider socio-economic 
sphere. In the era of the European Union, the transition to adulthood 
is generally considered to be a uniform process across all countries. The 
implementation of common policies imposed on individual member 
states shows that internal structural differences within each state are 
overlooked to some extent. However, the historical characteristics 
of each country have not all faded away. Specific historical traits are 
embedded in national contexts and carried into the present. These 
national peculiarities still have an implicit but considerable impact 
on individuals’ life trajectories, choices and opportunities.
Patterns of transition regarding leaving home and starting a fam-
ily are noticeably similar in the two countries. Young people leave 
the parental home at about the same age and within a comparable 
contextual framework with regards to the housing market. In rela-
tion to starting a family the trends converge too, and depart from the 
European average. In both Finland and France more young adults live 
in a consensual union than in a formal marriage, the ages at first birth 
and first marriage are similar, the fertility rates are higher, and the 
number of births outside marriage is significantly higher, especially in 
France. Slight differences appear in relation to patterns of cohabitation 
and marriage. While in Finland young people use cohabitation as a 
stage prior to marriage, a growing number of French young people 
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cohabit instead of getting married. In both countries, cohabitation 
is accepted and has become common practice. 
These patterns of transition concern young people in general. My 
research is based on empirical data collected from in-depth interviews 
with young female students. They clearly belong to the framework 
highlighted in this chapter. However, their transition patterns might 
be different from the average, thanks to various social factors such 
as social origin, educational level or gender. The interviews explore 
deeper aspects of transition that quantitative surveys cannot capture, 
and investigate new sets of issues. The four following chapters reflect 
my empirical analysis. They discuss young women’s considerations 
of their own transitional paths, with a focus on their position in the 
university system; their views on integration into the labour market; 
their perspectives on leaving home, becoming independent and start-
ing a family; and their perceptions of the meaning of adulthood. 
The informants certainly provided valuable additional information 
regarding patterns of transition to adulthood. They also offered a 
great deal of significant knowledge about young people’s attitudes 
and positions within the contemporary societal structure, and indeed 
within the current paradigm of transition.  
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4.
 sTuDYIng aT unIVersITY In fInlanD anD franCe
The field of higher education has undergone a transformation in 
the European Union in the wake of the Bologna Process. Member 
states’ higher-education systems are increasingly shaped by a com-
mon framework that facilitates academic members’ cooperation and 
mobility. Nevertheless, in Finland and France the educational systems 
continue to reflect the background ideologies that constitute the basis 
of those countries’ wider structures. The higher-education systems 
thus mirror the historical and social ideologies that shaped the very 
foundations of the two societies. 
Subchapter 4.1 provides an overview of the Finnish and French 
higher-education systems. Since the ideologies founding the systems 
diverge, the position of students within each educational structure 
also differs, as does the public and financial support offered to them. 
The divergences in the provision of support are also generated by 
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the operation of the different welfare regimes. Finland’s welfare state 
is based upon social-democratic principles of equality, and France’s 
upon conservative-corporatist principles that maintain existing class 
differences (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999; Esping-Andersen and 
Korpi 1987). 
The interview questions on higher education relate to the rea-
sons why the participants and their acquaintances decided to study 
at university, and their opinions about the university system. The 
interview results concerning these issues are presented in subchap-
ters 4.2 and 4.3. The differences in opinions and values often refer 
to deeper societal implications. Young women’s reasons for going 
to university and their integration into the system are connected to 
educational structures, and to wider processes of the transition to 
adulthood. Indeed, socio-economic contexts greatly influenced the 
young women’s decisions to enrol in tertiary education. The inform-
ants’ views on their respective university systems mirror the tertiary 
education systems and broader structural conditions. The Finnish 
societal structure aims to decrease differences between individuals and 
provide support on a universal basis, whereas in France, selective and 
hierarchical principles continue to predominate within the internal 
structure of the education system. The informants’ comments reflect 
these wider ideologies, which constitute the two countries’ contextual 
backgrounds from the political to the cultural levels, as well as their 
welfare regimes and educational systems. 
4.1 education systems and student support
This subchapter compares the Finnish and French higher-education 
systems. First, I provide a description of the structures of the institu-
tions themselves. Second, I analyse the ideologies that constitute the 
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education systems and explain how these implicitly operate in their 
organisation. Third, I explore the financial support schemes offered 
to students.
higher-education systems: an overview
The Finnish and French education systems converge at the first cycle 
or elementary school level, but start to diverge at the second cycle or 
upper-secondary school level. The tertiary education systems differ 
significantly. The Finnish education system is divided into three parts: 
basic education, upper-secondary education and tertiary education. 
Basic education or comprehensive school lasts for nine years. Pupils’ 
attendance is compulsory from the age of seven until they complete 
the nine years of study. The upper-secondary education stage lasts for 
three years and is divided into two sections: general upper-secondary 
schools, which offer broad and general academic knowledge (lukio), 
and vocational schools (ammattikoulu), which offer vocational training 
and qualifications. At the end of the three-year programme, students 
from the general stream pass the Matriculation examination, and those 
from the vocational branch are entitled to vocational qualifications. 
Similarly, the French education system is divided into three stages: 
primary, secondary and higher education. School is mandatory for 
all children aged six to 16. Upper-secondary school is divided into 
three distinct streams: general and technological, vocational, and ap-
prenticeship. After completion of the three-year programme, students 
receive the Baccalaureate or an equivalent diploma, depending on 
their study stream (Ministère de l’Education Nationale 2009) (see 
Appendix 4 for more detailed explanations). 
In both countries, all secondary-school graduates are eligible 
to apply to a higher-education institution. Tertiary education in 
Finland is free; students are not required to pay any tuition fees, 
just the student membership fee, which represents a small sum and 
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entitles students to healthcare services. In France, students must pay 
mandatory health and administrative fees, which are low and vary 
among universities. However, other institutions require tuition fees, 
and the amount varies greatly between institutions. Finnish students 
are required to pass an entrance examination to enter university. 
The Finnish entrance exam requirement is based on a rather strict 
numerus clausus system that regulates the number of students admit-
ted to university each year (Kivinen and Rinne 1996: 298). Previous 
study records, including the national Matriculation examination or 
vocational school qualifications, and an entrance examination are 
used as student selection criteria. In universities of applied sciences, 
school achievement and work experience as well as entrance exami-
nations determine students’ enrolment. This requires that students 
study for the entrance exam and know which discipline they want to 
enter (Eurydice 2007b). There are no entrance exams for university 
in France: the Baccalaureate is the only requirement for admission. 
Nonetheless, for other types of institution, and depending on the 
establishment, students are selected on the basis of secondary-school 
credentials, written applications, entrance examinations or competi-
tive selective examinations (concours). Young people or adults who 
have not obtained the Baccalaureate but who need it to enter competi-
tive selective civil-service examinations, to obtain a job promotion 
that requires higher-education skills, or to enter university, can study 
and pass the DAEU (Diplome d’Accès aux Etudes Universitaires), an 
equivalent of the upper-secondary school Baccalaureate (Ministère 
de l’Education Nationale 2009).
The Finnish higher-education system follows a dual model, di-
vided between universities offering academic degrees and universities 
of applied sciences (ammattikorkeakoulu, AMK), providing vocational 
degrees (see Figure 4.1). Universities offer Bachelors degrees (of a 
minimum three-year duration), Masters degrees (a minimum two-
year duration) and postgraduate Licentiate and Doctoral degrees 
(four years or longer). Universities focus on academic and scientific 
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curricula, and thus provide theoretical knowledge and education and 
promote academic research. Nonetheless, students are required to 
take part in an internship scheme for several months as part of their 
degree, in order to receive a minimum of practical training. Univer-
sities of applied sciences are professionally oriented and governed 
by municipalities. They are all multidisciplinary, and accounted for 
30 institutions in the country in 2009. Vocational higher education 
focuses on practical knowledge and skills, and industry development 
projects and research. The first cycle of degrees is the Bachelors, 
completed in three and a half or four and a half years. The second 
and highest degree offered by these institutions is the work-oriented 
Masters degree. Students are expected to have accumulated at least 
three years’ relevant work experience in their field in order to be 
eligible for the latter. It takes two years to complete, and can be 
combined with work related to the field of study.
There were 20 universities in Finland until 2010, all state-owned 
and financed. Half were multi-faculty universities, and half special-
ised in particular fields. However, a new Universities Act, which 
was passed in June 2009 and came into effect on 1 January 2010, 
changed the status of universities. It is argued that the reform extends 
their autonomy, and they become either independent corporations 
under public law or foundations under private law. In other words, 
the Act leads to a separation of universities from the state, and gives 
them more power by reducing the state administration’s control 
over them. The reform applies to the network of universities and 
other higher-education institutions. Some universities have also been 
merged. There have therefore been 16 universities since 2010 (Ope-
tusministeriö 2008–2009; Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriö 2010b; 
Virkkunen 2009).
There have been many political discussions concerning a reduc-
tion of study time for the completion of both Bachelors and Masters 
degrees to five years. This proposal is in line with the Bologna Process, 
which gives incentives to higher-education systems to merge into a 
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common European system and increase competiveness at the national 
and European levels. This entails internal restructuring, such as the 
harmonisation of degrees into the 3–5–8 structure (three years to 
complete a Bachelors degree, two for a Masters and three for a Doc-
torate) (Rinne and Koivula 2008). There are also many discussions 
around the suppression of the gap years that many students take 
between secondary school and higher education. The entrance exam 
scheme might be reviewed in order to facilitate students’ passage from 
secondary school to higher education, so that students can complete 
their studies earlier and enter the labour market at a younger age. 
Today most students start working in their late 20s (Hölttä 2010).
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Figure 4.1. The higher-education systems in Finland and France, 2009. 
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These figures are based on information from the following sources: Ambassade de 
France en Irlande (2007); La France en Suisse – Ambassade de France à Berne 
(2009); Ministère de l’Education Nationale (2009); Opetushallitus (2009); Opetus-
ministeriö (2009); Site de Ressources et de Formation des Directeurs d’Ecole de 
la Marne (2008).
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The French higher-education system offers short and long 
curricula in either broad or professionally oriented disciplines (see 
Figure 4.1). It is divided into three types of organisation: univer-
sities providing theoretical academic knowledge and focusing on 
research; vocational institutions offering professional training; and 
specialist schools (Grandes Ecoles) preparing students in specific fields 
for high-ranking white-collar positions. These three main branches 
are split into several specialised sub-branches. There are nearly 600 
higher-education institutions in France. This includes 84 public 
and state-funded universities, which are all multidisciplinary. The 
current university system and initial secondary-school system were 
established by Napoléon in the 19th century, followed by new re-
forms in 1968. Universities offer long study programmes and focus 
on academic knowledge and research, such as in law, social sciences, 
the humanities and medicine. Since 2006 French universities have 
adopted the Bologna Process model, with Bachelors, Masters and 
Doctorate degrees obtained respectively in three, one or two, and 
three or more years, unless the students repeat a year. As in primary 
and secondary schools, failed years can be repeated and exams re-
taken (see Appendix 4). Admission from one year to another is not 
automatic and depends on biannual exam results. A stricter selection 
is made for Masters 1 programmes, and then another for Masters 2, 
as the two years are not necessarily consecutive. 
The IUFM (Institut Universitaire de Formation des Maîtres – 
Training Institute for Schoolteachers) is a separate institution, but 
is part of university. To enter the IUFM, students need to obtain a 
Bachelors degree and then go through a selection process. At the end 
of the two-year training, they undergo a strict competitive selective 
examination that will entitle them to exercise their profession as a 
teacher. They do not receive the teaching diploma automatically, and 
are not employable until they have passed the examination, which 
can be taken only once a year. Many students attempt it several times 
before passing it. The IUFM is specific to France. In Finland, students 
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wishing to become schoolteachers need a Masters degree in the field 
they wish to teach, as well as training to enter the profession.
Three kinds of institution provide vocational and technological 
higher education in France, in different fields, at different levels, and 
leading to different types of diploma. They offer theoretical knowl-
edge, practical skills and professional training. First, the STS stream 
(Section de Techniciens Supérieurs – Higher-Level Technicians’ Section) 
entitles students to a BTS diploma (Brevet de Technicien Supérieur 
– Higher-Level Technician Diploma). The curriculum is offered by 
secondary schools, and specialises in industry and the service sec-
tor. The degree is obtained in two years. Currently, an additional 
study year is available for those who wish to specialise further and 
acquire the vocational Bachelors, a higher-level diploma. Students 
must submit an application to be admitted. Second, IUTs (Institut 
Universitaire de Technologie – Technological University Institute) are 
part of the university system, although the instruction is offered in 
separate establishments. They provide syllabuses specialised in the 
technological sector. Students obtain a DUT (Diplôme Universitaire 
de Technologie – Technological University Diploma) after comple-
tion of a two-year curriculum, and can also carry on to a specialised 
course for a year and obtain a vocational Bachelors. Admission to 
IUTs is not automatic, as it is to universities: students are selected 
on the basis of their previous study records, entrance exams and 
sometimes competitive selective examinations. Third, IUPs (Institut 
Universitaire Professionnalisé – Professional University Institute) are 
part of the university system too. They have been designed to meet 
the specific needs of the labour market and businesses. IUPs offer 
specialised technological Masters degrees in management in the 
service and industrial sectors, leading to intermediary white-collar 
positions between the BTS and higher-level white-collar managers. 
The Bachelors is obtained in one year, and is a continuation of prior 
vocational degrees such as the BTS or DUT. The Masters degrees 
are completed in two years. The entrance selection process in IUPs 
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is strict. Previous study records, written applications, entrance exams 
and/or competitive selective examinations determine admission. 
Students must also have obtained a BTS, a DUT or a Bachelors 
at university, or have attended a preparatory class before applying. 
Those who have obtained sufficient credits prior to application can 
enter the Masters-level curriculum; others will first need to get the 
IUP Bachelors. IUPs are designated higher vocational institutions, 
but can be equivalent to some specialist schools (Grandes Ecoles) of 
management or administration (Ambassade de France en Irelande 
2007; Ministère de l’Education Nationale 2009; Ministère de l’En-
seignement Supérieur et de la Recherche 2009–2010). Tuition costs 
remain low in all these public institutions, which are state-funded. 
In private institutions, fees can be significant. They also vary from 
one institution to another. 
There is also a parallel system to university institutions in France: 
specialist schools, or Grandes Ecoles. Most of these were created prior 
to and after the French Revolution. Grandes Ecoles are elite institutions 
like the Institut d’Études Politiques or ‘Sciences Po’, distinctive business 
schools like INSEAD (Institut Européen d’Administration des Affaires 
– the European Institute of Business Administration), or schools of 
government like the ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration – National 
School of Administration). They can be public or private. White-
collar executives such as senior managers, administrators, politicians, 
engineers, architects, humanities scholars or specialists in the arts have 
often studied in Grandes Ecoles. Specialist schools are highly selective, 
and tuition fees are more or less high, depending on the status of the 
school. The selection process mostly operates through competitive 
examinations, for which students prepare on two-year courses. Only a 
small number of students are admitted each year. Preparatory classes, 
which are also selective, do not guarantee admission to the Grandes 
Ecoles. They only train students for the selective examinations. They 
provide a broad and multidisciplinary curriculum, and the studies 
are very intensive. Those who pass receive a three-year education in a 
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Grande Ecole, and gain a diploma entitling them to the highest posi-
tions in the labour market, primarily in the private sector. Grande 
Ecole diplomas function as social elevators and represent a legitimate 
source of access to social prestige and elite positions (Curtis and 
Klapper 2005; Ministère de l’Education Nationale 2009; Ministère de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche 2009–2010; Ministère 
des Affaires Etrangères 2007). 
While in Finland the higher-education structure offers equal 
opportunities to students, in France the organisation of the system 
is selective, and this has an influence on students’ future processes of 
integration into working life.
students within the higher-education system 
In Finland, the proportion of students choosing to study at either 
university or vocational higher institutions is not straightforward, as 
a significant number of students take gap years between upper-sec-
ondary school and tertiary education. Among those who completed 
secondary school in 2005, about 20% went directly to university, 
20% went into vocational higher education, and almost 60% took 
a gap year, started working life or took part in other types of activi-
ties such as voluntary work. Many secondary-school leavers choose 
to take time off, but for many this is because of the way entrance 
exams are organised. Not all applicants get into university in the year 
they take the exams; many do so two or three years later (Kaukonen 
2009). French students rarely take gap years, and tend to go into 
higher education straight after the completion of secondary school. 
The process of entering university is facilitated by the absence of 
entrance exams. 
In 2005, 50% of French young people who had obtained the 
General Baccalaureate between 2002 and 2004 were studying at 
university, 15% were in preparatory classes or specialised schools, 
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and 10% were not in higher education. Forty-four per cent of those 
who achieved a Technological Baccalaureate were in STS or IUT, 
and 30% did not join any higher-education institutions. Among the 
vocational Baccalaureate holders, 28% carried on to STS or IUT, 
and 67% were supposedly integrated into the labour market. Of all 
Baccalaureate holders, a third were studying at university, a third 
went into the labour market, a quarter were in vocational higher 
institutions, 9% were in preparatory classes or specialised schools, 
and 10% were in other types of higher-education institution, such 
as agricultural schools (INSEE 2009a). 
Consequently, students are younger in France than in Finland. 
The median age of French students in tertiary education was 20.6 
in 2007, compared with 24.5 for Finnish students (Eurostat 2009c). 
Approximately 50% of new entrants to Finnish higher education are 
younger than 23, and one fifth are over 28 (Kaukonen 2009). Fol-
lowing this trend, the Finnish young women I interviewed were on 
average older than the French interviewees. The French informants 
were aged 21–26, and the Finnish 24–30. The age of graduation 
from higher-education institutions varies between the two countries 
too (see Table 4.1). While it is common for students to graduate in 
their late 20s or early 30s in Finland, students graduate in their early-
to-mid-20s in France. Young people studying at university graduate 
later than those in vocational higher education. Students studying 
on university academic programmes such as medicine or architecture 
graduate later than those in vocational higher education, which offers 
shorter curricula. Those engaging in Doctorate studies or advanced 
research programmes graduate later in general, but the age differences 
between Finland and France are still significant.
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Table 4.1. Graduation ages in tertiary education in Finland and France, 
academic year 2003–2004.
Type of 
tertiary 
education
Vocational 
higher 
institution
University Advanced 
research 
programme 
(University)
3 to less 
than 5 years
5 to 6 
years
More than 
6 years
Finland 21–22 25–29 25–29 30–34 29
France 20–21 21-22 23-24 25 25–26
The data comes from OECD (2006). 
In both Finland and France, as well as in the European Union, the 
percentage of women among all tertiary students at university in 2007 
(excluding the field of education) was larger than that of men, reach-
ing 55% (Eurostat 2009b). The larger proportion of female students 
among the student population applies particularly to the 20–24 age 
group (see Table 4.2). The student population is proportionally larger 
in Finland than in France or the European Union. The differences 
are visible among all age groups. This also shows that students are 
older in Finland than in France. The number of 25–29-year-olds and 
30–34-year-olds still in higher education is also higher in Finland 
than in France or the European Union. 
Table 4.2. Students’ participation and enrolment in tertiary education by age 
and gender (as percentages of the corresponding age group) in Finland, 
France and the EU 27, 2007.
Age groups 20–24 25–291 30–34
Gender F M T F M T F M T
Percentages of the corresponding age group
Finland 44 36 40 23 22 23 11 10 10
France 32 26 29 6 5 6 5 4 5
EU 27 32 25 28 9 9 9 5 4 5
1 Average calculated based on the only data available: data for 26- and 28-year-old 
students, rather than for the whole 25–29 age group.
The data is calculated on the basis of the following source: Eurostat (2009a).
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educational ideologies
The Finnish and French education systems reflect the different ideolo-
gies underlying their structures, that is, the Nordic model in Finland 
and the Napoleonic model in France. Risto Rinne and Jenni Koivula 
(2008) offer a typology of the main types of educational systems. The 
Nordic model emphasises the principles of equal opportunities and 
homogeneity. Higher education is free and accessible to all. Higher-
education institutions are also regulated by the state, and there is no 
competition between the various institutions. The Napoleonic model 
emphasises the principle of the academic freedom of researchers, and 
there is also very little competition between universities (for more 
information, see Appendix 4). The main differences between the two 
systems currently lie in the school curriculum delivery and the trans-
mission of knowledge (Kupiainen et al. 2009) (see Synopsis 4.1). 
First, the Finnish model is based on flexibility and diversity in 
the delivery of the educational syllabus. A common core curriculum 
and guidelines instituted by the Ministry of Education must be fol-
lowed, but schools retain considerable autonomy concerning the 
delivery of the curriculum. This principle confers local flexibility and 
diversity. By contrast, in France schools and teachers must follow a 
strictly imposed common curriculum established by the Ministry of 
Education (Kupiainen et al. 2009).
Second, the Finnish model emphasises pupils’ knowledge and 
skills acquisition, but also individual growth, creativity and autonomy. 
Pupils are provided with clear objectives, tools and learning plans to 
meet these targets, and can use their own methods to reach them. 
They are given responsibility for their own achievement. The focus 
is simultaneously placed on individual progress and social, civic and 
economic participation and interaction (Salo et al. 2008: 12). The 
Nordic model places pupils at the centre and encourages individu-
alisation. It is based on progressivist and individualist educational 
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ideologies that regard pupils as active. Egalitarianism holds a strong 
ideological position in the system, and highlights individual respon-
sibilities and prosperity (Carlgren et al. 2006). 
Synopsis 4.1. The major foundations of the educational systems.
FINLAND FRANCE
Flexibility and diversity
Teaching curriculum regulated by 
schools, based on 
Ministry of Education guidelines 
Standardisation and conformity
Standard core curriculum imposed 
on schools and teachers 
by the Ministry of Education
Emphasis on individual 
development
Equal importance given to intellectual 
development and individual growth
                    and creativity 
Emphasis on academic knowledge 
Focus on assimilation of the syllabus 
and intellectual development
The synopsis is based on Kupiainen et al. (2009).
While the Finnish system is ‘student-oriented’, the French system 
concentrates exclusively on the assimilation of academic knowledge 
through standardised learning methods (Opetushallitus 2009; Ope-
tusministeriö 2008–2009). This can be explained by the position of 
pupils in the system. After the reforms following the French Revolu-
tion, children’s role was that of the pupil, receiving and assimilating 
knowledge without questioning it, and respecting the authoritarian 
figure of the teacher. The system initially aimed to transmit the repub-
lican ideals put in place after the Revolution. The republican school 
was thus more of a political than a pedagogical project. The goal was 
to solidify and diffuse the newly born Republic’s ideologies, in order 
to counter the ancien régime. Subsequently, the French educational 
model was based on the hierarchical transmission of knowledge, and 
encouraged pupils’ homogeneity rather than individual creativity or 
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diversity (Pugin 2007; 2008). The French school system became an 
effective means of conveying moral codes, the French language and 
patriotic values. The role of the school became simultaneously that 
of promoting intellectual and academic development and constitut-
ing young people into citizens on the basis of republican values. 
The school system maintains a distance between school and juvenile 
life, keeping pupils in a subordinate position with no autonomy or 
individual responsibility (Cousin 1998; Langan 2008).
financing studies
The financial support available to students in European countries 
is based on two distinguishable principles that reflect the individual 
countries’ welfare regime ideologies (see subchapter 3.1): financial 
independence versus targeted assistance (Eurydice 2007a). There are 
three major categories of student support: financial support provided 
to students, financial support for the payment of administrative fees 
and contributions to tuition costs, and financial assistance to the 
students’ parents. The first model, based on the principle of indi-
vidual financial independence, applies in Finland and other Nordic 
countries. Financial support is exclusively directed at students with 
the purpose of promoting their financial autonomy, regardless of their 
parents’ income. Students’ parents do not receive family allowance 
or tax relief. The support is universal. Every student, regardless of 
background, is entitled to assistance. The second model, based on 
the principle of financial dependence and targeted financial support, 
operates in France. Students are considered to be dependent mem-
bers of their family and the responsibility of their parents. Support 
is awarded to students from poorer economic backgrounds on the 
basis of their parents’ income. Parents can receive extended family 
allowance and/or tax reliefs. The aim of the student support system 
is to help academically qualified students from socially disadvantaged 
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backgrounds to access higher education (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
1999; Eurydice 2007a).
Students’ financial support in Finland was initiated in 1969, 
including family support and a loan system. Today financial support 
to students is provided in three streams: a study grant, a housing sup-
plement and a loan. The study grant system in operation today was 
introduced in 1972. The loan, grant and housing supplement system 
was adopted in 1977. Financial aid was available to students for seven 
years (Opetusministeriö 2005). In 1992, the system was changed to a 
higher-education study grant, available for 55 study months (between 
four and a half and five study years, excluding summer months); a 
housing supplement; and government-guaranteed study loan, mar-
ket-based but lower than the market rate, up to a maximum of €300 
per month. The study grant is allocated for a determinate period, 
but university students can take longer than that period to gradu-
ate. In that case, they finance their studies themselves. Other types 
of support are available for the length of time required to complete 
Bachelors or Masters degrees (Vossensteyn 2004: 30–32; Kela 2009a; 
2009b). Every student older than 17 who has been admitted to a 
post-compulsory institution, whether in upper-secondary or higher 
education, and is in need of financial assistance is eligible for financial 
aid. There is no age limit for entitlement. The study grant and the 
housing supplement are government-financed benefits, paid monthly 
to the students. This income is taxable. Housing supplement covers 
80% of the monthly rent, up to a government-set threshold of €252. 
The rest has to be paid by the students (Kela 2009a; 2009b). 
Finnish students receive income from four sources. The first 
source is the study grant and the housing supplement, which often 
complement each other. The second source is work. More than 50% 
of students work part-time or full-time to boost their income. How-
ever, for such students to be entitled to the study grant, their gross 
income must not exceed €660 per month, or €1970 during aid-free 
months, such as in the summer (Kela 2009a; 2009b). Many students 
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choose to work part-time or full-time and do not receive any grant. 
The third financial source is parental support, the extent of which is 
difficult to measure, since most of it is support in kind. The fourth 
support option consists in taking out a loan.
Undergraduate and Masters students receive benefits in kind, 
such as public transport concessions, meal subsidies in their study 
environment, or concessions in museums. The student housing 
foundation also provides moderately priced accommodation for 
students, cheaper than that offered by the housing market. Higher-
education students are required to pay a healthcare contribution as 
part of the student membership fee. This entitles them to use the 
free health service provided by the Finnish Student Health Service 
centres (Ylioppilaiden terveydenhoitosäätiö, YTHS) (Vossensteyn 2004; 
Kela 2009a; 2009b).
Doctoral students are not entitled to the financial support scheme. 
They can access student housing foundation accommodation, but 
are not entitled to study grants. However, they might be entitled 
to General Housing Allowance, which is intended for low-income 
households. The amount is not fixed: it is based on marital status, 
family situation and household assets (Kela 2009). Doctoral students 
usually get support from personal grants or scholarships provided 
by private foundations, stipends, funding offered to the research 
projects in which they are taking part, graduate school positions, 
assistant salaries, state grants, or mobility grants (Helsinki School of 
Economics 2009).
Students’ financial support is provided on a different basis in 
France. There are different sources of financial aid. The major source 
of student support is means-tested state grants, which are available to 
students whose parents have a low income. Students have to apply 
before the start of each academic year. The amount of the grant is 
based on parents’ income, the number of dependent children in the 
household, and the distance between the higher-education institution 
and the parental home. Only full-time students who are attending a 
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higher-education institution and are not older than 26 are eligible. 
Merit aid grant is a merit-based complementary grant for students 
who are eligible for the means-tested grant and who obtained the 
highest grades in the Baccalaureate (high honours). It is a small grant 
paid for the duration of the Bachelors or Masters degree. Students 
who are willing to study or receive training abroad can also apply 
for mobility grants. Eligible students are selected by their higher-
education institution. Emergency aid is a recent and personalised 
type of support, provided immediately or for the duration of an 
academic year, to students facing sudden financial difficulties, for 
instance following family crises. The Aide Personalisée au Logement 
(APL, Personalised Housing Assistance) and Allocation au Logement 
à Charactère Social (ALS, Social Housing Allowance) are housing 
allowances distributed by the Caisse d’Allocations Familiales (CAF, 
Family Allowance Fund). They are means-tested according to income, 
family situation and type of housing. These allowances are aimed at 
people who are on a low income, including students, and who live 
in privately rented accommodation (not belonging to their parents). 
The APL and ALS cannot be combined. Eligible individuals can ap-
ply for one or the other. Student loans are available to students not 
eligible for state grants. Student loans or ‘Prêts d’Honneur’  (Honours 
Loans) are interest-free and means-tested government loans, allocated 
by educational institutions. Loans must be repaid within 10 years 
(Ministère de l’Education Nationale 2009; Ministère de l’Enseigne-
ment Supérieur et de la Recherche 2009–2010).
French families with children who are studying full-time can 
receive tax deductions and child allowances until the children turn 
26. Students are also entitled to a variety of discounts, such as on 
public transport, student meals or cultural activities. Many students 
receive regular financial support from their parents, and are thus 
partly financially dependent on their family. However, this kind of 
aid is not measurable, since the support offered is in kind and/or in 
cash. Parents might pay for rent, food or various other expenses. The 
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amount received also varies greatly among students. A large number 
of students work part-time or full-time alongside their studies, to sup-
port themselves (Kaiser 2007; Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur 
et de la Recherche 2009–2010).
Until the academic year 2009–2010, doctoral students’ main 
source of support was state-funded doctoral grants provided by the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Research. Since that date, doc-
toral students have had to sign a three-year doctoral contract (contrat 
doctoral), which is equivalent to an employment contract and entitles 
the students to similar rights in respect of matters such as salary and 
termination of contract. The contract can be prolonged for an extra 
year for health reasons or in case of maternity leave. Some research 
areas have been given priority over others. This implies that doctoral 
projects are selected according to the priority of the subject areas. 
More than half of those receiving support before the reform were 
studying on science and technology programmes, one third in law or 
economics, and less than a fifth in the social sciences or humanities. 
Some students in some Grandes Ecoles such as public administration 
institutions already received a salary, and were required to work in the 
public sector for a particular number of years (Chevaillier and Paul 
2006). There is no information yet available regarding the selection 
(or absence of selection) of doctoral students according to subject 
areas since the 2009–2010 reform. 
Conclusion: homogeneity and heterogeneity
The Finnish and French higher-education systems are very distinct 
from each other. The Finnish system presents a straightforward and 
homogeneous structure, while the French system has a complex 
structure based on a separation between sectors. In Finland, students 
can choose between two paths, academic or vocational. Each is given 
roughly similar value in terms of diplomas obtained and occupational 
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status. In France, students can choose between various streams, all 
leading to different occupational sectors and different social positions. 
Some streams and institutions are given considerable weight and 
value. Fields of study and institutions thus determine the social status 
of future graduates. The Finnish higher-education system thus helps 
to level graduates’ future social positions, whereas the French system 
reproduces the hierarchy among socio-economic groups through 
the division of the system into universities, vocational higher insti-
tutions and elite specialist institutions (see Bourdieu and Passeron 
1977). The two countries’ educational systems clearly embody the 
social class ideologies that shape their social structures and welfare 
regimes. The Finnish model is based on flexibility and diversity in 
terms of the transmission of knowledge and students’ intellectual 
development, while the French system encourages standardisation 
and conformity (see Synopsis 4.1). If homogeneity and unity can be 
perceived between the people and the state in Finland, in France the 
welfare regime, and particularly the education system, to some extent 
perpetuate the divisions between different social groups (Alapuro 
2005). The ideologies of homogeneity and heterogeneity are visible 
at the level of students’ financial support schemes. Support is uni-
versal in Finland, provided to all students regardless of their social 
background. In France, support is selective and means-tested, and is 
offered according to apparent economic need. 
The young women that participated in the research appeared 
to be similar: all in their 20s, university students, at the end of their 
study programmes and about to start working life. Yet the answers 
they provided were very different in the two countries. In fact, their 
statements greatly reflected the prevailing structural differences. The 
next two subchapters are based on my interview analysis, specifically 
on the reasons why the informants chose to study at university and 
their perspectives on the university system.
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4.2 Motives for studying at university
At first, the young Finnish and French women explained that their 
and their peers’ main reasons for studying at university were their 
personal interest in a specific subject. However, when they emphasised 
that studying at a higher-education institution was logical, it became 
apparent that their initial ‘choice’ had been influenced by different 
social factors. The informants also showed awareness of current labour 
market requirements, and tried to respond strategically to the current 
economic restructuring by adjusting their study choices.
While many Finnish students take one or several gap years before 
entering tertiary education, French young people go straight into 
study. For some of these students, university offers a shelter for ‘lost’ 
young people who do not know what to do after upper-secondary 
school. The institution represents a stage of experimentation when 
students figure out their study programme and, in a sense, have de 
facto gap years. Some interviewees in both countries regarded go-
ing to university as a way to gain time, both for the construction 
of individual identity and before facing integration into the labour 
market.
logical path
Although Finnish and French informants indicated that going to 
university was their choice, they pointed out three factors that might 
have influenced their initial decision. First, several of them stressed 
that going into higher education simply appeared as a logical step 
on their educational path, because they were good at school and it 
seemed normal to pursue higher education. Second, some explained 
that their parents and/or siblings had been to university, and that it 
simply seemed natural to follow the same route. Their family thus 
directly or indirectly encouraged them to pursue their studies. Third, 
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obtaining tertiary education qualifications was also considered a means 
to achieve a higher social position, particularly in Finland. 
R1:  And why did you choose to go to university?
I:  I think, to be honest, I never really thought about it too much … 
school was always really easy for me. (…) [And] if you’re smart, they 
think you should go to university. (…) I never questioned it myself. 
(…)
R:  So it was just a normal path.
I:  Yeah, I just went there. Didn’t really think about it.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
 I think I’ve always been, you know, the one with ‘koulupää’ [good 
academic abilities], I’ve always been the reader of the family and pretty 
good at school, and it felt like a natural choice.
 Elin (26, Finland)
I:  It’s funny, it’s never been a question that occurred to me! It was clear 
that since I passed the Bac …
R:  That you would carry on?
I:  Ha, yeah yeah yeah! All my brothers and sisters carried on, (…) they 
all went into higher education, so really it wasn’t a question …
R:  You followed the same path?
I:  I followed the path.
 Valérie (23, France)
 I never really thought about stopping studying [after secondary 
school]. I always liked it.
 Nicole (21, France)
1. The initials ‘R’ and ‘I’ stand for Researcher and Informant. These abbreviations 
will also be used in subsequent chapters.
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Today, it is expected that many young people will carry on to 
tertiary education. This path has become a social and cultural norm. 
In both Finland and France, university has become an extension of 
secondary school and the next logical educational step (Felouzis 2001; 
Honkimäki 2001). This is one of the results of the expansion of edu-
cation. The development of higher education is rooted in post-war 
educational policies and political ideologies. The great development of 
the service sector in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the development 
of the welfare state, also contributed to the expansion of higher educa-
tion (Välimaa 2001: 25, 29). The service and public sectors increased 
the demand for highly educated people and provided white-collar 
jobs that needed higher qualifications, in contrast with the blue-collar 
jobs offered by the industrial sector. In addition, one crucial issue 
on the agenda in the late 1950s was to create equal access to higher 
education, alongside the promotion of democracy throughout the 
whole of society (Kivinen and Rinne 1996). During the 1960s, the 
reduction of social inequality and the creation of equal educational 
opportunities were on the political agenda across Western European 
societies (Teichler 2007: 26).
Higher education became accessible not only to lower socio-eco-
nomic groups, but also to women. Their enrolment rate rose steadily 
from the 1950s onwards. While at that time women represented 
about a quarter of the total number of higher-education students 
in Western Europe, today they represent more than half the stu-
dent population. In 2007 in Finland and France, respectively 54% 
and 55% of tertiary students were females. These figures follow the 
trends in most European countries and the EU 27 (Eurostat 2009b). 
Galland (1996: 21–22) claims that the massification of education 
is simultaneously a feminisation of education. This is because of 
the new centrality of work in women’s lives, the increasing need for 
qualifications, changes in the socialisation of girls, and the change 
in women’s status. However, the proportions of men and women 
remain unequal within subject areas (Furlong and Cartmel 1997: 
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22). There are still gender differences according to educational sectors 
and markets. For instance, in the field of humanities most students 
are females, in the fields of science and engineering most students 
are males, and white-collar professions in the public sector tend to 
be female-dominated (Kivinen and Rinne 1996; Teichler 2007: 32). 
The gender differences are not striking from a democratic point of 
view in terms of access to education, but they continue in the choice 
of subjects, and can affect future prospects on the labour market. 
Family influence
I:  I think most of my friends went to uni ’cause their parents went to 
uni. And (…) [most] of my friends who’ve studied at university (…) 
have had parents who’ve studied at university. Or they have older 
siblings who went to university. (…) It was just really clear to me from 
[when] I was very young, that I would go to university, because my 
mother went, my father went, my brother went, both of my sisters 
went … So it was just …
R:  Logical?
I:  Yeah, logical to go.
 Piia  (24, Finland)
R:  And in the first place, why did you choose to go to uni?
I:  Why? I don’t think it was really a choice, I think I didn’t have any 
other choices, it was quite evident for me that I will go to university. 
That was kind of the only option, yeah.
R:  Why? Because you were obliged by someone, or …?
I:  No, no! I just felt ‘that’s the place I want to go.’ (…) 
R:  Mmm … /I: Yeah … /R: Like, work-wise, to prepare/
I:  Yeah, work-wise and maybe, because of my parents, no, they weren’t 
forcing me, but they both have a degree from university, so (…) I don’t 
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want to, you know, have a lower position. I mean, subconsciously I 
think it was something like this.
 Sanna (25, Finland)
 Well, when I was in secondary school, I didn’t really know what I 
wanted to do. (…) My brother told me, ‘really, try university, I think 
you’ll like it.’ 
 Nadège (21, France)
 Alice (23, France) told me during the interview that she had planned 
to end her studies after secondary school because she had had enough 
of studying, and yet she continued nonetheless.
 I have a big brother and a big sister who both went into higher 
education. My brother went into a specialist engineering school at a 
rather high level. And my sister went to IUT [technological higher 
institution] too, then she went to a specialist school to get a Masters. 
So I’ve been surrounded by a family who went into higher education, 
and inevitably, it pulls you up rather than down.
 Alice (23, France)
In both Finland and France, the younger age groups have clearly 
attained higher levels of secondary and tertiary education than the 
older age groups, particularly women (see Table 4.3). However, the 
proportion of highly educated individuals is higher in Finland, par-
ticularly among older age groups. In Finland, with the exception of 
the oldest age group, more women than men have achieved second-
ary-school qualifications or a higher-education degree. The difference 
in proportion is more pronounced regarding tertiary education. In 
France, men have attained more qualifications than women, except 
for the younger age groups in tertiary education, where women 
predominate. 
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Several Finnish informants mentioned direct or indirect fam-
ily influence on their decision to go to university. While in Finland 
parents played the biggest role in terms of influence, in France, 
siblings may have had a greater impact. That might have to do with 
the higher proportion of highly educated adults in Finland than in 
France. The data presented in Table 4.3 reflects the profile of my 
informants’ parents. Half of the Finnish interviewees’ parents had a 
degree from a university or vocational higher institution. However, 
it was mainly fathers who had a university degree. Mothers mostly 
had vocational degrees. Also, while fathers had obtained their degree 
before having a family, several mothers had worked, had a family 
and studied in higher education at the same time. In France, more 
fathers than mothers were highly educated. Most of the parents who 
achieved a tertiary degree did so during their adult life rather than 
immediately after secondary school. They went to work after school, 
had a family, and then studied at the same time in order to gain a 
better job or a promotion. Parents are generally the role models that 
directly influence their children’s views and life direction. Those with 
parents who went to university might perceive that route as the natural 
path to follow and try to maintain an equal status to their parents. 
Parents hope that their children will receive an education equal to or 
better than their own, and also hope that their economic success will 
be continued (Kivinen and Rinne 1996; Smith 2004: 199). Parents 
therefore encourage their children to access higher social positions. 
Having highly educated parents or siblings can influence one’s deci-
sion to pursue equal status and qualifications, as Sanna (25, Finland) 
and Alice (23, France) explained. Young people whose parents are 
not highly educated automatically upgrade their status by entering 
higher education, as some of the French informants did. However, 
one needs to remember that those from higher social classes have 
the advantage of richer social and cultural capital, which promotes 
higher education and social upgrading (Bourdieu 1979; Kivinen and 
Silvennoinen 2002).
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upgrading status
 I think, part of that is, at least when I was young, there was this 
big speech in the schools that if you educate yourself, the more you 
educate yourself, the better salary you have, the better job you have, 
the happier you are. (…) First thing is that, you know, you were told 
that if you study, you’re gonna have a good life.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
The Finnish informants clearly mentioned that going into tertiary 
education, depending on the field and type of institution, was a way 
to attain a better social status. They also showed awareness that their 
decision to enter university was partly influenced by the political 
and economic ideologies of the 1960s and 1970s discussed above. 
Post-war Finnish educational policy strongly emphasised the benefits 
of schooling and the expansion of education. It was believed that 
the expansion of higher education would ensure economic growth 
(Kivinen and Rinne 1996). European governments’ policies encour-
aged both the production of human capital and the need for higher-
educational qualifications and mass education. Educational policies 
and governments in many European countries promote participation 
in higher and post-compulsory education (Reiter and Craig 2005: 
32). In the 1990s, the Finnish government adopted the rhetoric of 
the information society and international competition as its guiding 
principle, calling for a well-educated labour force and capital-intensive 
services and research centres (Kivinen and Ahola 1999). Several Finn-
ish interviewees mentioned that a major reason for entering higher 
education was related to status, salary and social position. However, 
they did not offer this monetary explanation for their own choices, 
but for those of people they knew, mainly people studying business 
or economics or in vocational higher institutions. 
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 I think it’s also because of the status, they want to achieve something. 
(…) Manual work, people view it as some kind of … (…) it’s not 
desired, they don’t want to do manual work all their life. It seems to 
be hard, so it’s nicer to imagine that you have a nice white-collar work 
and you work in an office. (…) Maybe also society creates this, that 
they valuate more people who have gone to lukio [secondary school] 
(…) than vocational school.
 Sanna (24, Finland)
Tiia (26) also stated that university seemed more attractive than 
vocational study because of the job opportunities it promised, such 
as intellectual rather than manual work. Anna (28) added that many 
people bet on their higher-education qualifications to win better jobs 
and salaries. Tuuli (25) maintained that most of her friends who were 
studying at vocational higher institutions ‘just have in mind to get 
a well-paid position’, but she clearly pointed out that most students 
from her own field of study did not think like that. They went to 
university to gain additional knowledge, without aiming for a high 
salary at the end of their degree. The interviews suggest that Finn-
ish young people still have faith in the benefits of education, even 
if they are aware that their degrees will not lead to a direct or secure 
place on the labour market and that they will need additional skills 
to attain their desired positions.
In France, upward social mobility was barely mentioned. Ob-
taining tertiary qualifications was seen mainly as a means of entry 
into the labour market; in other words, as a tool. Some informants 
slightly diverged from the rest of the group, stressing that university 
could lead to a better social position. Marie (24) just pointed out 
that some young people studied in order to obtain a better job than a 
blue-collar position. Alice (23) emphasised that aspirations for money, 
getting an interesting job and attaining a comfortable lifestyle pushed 
people to study. Nevertheless, university was not perceived as a route 
to attain a higher social status than one’s parents or peers. As Céline 
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(23) mentioned, those who wish to attain a prestigious job study at 
specialist schools (Grandes Ecoles) rather than university, or even in 
technological or vocational higher institutions, which increasingly 
guarantee access to the labour market and oppportunities to upgrade 
one’s professional and social rank. 
Educational inflation: Awareness and response
R:  Do you think it was easier for people back then, when your parents 
were young, to find work, than nowadays?
I:  Yeah … I think those days you didn’t have to have a paper [stating] 
that you’re qualified to something, because you could, like my mum 
… she’s been just working and going to better places, like that. (…) 
Now I think it’s more difficult, because you have to have a qualifica-
tion for everything.
 Emmi (25, Finland)
R:  Do you have an idea about what pushes young people to go to uni-
versity today?
I:  Well, I think it could have something to do with the inflation of 
degrees, so if you are an engineer, it’s nothing; you have to be a 
[qualified] engineer. If you don’t study, you’re easily left jobless. (…) 
And (…) Finland is so much an [information] society, that in order 
to survive, you have to study. (…) Because everybody else does it, 
you have to also, so that you won’t be any less than anyone else. 
 Elina (26, Finland)
 There’s the problem of those who don’t have any diploma and can’t 
find work, and the problem of those who have too many diplomas 
and who can’t find work either.
 Natalie (22, France)
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I:  [My mother] was from a rather disadvantaged family, so she went 
to a teacher-training college, she didn’t study further after that. She 
became a teacher at a very young age.
R:  There weren’t any selective exams back then?
I:  No, there weren’t any of those. She doesn’t even have the Bachelors 
level actually. (…) It’s so difficult to manage to become ‘just’ a teacher 
[nowadays], they ask us to get unbelievable qualifications!
 Audrey (26, France)
Educational inflation, degree inflation and overqualification are at 
the heart of contemporary socio-economic and political discussions. 
But what does it mean? Degree or qualifications inflation refers to the 
consequences of the demand for qualifications to get a job in advanced 
societies. Tertiary qualifications previously provided the opportunity 
to upgrade one’s social position, especially for the baby boomers’ 
generation (Chauvel 2002; Karisto et al. 2005). Diplomas became 
the basis of job eligibility, not just for higher-status professions but 
also for lower-status ones, and were the key to securing one’s posi-
tion on the labour market. However, the outcomes promised by the 
educational system in the 1960s and 1970s no longer match today’s 
labour market opportunities. As Bourdieu observed as early as 1980, 
young people with higher diplomas often attain lower social positions 
than did their counterparts in the previous generation (Bourdieu 
1980). This is connected to the restructuring of the labour market 
and the rise in unemployment and job competition (Furlong and 
Cartmel 1997). The number of people obtaining university degrees 
has multiplied beyond all proportion with the number of positions 
available on the labour market. Simultaneously, qualifications have 
lost some of their value. This is most visible among white-collar 
professions. Competition is therefore fiercer and employers more 
demanding, contributing to the phenomenon of qualifications infla-
tion (Chauvel 2002). 
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A side effect of this phenomenon is overqualification, when 
individuals obtain too many diplomas, or qualifications too high for 
the occupation they wish to enter. Some informants pointed to this 
problem, such as Natalie (22, France). Tuuli (25, Finland) explained 
that when her parents were young, having a university degree was 
much appreciated, and it was very easy to find work and keep a secure 
position. Today she feels that young people overeducate themselves 
because of the scarcity of jobs, and that because too many people are 
becoming educated there is an increase in job competition. Obtain-
ing more qualifications is therefore a response to the battle for jobs. 
Caroline (25, France) stated that integration into working life was 
‘difficult and frightening for those without diplomas, and for those 
with the highest diplomas, because sometimes we can be overqualified 
[and] be completely rejected. It’s completely paradoxical.’ Grégoire 
Tirot (2008: 39) indicates that young people have never obtained as 
many diplomas or been as competent as they are today. And yet, since 
many diplomas do not lead to predefined professions, many employers 
refuse to employ young people with a degree in the humanities, for 
instance. Many young people with a Masters or PhD can experience 
degree devaluation and work in low-paid jobs for an undetermined 
period. They end up accepting lower-paid and precarious jobs which 
require qualifications below their actual level of education (Baudelot 
and Establet 2000). 
However, although educational capital no longer ensures direct 
access to economic capital or fully protects individuals against un-
employment, it still provides them with human capital, which is an 
important competitive tool on the labour market (Bourdieu 1979). 
Higher-educational qualifications no longer distinguish highly edu-
cated individuals, but they still differentiate them from young people 
with lower educational diplomas or no qualifications at all. The highly 
educated group is less at risk of unemployment and downward social 
mobility than less educated groups (Kivinen and Ahola 1999). The 
fiercest competition therefore takes place among individuals within 
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the same highly educated group. These individuals increasingly need 
to strive for new skills that will help them to stand out and increase 
their chances on the labour market. 
The young women in my study showed awareness of the phe-
nomenon of educational inflation and the loss of value of diplomas, 
but rather than simply acknowledging and contemplating these facts, 
they reacted to them strategically. Most Finnish participants and some 
of the French informants clearly stated that they had modified their 
programmes during their studies at university expressly to adapt to 
labour market demands and future career opportunities. Their choice 
to change courses or fields of study was nevertheless closely related 
to their recently developed interests in particular fields. In that sense, 
they had strategically combined their personal interests with future 
professional opportunities.
I:  I was studying sociology, [then] after I finished my Bachelors degree 
I decided that (…) international politics [would be] (…) more useful 
for me. (…) So I just switched.
R:  And you enjoy that better?
I:  Yeah. Yeah, and it’s also (…) labour-wise, I think later on, it’s gonna 
be more useful for me.
R:  In what sense?
I:  Ummm …
R:  Work-wise?
I:  I mean, the employers, as far as I’ve understood, in my field of work, 
they appreciate the degree of international politics better than sociolo-
gy.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
R:  I’m gonna ask you, to start with, what you are studying?
I:  Social work.
R:  Ok. And you said you changed?
I:  From French.
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R:  So you were studying languages?
I:  Yes, yes.
R:  And why did you decide to change?
I:  Well, because I think I’ll have a better chance to find a job with social 
work, and it’s also more interesting.
 Sanna (24, Finland)
At the University of Tampere there is a major and minor subject 
system, which entails that students study a major subject but can 
also select minor subjects from other disciplines. Therefore they can 
have a broader study base. Some enter university on a particular 
programme but later change their course in line with a preference 
for the minor subject. Tuuli (25) selected minor subjects in order 
to expand her field of knowledge in different domains. Her major 
subject was French, and she studied history, Spanish and administra-
tive science as minor subjects. She did not like the jobs available to 
graduates with French language degrees, so she decided to combine 
her areas of expertise, and was hoping to work in a body such as a 
Non-Governmental Organisation. In France, Alice (23) stated that 
she went to a technological higher institution (IUT) to pursue her 
studies after her technological Baccalaureate. She chose fairly non-
specialist subjects, as she was not sure in what domain she ultimately 
wanted to work, but she preferred technological institutions, which 
are more structured than universities. She obtained a Bachelors and 
then became interested in the field of sustainable development. She 
described this field as relevant, related to current environmental is-
sues, and as leading to new study disciplines, new occupational op-
portunities and a whole new employment sector. She described it as 
‘tomorrow’s profession’, and was happy to have entered ‘the jungle’. 
The other informants who were completing a Masters 2 in sustainable 
development had entered that field despite the fact that their initial 
secondary-school studies and early higher-education paths had been 
totally different. What led them to their final choice was a combi-
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nation of their personal preferences, the new opportunities offered 
by the higher-education system with the creation of new study and 
research programmes, and the labour market, with the opening up 
of a new occupational sector.
Such thinking involves strategic planning and personal flexibility. 
In that respect, university is both an educational service and a tool 
for integration that young people use for their own benefit. Higher 
education increasingly functions as a market, and the users of this 
market can be perceived as ‘players’ who utilise higher-education 
credentials as human capital and marketable commodities (Kivinen 
and Silvennoinen 2002; Oblin and Vassort 2005: 53). Students choose 
subjects related to their personal preferences and also to what they 
think will be useful for their future career (Honkimäki 2001: 98). 
The stimulus of working life and competition plays a large role in 
today’s study strategies. Many young people manage to adapt to the 
labour market’s requirements and use the education system strategi-
cally. However, others become victims of economic restructuring 
and eventually fall into the circle of precariousness. Young people’s 
responses and adaptability to the current economic situation are 
heterogeneous, and contribute to the polarisation between successful 
and marginalised youth (see Bynner et al. 1997).
Visible and invisible gap years
University students in Finland need to be sure what subject they want 
to study, as they are required to pass entrance exams. The system 
compels them to have an idea of the academic field they want to study. 
Some students enter university straight from secondary school, but 
as I explained in subchapter 4.1, many are on waiting lists because 
of the numerus clausus system that regulates the number of annual 
university admissions. As a result, many secondary-school leavers are 
forced to take one or several gap years. Some also take voluntary gap 
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years, during which they gain work experience or realise personal 
projects such as travelling or participating in a voluntary organisa-
tion. The informants indicated that they had gained extra-curricular 
experience and knowledge between secondary school and higher 
education. Most of them had taken gap years, during which they 
had prepared for the university entrance exams and also worked, in 
Finland or abroad. During that time they had become familiarised 
with the labour market, gained additional individual skills, and 
figured out what they really wanted to study and which profession 
they wanted to work in. Suvi (25) was studying social policy and 
political science because she was interested in the integration of im-
migrants in Finland. However, she did not find that path straight 
after secondary school. She went to a vocational higher institution 
first, and realised that that professional orientation did not suit her 
at all. Her current interest grew while she was working and reflecting 
on her future career plans. She gave that as her reason for going to 
university and changing her initial plans. Similarly, Maria (30) had 
worked for several years before finding her true interest and realising 
that she would like to become a social worker and organise support 
groups. She had also worked voluntarily in that sector. To obtain a 
suitable job in that field she needed a university degree, which was 
why she was studying. 
The Finnish informants entered university having already cho-
sen the subject they wanted to study, because in most cases they had 
had time to think about it, mainly during gap years. By contrast, the 
French respondents explained that they went to university straight 
from secondary school, both because it was the expected path and 
because they were not sure what they wanted to study. The general 
secondary-school stream leads to tertiary studies. As in Finland, the 
diploma obtained does not provide any vocational qualifications. 
Moreover, young people rarely take gap years in France. University 
provides broad knowledge, is multidisciplinary and free, and above 
all does not require any entrance exams. These aspects appeal to sec-
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ondary-school leavers who are not sure what to do after graduating. 
Most of the French young women said that university was mostly a 
place for ‘lost’ young people. They go to university without any pre-
defined study objectives, choose courses randomly, try out different 
modules and repeat academic years, until they either find what they 
really want to study or drop out of the system. In the latter case, they 
might work, return to university the following year, or enter vocational 
higher education instead. In a sense, they take unofficial gap years 
during their studies, within the university structure. 
University is free, whereas most other institutions demand tuition 
fees. Those whose family cannot help or who cannot get a study grant 
might not be able to afford the costs. University is therefore the last 
resort for many young people. It can also be a waiting room for those 
wishing to study in other institutions that require entrance exams and 
exercise strict selection. Many students go to university not by initial 
choice, but because it is the only alternative left to them (Felouzis 
2001: 22, 51–54). Some would have preferred to study elsewhere, 
such as in a specialist school (Grande Ecole) or vocational higher 
institution, but these require entrance exams or selective examina-
tion. Sabrina (23) stated that for a majority of students at university, 
their presence is the result of a ‘last-resort orientation’. Florence (22) 
revealed that she went to university after secondary school because 
she did not know what to do. She had failed her entrance exam for 
the specialist school she had chosen. She therefore went to university 
as a last resort, and she studied history for a year, a course chosen 
‘by feel’ on the basis of personal interest. She gave up history after a 
year and discovered that sociology and economics suited her better. 
However, she also mentioned implicit social pressure to carry on 
studying, which persuades young people to push themselves in the 
system: ‘You get pressure from your family, society, teachers, to do 
something after secondary school. And the first simple plan when 
you don’t have any ideas is going to uni.’ For the reasons discussed 
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above, university can be viewed negatively, as a dumping-ground 
(Felouzis 2001: 52). Several informants reinforced that perspective.
 In my opinion, university is a big ragbag! Mainly for the first years. 
(…) It’s a big ragbag for all those who don’t know where to go, or, 
well, who don’t know what to do.
 Natalie (22, France)
 Uni always convey this message that it’s an easy option if you don’t 
know what to do. (…) But uni is not prestigious! Schools of econom-
ics are prestigious.
 Céline (23, France)
University is therefore a stage of experimentation in different fields of 
study, and is also where many young adults negotiate and construct 
their identities. Drawing on interview research with French students, 
Georges Felouzis (2001: 55) suggests that university can be seen as 
a liminal institution or structural threshold that leads young people 
with no fixed status into a more stable phase of life. This connects with 
the theories of liminality developed by van Gennep (Turner 1992: 
48) (discussed in subchapter 1.1). The first stage separates individuals 
from their original status, the second involves an interval away from 
any traditional status, and the third confers a new status (Davies 1994: 
3). The middle stage between the two statuses, ‘liminality’, is a phase 
when people are temporarily positioned on a threshold, belonging to 
neither one status nor the other. In this respect, university embodies 
a kind of intermediary stage during which many young people seek 
and eventually find their path. The years spent at university are thus 
a decisive phase regarding their career plans and future orientation. 
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Buying time
The rise in unemployment in advanced societies has greatly contrib-
uted to the phenomenon of young people prolonging their studies, 
entering higher education and gaining tertiary diplomas. Paradoxi-
cally, this phenomenon has given rise to the issue of qualifications 
inflation, discussed previously. Andy Furlong and Fred Cartmel (1997: 
27) suggest that many young people decide to start an academic career 
in order to multiply their chances of getting an adequate position on 
the labour market, and to avoid some of the risks associated with the 
period of uncertainty in the transition from school to work. Oinonen 
(2004: 297) emphasises that this phenomenon can be justified by 
the job-queue effect rather than the real value given to education 
itself. Prolonging education is a tactic to diminish and avoid haz-
ardous potential outcomes. Obtaining additional higher-education 
qualifications is also part of the strategy to gain access to the labour 
market. Higher-education diplomas do not guarantee work, but they 
provide better chances in terms of employability and the attainment 
of higher socio-professional positions. 
The pursuit of study as a way to guard against uncertain outcomes 
on the labour market has been acknowledged in previous studies of 
the transition from school to work (e.g. Bradley and van Hoof 2005; 
Miles 2000: 60). However, higher education might have another 
function for some young people. What if some do not want to enter 
working life when they are expected to do so, because they are simply 
not ready? One might also wonder whether some young people are 
merely seeking alternative pathways to adulthood.
According to the informants, Finnish young people go to univer-
sity with rather precise ideas of the degree they want to study for and 
the profession they want to enter. Depending on the field of study, 
some do change their degree programmes, but unlike their French 
counterparts they seldom enter university in order to find out what 
they can study. Nonetheless, a few informants diverged in their views 
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and pointed out that university could be used to figure out one’s 
life and to ‘buy’ more time for that purpose. Päivi (25) mentioned 
that for some people who are not sure what to do in life, university 
could be used like secondary school rather than to study for a specific 
profession. Johanna (26) had a similar opinion.
 I didn’t want to enter working life at that point, I was still not feeling 
quite ready for it (…) so I decided to come back to university. (…) 
Here, just studying and getting [the grant], you can sort of live a free 
life for a couple more years, and [studying humanities] was maybe 
my choice because it’s a subject that allows you to think and ponder 
about things, and I was still not sure where I was really going, but 
now it’s getting clear! (…) Studying (…) in the humanistic field, 
it’s not really a way to a high career (…), it’s more thinking of what 
you’re actually going to do with your life, like, more years to think 
about things.
 Johanna (26, Finland)
Anna (28, Finland) stressed that some of her fellow students were not 
yet ready to enter full-time working life, and were trying to prolong 
their studies. Although many students work alongside their studies in 
Finland, they do not always consider student jobs to be real working 
life, as such jobs are only part-time and temporary. They were thus 
attempting to delay their entry into the labour market, trying to 
remain a little longer at university, which offers a familiar structure 
and secure environment. In that respect, university is a safe haven 
where young people can hide for a while before trying their luck on 
the labour market. As Caroline (25, France) indicated, university 
has the function of a ‘buffer’, and prolonging one’s studies is usually 
‘due to the anxiety of entering directly onto the labour market. It’s 
frightening, because we think we are not prepared … studying, well, 
it’s a bit of a buffer, [pushing] away [entry on the labour market].’ 
Furthermore, many young people need more time to experiment 
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with life and develop their identity, and simply do not feel ready to 
enter working life. Marie (24, France) pointed out that many young 
people opt to study merely because they are not prepared to face 
the labour market. Nadège (21, France) did not feel ready to enter 
professional life and still wished to acquire additional intellectual 
knowledge, and she was therefore planning to continue studying. 
Nicole (21) explained that she enjoyed studying, learning and having 
free time, like most of the students that she knew. In her opinion, 
having a permanent job could be restricting. Tuuli (25, Finland) 
shared similar thoughts.
R:  And are you in a hurry to finish your studies and enter working 
life?
I:  No, noo! I’m fine the way it is now, because I have some work, some 
free time, interesting studies, and I like doing my [Masters thesis] 
(…) because it’s an interesting subject for me, so I’m in no hurry!
 Tuuli (25, Finland)
Individual development does not necessarily coincide with expected 
social development. University can be a way to smooth the transition 
to adulthood, and being a student can itself be a stage of transition, 
on both the individual and social levels.
Conclusion: Participation in tertiary education: 
Personal and socio-economic reasons
Most informants stated that going to university was their choice. 
However, this ‘choice’ was greatly influenced by educational, political 
and economic policies dating from the 1960s onwards, which greatly 
encouraged the expansion of higher education. The path to higher 
education appears ‘logical’, but it is also linked to family influence 
and the attempt to attain a higher social status, especially in Finland. 
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However, this varies by study area and type of institution. Young 
women were also aware of educational inflation, and that diplomas 
no longer offered direct access to good jobs. They responded to that 
issue strategically. In Finland they tended to modify and adapt their 
degrees to employment opportunities, and in France some tried to 
choose the type of tertiary institution and field of study that would 
open doors on the labour market. Furthermore, Finnish young women 
entered university knowing what programme they wanted to study, 
unlike most of the French informants. In France, it is common to 
enter university and then decide on the course of study while at 
university. French students rarely take gap years after secondary 
school, unlike their Finnish counterparts. However, since they usu-
ally repeat their first university years while searching for the right 
programme, they undertake de facto gap years. Finally, according to 
traditional views on the transition from school to work, university 
provides a shelter from economic uncertainty and unemployment. 
The informants agreed with that, but their comments also suggested 
an alternative view. Contemporary theories about the prolongation 
of youth tend to focus on the socio-economic factors that lead to 
that prolongation; however, perhaps more studies should concentrate 
on individual causes and choices. Some students seem to prolong 
their studies simply because they are not personally ready to enter 
the labour market. They need additional time to experiment with 
life and think about future possibilities. The development of each 
individual does not necessarily match the expected level of growth 
and maturity imposed by the societal structure. 
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4.3 evaluating the university system 
R:  And what do you think about the Finnish university system in gen-
eral?
I:  Well, I think it’s quite good, and what I like in Tampere is that we 
can choose what we study. We can study free minors, it’s great. (…) 
It’s (…) flexible. (…) And you can also change your major if you 
want to. Of course, you have to do work for it.
 Suvi (25, Finland)
 One of my teachers (…) told me that the French [university] system 
was in complete disrepair, that it couldn’t carry on any more. (…) 
And it’s true that I feel that I don’t fit into the system or what it 
requires.
 Céline (23, France)
 I’ll never regret having been to uni. (…) I think there’s really a great 
cultural profusion [there]. (…) But then, as for its usefulness for get-
ting work, I think it’s rather limited, because the courses are extremely 
theoretical, rather disconnected from reality.
 Sabrina (23, France)
Finnish and French young women alike indicated aspects of univer-
sity that could be improved, such as the provision of more guidance 
and career advice before and during studies, and the improvement 
of teaching methods. However, these quotes illustrate the thoughts 
commonly expressed by informants when I asked their opinion of the 
university system. The Finns showed satisfaction with the system and 
their studies in general, and the French were critical and pointed out 
several negative aspects. These results are in line with the ESS Round 
3–2006 findings for the question ‘Please say what you think overall 
about the state of education in your country nowadays’ (on a scale 
from zero to 10, 10 being the best). The mean score among 20–34-
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year-olds was eight in Finland and five in France. Clearly, the data 
shows satisfaction in Finland and disappointment in France. Never-
theless, although the data shows positive outcomes for Finland, the 
informants expressed clear concerns regarding the policies and reforms 
that took place in 2010 to restructure the university system. 
lack of guidance
In both Finland and France the informants complained about the 
lack of guidance at university. However, the young Finnish women 
referred to a lack of guidance during university studies, whereas in 
France they complained mostly of a lack of guidance before higher 
education, in secondary school. 
Some of the Finnish interviewees felt that they were left to choose 
their courses, conduct their studies and organise their degrees on their 
own. Some students can feel lost in that process. Anna (28) liked 
the flexibility of being able to choose free minor topics. However, 
she felt that there was a lack of guidance regarding how one’s studies 
could be organised and planned to make them more relevant to the 
labour market. Elina (26) also thought that the university system was 
comprehensive and flexible, but that students were left on their own. 
Piia (24) stated that more assistance was needed.
 What people should pay attention to is guiding students more. I 
think you’re pretty much left alone, and to make your decisions … 
(…) I personally need much more guidance than they give!
R:  Like, people explaining about the courses?
I:  Yeah, and what do you have to do, which are the compulsory subjects 
and all this.
R:  So you felt a bit left alone?
I:  Yeah.
 Elina (26, Finland)
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 I think that the guidance …Well, (…) when I started (…) I thought 
the guidance system was a bit crappy, ’cause you had the freedom 
to do whatever you wanted, but if you would have wanted someone 
along to give you tips and advice … I personally felt that that was 
lacking. 
 Piia (24, Finland)
A large number of the French interviewees emphasised a lack of 
guidance and career advice, especially in secondary school. They 
mentioned that students are not provided with adequate knowledge 
of the various study options after the completion of secondary school. 
Céline (23) gave an example of this.
 [In seconary school] we meet so-called career advisors who … who are 
completely useless! There’s no psychological or sociological approach 
at all.
 Céline (23, France)
The respondents also emphasised that upon arrival there was not 
enough information about the general functioning of the university 
system or on planning one’s studies. Many students feel isolated and 
neglected when they enter university (Felouzis 2001: 60). Galland 
(1996: 36–37) points out that a survey conducted in 1991 among 
secondary-school students showed that the lack of career advice was 
already a major problem. Consequently, some students choose a study 
path on the basis of scraps of information they get from friends and 
family. Others enter university without knowing what they want 
to study, and discover their field of interest by trying out different 
disciplines (see subchapter 4.2). 
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Isolation during study and lack of teaching skills
Several Finnish and French informants pointed out negative aspects 
of the teaching methods at university, although they pointed to differ-
ent issues. The Finns highlighted a lack of contact with the teaching 
staff, and the French pedagogical weakness. Depending on the field 
of study, the learning method in Finnish universities is rather pecu-
liar. Students can take part in taught courses, but also in book-exam 
sessions. The latter consist in reading and analysing a few books on 
a particular subject, and then answering questions based on those 
books during a prearranged exam. This way of studying offers a lot 
of freedom and flexibility, but it requires motivation, independence 
and responsibility. It is simultaneously isolating and individualistic, 
since no exchange with teachers or other students occurs. Suvi (25) 
wished she could participate in more courses with specific assignments 
to do, and with a lecturer. 
 I would like to have more contact teaching. (…) [For] my minor, (…) 
nearly everything, I’ve studied myself, in books. (…) Now I did one 
course and it was great, it was in English, and I think I’ve learned a 
bit different things, because the teacher has always personal views. 
(…) I would like to have more teaching or writing essays, because 
it’s a lot easier for me to read three books and go to [an] exam. [If ] I 
have to write a 10-page essay, it’s a lot more work for me, and I would 
like to be a better writer.
 Suvi (25, Finland)
Emmi (25) was studying two different subjects in two universities, 
one being the University of Tampere. She was aware that the subject 
one is studying can affect the learning and teaching methods used, 
but she still felt fairly isolated.
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 When you study arts you have to do a lot of practice, and you have 
to be there, and with the same class all the time. And here, (…) you 
just go to exams. (…) It’s really free here, but also it’s really a kind 
of lonely studying, ’cause you don’t know people so much, and you 
just read at home.
 Emmi (25, Finland)
The French informants criticised the method of teaching at uni-
versities and other higher-education institutions. However, their 
complaints were directed more at the lecturers’ lack of pedagogical 
skills and lack of interest in teaching. Natalie (22) had studied for a 
year in a preparatory class, and appreciated the level of teaching there. 
She went to university on the basis of her career choice: she needed 
a Bachelors in order to enter the IUFM to become a schoolteacher. 
She was disappointed with the university system and the level of 
teaching, and had therefore decided to study by distance learning. 
She expressed her frustration during the interview.
 [It was] really weird, because there [at university] lecturers didn’t give 
a damn at all! (…) Often, I would go to classes, teachers wouldn’t 
come. They turn up late, leave early, during exam periods they go and 
buy the newspapers … It showed so much disregard and indifference 
towards what we do.
 Natalie (22, France)
Sabrina (23) liked studying at university for the knowledge she ac-
quired, but also expressed concern at teachers’ lack of pedagogical 
skill and motivation. She recognised that there are good researchers 
who do not know how to transmit their knowledge. Valérie (23) 
mentioned the same issue, and pointed out that in specialist schools 
the problem can be similar. She also had very good lecturers at uni-
versity who were passionate about their subject. Felousiz (2001: 
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62–63) discusses the ambiguous relationship between students and 
lecturers. The relationship is generally hierarchical and broken, with 
students considered to be in a lower position. The distance and lack 
of interest displayed by lecturers could be a negative consequence 
of the massification of higher education. One’s integration into the 
university system is thus based not only on one’s motivation to study 
and adapt to new learning methods, but also on an understanding 
of the general functioning of the system.
The bridge and the tower 
Finland and France are in opposite positions regarding the transition 
from school to work. While the Finnish university system seems to 
work alongside the labour market and to guide students into working 
life to some extent, in France the university system and the labour 
market seem to operate independently of each other. 
In Finland students are able to design their own degree pro-
grammes according to their personal preferences and career plans. As 
discussed in subchapter 4.2, the respondents had used the flexibility of 
the university system to adapt their degrees to labour market demands 
and opportunities. In addition, a large number took one or more gap 
years between secondary school and higher education, during which 
they gained work experience and became familiarised with the labour 
market. Although the courses were described as rather theoretical, in 
fact all students are required to get an internship related to their field 
of study. They thus obtain a minimum of professional training as 
part of their curriculum. In this respect, the Finnish university system 
can be likened to a bridge that carries young people onto the labour 
market. One must bear in mind, however, that labour opportunities 
differ according to fields of study. Higher-education qualifications no 
longer guarantee integration into the labour market (see subchapter 
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4.2). Nevertheless, the system allows students to access both theoretical 
and practical knowledge, which eases their transition from university 
to working life. 
The French informants were rather critical of the university 
system. They described it as obsolete and out of step with current 
employability requirements, and they emphasised its inaptness to 
prepare students for entry into the labour market. They stated that 
university offers solely theoretical knowledge, with no practical and 
professional experience at all. By contrast, vocational and techno-
logical institutions provide much better-adapted qualifications and 
training. The French university system can be likened to a tower that 
leads students to accumulate theoretical knowledge and diplomas, 
and to build up individual capital. This contributes significantly to 
the phenomena of degree inflation and overqualification highlighted 
previously. However, outside of the tower, many graduates are no 
longer credible and face problems with integration, as their qualifica-
tions are not always convertible into concrete employment. 
Students in smaller institutions, such as vocational and techno-
logical establishments, accumulate work experience through profes-
sional training with businesses. Their diplomas also provide potential 
employers with a visible and comprehensible ‘label’, especially in 
terms of skills and qualifications (Académie des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques 2007: 84). Alice (23) was completing her Masters 2 at a 
technological institution (IUT), and she was very satisfied with her 
choice. She stressed the problem of having to learn lessons by heart 
at university, which she described as illogical and in contradiction 
with labour market expectations, which require autonomous and 
practical thinking.
 To me, university is not a good up-to-date system, maybe it was 
before, but now, I think it’s a bit ‘out’, because (…) firms are look-
ing for people that are operational, who know about organisational 
environments, (…) who have already acquired experience. (…) Be-
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ing in something both theoretical and practical with my work-based 
education, I often realise that theory is 100,000 miles away from 
what is really going on within companies.
 Alice (23, France)
University and the labour market tend to operate as two separate enti-
ties, two different worlds that work in parallel with each other rather 
than together, as Caroline (25) pointed out. This young woman was 
completing a Masters 2 that combined both theory and training, and 
she considered it a good way to close the wide gap between university 
education and professional life. 
 [University] is a system (…) [which is] a bit … closed! (…) which 
doesn’t really open towards the outside world. I think that bridges 
are missing actually, between university and the world of work in 
general. (…) We can have broad general knowledge, and I think it’s 
essential, (…) [but] this type of training [combining both practical 
and theoretical knowledge] should develop, in order to try to make 
a bridge between the two worlds [university and the labour market], 
because it’s almost two worlds.
 Caroline (25, France)
Table 4.4 presents the differences in unemployment rates between 
holders of diplomas from tertiary education. In both countries, 
women are more at risk than men. Individuals are generally more 
at risk of unemployment in France than in Finland. However, the 
trends are reversed between the two countries concerning types of 
higher education and unemployment. Whereas in Finland vocational 
institution degree-holders are more at risk of unemployment than 
university degree-holders (including those with Bachelors, Masters 
and Doctorate degrees), in France the latter are more at risk than 
graduates from vocational higher institutions.
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Table 4.4. Unemployment rates (percentages) among 25–64-year-olds by 
type of higher education and gender, in Finland and France, 2005. 
Finland            France
Higher 
Education         Females Males Total Females Males Total
            Percentages
University        4.4 3.7 4.0 6.6 6.3 6.4
Vocational        5.1 4.4 4.9 5.4 5.3 5.3
The data comes from OECD (2007b).
Several French informants voiced their frustration with the university 
system in terms of job prospects. They felt that students from other 
types of higher-education institution had better chances of integra-
tion into the market, and that they also had more choice, rather than 
being confined to the public sector.
 [University] is a very good system for general knowledge. But after, 
concretely, in terms of job opportunities, (…) to be honest, I think it’s 
a bit catastrophic. (…) Frankly, when you graduate from university, 
I wonder, apart from going into teaching, what you can do. 
 Florence (22, France)
 I’ve got friends, it’s incredible! (…) I have a friend who got out of 
IUT [technological higher institution], he got a job immediately, and 
he’s got opportunities to upgrade his position within the company. 
(…) It’s really in total contradiction with what we hear.
 Sabrina (23, France)
As early as the mid-1990s, Galland (1996: 46–47) stated that many 
students criticised university because it inadequately prepared them 
for professional life. The university syllabus does not provide a clearly 
defined content of competences and skills, and courses remain abstract 
and theoretical. Consequently, young people obtaining a degree at 
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university find themselves destined to work predominantly in the 
public sector, while those graduating from specialist schools (Grandes 
Ecoles) mostly join the private sector (Académie des Sciences Morales 
et Politiques 2007: 56, 71). Students graduating from technical or 
vocational higher institutions find their way into industry. In 1996 
they already represented the largest employed segment of highly 
educated young people (Galland 1996: 53, 56). 
Work or study, you have to choose!
The Finnish informants made positive remarks concerning the or-
ganisation of their study schedules. The system was perceived as 
comprehensive and flexible, and as helping them to gain work experi-
ence, related to their studies or otherwise. Students can even interrupt 
their studies for a determinate period, for instance if they decide to 
apply for work. During that interval, their enrolment remains valid, 
but they are not considered full-time students, and cannot register 
any credits or receive student benefits (University of Tampere 2009). 
The young women who were working alongside their studies appreci-
ated the ability to arrange their study and work schedules, although 
having a job was also mentioned as a possible reason for prolonging 
one’s studies.
 I’ve been working all the time when I’ve been studying. I’ve been 
working in different bars, and in schools. And it’s because we don’t 
get that much money from the government, and I didn’t wanna get 
any loan, (…) so I was working all the time, and of course sometimes 
that makes your studies last a bit longer.
 Emmi (25, Finland)
In Finland, students need to accumulate credits to receive their 
Bachelors or Masters degree. They are not constrained by academic 
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years; the total of credits is what counts. Students can also take part 
in regular prearranged exam sessions related to the independent study 
of books. This method offers flexible study time, but as explained 
previously, it can also lead to isolated learning. The French students 
are provided with more courses and contact teaching. They are com-
pelled to fulfil a certain number of courses during the academic year, 
to actively contribute to those courses, and to pass biannual exams 
if they want to be admitted to the subsequent academic year. As a 
result, the study burden is rather heavy. Some young women stressed 
the difficulties of combining studies and part-time jobs.
 The university system (…) is badly adapted to studying and having a 
job in parallel. But I’m sure that there are hundreds, thousands of stu-
dents that are either obliged to juggle the two, or are obliged to choose 
between the two, which is terrible. (…) It’s not adaptable at all. 
 Marie (24, France)
Marie (24) also gave the example of a female friend who had worked 
alongside her studies but had had to quit her job because she could 
no longer concentrate on her studies. She could continue studying 
because she received unemployment benefits for a while. Florence 
(22) stated that at some point during her studies she got a 20-hour-
a-week part-time job, and sometimes had to simply miss lectures in 
order to be able to combine the two. 
Finding part-time jobs in France can be difficult. It is sometimes 
easier to get a full-time job. The respondents clearly mentioned that 
there was a lack of flexibility from both employers and the study 
schedule that made it hard to combine study and work. This is one 
reason why many students leave university and cannot finish their 
studies. While the Finnish system to some extent bridges the gap 
between studies and professional life by offering the opportunity 
to combine study and work, the French system does not encourage 
such arrangements. From that perspective too, university and the 
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labour market act as two separate entities which do not complement 
each other. 
flexibility and rigidity: educational service or school institution?
One reason for going to university, both in Finland and in France, 
is that it is seen as a logical continuation of secondary school (see 
subchapter 4.2). Felouzis (2001: 52) claims that in France, secondary 
school has become merely a step on the educational path to higher 
education, which is the ‘natural’ step to reach. The massification 
of both secondary schooling and higher education has led to the 
transformation of the meaning of tertiary education itself, from be-
ing the privileged preserve of the higher social classes to being the 
conventional path for all to follow. Sanna Honkimäki (2001: 91–92) 
stresses that in Finland too, university today is often considered an 
extension of secondary school by many students. Studying in higher-
education institutions has become commonplace, a new social norm. 
Is university therefore becoming just another school institution? 
The flexibility of the Finnish system made it appealing, and the 
informants considered it a service for mature adults, rather than a 
school institution. They appreciated the freedom to choose various 
minor subjects, and some had even changed their major subject. 
Emmi (25) was taking courses in two universities and enjoyed the 
possibilities this offered in terms of opportunities, courses, environ-
ments and learning methods. The research participants explained that 
they selected their minor subjects on the basis of not only personal 
choice, but also future career plans and prospects (see subchapter 4.2). 
They had all been able to construct their own personalised degree 
programme, and were clearly satisfied with that aspect.
 I like the fact that (…) you’re free to study any minor that you want, 
especially in Tampere, (…) so you can have a very interesting com-
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bination of different subjects and you’re not confined to the major 
you have; you can do other things.
 Piia (24, Finland)
The Bachelors degree at the University of Tampere consists of basic 
and intermediate studies in a major subject and additional, less 
extensive studies in minor subjects. It is clearly stated that ‘students 
may, in many cases, choose their minor subjects fairly freely and even 
take course units or modules from another university’ (University 
of Tampere 2009, my emphasis). There is a ‘Flexible Study Rights 
Agreement’ (Joustava opinto-oikeus, JOO) in Finland, which allows 
both undergraduates and postgraduates to take part in courses at other 
universities and incorporate the credits obtained into their degrees 
(Joustava opinto-oikeus 2010; University of Tampere 2009). 
In addition, students are responsible for arranging their own 
timetable, and hence for the development of their own studies and 
degree: ‘the Finnish system of academic education gives students a lot 
of freedom to plan and schedule their studies. This means that plan-
ning the schedule for the academic year, i.e. choosing the subjects 
and course units, matching the times of lectures and keeping the 
schedule intensive throughout the studies, requires a lot of activity 
and responsibility on the part of the student’ (University of Tampere 
2009, my emphases). The research participants were aware of their 
role and responsibilities.
 
 We have this academic freedom, (…) you can study what you want, 
(…) teachers can teach what they want, and you can (…) make your 
own schedule, choose what courses you’re taking, and everything like 
that. For example, in England, that was totally different, it was really 
(…) like at school. People were telling [us] what to do (…). But of 
course there’s the other side that when you are told what to do, then you 
don’t have to have so much self-discipline as you have to have here.
 Maria (30, Finland)
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While Finnish students benefit from academic freedom and flex-
ibility, in France students must follow specific courses according to 
their study discipline. Some of the informants criticised the rigid 
approaches to teaching and learning, comparing them to second-
ary-school methods. Several young women explained that they still 
had to learn lecture notes by heart and regurgitate them in exams. 
Céline (23) stressed that as in secondary school, knowledge tended 
to be imposed on students rather than leading them to develop their 
own positions on issues. She was afraid of getting low grades, which 
would affect her future study path and opportunities. As in secondary 
school, grades are given considerable weight. The grades obtained 
for the Bachelors determine access to specific Masters programmes. 
Unlike in Finland, there is no automatic progression from Bachelors 
to Masters degrees in France, and students must be selected to enter 
Masters programmes. However, the young women who had studied 
in, or who knew someone who had been to, a preparatory class (lead-
ing to study in a Grande Ecole) before entering university described 
the learning methods there as strenuous, intensive, competitive and 
highly supervised. By comparison, they enjoyed having freedom at 
university and being more autonomous and independent regarding 
the methods of study.
On the other hand, some young women expressed feelings of 
‘unavoidable destiny’. They emphasised that once a student is engaged 
on a specific study path, they are destined for a job related to that 
path, as it is very difficult to change path unless one decides to start 
again from the beginning. Audrey (26) knew a male student who 
had obtained a degree in philosophy, but could not enter the labour 
market because of the limited prospects in that field. He wanted to 
do something in a different area, but had to start studying all over 
again. Nicole (21) felt that now that she had entered a particular 
discipline, she would have no opportunity to study anything else or 
to change her field of work after completing her studies. She said that 
she felt trapped on this particular path. It is therefore important to 
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make the right choice from the beginning. Many first-year students 
try out different fields of study, but they have to register as new 
first-year students each time they change. That prolongs both their 
studies and their need to find adequate financial support. The student 
grant system is means-tested, and no longer applies to young adults 
over the age of 26. Those who have obtained a degree in a particular 
field, or are halfway through their studies, cannot always afford to 
change and start again, mainly for financial reasons. In that sense, 
the rather rigid structure of the university system implicitly restricts 
one’s life direction.  
selection through failure
Once Finnish students are admitted to university, their position in 
the system is secure. They will not drop out if they do a minimum of 
study, nor be dismissed on the basis of exam failure or incompletion 
of courses. Their place depends not on passing annual examinations, 
but on gaining a certain number of credits. They can even retake 
book-study exams if they are not satisfied with the initial mark ob-
tained. Students’ places at university are guaranteed until they obtain 
their Bachelors or Masters degree. Those who have completed their 
Bachelors degree are eligible for admission to Masters programmes 
related to their major subject or a subject area close to their Bachelors 
degree (University Admissions Finland 2010; University of Tampere 
2009). 
By contrast, French students have no guarantee of retaining 
their place in the higher-education system. University is accessible to 
everyone, as there are no selective entry examinations. However, selec-
tion does operate implicitly within the university system. It operates 
through failure. Students must pass compulsory courses and exams 
if they want to be admitted to the next academic year, until they 
obtain their Bachelors or Masters. It is possible to repeat academic 
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years in cases of exam failure; students can re-register at the same 
level of study and have a second chance. Nonetheless, many drop out 
of university when they fail the exams, because these become more 
challenging as the academic years progress (Académie des Sciences 
Morales et Politiques 2007: 72). According to Galland (1996: 39), 
about a third of students dropped out before the end of their Bach-
elors in the mid-1990s. Others start work and return to study, often 
in a different field, when they have clearer ideas about their career 
plans (Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques 2007: 75). The 
informants were aware of this issue and clearly pointed it out.
 The problem with university is that they let everybody in, so you’re 
in, and each year it gets harder. In the third year not everybody gets 
their Bachelors, because they start to make it harder. They still let 
many people into Masters 1, and the problem is that they really select 
people in Masters 2.
 Florence (22, France)
 The peculiarity of the French system is that it’s accessible to all. After 
secondary school, there’s no entrance selection. (…) The selection 
happens at the end, not at the beginning. (…) We weed out at the 
end. 
 Caroline (25, France)
For those who wish to pursue a Masters, admission is not automatic. 
They must go through selection, which is often based on grades ob-
tained on their Bachelors degree as well as on an application process 
and selective examination. The French system is thus democratic in 
appearance, as it is open to all, but the structure is implicitly dis-
criminatory and strictly selective during the study path. A student’s 
position within the system is never certain, by contrast with that of 
Finnish students.
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no to business orientation!
The Finnish informants nevertheless demonstrated concern at the 
new reforms planned for the university system. The new laws have 
generated discussion and disapproval among students, and teaching 
and administration staff all over Finland. The Universities Act (see 
subchapter 4.1) aims to extend universities’ autonomy by removing 
their management from state control. It also aims to reduce study 
time and to end, or at least reduce, gap years between secondary 
school and tertiary education. The entrance exam scheme was under 
discussion during winter 2010 too. Most of the informants clearly 
stated that they disagreed with the direction the university system 
was taking. The changes were perceived as harmful, and as taking 
the currently well-functioning university system in the wrong direc-
tion. This was mainly because it might weaken students’ ability to 
control their own study path, and might also hinder the quality of 
the service that universities were initially designed to provide. Some 
respondents feared a loss of freedom, and also felt that the system 
was being transformed into a business where the focus would be on 
productivity rather than on providing a good education. 
 I don’t agree with the current situation that you have to get out of uni 
in five years, that you first study three years and do your Masters in 
two years. (…) You shouldn’t lose the freedom. (…) When I started 
at the university I thought that if I graduated in eight years I’ll be 
fine. I have no rush, and if I want to do something else in between, 
I can do it. I think that’s a very good thing.
 Piia (24, Finland)
I: I don’t like the direction it’s going to. (…) I always thought that 
universities [were] something more like a service than a business. (…) 
They are sort of directing it towards a business way of thinking
R:  How, do you feel?
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 157 
I:  For example, (…) you have to have results, certain kind of results 
from everything. Well, not all the things in universities are supposed 
to give very concrete results. For example, (…) arts: I don’t know what 
kind of results they are expecting to get there. (…) You can’t have the 
same rules with everything. So I think universities and science, free 
scientific [thinking], and free scientific research, is a value in itself. And 
this (…) way of thinking, directing the university to business-minded 
thinking, I’m not sure that’s the best way to secure it.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
The university’s change of direction towards ‘business-minded think-
ing’, as Päivi (25) put it, which is implied by the new reform, was 
clearly stipulated in the June 2009 document The Universities Act 
Promulgated, by Minister Henna Virkkunen (2009): ‘The government 
will continue to guarantee sufficient core funding tied to the rise in 
costs for the universities. In addition, the universities will be able to 
apply for competed public funding and use the revenue from their 
business ventures, donations and bequeaths and the return on their 
capital for financing their operations’ (my emphasis). This clearly 
indicates the goal of the reform and the new direction the Finnish 
university system is taking.
Conclusion: Divergences between education systems
Finnish and French respondents agreed that the quality of teach-
ing could be improved, as could guidance and career advice before 
and during university studies. However, the young women’s general 
opinions of their university systems strongly diverged on some points. 
The Finnish informants expressed satisfaction with the system as a 
whole, and with their studies, the degree of freedom to build their 
own curriculum, the flexibility of the system for working students, 
and the compatibility of their studies with labour market demands, 
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which led to good opportunites to enter working life. By contrast, 
the French informants criticised the general structure of the system, 
the rigid organisation of the curriculum, the lack of consideration 
for working students, the discriminatory and selective aspects of the 
system, and its inaptness to provide students with adequate tools to 
join the labour market. 
Nonetheless, although Finnish participants showed satisfaction 
with the current system, they were worried by the new direction it 
was taking following the Universities Act. In their opinion, the new 
laws were about to damage a well-functioning institution, making 
the situation worse rather than ameliorating it. Several young women 
who had been exchange students in France and England hoped that 
the Finnish system would not be changed to follow a more European 
model. Paradoxically, the French Ministry of Education is closely 
interested in the Finnish education system thanks to the latter’s re-
cent success in the OECD Pisa ranking, and is planning educational 
reforms inspired by the Finnish system (see Jost 2007).
4.4 Different historical Ideologies, 
Different higher-education systems
The research informants had gone to university in response to a 
growing socio-cultural norm: obtaining a higher-education degree. 
Nonetheless, as discussed above, entering higher education is also the 
result of economic restructuring, unemployment and degree inflation. 
The young women were aware of the current situation and tried to 
adapt to structural flows. They modified their curriculum or chose the 
type of degree or institution that would provide them with adequate 
skills and increase their chances on the labour market. At the same 
time, their attempts to keep control over their own life paths were 
notable. The French informants suggested that university had become 
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a stage during which to decide one’s life direction. Students use the 
education system in a way very different from its original purpose: as 
a stage of experimentation and transition to adulthood, rather than 
as a merely educational institution. Furthermore, the respondents 
(both Finnish and French) stressed that many students prolong their 
studies and take shelter within the known and secure environment 
of the education system. This can be perceived as a response to the 
present socio-economic conditions; however, it might also be a way 
to contest the lack of control over one’s own destiny. Prevailing social 
norms presume that there is a time for studying based on age, a time 
to enter working life, a time to start a family, a time to become adult. 
What if this imposed timing did not suit everybody? Some individuals 
develop at a different pace than others. It might be pertinent to ask 
whether assumed ‘norms’ now seem obsolete to a growing number 
of young people.
The most significant difference between the Finnish and French 
university systems lies at the level of the transition from school to 
work. The Finnish university system appears to work alongside the 
labour market and lead students towards working life. The informants 
used its flexibility to build their own degrees and take a variety of 
courses they considered useful for their career plans. Moreover, they 
had the opportunity to acquire working experience (related to their 
degree or otherwise) and become familiarised with the labour market, 
as they took gap years before and/or during their higher-education 
path and could work alongside their studies. They could also prolong 
their studies if needed. The system allows students to gain not only 
theoretical and academic knowledge, but also practical skills. In that 
respect, it provides students with most of the skills needed on the 
labour market, and attempts to prepare them adequately to enter 
working life, like a bridge across a river. 
By contrast, the French system is much more rigid, and seems 
to work separately from the labour market. The informants openly 
criticised this weakness. They felt that the system did not prepare 
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them for working life, as it offered only theoretical knowledge with 
almost no practical or professional skills. Students rarely take gap 
years before higher education in France, and therefore might gain 
less work experience than their Finnish counterparts. Many students 
work alongside their studies or during the summer, but combining 
studies and work is difficult because of the lack of flexibility in both 
study and work schedules. The university system does not encourage 
students to take part in working life. It concentrates essentially on 
providing academic knowledge and accumulating individual capital. 
In this respect, the system resembles a solid tower, in which students 
gain credibility through their status and qualifications. However, their 
position weakens and loses its power outside the tower, because of 
their lack of familiarity with the labour market and their difficulties in 
converting educational credentials into professional occupations.
Finnish and French young women’s experiences of university 
and study vary considerably between the two countries. The Finnish 
higher-education system offers a homogeneous structure, with only 
two possibilities: the academic path at university, or the vocational 
path in universities of applied sciences. In contrast, the French system 
comprises a combination of various educational apparatuses, all very 
distinct from each other, which offer various types of credentials and 
study paths. The system is split between institutions and the different 
value attributed to them. The students’ financial support scheme fol-
lows the same model. In Finland, financial aid is universally provided 
to all students, whereas in France, a selected number of students can 
obtain a range of aid and allowances on the basis of their socio-eco-
nomic background and/or study results. 
According to Risto Alapuro (2005; 2010), the different histori-
cal events that occurred in the two countries led to different social 
structures, and also to different modes of popular political representa-
tion. After the French Revolution, the building of the Republic was 
the priority, and associations were proscribed because they might 
have been attempts to revive the group interests that the Revolution 
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had condemned. In Finland, efforts were concentrated on building 
the nation. The people, represented by various associations, played 
an essential role in that process. In France, the state developed as a 
separate entity, controlling the people through the strict regulation 
of representative associations, and thereby distancing itself from the 
people. In Finland, the people and the state cooperated to build the 
nation. For that reason, Finnish society is more cohesive and homo-
geneous, and also more transparent. The lack of clear representation 
of the different groups in France has produced a situation in which 
society and the people are much more abstract entities. The people’s 
identity is ambiguous and the society is greatly divided, with a variety 
of coexisting atomised groups. Following this model, the Finnish 
education system has remained largely consistent and accessible to 
various groups, whereas the French system is segmented and unequal 
in terms of the quality of institutions, the value of qualifications, and 
the representation of different social classes within the different types 
of institution. Individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds are 
still under-represented in elite specialist schools (Grandes Ecoles).
The Finnish respondents felt that the higher-education system 
and the uniform financial support offered to students provided equal 
opportunities and chances to everyone. In France, the informants 
referred to financial opportunities as a crucial issue. Social class was 
not openly mentioned, but their comments regarding the financial 
difficulties of numerous students, uneven financial support, and the 
tuition fees required by elite specialist schools all suggested an inequal-
ity of opportunities according to socio-economic background. This 
is in line with Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron’s (1977) 
argument, which stresses that the French education system fulfils 
an implicit role of ‘social selection’ through ‘academic selection’. In 
other words, the education system has a hidden social function: to 
maintain social privileges and hierarchy. ‘Social selection’ is legitimated 
under the guise of the ‘technical selection’ conducted during course 
exams, entrance exams and competitive selective examinations. The 
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privileges of the groups who possess a legal socio-economic monopoly 
are maintained through the rules of access to elite institutions (Par-
kin 1979: 58). The chances of entering higher education, and of 
succeeding and upgrading one’s social status, are therefore largely 
predetermined and implicitly regulated. Educational chances are not 
equal for everyone. This is evident in the strictly selective and limited 
access to elite institutions. 
The massification of education in France has provided individu-
als from lower social classes with an opportunity to become highly 
educated. However, hierarchical selection continues to operate, albeit 
at a different level, namely through the types of tertiary establish-
ment that young people enter. University seems to be the place for 
underprivileged social groups, since access is free and effortless, while 
Grandes Ecoles remain primarily privileged institutions for the children 
of the higher social classes, who can afford the financial costs and 
possess an adequate cultural background to negotiate their way in. 
Timothy B. Smith (2004: 199) emphasises that a large number of 
students get a university degree. However, the university infrastruc-
ture has not adapted to the growing number of students. Universities 
are overcrowded and underequipped, and lack financial resources. 
Moreover, the value of university degrees is questionable, as they 
are not always recognised on the labour market or compatible with 
the market’s current needs. By contrast, the number of students in 
Grandes Ecoles is low, there are few graduates, and the infrastructure 
is smaller and more adapted to both students’ needs and labour 
market demands. The majority of students earn valuable diplomas 
that guarantee them a secure job and direct access to high-ranking 
professional positions. The French higher-education system appears 
divided and hierarchical, and also seems to contribute to and perpetu-
ate existing social divisions and hierarchies.
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5.
 enTerIng WorKIng lIfe
Advanced countries’ socio-economic structures have undergone sig-
nificant changes since the 1960s. Transformations have occurred at 
the social, political, economic, educational and cultural levels, and 
have generated a new post-industrial context where life paths are no 
longer predictable. Traditional strategies of integration into the labour 
market, and ultimately into society, have become more complicated, 
particularly for young people. Indeed, as explained in the previous 
chapter, there is no guarantee of obtaining or keeping a stable job, even 
with tertiary-education diplomas. The current economic apparatus 
offers new professional opportunities, yet presents uncertain prospects 
to young people, who are very vulnerable to economic upheavals. 
Young people’s integration into the wider societal context today is 
compromised by their lack of opportunities to achieve stable positions 
on the labour market (Holdsworth and Morgan 2005). The shift from 
the industrial to the service era has generated an increase in fixed-term 
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contracts and low-paid and part-time work, which challenges young 
people’s routes to independence (see Jones 1995).
Simultaneously, social values have shifted towards a more in-
dividualistic perception of life, and the meaning of work has been 
transformed, from being a means to survive and earn a salary to be-
ing a means of personal fulfilment. A twofold situation is therefore 
occurring: changes in access to work, and also transformations in the 
values attached to work (Inglehart 1997). 
All informants from both countries clearly said that they wanted 
to have a job that they liked. In most cases, this was more important 
than having a good salary. They wanted enough money to be finan-
cially independent and live a decent life, but having an enjoyable and 
interesting job related to their personal values was their priority. 
People’s lives are increasingly entangled in a variety of structural 
risks produced by the postmodern development of Western societies 
(Beck 1992). That development involved the conditions that led to 
major transformations in the structural apparatus of advanced so-
cieties from the 1960s onwards. This major shift has disrupted the 
traditional foundations of existence and generated new ontological 
insecurities. Self-identity is increasingly tied to individual choice, self-
monitoring and self-reflexivity (Giddens 1984; 1991; Sweetman 2003: 
530). Postmodern conditions have brought new dilemmas that chal-
lenge individuals’ lives. Individuals have to face new constraints, new 
doubts, and a growing sense of insecurity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
1995). One’s destiny seems increasingly to rest with oneself, although 
it is still undeniably influenced by a web of external structural forces. 
Indeed, although postmodern theories suggest that life in Western 
societies has become ‘fluid’, the socio-economic apparatus still greatly 
influences individuals. It has changed, but it keeps on operating as a 
foundation for people’s lives. People still construct their identities on 
the basis of reflections of the environment in which they live.
Young people today are experiencing the transition to adult-
hood within that context. The informants in my study were all 
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young women and university students. A large number studied in 
the humanities or social sciences and planned to work in the public 
sector. Others followed a work-based curriculum and aimed to join 
the private sector. These factors greatly influenced their perceptions 
of the labour market and their expectations of working life. In this 
sense, how did the young women in my study actually view economic 
restructuring? How did they situate themselves in the current con-
text? And did their perceptions of the transition from university to 
the labour market match experts’ claims regarding young people’s 
integration into working life?
In the following subchapters I will discuss the labour market 
as observed by my informants, how they consider their positions in 
the economic sphere, and how they place their own interpretations 
within the economic contexts of Finland and France. 
5.1 More Than Work: Self-Fulfilment
 I think most people want to do something that feels right for them, 
and not just a random job, [that is,] most people who go to university. 
(…) Maybe the people who go to [vocational higher education] are 
less oriented in thinking that they have to do something that really 
fits their soul.
 Johanna (26, Finland)
 I don’t consider at all doing something I don’t like. (…) I won’t 
choose a job just for the sake of it or out of duty. (…) I couldn’t … 
I couldn’t! 
 Céline (23, France)
Finnish and French respondents alike clearly stated that they needed 
to have a job they would enjoy. That factor was central, more so 
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than the issue of earnings. Some young women were aware that their 
preference was specific to university students and by gender. They 
felt that vocational students, especially young men, were much more 
career-oriented and focused on financial rewards. The informants 
did not say that money did not matter at all – they clearly wanted to 
earn enough to be financially independent and have a decent lifestyle 
– but their priority was to have a job related to their personal values 
and interests.
Most informants knew what job they wanted to do. Some were 
not sure yet what field they would work in, and some (in France) 
simply did not know at all what they would do. Several informants 
in both countries planned to work in the public sector and become 
schoolteachers or social workers. Working for associations such as 
Non-Governmental Organisations was a popular choice too. Others 
wished to obtain professional jobs in the private sector, for instance as 
journalists or translators, for a private company, or as freelancers.
My respondents’ perspectives on the labour market and their 
opportunities for integration were greatly influenced by their current 
positions as university students, and by their personal values. This in 
turn guided their future work plans and career expectations. They 
perceived the labour market in relation to their own subjective goals 
and positions, rather than impartially.
Furthermore, the division between the working and personal 
spheres seemed to have faded, with young women choosing their 
careers on the basis of personal passions and ethics rather than merely 
in order to earn a living. For instance, those who had humanitarian 
values wanted to work for Non-Governmental organisations or in 
environmentally friendly companies. They wished to have fulfilling, 
interesting and meaningful work that would bring them satisfaction 
and allow self-development and self-realisation. They pointed out 
that finding any old job was easy, but getting the job that would fulfil 
their expectations would be difficult. 
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Many had changed their study path in accordance with labour 
market demands, but still related to their personal interests and 
values. They had to search for a career path that would meet both 
labour market opportunities and their own requirements for indi-
vidual fulfilment. Some were aware that their study choices did not 
always match the best possible chances of future work, but they were 
determined to find work in their preferred domain. They knew that 
patience would be required, but were rather hopeful. 
Passion and meaning versus salary
 As [for] voluntary work, I’ve done quite a lot of it, but I hope in 
the future I can actually live on it (…). I’d like to do work that I’m 
interested in, rather than getting a lot of money for something I don’t 
really care about. (…) I would hate to end up in such a job that I 
would (…) have to justify myself every morning (…) ‘Yes, you do 
have to go there, because you need to pay the rent (…).’ 
 Päivi (25, Finland)
 Most of my friends here are humanists, so they don’t get to university 
because of money. But I know also people who just go [to higher 
education] because they’ll get more salary afterwards. (…) My friends 
(…) who went mostly to a [vocational higher institution], (…) they 
just had in mind to get well-paid positions. 
 Tuuli (25, Finland)
The values attached to work today are connected to the shift from 
modernity to postmodernity, in which the focus is essentially on the 
individual. Postmodernity consists in a shift in survival strategies, from 
maximising economic growth to maximising survival and well-being 
through lifestyle changes (Inglehart 1997: 23, 338). The transforma-
tion of industrial into post-industrial societies generated new sets of 
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values and lifestyles, particularly among the younger generations. The 
motives for working have changed too. The emphasis is increasingly 
on finding interesting and meaningful work, rather than maximising 
one’s income and job security (Inglehart 1997: 44). Young people 
want a job that is enjoyable, gratifying, and a direct expression of their 
identities (Arnett 2004: 157). However, that also depends on social 
origins, level of education, employment sector, and the individual. 
It does not apply to every social being. Nevertheless, my Finnish and 
French respondents alike seemed to hold that view. 
Suvi (25, Finland) was working part-time alongside her stud-
ies, and clearly stated that it was nothing more than a means to earn 
a living. Once she had obtained her degree she would seek more 
meaningful work. Tiia (26, Finland) distinguished between working 
only for money and working for pleasure too.
R:  What do you think will be the most difficult in your transition from 
university (…) to working life?
I:  I think it’s finding a job which I want, and not a job any more which 
I have to do. (…) Working is not the problem; finding the work is, 
(…) and finding one which you enjoy.
 Tiia (26, Finland)
Florence (22, France) explained that it is always possible and even 
rather easy to find low-skilled and precarious jobs, but it is much 
more difficult to get a stable and enjoyable job that also allows one 
to build one’s own life and construct something special. The main 
goal for Caroline (25, France) was to have a job related to her ideals, 
values and ideas, something that would contribute to her personal 
blossoming and inner fulfilment. Nicole (21, France) had done many 
low-skilled jobs, and had suffered from the pressures of productivity 
and the demanding working environment. She truly felt exploited, 
and stressed that having that kind of job for the rest of her life was 
out of the question, as it would be unbearable. According to a survey 
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conducted in Finland among the economically active population, hav-
ing an interesting job is the most important thing for most workers, 
far more than salary levels. Income is necessary for living expenses 
and leisure activities, but the meaning and level of self-satisfaction 
generated by one’s job is central (Vehviläinen 2010).
 I would like to do a job which is more like a passion, (…) a job that 
gives motivation and meaning to what I’m doing, not just getting 
up, doing my office hours and coming back home, but [a job] that 
gives meaning to my actions. 
 Marie (24, France)
Like Marie (24, France), Päivi (25, Finland) wanted to work for 
Non-Governmental Organisations and held strong humanitarian 
values. She hoped to get meaningful work that would be valuable 
to society, rather than simply earning money. Both informants had 
oriented their studies in that direction. Valérie (23, France) wished to 
work in community associations because of her personal upbringing 
and values. Her parents had been involved in community work, and 
she planned to follow in their footsteps. Joining a specific cause and 
putting her heart into her actions was very important to her.
Elina (26, Finland) indicated that her mother still had a conven-
tional and modern perspective on work. She said that for her mother, 
work was mostly a means to earn money, rather than a personal quest 
for self-gratification and achievement. Finnish and French inform-
ants alike distinguished themselves from their parents in relation to 
their views of work. Several of them explained that their parents had 
started working in a particular sector simply to earn an income. Some 
of them had later studied or retrained in order to enter another oc-
cupation or gain a promotion. Unlike their daughters, they did not 
go into education specifically to obtain a job related to their values 
or personal interests. For them, work was a necessity, a practicality, 
a value in itself, and the logical path of life to follow. 
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In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1995 [1904–
05]), Max Weber claimed that in order to function and progress, 
the capitalist system needed people to be devoted to the calling of 
money (1995: 72). However, in accordance with Protestant ethics, 
money should be a reward for doing one’s job well, rather than being 
a purely individual reward. Wealth should be pursued as the fruit 
of one’s labour, in response to God’s blessings (Weber 1995: 172). 
The respondents’ parents had a different ethic than that portrayed 
in Weber’s model, such that they worked essentially for money, but 
also for their own needs and enjoyment. Many young people still 
follow this principle today; nonetheless, a growing number, includ-
ing my informants, expect new rewards from work. Before the shift 
to postmodernity, for a large percentage of people work was a tool 
for the construction of personal and social identity and self-worth 
(Bauman 1998: 27). Individuals, especially men, primarily defined 
themselves through their occupation or professional achievements. 
Occupational status and financial success greatly contributed to 
one’s social and personal identity. This still holds true for a large 
part of the labour force, but economic upheavals, uncertainty and 
unemployment are challenging individuals’ identity-building and 
self-value related to work. In addition, the shift to postmodernity 
brought cultural changes in people’s attitudes to work and quality 
of life. The system of values has acquired new dimensions, such as 
questioning and searching for deeper meaning in life, and emphasising 
subjective well-being (see Inglehart 1997). Many people value work 
today through its capacity to generate pleasure and self-realisation. 
Work is a matter of aesthetic satisfaction, and is used by the worker 
as a means to give more meaning to life, rather than being the thing 
that defines their life (Bauman 1998: 32–36). All the Finnish and 
French young women I interviewed shared this new set of values. They 
emphasised getting a job that was not just interesting and fulfilling, 
but would also give meaning to their lives. 
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In addition, the young women had integrated certain feminist 
principles into their everyday lives. Independence, self-realisation, ac-
cess to professional status and a re-evaluation of family roles are values 
for which the previous generation of women fought in the 1960s. My 
informants grew up in a context in which these ideologies, developed 
by the women’s movement, were to some extent already established 
and/or were perpetuated by their mothers (Aronson 2008).
Work as ‘part’ of life rather than ‘work as life’
Melinda Mills and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (2005) argue that global 
changes have led to new international uncertainties that have im-
pacted on national structures. National institutional filters, such 
as the employment system, education system, welfare regime and 
family systems, have been affected, and have in turn generated new 
ambiguities at the individual level. Individuals’ decision-making and 
habitus are likely to have been altered as a result. A transformation 
in young people’s values and patterns of transition to adulthood has 
also resulted from this restructuring. 
The shift to postmodernity has increased not just existential 
insecurity but also insecurities of identity, with the creation of new 
ambivalences and contradictions (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002). Individuals have become more focused on their own identities 
and quests for personal happiness and self-realisation. At the same 
time, the concept of identity has become ambiguous. Alongside the 
rise of postmodern values, the traditional mindset or habitus has been 
transformed, and the degree of reflexivity has intensified (Sweetman 
2003: 542). The era of the reflexive habitus is nevertheless a response 
to contemporary uncertainties, such as the unpredictability of working 
life. In this regard Anthony Giddens (1984: 25) mentions the duality 
of the social structure, which both enables and constrains people.
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Before the 1960s, individuals’ identities (at the personal and 
social levels) were fairly stable, and were determined by coherent 
social practices and structures such as social class, gender and em-
ployment (Wagner, cit. Sweetman 2003: 530). Today, autonomous 
self-construction plays an important role, and is essentially based on 
freedom of choice and opportunity. Moreover, rather than letting 
work determine their identity, a growing number of individuals merge 
their personal values with their occupation. Work is where they can 
express their values, and it reflects their ethical choices. This is a dual 
process: work is influenced by individuals’ principles, and also offers 
them a social position. 
According to John H. Goldthorpe (1982: 167), the change from 
Fordism to post-Fordism has given rise to a service class of public 
sector employees, private economic services and social services. In 
contrast to waged workers in the manufacturing sector, service-class 
workers enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in their work, trust (from 
their employers), and moral commitment to their work and their or-
ganisation. This gives rise to a distinction between an instrumentalist 
orientation and a bureaucratic orientation (Goldthorpe et al. 1968: 
38–40; Goldthorpe 1984: 17–18). Both orientations are connected 
to a process of exchange between employers or organisations and 
employees. The instrumentalist orientation involves a labour contract. 
Instrumentalists are work-oriented labourers, for whom work is a 
means to acquire the income necessary to live. Work is experienced 
as mere labour, and as a mandatory and instrumental activity. The 
workers’ lives are dichotomised between work and non-work activi-
ties. In addition, the labour contract implies direct control by the 
employers over their employees, in order to maintain an adequate 
level of effort in their work. Bureaucratics have a different relationship 
to their work and their employers. Employers agree to delegate their 
authority to their expert employees, who have responsibilities and a 
certain degree of autonomy. In return, employees offer their knowl-
edge, expertise and commitment. However, their level of performance 
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depends on their moral commitment to the organisation. In this case, 
the labour contract does not involve employers’ monitoring of their 
employees, but rather rests on a strong moral investment from the 
latter. In exchange for their services and commitment, they receive 
an income and other benefits. The most prized rewards are personal 
recognition from the organisation (for being a competent and loyal 
worker), status and career advancement, rather than mere payment. 
Career achievement thus becomes a source of social identity.  Unlike 
the instrumentalists, bureaucratics’ lives are not divided between 
work and non-work. Many forge bonds with colleagues that extend 
beyond the workplace. In addition, individual personality, morals 
and ethics are not set aside at work, but are implicated in the tasks 
to be performed (Goldthorpe et al. 1968: 38–40; Goldthorpe 1984: 
17–18; 2000: 217–218). 
Work is thus still a means of survival, but the subjective dimen-
sion is increasingly important in working life. In particular, highly 
educated young people endorse post-materialist values. While their 
elders focused primarily on the material dimension of work, young 
people concentrate on the personal dimension. Their work orientation 
involves a commitment to the organisation. However, it is important 
to remember that education levels, gender, social background and 
employment status impact significantly on that orientation (Epiphane 
and Sulzer 2008: 57–58). At first glance it seems that young people 
value work much less than their elders did, and engage increasingly in 
free-time activities and personal interests. However, in reality they still 
place great importance on work, but do so in the form of individual 
commitment, and often in relation to their personal values.  They 
still value work, but from a different perspective than that of their 
elders, and no less than the other spheres of life. Work is no longer 
their dominant commitment, but is one of many such commitments 
(Tchernia 2005: 212–214). All my informants supported these ob-
servations. Sabrina (23, France) wished to have a job related to her 
passions that would not take up too much space or time in her life. 
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She did not want to be a busy white-collar worker like her father, or 
to have a stressful job which would affect her well-being and life as 
a whole. Suvi (25, Finland) and Florence (22, France) clearly stated 
that work should be a part of rather than the whole of life.
R:  What do you think in general about the world of work? How do you 
view the world of work?
I:  What comes to my mind is that it’s too central in Finland in peoples’ 
life, and it’s like essential for you. I know people who just work and 
work and work and it’s, if you lose your job, it’s like you lose [eve-
rything]. And I don’t like (…) that … (…) I would like that you’d 
have something else in your life, (…) not just work.
 Suvi (25, Finland)
 I don’t want – and many young people agree with this – I don’t want 
my work to become my whole life. (…) I have many interests, and 
I want a job [teaching] that will allow me to do what I like and do 
other things, such as travelling.
 Florence (22, France)
According to Jean-François Tchernia (2005: 205–209), young people 
view work as both a means of subsistence and a means of personal 
development, and see work and private life as equally important. 
Work has thus gained a double value. It must bring financial stability 
but also allow personal realisation. According to the 1999 European 
Values Survey, among 18–29-year-olds, personal development and 
salary were valued over working conditions or social dimensions (such 
as work stability or usefulness to society) in Finland and France alike, 
with a slight emphasis on salary in Finland (Tchernia 2005: 211). A 
large number of young people endorse moral commitment as a work 
value. They seem ready to get involved in work on condition that it 
give meaning to their lives. They are less ready to get just any kind 
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of job, unlike most of their elders. They expect their job to bring 
them satisfaction, self-fulfilment and potential for advancement, to 
provide for their family, and to give them the opportunity to enjoy 
their personal lives (Epiphane and Sulzer 2008: 80). The rest of life 
is regarded as no less important than work, and that presumes that 
one already has an interesting job. 
Ronald Inglehart (1997: 132, 152) argues that individuals’ value 
systems reflect their subjective sense of economic and social security 
during their formative years. The level of economic security they 
experienced as children significantly shapes their adult attitudes and 
beliefs. However, young people are very heterogeneous when it comes 
to values and attitudes. Young people from lower social backgrounds 
and those who have attained lower educational levels tend to give a 
higher value to work. Highly educated individuals who have gained 
responsibility and developed their professional careers, as well as 
highly educated youths who are disillusioned with the current labour 
market, have changed their attitudes towards work and adopted a 
more individualistic and postmodern stance. In addition, life expe-
rience, generation, and the state of the national economy all affect 
young people’s value systems (Tchernia 2005: 218–224). 
In 2006, the Swedish polling organisation Kairos Future Institute 
conducted the European Youth in a Global Context 2007 opinion 
survey of values and attitudes with 22,000 young people aged 16–29 
and 300 adults aged 30–50 (in order to analyse similarities and differ-
ences between age groups) (see Stellinger and Wintrebert (eds) 2008). 
The survey was conducted in 17 countries, including European and 
Asian countries and the United States. Finland and France were part of 
the study. The findings of this survey match my respondents’ percep-
tions of work. The results show that French and Scandinavian youths 
seek meaning, symbolic rewards and personal achievement from their 
profession. They value work highly when they feel it offers personal 
fulfilment. However, this perspective was held primarily by highly edu-
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cated young people. Getting a high salary was mentioned most often 
by lower-educated informants (Epiphane and Sulzer 2008: 64–67). 
Conclusion: Working for a purpose
Young people do not reject work, but they do not want it to over-
whelm their private lives. Work per se has lost its aura and grand 
value, but has become a domain that can express new values, such as 
self-realisation and enriching personal development. Young people 
do not deny work, but they contest and dismiss the conventional 
social norms attached to it (Tchernia 2005: 226–227). 
All my informants considered work as a means to better them-
selves and express their individual capacities, and as a way to give 
meaning to their lives. In their opinion, life could no longer be merely 
centred on work. Personal life, interests and passions are valuable parts 
of existence that should be pushed into the foreground rather than 
kept in the background. The traditionally separate spheres of public 
and private life (corresponding to work and personal or family life) 
are therefore increasingly connected. They even seem to merge and 
complement each other, with work used as a tool to improve personal 
life and promote personal ethics and values. Highly educated young 
women do not reject work, but they strongly contest the traditional 
values attached to it. They want to work, but to work with a par-
ticular purpose and meaning, not just for the simple fact of having 
to earn an income. 
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5.2 Young Women in the labour Market
R:  How do you view the world of work in general?
I:  That’s a good question. To be honest, I don’t really know, ’cause for me 
it’s quite natural to do a lot of things, (…) for example (…) voluntary 
work. And I don’t consider it as work, really, it’s just something I do. 
(…) But I guess that’s work in a way as well. I guess work could be 
called something like an activity that I’m committed to doing. 
 Päivi (25, Finland)
 [There was] a time when [you] didn’t look for work; work was looking 
for you!
 Caroline (25, France)
How young women position themselves in the labour market, and 
how do they perceive their own integration? From a comparative 
perspective, there were visible differences between Finland and France 
in a number of respects. Finnish and French informants held similar 
opinions on numerous points. They were rather critical, and viewed 
integration into working life as a complex problem because of the 
considerable hostility and demands of the labour market. They clearly 
perceived the contradictions between working life and personal de-
sires, such as the desire to start a family. Nevertheless, while the 
Finnish respondents felt fairly confident about their integration and 
seemed to accept the instability of early employment, the French 
displayed rather strong pessimism and fear about their integration 
and the future. The last two sections of this subchapter investigate 
differences of opinion between informants from the two countries. 
Is the labour market hostile towards young women?
Most French and some Finnish informants believed that the transi-
tion to working life was easier for those who had a degree from a 
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vocational institution, because university degrees were too abstract 
and lacked practicality (see subchapter 4.3). Private-sector employers 
in particular perceive university degrees as abstract because students’ 
practical skills are invisible. The demand for university degrees is still 
high in the public sector, which offers positions such as teaching, 
social work and the civil service. The path to integration into the 
labour market is clearer for vocational degree-holders after graduation, 
because their curriculum leads to specific professions in a particular 
area of employment, usually in the private sector. Most of my in-
formants wished to join the public sector, and needed a university 
degree. Others planned to work for private companies. Nevertheless, 
interviewees from both countries understood the concrete practical 
difficulties of obtaining work. They complained at having to prove 
their skills to potential employers more than vocational degree hold-
ers needed to do, and at having to constantly ‘sell themselves’ during 
job interviews. This was even felt as degrading.
R:  What do you consider as the most difficult issue when university 
students enter working life? (…)
I:  I think finding a job, and you know, selling yourself. (…)
R:  Do you feel that people now actually, or young people, have to sell 
themselves often?
I:  It depends on the field that they have been studying, but I think, 
when you don’t have specific qualifications for some jobs, then you 
have to somehow sell yourself.
 Elina (26, Finland)
I:  When I tell [my parents] I’m looking for a job and I say I’ve been to 
job interviews, they say they have never been to job interviews. (…) 
They don’t have any experience of selling yourself, and telling your 
strong points.
 Sanna (24, Finland)
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Marie (24, France) described how stressful and even humiliating 
her job interviews had been, even for simple low-paid jobs or short 
internships. She had felt as if she were on trial. Nonetheless, she 
recognised that it was necessary, because of the competition for jobs 
and the demands of selection. 
Some informants raised the issue of the exploitation of young 
people. Sanna (24, Finland) believed that finding work was more and 
more difficult, and that it felt as if companies were ‘just created to 
exploit people, like, they are not following the laws, or they find some 
ways not to’. She added that being a good worker no longer helped to 
protect one’s position, that good workers were no longer rewarded for 
their work or commitment to a company. She felt people were used 
and exploited when needed, but discarded when unneeded. Nadège 
(21, France) and Nicole (21, France) shared the same perspective, 
feeling that people were used like pawns. 
Although the Finnish informants pinpointed negative aspects 
of the labour market, overall they were more hopeful than their 
French counterparts regarding their future labour market integration 
and working life. The French informants who viewed the market 
negatively still believed they would be integrated into it. However, 
although some adapted their degrees to market demands in order to 
increase their working opportunities, they still feared the ‘big ma-
chine’ and the unknown. As mentioned above, Marie (24, France) 
was frightened by the recruitment system and the pressure put on 
people to sell their skills, and Caroline (25, France) compared the 
market to a frightening labyrinth. Alice (23, France) was studying in 
a vocational higher institution, and was already working part-time as 
part of her work-based training. Yet surprisingly, she was still afraid 
of the world of work. 
R:  What is your vision of the world of work, in general?
I:  Well, there are a lot of people around me who don’t like it! (…) I 
think it’s a harsh environment. It depends on the occupation, but 
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in my case, regarding the kind of responsible occupation I’m aiming 
for, I think it’s a rather merciless world. You always need to be rigor-
ous, very professional, and there’s always a lot of pressure. (…) It’s a 
merciless [world], (…) a sink-or-swim situation, and there’s so much 
competition too. 
 Alice (23, France)
The French young women perceived the market as very demanding 
in terms of qualifications, knowledge and experience, and clearly 
stated that gaining experience was a problem because internships 
and training places were difficult to obtain. The labour market was 
viewed as a big machine that one has to fight one’s way into, and 
once inside it one has to fight again to maintain one’s position. For 
students who are working during gap years or part-time alongside 
their studies, the school-to-work transition is smoother once they 
have entered the labour market, as is the case for many Finnish 
youths. By contrast, those joining the market after the completion 
of their degree are new entrants, and are therefore more vulnerable 
to uncertainty, precarity and discrimination from employers. Many 
French graduates therefore enter badly paid training programmes in 
order to acquire the experience required by employers and companies, 
and get involved in work that is below the level of their qualifications 
(Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques 2007: 20–21; Erhel et 
al. 2010: 213). 
The proportion of women obtaining higher-education diplomas 
and entering the labour force has greatly increased; however, their 
integration is horizontal, or in other words, segregated by sector (Fur-
long and Cartmel 1997: 30). Women with less or no education are 
seriously disadvantaged, and are likely to experience unemployment 
and precarity. Lower-educated men are losing out too, but not as 
extensively as women (Baudelot and Establet 2000: 141). According 
to Alestalo (1991), although the number of women in the Finnish 
labour force increased considerably between 1970 and 1985, their 
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proportion in the private sector did not change much. Their numbers 
rose particularly in the public sector. In addition, within the private 
sector, women occupied lower-skilled professions, or their propor-
tion rose in professions that were already female-dominated, such 
as pharmacists, teachers, librarians or social workers. Their number 
increased throughout the years in previously male-dominated occu-
pations, such as lawyers, university teachers or journalists, but their 
proportion in these occupations remained significantly inferior to that 
of men (Alestalo 1991: 24). The labour force is thus concentrated in 
specific professions according to gender. Men and women hold dif-
ferent kinds of occupational and hierarchical position on the labour 
market. Horizontal (occupational) and vertical (hierarchical) segrega-
tion has diminished, but positions remain divided between men and 
women in the higher-status occupations. The structure of segregation 
itself might be changing, with some male-dominated jobs, such as 
veterinaries or doctors, becoming feminised, but in many sectors 
segregation continues (Kolehmainen 1999: 8–10, 105–110).
Among 25–64-year-olds in Finland and France in 2008, males 
dominated in higher working positions, such as lawyers or manag-
ers. Among professionals, the number of men and women was fairly 
even. However, more females than males were in assistant roles, 
or had a low-skilled (or elementary) occupation (Eurostat 2010a). 
Osmo Kivinen and Risto Rinne (1996: 302) claim that the divisions 
between men and women during education are perpetuated on the 
labour market. Men dominate some sectors and women others, and 
a larger proportion of women have gained secure occupational status 
in the wake of the expansion of education. Nonetheless, more women 
tend to occupy middle-professional levels, while men continue to 
dominate in higher-status positions. 
Compared to older age groups, young people are very likely to 
have a part-time job, particularly in Finland (see Table 5.1). That 
might also be because students work part-time. Nevertheless, in both 
countries, more women than men have part-time jobs, especially in 
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France. Moreover, while in Finland younger women are more likely 
than older women to have a part-time job, in France women from 
both age groups are almost equally likely to do so. More young people 
have a part-time job in Finland than in France, but the trends are 
reversed in relation to temporary employment: more French young 
people have temporary jobs (see Table 5.2). However, this trend is 
equal among young men and young women in France. In Finland 
the proportion of young women is higher than men in this category. 
Concerning the older age group, in both countries more females have 
fixed-term contracts. This can be related to the types of jobs women 
perform. Since more females occupy lower-skilled professions – in 
other words, occupations that are more at risk of restructuring – they 
are simultaneously more likely to have precarious jobs and temporary 
contracts. There is a high rate of fixed-term contracts and part-time 
employment in France, but also a high rate of involuntary part-time 
employment (Gangl et al. 2003: 281). Many work part-time because 
they cannot find full-time employment. The 15–24- and 25–29-year-
olds with part-time jobs in the two countries gave different reasons 
for their working conditions in 2007. While the Finns (74% of those 
aged 15–24, and 60% of those aged 25–29) chose to work part-time 
because they were in education or training, the French (58% of those 
aged 15–24 and 56% of those aged 25–29) simply could not find a 
full-time job (Eurostat 2009d: 121). The same applies to temporary 
employment: most French young people in temporary jobs could not 
get a permanent job. Finnish youths either could not find a permanent 
job or else had chosen temporary work (Eurostat 2009d: 119).
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Table 5.1. Part-time employment rates (as percentages of total employment) 
by gender and age in Finland and France, 2008.
Age 15–24 25–64
                      As percentage of total employment
Country/Gender Females Males Total Females Males Total
Finland 49 26 38 14 6 10
France 33 13 22 29 5 16
EU 27 34 20 26 30 6 17
The data is taken from Eurostat (2010d).
Table 5.2. Temporary employment rates (as percentage of the total number 
of employees) by gender and age in Finland and France, 2008.
Age 15–24 25–64
                        As percentage of the total number of employees
Country/Gender Females Males Total Females Males Total
Finland 44 35 40 15 8 11
France 53 52 53 12 9 11
EU 27 41 40 40 12 10 11
The data is taken from Eurostat (2010e).
As I explained previously, women tend to work in lower-status occu-
pations than men. The informants in both countries referred to that 
issue. Elina (26, Finland) did not think that gender made a differ-
ence to one’s access to the labour market, but pointed out that even 
in female-dominated professions, such as schoolteaching, it was still 
men who had access to the highest positions. This phenomenon can 
be explained by several factors, including difficulties in combining 
one’s family life and professional career. Women with children tend 
to work less, being either out of work or in part-time employment, 
for domestic reasons. Motherhood appears to lower one’s opportuni-
ties to get full-time work, particularly for women with lower-level 
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qualifications (Joshi and Paci 1997: 37). Combining family and 
professional life can be challenging for women. Women themselves 
might take the decision to remain in lower-level positions with fewer 
responsibilities than their male counterparts, so that they can devote 
equivalent time to their family. Some informants saw having children 
as something that would hinder their professional development, and 
others felt that the market constrained their freedom to both start 
a family and develop a career. Informants’ views were divided on 
this issue, not between Finland and France, but between those who 
did and did not think that being a woman made a difference on the 
labour market. 
According to Marie (24, France) and Caroline (25, France), 
women must prove their value and capabilities twice as much as 
men, because they have to show that they are able to be both a caring 
mother and professionally active. Men, on the other hand, only need 
to demonstrate their professional capabilities. Combining personal 
and family life with professional life is therefore challenging for 
women. Sabrina (23, France) was aware of possible discrimination 
with regard to childbearing.
R:  Do you think that being a woman can complicate your future plans? 
For example, combining family and career?
I:  I’ll have a civil service occupation, so I won’t suffer from discrimination 
during the hiring process. (…) In the public sector these things don’t 
occur. In the private, it certainly does more. (…) And since I don’t 
(…) want children, for me it won’t be an impairment [my emphasis]. 
(…) For women in the private sector, it’s more difficult (…) to develop 
[professionally], (…) be it conscious or unconscious, because (…) 
when you have children, it’s a bit the story of the glass ceiling, you 
don’t necessarily want to move forwards, because it requires further 
commitment.
 Sabrina (23, France)
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 If you are a young woman applying [for a job], there’s always the risk 
that you’re gonna get pregnant, and you know, go home and have 
children … and it’s gonna cost … (…). It’s a safer bet [for companies] 
to hire a young man, (…) ’cause (…) he’s not gonna stay at home 
with the child. (…) Even though they are not allowed to ask if I’m 
in a relationship or not, (…) if I was single I would probably say it 
out loud, ’cause I know that it would benefit me.
 Piia (24, Finland)
R:  Do you think being a woman can facilitate or complicate your life 
or career plans?
I:  Probably it can make it more complicated. (…) And also combining, 
having kids, (…) this is a really hard question, like ‘when is it a good 
time to have kids?’ Because, if you have them right away after your 
graduation, it’s not good for getting a job. (…) It’s not very convinc-
ing if you have just studied and been at home with the kids. 
R:  And then after, if you just start working, it’s difficult also [to have 
children].
I:  Yeah, if you start working immediately, [then] you might [get] too 
old to have children! (…) So, that’s the thing, you should get a per-
manent job, but (…) I think some employers are not willing to give 
you a permanent job, because they think ‘Aha, a woman in her 30s 
and not having kids, so … hmm … she will soon get pregnant!’
 Sanna (24, Finland)
Nicole (21, France) joked that young women at job interviews never 
want to have children. It is not a relevant question during the recruit-
ment process, but it is generally implied. Like Sanna (24, Finland), 
she added that it was difficult to have children, because during one’s 
studies one is too busy, whereas having a child as soon as one is hired 
is not a good idea, as women might be made redundant. The only 
time to have children would thus be around 35–40 years old – which 
is fairly old, and may even be too late. Having children therefore re-
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quires careful planning so that it does not impair one’s employability 
or interfere with career development. At the same time, biological 
factors also put pressure on women. Choosing a career path puts 
double pressure on young women, as the job must connect with 
their identity and personal values but also allow them to balance 
their dual roles as workers and mothers (Arnett 2004: 149). Current 
labour market requirements thus leave young women on the horns 
of a combined personal and social dilemma. 
Distance and acceptance
When I asked my informants what they thought about the labour 
market, how they perceived the world of work, several Finnish and 
French young women displayed a feeling of distance from or even 
lack of interest in it. They had participated in the labour market in 
various ways, but their perception remained abstract and elusive. 
They had difficulties grasping the concept, yet they were aware of 
concrete aspects, such as young people’s struggles to enter the labour 
market. Céline (23, France) explained that she had no idea of her 
future career. She was studying for a Masters, and still had no clear 
perception of what her early working life would be like.
R:  How do you view the beginning of your working life?
I:  No idea! I can’t even imagine it! I can’t do that! No, really, I can’t, it’s 
blurred …
 Céline (23, France)
R:  How do you view the world of work?
I:  I know very little about it, to be honest. I view it as something big 
and something I don’t really understand.
R:  Even if you have a few experiences?
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I:  Yes, because my experiences, they are really limited still, and the jobs 
that I’ve got are mostly through contacts, I haven’t gone and searched 
for a job, all alone in the world. 
 Johanna (26, Finland)
R:  How do you perceive the world of work?
I:  It’s a world that doesn’t really interest me!
R:  Do you prefer studying?
I:  Well, at the moment, I prefer studying. (…) I don’t feel that there’s 
anything I’ll go into, where I’ll feel good … (…) Well, for me, com-
munity work for example is a world I’d like to get involved in. (…) 
At the same time, maybe I’m wrong, but I don’t have the feeling that 
community work really belongs to the world of work.
 Valérie (23, France)
A large proportion of the young women from the two countries 
had a realistic view of the current economic situation. They showed 
awareness of the difficulties of labour market integration, unem-
ployment, degree inflation and competition. Nonethelesss, Finnish 
young women in particular tried to adapt and to respond to current 
circumstances, and were rather hopeful about their integration into 
the labour market and future career plans. They emphasised the need 
to be patient, but retained an optimistic approach. The French young 
women were also realistic, but took a darker view.
R:  How do you view the beginning of your working life, when you finish 
university? 
I:  I hope I could get a job in a few months, but I think I might have 
to (…) go back to the cafeteria for a while, or … be unemployed, 
’cause I know it’s very hard to get a dream job or something from 
your own field right away [after graduation]. So I really wanna get 
it, but I know I have to be patient and not get depressed right away 
…
 Suvi (25, Finland)
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R:  How do you view the beginning of your working life, your own 
integration in working life? 
I:  My own integration will be hard. (…) It won’t be easy, and I’m aware 
that it will take several years to find my place, so I’m not so stressed 
about it.
 Tuuli (25, Finland)
Caroline’s (25, France) vision of the labour market was more pes-
simistic, but she accepted the situation and had chosen a career path 
with better future opportunities.
R:  How do you view the world of work in general? 
I:  It’s a labyrinth with its opportunities [and] its dead ends. I don’t have 
a ready-made vision of it. I hear what people say, it’s quite frightening, 
but I think that once we’re in, we can bend things a little, (…) there 
are opportunities, we should try to seize them, and adapt.
 Caroline (25, France)
Several French informants discussed the uncertain contemporary 
economic situation, but did not feel personally concerned because of 
their career choices. This included those who had chosen to become 
teachers and thus work in the public sector. Teachers in France are 
employed by the state, and their positions are secure. It is difficult 
to get through the competitive selective examinations because of 
the regulation of the teaching staff, but once candidates receive 
their diploma, they are guaranteed a job as a civil servant. Sabrina 
(23, France) fell into this category. This young woman was very 
conscious of the challenges of entering the labour market, but was 
sure she would find work if she were to fail the competitive selective 
examinations, whatever she decided to do. Sabrina also mentioned 
that ‘many people do not find work immediately, not because they 
don’t find it, but because they don’t look for it!’  
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 189 
Forced versus chosen flexibility
I: The concept of work (…) is changing. (…) Thirty years ago, you 
had this long-time job for life, or at least for the next 10 years. It’s 
not quite like that any more. (…) I think the way people see work 
as well, like what they want from it, is changing.
R:  Like what do they want, for example?
I:  Like, for example, a lot of people seem to like to have flexibility over 
security.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
Surprisingly, some Finnish and French informants saw having a 
non-linear working life – in other words, not having the same job 
throughout their lives – as a natural aspect of their future working 
lives. Rather than seeing this as a problem, they welcomed it. However, 
they clearly distinguished between choosing to lead a flexible lifestyle 
within a particular field of work and being the victim of restructuring 
and precarity and having to take any job. 
 Personally, I would be horrified by the idea that I would go to a job 
and stay there for 20 years, in the same place, doing the same thing. So 
I don’t mind the fact that it changes, and that I’ll only be somewhere 
for a few years and then I’ll go somewhere else. 
 Piia (24, Finland)
Marie (24, France) explained that many people are fearful of the lack 
of economic stability and try to resist precarious work. However, at 
the same time, people’s mentalities have developed alongside the social 
context, and many welcome the new conditions and the advantages 
they offer.
 To imagine that, today, one might join a firm until the end [of one’s 
working life], I think that our mentalities have changed, that we 
190 – Aurélie Mary
wouldn’t be able to stand that any more, because we would feel … 
imprisoned. (…) When [flexibility] is chosen, it’s positive, but the 
problem is having a precarious job, and in that case we don’t choose, 
it’s imposed upon us. (…) This movement is a good thing if it is 
chosen, rather than having to endure it, which unfortunately is the 
case for many young people. (…) I don’t mind changing jobs, if I 
choose it myself rather than having it imposed.
 Marie (24, France)
Sabrina (23, France) explained that many students feel the need to 
take a break for a few months after graduation and before starting 
full-time work. In that case they have chosen to enter a short period 
of stasis. However, in most cases this ‘choice’ is imposed upon them. 
They are forced to take a break after their studies, because they simply 
cannot find a stable job.
Like an increasing number of young people today, my respond-
ents were no longer seeking lifelong employment, but were seeking 
lifelong learning. In any case they were well aware that they could no 
longer hope to get a job for life. Rather, they were seeking personal 
employability over employment (see Brown and Hesketh 2004: 19). 
However, several French informants contested forced flexibility and 
imposed geographical mobility. They criticised the constant need to 
adapt to economic restructuring and new requirements imposed by 
labour market fluctuations, such as imposed geographical flexibility. 
The respondents in both countries were clearly fighting to retain 
control over both their personal and working lives, rather than having 
to follow a path decided by external circumstances.
Irrevocable destiny
The next sections examine two major differences between Finland 
and France: the feeling of lack of control over one’s own destiny, and 
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the pessimism regarding labour market integration that is promi-
nent among French respondents. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) and 
Alapuro (2005; 2010) argue that there is explicit and implicit social 
pressure from the hierarchical arrangement of the French education 
system (see subchapter 4.5). Similarly, Galland argues (2008: 48) that 
educational qualifications function like titles, rather than constituting 
human capital that will facilitate entry into the labour market. The 
education system acts as a social ladder on which levels of attain-
ment are more important than content. This ranking system based 
on education might contribute to French young people’s pessimistic 
attitudes. They feel trapped within a hierarchical structural system 
that decides their future and assigns them a social position, with little 
individual control over one’s own destiny (Galland 2008: 48). Young 
people with few or no qualifications are worse off in terms not only 
of job opportunities, but also of opportunities to access higher social 
status. According to Cécile Van de Velde, French youth have the 
perception that their professional prospects and fate are determined 
by their level and field of study (cit. Loncle 2008: 122). 
Indeed, several French informants mentioned the feeling of be-
ing trapped within a particular study and career path once they had 
committed to a specific curriculum. Audrey (26, France) stressed that 
her parents’ generation had been able to change professional paths 
easily, without having to restart their studies, while today’s young 
people are compelled to work within the field they initially selected 
unless they start their studies all over again, which is challenging, 
especially financially. Nicole (21, France) felt stuck on the path she 
had entered, and thought that it would be impossible to ‘change life’ 
later if she wanted to, because that would entail having to study for 
a new degree. She pointed out that it was possible to take a risk and 
change career, but as in a poker game, one could never know what 
to expect. 
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 Mainly, [before], there were more possibilities to … well, change your 
life, and simply think, ‘I’m gonna start studying again, I’m gonna do 
something else.’ (…) Now (…) I feel that I started off with my stud-
ies, and once I’m done, it won’t be possible for me to take any time, 
to study something else, to change direction, because financially it’s 
not possible. (…) We feel stuck, in fact.
 Nicole (21, France)
 
 [Before] you could switch jobs more easily, (…) think ‘ok, well, after 
that, I’ll change,’ while now, once you start off on something, well, 
here you go! You are off on that, so you’d better have made the right 
choice!
 Alice (23, France)
The feelings of irrevocable destiny were not entirely confined to the 
French respondents. One young Finnish woman, Emmi (25), was 
conscious of that phenomenon. She said it was difficult today to 
change career paths, because of the diplomas that would be required to 
start working in another field. Like Audrey (26, France), she pointed 
out that one would need to study all over again. For that reason she 
felt that young people suffered from the pressure of having to decide 
at a very young age what they wanted to do later in life. She added 
that her parents had joined the labour market without thinking that 
they would be stuck in a particular profession for the rest of their 
lives, unlike young people today. This view is clearly at odds with 
the common belief that there are more choices and opportunities 
available nowadays. Indeed there are, but competition and demands 
for higher skills have increased too. Consequently, it is more difficult 
to attain the social positions that are apparently available. Birth may 
no longer determine one’s social status, but individual aptitudes do, 
as does chance to some extent.
Furthermore, in particular in France, both the education system 
and the labour market seem to control young people’s life paths. To 
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some degree young people feel that their choices are no longer delib-
erate. Van de Velde (2008: 139) raised the issue of fear and pressure 
among young French people, who are afraid of making the wrong 
choice during their studies, because it determines their future life 
paths and they will never have another chance. Paradoxically, the fear 
of precarity generates pressure to make the right decision regarding 
one’s studies and career path from the beginning. Studying for a new 
degree is very difficult in France, where social conditions do not favour 
such actions (Van de Velde 2008: 222). Qualifications are competi-
tive tools for social status rather than for jobs (Verdier, cit. Van de 
Velde 2008: 163). Young French people therefore feel the pressure to 
choose the ‘right’ path which will lead them to a secure social rank 
and a definitive position within the labour market, either as insid-
ers (who have a stable working life) or outsiders (who struggle with 
precarious working conditions). This is a major difference between 
Finland and France. In Finland, many students gain relevant profes-
sional experience during their studies, and are able to modify their 
study paths accordingly. The process of labour market integration is 
therefore smoother. In France, students complete their studies first 
and then start working life afterwards, when they have little relevant 
professional practice. That increases their fear of making the wrong 
choice during their studies. This important issue is examined further 
in subchapter 5.3.
Pessimism
I:  I feel we are all desperate, thinking ‘will I manage to find a job with 
my diploma, will I manage to keep that job, will I retire before I’m 
94?’ (…) Yeah, I think we’ll be the sacrificed generation. (…) And 
my [80-year-old] grandma reminds me of it regularly. (…)
R:  Your grandma?! (…) But in what connection?
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I:  Well, in relation to work. (…) She told me that in her day (…) we 
could find work systematically, it wasn’t required to leave, to move 
300km away to work, [and] we weren’t thrown away like an old 
sock.
 Nicole (21, France)
This statement represents a specific feature that emerged among the 
French respondents: their fatalistic and disheartened feelings about 
the labour market, and their pessimism and gloom about the future. 
In a sense, a large number of young people feel betrayed by the cur-
rent structural system, which cannot keep its promises – such as the 
promise of access to a decent job and social status – even to those 
with higher-education qualifications.
Interestingly, the ESS Round 3 – 2006 presents similar results. 
Young people aged 20–34 were asked to rate their satisfaction with the 
state of the economy in their country (at the time of the survey). On 
a scale from zero to 10 (10 being the best), the mean score was seven 
among Finnish young people, and four among the French. There was 
no gender variation, but the difference between the case-countries was 
apparent. Furthermore, the results among 20–34-year-olds for the 
statement ‘For most people in your country life is getting worse’ also 
showed significant differences between the two countries (see Table 
5.3): Finnish young men and women are noticeably more optimistic 
than their French counterparts. 
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Table 5.3. Satisfaction with the state of the country among 20–34-year-olds 
by gender in Finland and France, 2006. 
Satisfaction 
level
Strongly 
agree Agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Disagree Strongly disagree
                            ‘For most people in your country life is getting worse’
                             As percentage of the corresponding age group
Country/
Gender   F M F M F M F M F M
Finland   2 1 11 13 36 29 46 54 5 2
France 32 25 49 51 12 18 7 6 1 0
The data is calculated on the basis of the ESS Round 3 (2006).
The European Youth in a Global Context 2007 study examined similar 
issues among 16–29-year-olds. On the basis of these results, Galland 
(2008: 45–46) argues that the level of youth unemployment and the 
lack of opportunities on the labour market generate great pessimism 
among French youth. Many young people have very little faith in 
the future, and have fatalistic perceptions of life opportunities. No 
comparisons between young men and women are available, but the 
difference between Finland and France is again evident, as illustrated 
in Table 5.4. Finnish young people are not entirely optimistic; how-
ever, the French are clearly more cynical.
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Table 5.4. Attitudes towards the future and life opportunities among 16–29 
-year-olds in Finland and France, 2007.
Finland France
Attitudes towards the future 
and life opportunities 
(agreeing with the statements)
As percentage of the corresponding 
age group
My future looks bright 43 26
Society’s future looks bright 18 4
People in my country have the 
opportunity to choose their own lives 50 26
I have complete freedom and control 
over my life 38 22
I am confident I will have a good job 
in the future 38 27
The data comes from Galland (2008: 46). The percentage of agreement is calculated 
on the basis of the persons who gave the scores six or (seven on a scale from one 
to seven).
Mills and Blossfeld (2005: 7–8) distinguish two job systems, in which 
young people have different employment relationships: the ‘closed job 
system’ and the ‘open job system’. Closed job systems are dual systems 
that oppose a core of protected workers against a marginal group of 
peripheral workers. The ‘insiders’ are highly protected against uncer-
tainty and market restructuring, with permanent job contracts, while 
the ‘outsiders’ struggle with precarious and rigid working conditions, 
and are offered access to the market through training and part-time 
and/or temporary employment (Académie des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques 2007: 16; Mills and Blossfeld 2005: 8; Tirot 2008: 69). 
Entering the labour market and becoming an ‘insider’ within this 
system is difficult. France has a closed job system, with a high degree of 
employment protection and centralised wage negotiation procedures 
for certain social groups, and various forms of flexible and unstable 
jobs that are highly concentrated among other social groups, such as 
women and young people (Galland 2008: 47).
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In the ‘open job system’, economic security is low for most 
professions, precarious employment and market flexibility are more 
widespread among all social groups, integration into the labour market 
is relatively easy, and the job mobility rate is relatively high. Finland 
has an ‘open job system’. In this system, which is also adopted by 
liberal countries, job protection is weak and flexibility is high for 
the whole population. However, in Scandinavian societies, although 
flexibility is relatively high, there is a strong level of job protection, 
with policies and services to help the unemployed. Scandinavian so-
cieties offer protection to individuals rather than employment, while 
France tends to protect employment rather than workers (Galland 
2008: 47). The employment-centred French regime provides a high 
level of protection to the unemployed; however, this protection is 
selective. The provision of benefits follows principles of eligibility, 
especially previous employability. This amplifies the division between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The universalistic Finnish regime provides 
comprehensive coverage, and benefits are offered on the basis of indi-
vidualised rights (Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques 2007: 
49–51; Gallie and Paugam 2000: 6). Individual European countries’ 
job systems vary according to differences in national welfare regimes 
and societal frameworks.
Conclusion:  Paradoxical labour market
The labour market appears to be a paradoxical sphere for young 
people, especially for young women. It is demanding in terms of 
individual competences, requires individual flexibility and adaptabil-
ity, and imposes a certain lifestyle on the basis of those prerequisites. 
Integration into the labour market varies according to economic 
fluctuations and levels of employment and unemployment. In the 
case of my informants, it seems that French young women expected 
to experience more difficulties in accessing the labour market after 
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graduation than did the Finns. They anticipated a situation of ‘the 
self against the labour market’. By contrast, Finnish young women 
had become acquainted with the labour market before and during 
their studies. Their labour market integration was already underway, 
leading to a situation of ‘the self as part of the labour market’. This 
is also encouraged by the structure of the education system (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4).
Nevertheless, in both countries, young women faced a similar 
dilemma concerning the combination of having a professional ca-
reer with starting a family. The labour market and the social sphere 
demand opposite achievements from women. The respondents felt 
that the market condemned women who wanted to have children 
and to dedicate time and attention to their families. At the same 
time, social and family policies strongly encourage women to have 
children, because of the incentive to raise national fertility rates. In 
addition, experts’ discourses indicate disapproval of young women 
for their increasing postponement of childbirth, which is perceived as 
a deliberate attempt by young women to prolong their youth. From 
a personal and biological point of view, most young women wish 
to have children, which is a natural aspect of human life. However, 
the economic sphere appears to take control even of that part of life. 
Nonetheless, the female population has absorbed postmodern values 
and the right to choose economic independence and professional 
success. Young women seem trapped between market demands, 
increasingly postmodern personal attitudes and desires, and family 
values. The combination of these features requires very tight negotia-
tions at the individual level.
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5.3 The finnish and french labour Markets: 
restructuring and Integration Policies
The previous subchapters discussed young women’s perceptions of 
the labour market, how they viewed their entry into the labour mar-
ket, and what they expected from their working lives. This section 
recontextualises the informants’ opinions in the light of the current 
socio-economic situation regarding young people’s integration into 
the labour market in the two countries. 
The contemporary socio-economic context
Advanced societies’ labour markets have undergone considerable 
restructuring since the 1960s, as mentioned in subchapter 3.1. Those 
born after the Second World War have benefited from the 30 prosper-
ous years of development between 1945 and 1975. By contrast, today’s 
young people struggle with the discrepancy between conventional 
ideologies and the actual attainability of the successful financial and 
professional life that those ideologies promise (see Chauvel 2002). 
The recent structural dilemmas produced by the economic downturn 
have greatly contributed to young people’s difficulties in joining the 
active workforce, gaining independence and establishing a stable 
lifestyle. Economic restructuring has disrupted post-war patterns of 
transition. Since getting stable work is no longer guaranteed, access 
to further life stages, such as attaining financial independence and 
starting a family, is simultaneously compromised. As has been pointed 
out (Walther et al. 2006: 41), the flexibilisation and restructuring of 
the market has led to a destandardisation of young people’s transi-
tion to adulthood, citizenship, biographical individualisation and 
subjectivity. Finland and France have reacted to these transformations 
and attempted to help young people enter working life by means of 
different measures. 
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financial support and integration measures
There are several different subsidies and support systems in Finland 
and France as part of those countries’ strategies to help young people 
enter the labour market, or to compensate for their lack of oppor-
tunities to do so. In this section I will concentrate on the support 
provided to young people and students graduating from secondary 
or tertiary education. The support schemes offered to young people 
in the two societies follow a similar model to the countries’ education 
systems: they are based on different founding ideologies with regards 
to the distribution of support (see Synopsis 5.1).
Synopsis 5.1. Financial support apparatuses for young people.
FINLAND FRANCE
Universalist
General support scheme aimed 
at all individuals 
Selective
Different support schemes directed 
at different social groups 
Decentralised
Support distributed by the state, 
provinces and municipalities
Centralised
Support based on state 
implementation
In Finland, the government subsidises local authorities and mu-
nicipalities, which in turn implement and provide services to young 
people. Finnish municipalities are self-governing and can make their 
own decisions concerning youth work. The state supports municipali-
ties through special funds (Allianssi 2010). According to the Youth 
Work Act 1995 (the act preceding that issued in 2006) (Finlex 1995), 
‘The general administration and development of youth work shall 
be the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. In the provinces, 
the promotion of youth activities and the development of young 
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people’s living conditions shall be the responsibility of the provin-
cial state offices’ (my emphases). Responsibility for youth work and 
youth integration measures is thus shared among the government, 
local authorities and youth organisations (Finlex 1995). This set-up 
is similar to that of the education system, in which the Ministry of 
Education issues the core curriculum, but municipalities and schools 
retain autonomy regarding the transmission of the syllabus. 
Youth support, funds and integration measures are more central-
ised in France, and like the education system are exclusively directed 
by the state. There are also a number of national and local networks 
(mainly apprenticeship programmes) that help young people to 
enter the labour market, although these are still based on the state’s 
initial provisions.
Finnish students who finish school or university and do not yet 
have work are eligible for different types of allowance. Basic Unem-
ployment Allowance and the Labour Market Subsidy are provided 
by Kela, the social insurance institution of Finland. In order to be 
eligible for Basic Unemployment Allowance, applicants must be 
aged 17 to 64, be seeking a full-time job, and have worked for at 
least eight months during the two years preceding unemployment. 
The allowance is paid for a maximum of 500 days. Those who are 
still unemployed after that period and the long-term unemployed 
can claim Labour Market Subsidy. This benefit is also aimed at new 
entrants onto the labour market, and at unemployed people who 
lack recent work experience. The benefit is means-tested and can be 
decreased if the unemployed person shares a household with a work-
ing person, such as a spouse or parent (Kela 2009–2011). 
Young people in Finland can also participate in various measures 
for labour market integration and promotion offered by the Employ-
ment and Economic Development Office (Työ- ja elinkeinotoimisto 
2010a). Job-seekers receive the unemployment benefit to which 
they are entitled through their participation in labour market inte-
gration measures such as training, self-directed study, and various 
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work experience schemes. Labour market training is funded by the 
labour administration and intended for unemployed job-seekers. 
Unemployed people who wish to engage in self-directed study receive 
financial assistance to complete the programme. However, in order 
to be eligible, job-seekers must be over 25 when starting the course, 
and must study full-time (Kela 2009–2011).
The main goal of the Finnish Youth Act (issued in 2006) is to 
finance youth work, support systems and policies. Local authorities 
and youth organisations receive funds to initiate activities and services 
for young people (Opetusministeriö 2006). The 2006 Youth Act 
applies to young people under 29. The Ministry of Education sup-
ports youth work by local authorities and municipalities, youth and 
youth work organisations, and all kinds of projects related to youth 
and youth work, such as youth workshops or local youth councils. 
Youth workshops offer training and work experience to unemployed 
young people under the age of 25. These are financed by the Min-
istry of Education and the Ministry of Labour (Opetusministeriö 
2006). The Sanssi-kortti (Sanssi Card) is a new piece of legislation 
that was implemented in spring 2010 to respond to recent economic 
fluctuations (Sanssi 2010). This card is aimed at 18–29-year-olds 
who have recently graduated and are registered as unemployed. It 
provides them with greater opportunities to find their first job after 
graduation by giving employers incentives to hire them, as the state 
makes a contribution to salary expenses of €550 per month for 10 
months (Työ-ja elinkeinoministeriö 2010b). 
The French scheme offers a variety of support measures. New 
entrants on the labour market are not entitled to the Pôle Emploi 
(Employment Centre) unemployment benefits, since one must have 
worked for a minimum of four months in order to receive the allow-
ance. However, they can join a number of programmes for labour 
market integration. The Contrat d’Insertion dans la Vie Sociale (CIVIS, 
Social Life Integration Contract), created in 2005, is not in itself an 
employment contract, but is a measure to help obtain a permanent 
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employment contract. It lasts for a year and can be renewed. It is 
aimed at young people aged 16 to 25, particularly those who have no 
diploma or only minimum qualifications and who experience great 
difficulties in entering the labour market. The CIVIS is distributed 
by local offices of the PAIO (Permanence d’Accueil, d’Information et 
d’Orientation – Information and Orientation Service-Provider Agen-
cy), which was established especially for young people and provides 
assistance with social and labour market integration. Young people 
receive a small sum of money each month (Ministère du Travail, de la 
Solidarité et de la Fonction Publique 2010b). The FIPJ (Fonds pour 
l’Insertion Professionnelle des Jeunes – Funds for Youth Professional 
Integration) was created in 1994. It provides services to students to 
help them integrate into the labour market (Demuynck 2009). 
There are various state measures and funds for businesses that 
employ young people, and new apprenticeship measures for youths 
aged 16–25 that aim to facilitate their integration into the labour 
market (Ministère du Budget, des Comptes Publics et de la Réforme 
de l’Etat 2010). Contrats Aidés (Assisted Contracts) are aimed at 
young people and those who have difficulties entering the labour 
market. These contracts increase recipients’ employability by sub-
sidising employers’ salary expenses. The state provides employers 
with financial support to reduce the costs of recruitment, so as to 
encourage them to train and employ young people (INSEE 2009b). 
The Contrat d’Accompagnement dans l’Emploi (CAE, Employment 
Assistance Contract) was established in 2005 as a replacement for 
the 1990 Contrat Emploi Solidarité (CES, Employment Solidarity 
Contract). It is an assisted contract for the public sector only. Em-
ployers receive bonuses, exemptions or assistance with training when 
hiring an unemployed person (Le Site Officiel de l’Administration 
Française 2010). The CAE Passerelle (CAE Footbridge) is aimed at 
young people aged 16–25 to help them get training, initial work 
experience or reorientation (Ministère du Travail, de la Solidarité et 
de la Fonction Publique 2009). The Allocation d’Aide au Retour à 
204 – Aurélie Mary
l’Emploi (ARE, Employment Reintegration Assistance) is for those 
reaching the end of their employment contracts. One must have 
worked for a minimum of six months to be eligible, and must be 
seeking a full-time job. The amount varies according to one’s previ-
ous salaries. The allowance is based on the number of months in 
employment before the end of the employment contract (Ministère 
du Travail, de la Solidarité et de la Fonction Publique 2010). These 
measures aim mainly to support young people who have few or no 
qualifications or are unemployed. 
The road to integration into working life
Table 5.5 shows that more young women than men are in higher 
education in both countries, and that more young men are in em-
ployment. Unemployment rates are somewhat similar between the 
genders. The major differences are between the countries rather than 
the genders. More young people are unemployed in France. That 
might be explained by the larger number of 25–29-year-olds in Fin-
land who are still in higher education and work part-time alongside 
their studies. Also, more young people go into tertiary education in 
Finland than in France. The divergence is even greater among 25–29-
year-olds. This is because higher education lasts longer in Finland 
than in France (see Chapter 4). Moreover, the student age during 
the first year of study is much lower in France (19 years old) than in 
Finland (23 years old); thus French students graduate at a younger 
age (Eurostudent Report 2005: 28). However, the same number of 
25–29-year-olds have a job in both countries. Many Finnish students 
work part- or full-time alongside their studies. In 2007, the age at 
which at least 50% of young people were already on the labour market 
was 19 in Finland and 21 in France (Eurostat 2009d: 107). 
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Table 5.5. Higher-education rates (2007) and employment and unemploy-
ment rates (2008) by gender among 20–24- and 25–29-year-olds in Finland 
and France.
Finland France
Age groups 20–24 25–29 20–24 25–29
Gender F M T F M T F M T F M T
As percentage of the corresponding age group
Higher 
Education 44 36 40 23 22 23 32 26 29 6 5 6
Employment1 62 68 65 74 84 79 49 55 52 73 85 79
Unemployment 11 12 12 7 6 7 16 18 17 10 9 9
1 Includes full-time and part-time employment.
This data is taken from Eurostat (2009a; 2010b; 2010f). According to Eurostat defini-
tions, employed persons are those aged 15 and over who performed work, even for just 
one hour per week, for pay, profit or family gain during the reference week. The data 
does not include young people who are both out of education and out of employment 
or unemployment schemes (for instance, young women on maternity leave). 
 
According to the Youth in Europe report (Eurostat 2009d: 209–210), 
more French youths aged 24 and 29 were economically active in 2007 
than Finnish youths (Table 5.6). However, only a small proportion 
of French young people (10% of those aged 24 and 29) were com-
bining their studies with full- or part-time jobs, unlike the Finns, 
who tended to study and work at the same time (35% and 26% of 
24- and 29-year-olds). Thus more Finnish youths were in education, 
but they were also economically active. Combining education and 
work is more common in Finland than in France. 
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Table 5.6. Studying and working arrangements of young people aged 24 
and 29 in Finland and France, 2007.
Finland France
Age 24 29 24 29
Studying and working arrangements 
  Percentages
Working (and not in education or training) 43 61 69 78
In education or training and not working 15 4 10 2
Combining studying or training and working 35 26 10 11
Inactive (and not in education or training) 7 9 10 9
Total 100 100 100 100
The data comes from Eurostat (2009d). Gender comparison was not available.
Most of my Finnish informants had a part-time job at the time of 
interview. In France, some were working part-time, some did not 
work, and some were receiving training as part of their work-based 
studies. Most of the Finnish respondents had also taken gap years 
during which they had worked, and had thus gained work experi-
ence and a foothold in the labour market. The French respondents 
pointed out the problem of their lack of relevant experience when 
seeking work, and noted that employers discriminate particularly 
against university graduates because they lack employment skills. 
Many students work part-time and/or during the holidays, but do 
so in low-skilled jobs that are often irrelevant to their studies. In 
Finland, a large proportion of young people stay in higher education 
and training until their late 20s or early 30s, but they often work at 
the same time. By contrast, French young people remain in full-time 
education until their early or mid-20s, and start working afterwards 
(Couppié and Mansuy 2003: 84). 
Finnish young people thus experience a gradual transition to the 
labour market, especially those who work in connection with their 
studies. This model appears to be part of the national educational 
culture, and is embedded in university education (Kivinen and Nurmi 
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2003: 92, 97). Drawing on the 1999 Higher Education and Graduate 
Employment in Europe (CHEERS) survey, Osmo Kivinen and Jouni 
Nurmi (2003: 94) found that almost 30% of Finnish students found 
work after graduation without having to look for it, whereas only 
12% of French graduates were in the same position. In their ongo-
ing study, Kivinen and Nurmi (2011) show that French university 
students start their studies between the ages of 18 and 20, while Finns 
do so between 18 and 22 on average. French students generally need 
five years to complete their studies, and Finnish students up to six 
years. However, French students need more time after graduation than 
Finns to attain a position on the labour market that matches their 
qualifications (at Masters level). French graduates’ economic position 
remains imbalanced in this way for more than three years, whereas 
Finns find a relevant position more than a year after graduating. 
French young people on average are aged 28 when they start working 
in a job related to their studies, and Finns aged 30. Although Finnish 
young people enter university at an older age, and study for longer, 
they experience faster integration into the labour market. 
The youth unemployment rate is lower in countries where young 
people’s integration into the labour market starts before they complete 
their studies, as in Scandinavia (Académie des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques 2007: 20–21). Finnish graduates have an advantage when 
they enter the labour market, as they have had time to accumulate 
both theoretical and practical skills. Indeed, my Finnish informants 
felt more confident than the French about the start of working life.
 I have experienced work, (…) I’ve had three years of only working 
life, I’ve already tried it, so it doesn’t seem so scary, because I kind of 
know what it’s like.
 Anna (28, Finland)
Tiia (26, Finland) too had already worked, and was looking forward 
to starting working life and moving on. She was not afraid of the 
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transition to working life, because she had always managed to find 
work. Emmi (25, Finland) was confident about getting work because 
she had previous experience related to her studies, which she had 
obtained during a gap year and in part-time jobs during her studies. 
The French young women who planned to become teachers felt con-
fident about getting work once they had passed the difficult selective 
examinations, since teachers’ positions are guaranteed by the state 
and belong to the ‘insider’ group. 
Education increases one’s chances on the labour market, but it no 
longer guarantees one’s integration or the attainment of one’s preferred 
job. Young people are required to gain additional individual capital in 
order to stand out from the crowd. To secure an advantage they need 
extra competitive skills, and often these come from work experience 
and familiarity with the labour market (Kivinen and Silvennoinen 
2002). Sue Heath (2007) argues that gap years are increasingly a 
means of ‘gaining the edge’ over other students. During gap years, 
young people gain life experience and relevant personal attributes. 
They acquire greater maturity too. In short, gap years can become a 
new competitive tool on the labour market.
Minna Viuhko (2006: 56–57) found that 27% of Finnish stu-
dents had a job related to their studies, 19% had one that was quite 
connected, and 21% had one that was connected in some respects. 
Thirty-five per cent worked in areas unrelated to their studies. Stu-
dents gave two main reasons for working during their studies. Finan-
cial motives were the main reason, either to afford to live, or simply 
to improve their lifestyle. The other reason was to gain work experi-
ence, essentially relevant practice. Some students forge connections 
and plan to remain in the same workplace once they graduate. They 
prepare their labour market integration in advance, so as to already 
be ‘insiders’ in the market upon entry. 
Antero Puhakka, Juhani Rautopuro, and Visa Tuominen (2010: 
49) claim that two thirds of Finnish graduates have already accessed 
working life while studying. The transition from school to work there-
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fore occurs during studies, rather than following a clear-cut pattern 
as seems to be the case in France. The Aarresaari Network (Academic 
Career Service) conducted a national survey in 2006–2007 among 
Finnish students who had graduated in 2001 and 2002, and analysed 
their integration into the labour market. The results indicate that 
the transition from school to work is shorter in Finland than in the 
rest of Europe. One third of graduates had been unemployed after 
graduation, with a median length of three months among vocational 
graduates and six months among university graduates. Eighty-three 
per cent of graduates were employed five years after they graduated. 
About 2% were unemployed, 2% had returned to education, and 
10% were on maternity leave. The transition was slightly smoother 
for vocational graduates. Indeed, the informants themselves had 
pointed out that integration into the market was more difficult for 
university graduates (Puhakka et al. 2010; Sainio 2008).
An equivalent study was conducted in France by the Centre 
d’Etude et de Recherches sur les Qualifications (CEREQ). This was the 
Génération 2004 survey, which analysed higher-education graduates’ 
integration into the labour market between 2004 and 2007. After 
three years of working life, 74% of them were employed (including 
part-time and temporary employment), 8% were unemployed, and 
7% had returned to education or training (Calmand et al. 2009: 18). 
However, as in Finland, graduates from vocational institutions had 
entered working life more easily, and had gained better-remunerated 
jobs. The unemployment rates were similar for those with a Doctorate 
or a short professional degree. Graduates from Grandes Ecoles were 
clearly in better positions. Many university students also obtained 
jobs in the public sector. The higher the diploma, the better the 
chances of obtaining a white-collar job. However, except in the cases 
of graduates from Grandes Ecoles, high diplomas did not necessarily 
guarantee better access to permanent jobs. More than 70% of young 
graduates (including those from all types of institutions) obtained 
permanent positions, with students from Grandes Ecoles being at a 
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clear advantage. The situation was different just after graduation: 
more young people had a part-time or temporary job. Moreover, 
depending on professional field, more highly educated young women 
than young men had temporary jobs. The gap was wider among 
lower-educated youths. The same situation applied with part-time 
work (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Qualifications 2008; 
Joseph et al. 2008).
In relation to professional skills acquired during university educa-
tion, 69% of Finns (with a variation between university and vocational 
students) compared with 28% of French respondents stated that they 
could make great use of the knowledge acquired during their studies 
in their present job (Puhakka et al. 2010: 50). The difference is note-
worthy. It also corresponds to the views of the French informants’, 
who described the French university system as too theoretical and not 
adapted to the labour market’s requirements. According to Kivinen 
and Nurmi (2003: 100), after graduating, a large proportion (65%) 
of Finnish graduates had found a job in their own field of study, 
20% had found one in a related field, and 15% had found one in a 
different field. In France, fewer than 30% of graduates had obtained 
work related to their initial field of study, 45% had obtained one in 
a related field, and more than 25% had obtained one in a different 
field. This varied according to the fields of study. Finnish students 
felt that their curriculum prepared them well to enter the market, in 
contrast with the French, who felt that only some of the skills they 
had accumulated could be applied in their professional life.
Conclusion: smoother versus rougher transition
In both countries, the state provides support and integration measures 
for young people. However, as with the higher-education systems, 
there are contrasts in the provision of those measures and the ideolo-
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gies that underpin them. In addition, young French people seem to 
be at greater risk of unemployment, and to have more difficulties in 
entering the labour market. This results largely from the organisation 
of the countries’ higher-education systems. Finnish students start to 
enter working life before and/or during their studies, and thus ex-
perience a smoother transition when they graduate. By contrast, the 
French go through higher education, graduate, and then attempt to 
enter the labour market. In that sense, French youths are at a disad-
vantage, because their position is that of new entrants. The transition 
in Finland results from a combination of practical experience and 
theoretical knowledge, which makes it smoother. The transition in 
France is more traditional, with the spheres of education and work-
ing life being separated, but entry into the labour market is more 
chaotic. The informants’ perceptions of their own transition to the 
labour market clearly reflected these features. 
5.4 Two Different Paths to Integration
Postmodern ideologies, as well as feminist principles, have been 
absorbed into the informants’ values and attitudes towards work. 
Rather than seeking mere monetary reward, Finnish and French 
young women alike expected something more from their profes-
sional lives. Their expectations and values were also influenced by 
their position as highly educated individuals, and by their gender. 
Self-fulfilment, self-development and a purpose in life were the main 
things the respondents expected from working life. They wanted to 
have a job and be financially independent, but above all their profes-
sion had to be related to their personal passions and interests. It also 
had to conform to their personal values and ethics: for instance, the 
company they would choose to work for should be environmental 
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friendly. Increasingly, the public (or work) and private (or personal) 
spheres are merging, with the two sharing similar principles and fol-
lowing a similar ethos.
In relation to the labour market itself, the respondents had a 
rather critical stance towards it. They felt that young people’s integra-
tion into working life was being compromised by new sets of demands 
and requirements. For instance, people are constantly being pushed 
to acquire additional skills and display high-level competences. The 
labour market was perceived as being hostile towards young people, 
and to women in particular. The informants clearly felt that women 
had to fight harder than men for their positions in the job market. 
This is because of traditional ideologies that generate the idea that 
women are not as skilled as men, or that they belong to the private 
sphere. Therefore they have to prove their professional abilities more 
than men. However, most young women hope to become mothers. 
This adds to the pressure on young women to demonstrate their 
ability to be both a capable mother and a competent member of 
the labour force. Combining professional activities and family life is 
one of the biggest challenges faced by contemporary young women. 
The informants from both countries contested the situation, espe-
cially discrimination by employers against childless young women 
during the recruitment process. Nevertheless, they were aware that 
women themselves might slow down their own career development 
in order to focus on their families. New opportunities for women 
have emerged alongside the postmodern and feminist movements. 
However, they have generated new dilemmas for and expectations by 
women. Achieving financial independence, developing a professional 
career, starting a family and attaining self-fulfilment are ideological 
demands that put pressure on young women and require constant 
negotiation, at both the individual and the social level.
Finnish young women were conscious that young people and 
young women face difficulties in entering the labour market, but they 
remained rather confident about their access to a stable working life. 
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They knew that it would require time and perseverance, but since they 
had already obtained work experience before or during their studies, 
they also knew what to expect from the labour market. Some had 
had jobs related to their studies, which increased their employability 
and thus their chances of integration. The French respondents were 
much more pessimistic concerning their integration into and futures 
on the job market. They felt that the state of economy in France was 
deleterious, and they were concerned at the lack of opportunities even 
to enter the labour market, let alone to obtain a stable job. Those 
destined to work in the public sector would be in a safer position. 
However, even those who had obtained some work experience in 
their field of study remained sceptical. In addition, they had the 
impression that their destiny lay outside their own control. They 
explained that once one has begun a study curriculum leading to a 
specific career path, it is almost impossible to change direction. This 
increased their feelings of mistrust and cynicism about the future. 
These perceptions among Finnish and French respondents were not 
peculiar to my informants, but matched national and international 
data from surveys on these specific questions. 
The differences between Finnish and French young people in 
their opinions and attitudes towards the labour market are rooted 
in the organisation of their higher-education systems. The previous 
chapter (Chapter 4) investigated the different ideologies that underpin 
those systems and influence their functioning. The analysis suggested 
that the Finnish university system was like a bridge leading young 
people onto the labour market, while the French education system 
resembled a free-standing tower, acting independently of the labour 
market. According to the findings from my informants and from 
previous studies, integration into the labour market is more difficult 
for new market entrants in France. The reason for this is precisely that 
they are new entrants. The spheres of higher education and working 
life are extremely separate in France, whereas they tend to cooperate 
in Finland. A large proportion of Finnish students work during their 
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studies, and do so in jobs that are more or less relevant to their studies. 
Many French students work too; however, those who do not follow 
a work-based training curriculum often work in odd jobs unrelated 
to their studies, just to earn a living. Studies last longer in Finland, 
and many students claim that this is because they work at the same 
time. However, their integration into the labour market is faster and 
more relevant once they graduate. This is thanks to the professional 
experience they have accumulated during university life. In France, 
students graduate at a younger age than do Finns, but their path to 
integration into the labour market is more arduous and takes longer. 
They are more vulnerable to unemployment and work precarity too. 
In the end, they attain a stable working life at about the same age as 
Finnish university graduates do. Furthermore, feelings of irrevocable 
destiny were stronger in France. Finnish informants did not mention 
feeling stuck on a specific path by the structural apparatus of the 
labour market or education system as much as the French did. This 
inevitably raises questions about the genuineness of the freedom of 
choice and opportunities that postmodernity seems to offer. 
Higher education and the transition to adulthood seem to take 
longer in Finland, but students are better prepared both individually 
and professionally when entering the market. French students follow 
a shorter and more straightforward transition, in which they first 
study and graduate, and then enter the labour market. However, they 
struggle more than the Finns during their integration process once 
they have complete their studies, as they are not as well prepared prior 
to entry. Current leaders’ and experts’ discussions strongly criticise 
the prolongation of the transition to adulthood. The phenomenon 
is perceived as something that is negative and harmful to society. 
Governments attempt to shorten the transition to adulthood and 
to control transitional patterns in line with those of the previous 
generation, which were shorter and more linear. For instance, the 
Finnish government is trying to do away with gap years and reduce 
study time, in order to mould the Finnish higher-education system 
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according to the requirements of the Bologna process (see Chapter 4). 
That would mean less time for students to work during their studies, 
and less accumulation of relevant professional experience. As a result, 
Finnish students’ entry into the labour market might become more 
chaotic, like that of French graduates.
Integration into the wider socio-economic structure is the goal of 
every individual. But is the method or time taken by young people to 
achieve this really a problem? The transition might not actually take 
longer than it did before, but might simply be different, involving a 
mixture of features such as studying and working at the same time, 
rather than following clear-cut patterns. ‘Which type of transition is 
more beneficial to young people today?’ is a more pertinent question 
that youth experts might wish to tackle, rather than focusing entirely 
on the lengthening of the transition. 
216 – Aurélie Mary
6.
 BeCoMIng InDePenDenT
Becoming independent, particularly in terms of residential inde-
pendence, is compromised by inadequate integration into the labour 
market and a lack of suitable housing (see Bradley and Van Hoof 
2005; Jones 1995). The previous chapter (Chapter 5) examined the 
difficulties young adults face in obtaining a stable job after finishing 
their studies, and the period of precarity they might experience. In 
such cases they might remain dependent on their parents for longer. 
Depending on the family’s socio-economic background, parents are 
still a safety net for such young people (see Arrnett 2004). In some 
countries, such as France or Mediterranean countries, the principles 
and measures of welfare regimes presume parental support for young 
adult children (see Bradley and Van Hoof 2005). The literature often 
states that young adults today live in the parental home for longer 
than the previous generation. Both economic and cultural changes 
have contributed to this process. Today, in numerous cases, the re-
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lationships between parents and adult children rest on companion-
ship rather than hierarchy. This encourages young people to remain 
at home for longer (see Heath and Cleaver 2003; Holdsworth and 
Morgan 2005). 
Finland and France have different types of welfare regime, and 
thus provide different types of support. France’s ideologies privilege 
the family unit, while Finland’s privilege individuals. The variation 
in support distribution affects young people’s transitions to an inde-
pendent lifestyle. However, their ability to obtain a stable job after 
graduation has an even greater influence on their ability to obtain 
independent accommodation and start a family. Young people’s living 
arrangements have been analysed by youth experts in recent decades, 
because young people increasingly seem to live in the parental home 
for longer and to delay starting a family. However, becoming inde-
pendent is not only a question of one’s personal preferences. Being 
able to afford one’s own accommodation is at the heart of the issue. 
This rests on one’s ability to access an adequate, stable job. Start-
ing a family falls within the same dynamic: it is necessary to obtain 
permanent employment with a suitable salary. It also depends on 
welfare ideologies. Family-friendly policies might encourage young 
women to start a family. 
In the present study, the concept of independence refers to two 
characteristics. First, it involves the achievement of residential inde-
pendence and leaving the parental home, for instance when going to 
university. Second, it encompasses financial independence and the 
means employed by the informants to reach that status. Is it possible 
in practice to become both residentially and financially independent 
while one is a student? Achieving residential and financial independ-
ence raises the issue of starting a family, in terms of both one’s op-
portunities and also one’s desires to do so. The following subchapters 
discusss young women’s plans for these issues after graduation. Are 
they planning to concentrate on developing their careers, or on start-
ing a family – or both?
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6.1 Independence or semi-Independence?
Most of the young academic women I interviewed lived independ-
ently. They had left home after finishing secondary school, either 
to study or to work during their gap year(s). They also tried to be 
financially autonomous, and used different means to achieve this 
goal. Most of the Finnish young women received a state study grant 
and/or worked alongside their studies. The French received financial 
support from their parents and/or worked too. The respondents 
had access to different types of financial resources to enable their 
autonomy, depending on their country of origin. Nevertheless, there 
were convergences in their patterns of leaving home. Divergences 
appeared among the young women in general, rather than between 
the case-countries. While some young women emphasised living in 
their own accommodation, settling down and starting a family, the 
others did not attach much importance to having permanent ac-
commodation or starting a family, as they expected to lead a more 
flexible lifestyle. 
living arrangements and parental support
The Finnish informants all lived in shared flats, either with their 
partners or with friends. Most lived in privately rented flats, some in 
flats belonging to TOAS, the student housing organisation in Tampere 
(Tampereen seudun opiskelija-asuntosäätiö – Tampere Student Housing 
Foundation). Respondents in France lived in privately rented apart-
ments. Most lived with their partners, some on their own, some in 
shared accommodation, and one with her parents. The main reason 
why Finnish respondents had left home was to study, or to work (in 
Finland or abroad) if they had taken gap years. Most had left home 
after secondary school, at age 19 or 20. Many had come from differ-
ent cities, but those from Tampere had also been able to move away 
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from home, because they had access to student accommodation. 
In France almost all of the respendents had left home straight after 
secondary school, at 17 or 18, in order to study in different cities. 
They had thus been slightly younger than the Finnish young women 
when they left home. The respondents in both countries were younger 
than the average age at which young people leave home, which in 
2007 was 22 and 23 for Finnish women and men respectively, and 
23 and 24 for French women and men (Eurostat 2009d). In France, 
those studying in the same city stayed at their parents’. At the time 
of the interviews, one young woman was living in the parental home. 
However, she had moved out early to study abroad, had returned 
home to continue studying in the same city, and was about to move 
again to complete her studies in another city. A few other French 
respondents had also experienced such non-linear residential transi-
tions during their studies. 
Among my informants, most of the Finns received a student grant 
and worked alongside their studies. They were fully independent of 
their parents. Some stated that their parents helped them occasionally 
to buy expensive goods, and that they could have money if they asked 
for it. Only one received a small amount of money on a monthly basis. 
Most French respondents received financial support from their par-
ents, and some had part-time jobs. Some received significant parental 
financial support, and some only partial support. None received a 
study grant, but they had housing allowances, the amount depend-
ing on their income. One young woman no longer received parental 
help. She worked part-time as part of her work-based curriculum, 
and was thus fully independent financially. Almost all the French 
young women explained that without their parents’ help they could 
not have pursued their studies, or perhaps could have pursued only 
a short course. Some, like Marie (24, France), stated that they would 
have tried to work alongside their studies, which the organisation of 
the university system makes very difficult because it requires daily 
attendance at many courses (see Chapter 4). Parental support had 
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enabled them to study and live independently, but unlike the Finn-
ish young women, who no longer needed to rely on their parents, 
the French young women remained in a state of semi-independence. 
They were residentially independent, but continued to depend on 
their parents financially.
Young women knew that their parents would help them if they 
fell on hard times. The Finnish informants clearly stated that they 
could ask for help if necessary, but that they did not want to do so. 
They were proud of being financially autonomous, and Päivi (25, 
Finland) and others felt that it was normal to be self-reliant. Sanna 
(24, Finland) mentioned that her parents helped her occasionally, 
but she managed with her study grant.
R:  Have your parents maybe helped you a little bit?
I:  No, no. Not at all, actually. (…) You know, they were not very rich 
themselves. (…) But it’s also like, if I’m independent in every other 
way, I can’t expect someone to be financing me, it just doesn’t make 
(…) sense. And since (…) I’m able-minded, I’m able-bodied, I can 
just work (…) beside my studies. I don’t see it as a problem. 
 Päivi (25, Finland)
R:  And do your parents help you?
I:  Yes, they do help me, well, basically they help me if I need to buy 
something, for example, if I want to buy some furniture, (…) but 
they don’t give any specific amount of money monthly.
 Sanna (24, Finland)
The French informants received either a small regular sum of money 
from their parents to top up their income if they worked, or a large 
sum to cover all their living expenses such as rent, transport costs, 
food and bills. This is the common trend in France, but they were 
aware that not all students had the same good fortune; some parents 
simply cannot afford to support their children. However, several 
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French informants expressed feelings of embarrassment, pressure and 
even guilt over their economic dependence on their parents. 
 My parents are lovely and I could study until I’m 30, they’d pay for 
me, but I really feel guilty actually, ’cause I have friends who live in 
Cité U [university halls of residence], [who do not get any help,] and 
it feels a bit absurd to live in so much abundance. And also I need to 
be independent a bit. I mean, like, what I have, I owe it to myself. 
 Sabrina (23, France)
Nicole (21, France) expressed similar feelings, and found it difficult to 
have money in her bank account that she had not earned herself. The 
position of semi-independence generated feelings of subordination 
and lowliness among these informants. Vincenzo Cicchelli and Claude 
Martin (2004: 620) confirm that students dislike receiving assistance 
and try to find ways to limit or avoid it. Natalie (22, France) also 
felt indirect pressure from her father, who paid for all her expenses. 
Studying was not the problem, but succeeding was. She had failed 
to obtain her Bachelors and had to repeat her third academic year. 
She knew that delaying her entry into the labour market entailed the 
delay of some of her parents’ plans, because of the budget needed for 
her studies. Financial dependence thus sets up an invisible contract 
between students and their parents. To some extent parenting contin-
ues, and the young person feels obliged to act responsibly, regarding 
both the management of the money they are provided with and their 
academic results (Cicchelli and Martin 2004: 620).
Perspectives on property ownership and settling down
The informants had opposing views on ownership and settling down. 
The differences were not between the case-countries, but across the 
young women in general. Some wanted to buy their own accommoda-
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tion, either a flat or a house, and settle down. This view was stronger 
among the French respondents. Others did not view property owner-
ship as part of their future plans. They were not sure about acquiring 
their own accommodation, felt it was not important for them, or 
simply saw it as a burden. This group also did not know where they 
wanted to live. They wished to live in different places, even abroad for 
a while, rather than having to settle down in one particular location. 
Feelings of imprisonment connected to always having to live in the 
same place emerged from their discourses. Partnership status did not 
affect their views. Some respondents were single, some had a partner, 
and respondents in either category might intend to settle down in a 
particular area, or to live in different locations with their partner. 
Elina (26, Finland) and her husband were planning to buy a 
flat, and later a house. 
 We don’t want to take, or we can’t take (…) [such a] big loan that we 
could buy a [house]. And it’s not wise in this situation either, to take 
a really big loan. (…) We start from an apartment and then hopefully 
someday we’ll have [our own house].
 Elina (26, Finland)
Tiia (26, Finland) and her partner had a child and lived in student 
accommodation. They planned to get their own accommodation, 
but it did not seem urgent.
R:  And later on, do you plan to have your own flat or [house]?
I:  Well, at the moment, we’ve been thinking of buying a flat. But, who 
knows, it’s not really a current issue, so it might change. 
 Tiia (26, Finland)
Céline (23, France) and Natalie (22, France) wanted to be able to 
acquire their own houses. They both were from the countryside and 
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were used to living in a house. For Natalie, having her own accom-
modation represented a safe haven.
R:  Later on, would you like to buy your own flat or house?
I:  Yeah, yeah, I’m dreaming about that! Well, ok, it’s a dream, having a big 
house, things … [but] yeah, really invest in a place to live, in fact.
 Céline (22, France)
 Yes, ideally, yes. If I could buy a house it’d be … (…) I love travelling, 
but I don’t want to settle down somewhere else, actually. I want to 
settle down in France, even in Lyon; I like this place very much. I 
want to be able to leave … a month here, a month there, but come 
back here after. 
 Natalie (22, France)
Some young women had only vague opinions about whether they 
wanted their own accommodation. It was not a priority, nor very 
important to them. 
R:  Later on, would you like to buy your own flat or house?
I:  Maybe later … It’s not that … I mean, I don’t have a boyfriend and 
I’m in no hurry to have children, or anything like that. I think I’m 
gonna be renting for quite a long time. And then, later on, maybe 
get an apartment or a house. But I can’t see that happening in years, 
so maybe when I’m over 30 or something. 
 Piia (24, Finland)
 Maybe someday, I don’t know. It’s not, well, not in five, not in 10 
years, I don’t know, I have something else in my mind, and [a house], 
it’s not (…) the first thing I have to have.
 Suvi (25, Finland)
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Caroline (25, France) and her husband were conscious that they 
were paying high rent to a landlord every month, and were thinking 
that it might be worthwhile to buy a flat and then sell it after a few 
years. However, they did not know where they wanted to live. They 
wanted to move abroad for a while. Caroline also said that she did 
not want to live in the same place all her life. Päivi (25, Finland) also 
mentioned that acquiring her own flat or house would entail knowing 
where she was going to work and live, and for how long.
R:  And later on, would you like to buy your own flat or have your own 
house?
I:  I guess at some point … [but] considering that I want to work for 
NGOs, which will never pay me a very good salary, I don’t see that 
coming. (…) On the other hand, I don’t know if I will be working 
in Finland, or if I will be working in the same place for very long. 
 Päivi (25, Finland)
Some young women even contested the principle of ownership itself, 
viewed it as a financial burden, or felt alienated from it. Sabrina 
(23, France) even said that it would tie her down and force her to 
always live in the same place. Her and Valérie’s (23, France) com-
ments conveyed feelings of imprisonment, in contrast with Natalie 
(22, France), who considered that having her own place would be 
a secure haven.
 I don’t know. Buying, no. I’m afraid of everything that can be a ball 
and chain. It feels that if I buy [accommodation] I’ll stay always in 
the same place all my life. It just doesn’t appeal to me. 
 Sabrina (23, France)
 I don’t really think about it, but when I do … For example, my sister 
has bought a house, (…) and I thought ‘wow, she bought a house, 
so she’s settling down, she’s gonna spend her whole life there.’ So, 
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becoming a property owner, (…) well, [my parents] do not own 
their house. (…) So, the concept of home ownership, it’s completely 
foreign to me! And that’s why it kinda makes me freak out to think, 
‘wow, I’m gonna buy a house!’ (…) No, it’s not in my career plans.
 Valérie (23, France)
Some Finnish informants mentioned that attitudes towards and 
experiences of ownership differed greatly between students on the 
one hand and, on the other hand, young people who were not at 
university and already worked and/or had a family. Tuuli (25, Finland) 
explained that most of her friends from Tampere were students who 
lived in student or shared accommodation. However, her childhood 
friends who had followed a different path and were already working 
were thinking of buying, or had already bought, their own houses. 
In her case, having her own accommodation was not a priority. Elina 
(26, Finland) also discussed the differences between the residential 
situations of students and working young people, with working 
people being more willing to settle down and get their own place. 
Having a permanent job is therefore a crucial factor not only in one’s 
access to residential stability, but also in one’s attitudes towards home 
ownership. 
Among my informants, the issue of housing affordability was not 
raised systematically. However, Päivi (25, Finland) explicitly stressed 
that private housing costs were very high and kept on rising. She had 
personally witnessed the increase in costs when working as a hous-
ing officer. Nicole (21, France) stated that a 26-year-old male friend 
from Paris had wished to move into his own place for several years, 
but had not been able to afford the high rents during his studies and 
work training. He was about to get his own accommodation at the 
time of the interview. He had been working for a year, had a stable 
job, and had been able to save enough funds to do so.
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Conclusion: 
residential independence versus individual independence
There are similar policies in the two countries concerning housing 
support (see subchapters 5.3 and 6.3). However, entry into the labour 
market and the distribution of study grants differ in Finland and 
France. The dynamics of the countries’ welfare principles have a strong 
impact on students’ ability to reach fully autonomous status. French 
students might have residential independence but remain financially 
dependent on their parents. Finnish youths reach full independence 
once they leave the parental home, earning a living by working and 
receiving study grants. Nonetheless, to some extent their autonomy 
depends on social assistance. The state removes the burden of student 
financial support from the parents, but what would be the situation 
if there were no social aid? Are Finnish students truly independent, 
given that they depend on state support? They might no longer 
depend on their family, but their autonomous status is intrinsically 
linked to state assistance.
The informants across both countries expressed two different 
views on the question of settling down. Some wanted to have their 
own accommodation and settle down. It provided them with feelings 
of security. Others had adopted post-materialist views on property 
ownership and settling down. Owning accommodation was not im-
portant for them, and they resisted the implication that they would 
have to live permanently in a specific location. They chose a more 
flexible lifestyle that offered opportunities to live in different areas, 
even different countries. Both views were expressed by single young 
women as well as those in a relationship. 
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6.2 Perspectives on the family 
The young women I interviewed were all university students; therefore 
their priorities focused on graduating, finding a job, and achieving full 
financial independence. However, the question of starting a family 
arose strongly during the interviews. The informants talked about their 
transition from university to working life and developing a career, but 
also about becoming a mother. Indeed, parenthood is considered one 
of the key features of the process of transition to adulthood. 
Being able to start a family is intertwined with one’s abilities 
to achieve financial autonomy and obtain a stable job. However, 
combining a professional career and motherhood – in other words, 
assuming a dual role – can generate dilemmas for young women. 
The significant transformations in the labour market have given 
women new openings, choices and life opportunities, such as career 
opportunities. It has become a norm for young women to work and 
seek career prospects similar to those of men. Yet at the same time 
they are expected to retain their conventional role as mothers and 
family carers, while also being influenced by postmodern, femi-
nist and individualistic values, such as being fully independent and 
achieving self-fulfilment (see Chapter 5). Today’s young women are 
thus pulled between contradictory individual and social options and 
expectations. 
The informants’ discussions around their own roles as future 
workers and mothers focused on the dual-role dilemma. Some were 
more career-oriented, and others planned to both work and have 
children. Opinions were divided, not between the Finnish and French 
informants, but across them. Some women in both countries wanted 
a family and wondered how they would lead a career at the same 
time. Others expected their job schedule to allow them to care for 
their family. Most of them said that they wanted a family, but only 
several years later, after they had acquired more life experience and 
enjoyed the freedom of youth. A few simply did not plan to have a 
family at all. 
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are young women contesting the ideology of marriage?
The respondents had different living arrangements. Some of them 
were single or seeing someone. Some had been in a relationship for 
several years and shared a flat with their partner. Informants in both 
countries had different views regarding the issue of marriage. Two were 
married, one had a child, some wanted to get married, some had not 
considered the subject yet, some rejected the institution of marriage, 
and some simply did not see the necessity of getting married. Most 
of them fell into the latter category. They told that living together 
with a partner – in other words, cohabiting – was sufficient. They felt 
that the ritual of marriage was not necessary, but they highlighted the 
importance of relationship stability, compatibility with one’s partner, 
and ‘finding the right person’.
I:  If I would find the man of my dreams, (...) if I’d meet the right per-
son … It wouldn’t be a problem to have children and move on quite 
quickly, but I don’t really see that happening. (...) I think it’ll take a 
few years before I start thinking about anything like that.
R:  Like getting married? Or would you like/
I:  I don’t know if I wanna get married! (…) I have nothing against mar-
riage … and I want to have children. So, if I have children it would 
be a lot easier if we were married with the father of the child, with 
all the legal stuff. (…) I don’t know … Depends whether I find the 
right person …
 Piia (24, Finland)
R:  And you’d like to get married?
I:  Well, not necessary married, but find a man and have children. I 
want to have children too, but getting married, it’s not like … com-
pulsory.
 Maria (30, Finland)
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Céline (23, France) hoped to get married in a more traditional and 
romantic way, following the example of her parents.
 Secretly, yes, I’m dreaming … Yes, to get married … But well, it’s 
because I have the image of my parents, (…) it’s a bit of a model for 
me … It’s always been the thing that made me dream …
 Céline (23, France)
Sabrina (23, France) had an interesting perspective on relationships. 
She maintained that having a partner was only of secondary impor-
tance in her life; it came after her own priorities and life plans, such 
as working abroad and travelling. Nadège (21, France) referred to 
her feminist ideologies, and was against having to prove her love for 
her partner through a legal contract.
In the 1960s young French people married at an earlier age 
than their parents had done. From the mid-1970s onwards, the age 
at first marriage increased again (Galland 1990: 65). This suggests 
that the age of marriage is older today only by comparison with the 
baby boomers’ generation. Young people nowadays might get mar-
ried later than those in the 1960s, but not significantly later than 
the previous generations. Stephanie Coontz (2005) provides a similar 
interpretation. She argues that rates of marriage in Europe had been 
lower for 100 years than they became in the 1950s. The new model 
of marriage established during the 1950s produced a new cultural 
consensus regarding age of marriage (Coontz 2005: 4). The end of 
the Second World War reinforced the appeal of the model of mar-
riage in which men are breadwinners and women are homemakers. 
At the same time, the age of marriage fell and rates of marriage rose. 
This surge in marriage engendered new patterns (especially in terms 
of age) and forms (the nuclear family) of marriage that became the 
new norms in advanced societies. Unlike earlier generations, young 
people in the 1950s and 1960s did not postpone marriage until they 
had achieved economic independence. Marriage thus became a strong 
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marker of adulthood, rather than merely reflecting an adult status 
that had been already achieved. Changes in the age at first childbirth 
followed the changes in marriage, with women having children at a 
younger age than in previous generations (Coontz 2005: 222–227). 
However, the 1950s ideologies and patterns of marriage started to 
crumble in the 1970s. Young people began to delay marriage, and to 
reject the rigid conventions it embodied. They wished simply to live 
in a relationship rather than in an institution (Coontz 2005: 247).
However, consensual union nowadays cannot be compared with 
marriage in the early or mid-20th century. Today there are several 
alternatives to marriage, such as cohabitation. In Finland there are 
two options: legal union through marriage (avioliitto), and registered 
partnership or cohabitation (avoliitto). In France there are three op-
tions: official union through marriage, official union through PACS 
(Pacte Civil de Solidarité – Civil Union Pact), or registered partnership 
(cohabitation) (see Chapter 3.2 for more details). The institution of 
marriage has lost its moral appeal, religious authority and aura in the 
eyes of many young couples. A large number of people undeniably 
still wish to marry, but most test the relationship first by cohabiting. 
On the one hand, cohabitation can be a test for marriage, a trying-
out period. In that case, it is a transition to marriage. On the other 
hand, cohabitation can be a substitute for or alternative to marriage, 
when cohabiting people commit to the relationship as if they were 
married (Arnett 2004: 198; Galland 2004: 154). Traditional marriage 
may have lost its appeal in some instances, but this is not true of 
union as a loving and intimate relationship between two individu-
als. In that sense, cohabitation has acquired the same moral value 
as marriage (Coontz 2005: 278). By contrast with many marriages 
contracted in the past, most recent unions are based on the feelings 
of the individuals and the compatibility of the partners. Young people 
today focus on the ideology of love rather than on the legal marriage 
contract per se. Consensual unions have become a primary source of 
emotional support, and the central focus is on individuals’ subjective 
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happiness and their expectations of relationships (Arnett 2004: 98; 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 72). Some respondents, such as 
Piia (24, Finland), explicitly referred to that issue.
Furthermore, the shifts in women’s attitudes towards the post-
war societal establishment, the women’s movement, the rise in female 
labour force participation, the separation of marriage from childbear-
ing and parenting, and the change in women’s social roles and posi-
tions from the 1960s onwards have had a substantial impact on the 
institution of marriage itself. Many young women postpone marriage 
because they choose to focus on professional goals and self-fulfilment 
before entering a relationship, including most of my informants. A 
growing number of them also wish to preserve their professional and 
social autonomy. Before the 1960s, women’s social roles and positions 
were essentially determined by marriage and motherhood. Today 
many still define themselves as mothers, but not necessarily as wives 
or married women. In addition, they define themselves through the 
professional position with which the labour market provides them. 
They no longer depend on the institution of marriage to acquire 
social status. The post-war model of marriage was a system of asym-
metrical complementarity, with one active partner and one inactive 
and dependent partner. The new model is a system of symmetrical 
association in which each partner is active and autonomous (Galland 
2004: 157-158). My respondents unmistakably aimed for the latter 
type of union.
New priorities: Self-fulfilment
If attitudes towards marriage and relationships have changed for 
a segment of the population, so have attitudes towards the family. 
While the majority of young people still wish to start a family, in 
2007 more than 30% of young Finnish, French and European peo-
ple (aged 16–29) were not planning to have children. Similarly, the 
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majority of young people did not consider the family the foundation 
of society (see Table 3.7 in subchapter 3.2). Most of my informants 
were finishing their studies, and they mostly prioritised finding work 
over starting a family. Their current socio-economic situation greatly 
influenced their priorities at the time of interview. However, some 
mentioned that both were equally important to them, and they 
planned to start working and then to have children soon afterwards. 
One young woman already had a baby, and was focusing equally on 
her family and on finishing her studies so that she could start work-
ing. Some were single and mentioned that that had had an impact on 
their decision to concentrate on a professional career. They stressed 
that if the situation had been otherwise, their opinions about starting 
a family in the near future might have been different.
Catherine Hakim (2000: 157–168) distinguishes three main pat-
terns regarding family orientation among women. In the first group, 
some women are family-centred and renounce work in order to care 
for their family. In the second group, women are work-centred and 
reject family commitment. These two groups are a minority. Most 
women belong to the third group: the adaptive women, who combine 
family and working life. To reconcile the two roles, some choose a 
job that allows them to spend time with their family, such as school-
teaching, or accept at the outset that their professional career will be a 
modest one. In terms of Hakim’s typology, most of my informants fell 
into the adaptive category: they planned to combine work and family. 
Those who did not want children fell into the work-centred category. 
However, another group seemed to emerge during my analysis. My 
data is too limited in size to make any generalisations; nonetheless, 
the issue is worth highlighting. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the 
respondents stressed that having a job related to their passions was 
more important than earning a good salary. They wished to achieve 
financial autonomy, but mainly in order to be able to focus on their 
personal interests. Salary was not directly mentioned and seemed to 
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be taken for granted, but it was the basic resource that would allow 
one to enjoy one’s free time.
Emmi (25, Finland) showed strong resistance to the traditional 
gender role expected of and imposed upon women by the wider social 
structure. She had other plans for her life.
R:  What is your priority between finding a job and starting a family? 
Or have you started thinking about that?
I:  No, ’cause I think it’s really like a, I’m kind of … fighting against it, 
that when you’re almost 30 you have to start to think about that: ‘I 
have to own a house, and then I have to own a car, and then I have 
to have two kids and a dog.’ I don’t want that kind of things, at least 
not at the moment, ’cause [mainly], I would like to live for myself 
and just be free. And then later on, I’ll check what happens, but I 
don’t want to hurry with the family. But also, I think work is not that 
important.
 Emmi (25, Finland)
R:  What is the priority for you, to start a family or/
I:  Ah absolutely not! That, honestly, I really don’t want! Since one of 
my plans is to travel all around the world, I want children, but after! 
(…) So, as a priority, that’s why I want to start working life, because 
I want a job that’ll allow me to save money, so that I can have long-
term projects.
 Florence (22, France)
In her research with highly educated young people from Helsinki, 
Kaisa Ketokivi (2004) found that many educated young men and 
women delay starting a family until their late 20s or early 30s, in 
order to focus on their personal life. Jeffrey J. Arnett (2004) presents 
similar results from his informants in North America, who considered 
the 20s a time for experimentation and the exploration of identity. 
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Galland (1990) drew comparable conclusions from his research with 
French youth. A growing number of young people wish to enjoy a 
free lifestyle before taking on heavy commitments such as starting 
a family. Experimenting with life is increasingly becoming a norm, 
and is increasingly socially accepted. In addition, since the 1960s 
family ties have become increasingly about emotional ties. Partners 
and children are the centre of care and attention, rather than simply 
being there because of conventional and biological occurrences. 
Audrey (26, France) wanted to pass the competitive selective 
examinations in order to become a teacher, but was not sure about 
wanting to work immediately. She still wanted to travel, live abroad 
for a while, and experience a free lifestyle. Independence, self-fulfil-
ment and enjoyment are becoming more important than working 
just to earn money. Work must bring meaning to life (see Chapter 
5), but the issue of starting a family is also being questioned. Rather 
than starting a family simply because it is the conventional path and 
because motherhood is the role and identity assigned to women, some 
informants were questioning the importance of those things in their 
lives. Some even rejected them and felt that other paths could provide 
them with a more appropriate sense of identity. Individualistic values 
influenced their decisions, but mostly it was a question of what felt 
right for them. Most stated that they did not feel external pressure 
regarding their decisions to delay having or to refuse to have children. 
Others felt some biological pressure, and a few mentioned family 
and indirect peer pressure. Those who did not want children were 
not necessarily single. Some were in a stable relationship which they 
found satisfying and sufficient. 
Controlled fertility
 
Today’s young women might still see the family as a strong factor in 
identity and focus on both family and work. However, some contest 
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the limitations that a family would impose upon them. The contem-
porary social context is much more favourable to women’s freedom 
of choice. The shift to postmodern values, attitudes and expectations, 
both professional and personal, does not necessarily translate into a 
refusal to procreate and start a family, but the act is more pondered 
over, evaluated and rationalised (Devienne 2007: 81–82). It has be-
come a choice, and a calculated choice. Some respondents confirmed 
these views, especially in France. 
Marie (24, France) really hoped to have children, but she thought 
it should be carefully planned, otherwise it might compromise or 
hinder her life course. She thought that things should come in a logi-
cal order, one at a time. Starting a family requires tight negotiations 
to ensure that career ambitions, personal happiness and the desire to 
care for one’s children are coordinated and do not compromise each 
other too much. Marie was therefore going to control and decide 
upon the timing of her fertility.
 I’ve always thought, first my studies, I finish them, then I find a job, 
and after, I can think about starting a family. (…) I want to have 
a family, (…) but I know it requires sacrifices. (…) Even though I 
want to have a family and children, what has always frightened me 
is that it might happen during my studies, and that it might hinder 
my ambitions, and then as a result I would become frustrated later 
on, or I would have regrets. 
 Marie (24, France)
Nicole (21, France) referred to a friend who had calculated the exact 
time when she would have a child, so that it would not compromise 
her career as a lawyer. She had had a baby during her studies and 
training and taken the parental leave at the same time, so that when 
she started working the child would be old enough to attend nursery. 
She knew she could not have a baby at the beginning of her legal 
career. Nicole added sarcastically that if one takes into account fin-
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ishing one’s studies, starting a career and establishing oneself in the 
labour market, the right time to have children is now around 35–40 
years old, which is biologically difficult, if not too late altogether. She 
felt that women’s fertility was being controlled and compromised by 
socio-economic activities and structures. 
A growing number of young women today do not want to have 
children, and plan to remain voluntarily childless. Women are hetero-
geneous in that matter. This formerly unusual decision has become 
more common in the wake of women’s access to the labour market. 
Some women simply choose to remain independent and focus on 
their career. Childless women and couples are less and less deemed a 
deviant group, but are simply considered to have chosen a different 
lifestyle (Hakim 2000: 55). 
In relation to the reasons for voluntary childlessness, Hakim 
(2000: 44, 55) emphasises the psychological and social role of con-
traception for women. Contraception gives women personal and 
independent control over their fertility, and also over their life course. 
Women can therefore decide when to bear children, and how many 
to have (Coontz 2005: 253). Having a child has become a volun-
tary act, rather than a life hazard. The greatest numbers of childless 
women are in countries with egalitarian and family-friendly social 
policies, such as Finland and France. Paradoxically, France and the 
Scandinavian societies have the highest fertility rates. This indicates 
that women are given the freedom of choice to have children. The 
highest proportion of voluntarily childless women is among highly 
educated women and white-collars workers, mainly in professional 
and managerial occupations (Hakim 2000: 51). Some of my inform-
ants fell into that category, as they were highly educated, were hoping 
for white-collar occupations, and were planning to remain childless. 
Indeed, several respondents stated that they did not want children. 
Others were not very keen on the idea, but still believed that they 
would probably like to have children later. Some felt pressure to want 
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children because their acquaintances were starting to have babies, and 
others were shocked when their friends had their first child.
Suvi (25, Finland) expressed the implicit pressure she had felt 
when some of her friends had recently had children. 
 I felt that I [was] a bit an outsider, ’cause I don’t see a newborn baby 
as a very pretty thing. (…) I don’t have this baby fever. I don’t know 
what it is. I’ve been trying to get it, ’cause everybody is ‘ok, now I 
have a baby fever.’ No, I just want a dog!
 Suvi (25, Finland)
Päivi (25, Finland) had chosen to remain childless for personal reasons, 
and because children might compromise her career opportunities. 
 
 I can definitely see myself starting a career, but I can’t really see myself 
starting a family. (…) I know I’m quite young, so it may change, (…) 
who knows, but at this point I just [don’t] want children. (…) I just 
don’t feel the overwhelming motherly feeling towards [babies]. (…) 
If I have a six months old baby in my arms, and a really great op-
portunity rises up, I’m not sure that I’ll be able to take it, (…) at least 
it’s going to be more difficult if I have a partner and (…) a child. [If ] 
I get this great opportunity [to go] to Cambodia to do whatever for 
the next two years, (…) if I have a long-term partner, my decisions 
are not only mine, but it’s still sort of flexible. But if there’s a child 
involved, it gets less flexible. 
 Päivi (25, Finland)
Valérie (23, France) felt shocked when her closest friend had a baby, 
mainly because she did not feel ready to have children herself, or 
even to live with a partner. Sabrina (23, France) was shaken for dif-
ferent reasons.
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 It’s traumatising, I’m dreading it! (…) Because I have the feeling that, 
as a result, I’m gonna lose my friends. They’ll stop going out, they’ll 
play the doting parents, and I won’t see them any more.
 Sabrina (23, France)
When I asked if she planned to have children, she answered nega-
tively. 
 No, I don’t want to have children. I have a rather negative image 
of children. (…) When I see a kid, I don’t go all gaga, it has never 
appealed to me, I’ve never imagined myself as a mother. (…) I don’t 
think about it, and the more time passes, the more I think that I 
won’t have children.
 Sabrina (23, France)
Céline (23, France) wanted children later in life, but had also devel-
oped an aversion to children and childcare because of her student 
job as a babysitter. Babysitting had strongly curtailed her desire to 
have children, because it had revealed to her the negative aspects of 
children’s behaviour and needs, and of childcare responsibilities. 
Debra Mollen (2006) discusses similar issues. In her research, 
she found that many women resisted and rejected women’s social 
roles and gender-prescribed expectations such as motherhood, just 
like Päivi (25, Finland). Others based their choice on their own 
mother’s dissatisfaction with family life. This point of view was put 
forward by Sabrina (23, France). She explained that her ideology of 
full independence had been transmitted by her mother. Her mother 
had entered the traditional family apparatus in her early 20s, and 
had stayed out of work in order to take care of her children. She had 
remained financially dependent on her husband, and wished her life 
could have been different. She strongly discouraged her children from 
following the same path. Some women, like Céline (23, France), 
might also develop an aversion to childcare responsibilities – for 
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 239 
instance, through negative experiences related to childcare – without 
actually disliking children. In addition, many women enjoy having 
freedom and time to focus on their own interests; in other words, 
their focus is their own self. Others choose to concentrate their ener-
gies on both their career and their intimate relationships. For some 
couples, having time and devotion for each other is crucial, and they 
are dubious about the addition of another person to their relationship. 
Finally, monetary costs and obligations can contribute to women’s 
reluctance to have children. External factors such as worldwide or 
environmental fears and concerns can enter the equation too (Mollen 
2006). The 2008 Finnish Family Barometer survey provided similar 
explanations. The main reasons for the voluntary childlessness of 
25–34-year-old Finnish men and women were lifestyle preferences 
(they did not want or feel the need to have children), not being able 
to find the right partner, a desire to develop their career, and concern 
at present and future socio-economic uncertainty and insecurity 
(Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008: 95–97).
The 30 age limit
Nonetheless, some informants pointed out, directly or indirectly, that 
the age of 30 marked the point at which to stop experimenting and 
start settling down and starting a family (for those who planned to 
have children). This was essentially rooted in biological factors. Maria 
(30, Finland) clearly stated that she wanted children and was conscious 
of the limited time left in which to have them. She also wanted to 
start her career, which added to the time pressure. Anna (28, Finland) 
felt pressure too, but mostly external and social pressure. 
I:  (…) One of my friends, a student friend, has children. And she’s 
married too.
R:  Does it put pressure on you?
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I:  She’s not so close to me, but it’s not her that makes the pressure, it’s 
society in general, that makes [you feel] that when you’re 30 … Like 
I have two years’ time [left], and I should have more things done.
 Anna (28, Finland)
Céline (23, France) was thinking that in five years’ time she would 
be 28, and she would like to be officially married and not to have 
children too late, so that she would not be an old mother. The pres-
sure was both biological and psychological. Florence (22, France) and 
Valérie (23, France) said that they wanted children, but not before 
they were 30. They wanted to acquire life experience and enjoy their 
freedom before starting a family, as well as finishing their studies, 
travelling, and focusing on other personal interests. They did not 
feel any external pressure. Emmi (25, Finland) had very similar ide-
ologies. She was not sure about having children, and was thinking 
about adopting. This removed the biological pressure, as she said that 
it was acceptable to be a little older if one was adopting. Alice (23, 
France) felt she had to get the most out of life, both personally and 
professionally, before having children.
 I have the feeling that I should make the most if it now ’cause after 
[having children] I won’t be able to. I see people around me, like 
my [older] sister. (…) She tells me ‘make the most of it, and so on, 
’cause honestly, after you have children, it’s nice, but it’s no longer 
the same.’ 
 Alice (23, France)
Several authors have discussed the 30 age limit. Young people today 
have gained freedom over whether and when to marry. Personal 
choices may outweigh social pressure in that context. However, the 
age limit for marriage for young women remains 30. It serves as 
a biological deadline for those who want to have children. Young 
women are thus compelled to adjust their plans to biological factors 
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(Arnett 2004: 100–103). Van de Velde’s (2008: 50) Danish inter-
viewees took a similar view. The 20s are a stage of experimentation, 
but 30 is the limit. At 30, one should settle down and start following 
adult patterns, such as having a stable job, establishing a career, and 
starting a family. 
adaptive young women: Combining career and family
Combining family and career can be difficult, not just in terms 
of time but also regarding women’s values. Both family and career 
require time, dedication and financial considerations. In order to 
‘solve’ the dilemma, some women decide to stop working and stay at 
home in order to raise their family. They choose the option of being 
a housewife. Others decide to carry on working, but change their 
career prospects by working part-time or seeking only lower-level jobs. 
This allows them to reconcile their professional and family lives. In 
the 2003 INSEE Histoire de Vie (Life History) survey, the first reason 
offered by French women for working part-time was to take care of 
their children. These women have two roles to fulfil, and are able to 
combine them. Women and sometimes men from different socio-
professional groups, depending on their professional field, experience 
more or less difficulty in combining work and family. For instance, 
people working in the public sector find it easier to reconcile family 
and work (Garner et al. 2006: 34–36).
The interview questions on combining work and family life 
uncovered interesting perspectives. Several young women had not 
thought about whether they really wanted children, or were not sure, 
and therefore had not considered the question of combining the two 
spheres. The issue was still very abstract to them. Some mentioned that 
their job flexibility would enable them to handle both activities with 
ease. Several young women planned to be teachers, and stated that it 
was one of the best jobs to combine with having children. However, 
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they had not chosen that profession specifically in order to have a 
family, but had done so out of individual preference. There were also 
some who had chosen that occupation and wished to remain childless. 
The issues of financing and supporting a family also arose.
R:  How do you think you will be able to develop your professional career, 
have a family, and take care of your children at the same time?
I:  It depends on what my future husband or boyfriend will do for a liv-
ing, basically! If he has a secure job and we have some income, I don’t 
think it’ll be a problem, but (…) if I only have [irregular] contracts, 
(…) it’s going to be financially quite difficult to have children and 
provide for the family. (…) But then again, as a journalist, I don’t 
think it’s going to be an obstacle for me if I stay at home for a few 
years and stay with the child. It won’t cut off my professional career. 
(…) But yeah … financially it could be quite difficult.
 Piia (24, Finland)
Piia (24, Finland) also had the role model of her older sister, who 
managed to combine family and working life and still had personal 
interests and diverse activities with friends. Piia therefore felt rather 
confident about managing to combine not just professional and fam-
ily life, but also personal activities. Several young women felt that 
they would manage in the same way as other people did. Tuuli (25, 
Finland) claimed that firms and workplaces should be more flexible 
towards women and encourage them to have children, rather than 
doing the opposite. Elina (26, Finland) said that she would do what 
most Finnish people did: she would use day care services. Also, she was 
going to become a teacher, and expected that adjustable work shifts 
would allow her to take care of her children. Natalie (22, France) and 
several other French informants also mentioned that being a teacher 
would allow them to care for and spend time with their family.
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 From the perspective of being a schoolteacher, it’s rather simple. (…) 
For a start, we have school holidays, so concerning my children, I’ll 
share all that time with them. (…) Maybe I’ll be able to spend all the 
time they are not at school with them, because I won’t be either.
 Natalie (22, France)
Tiia (26, Finland) already had a child and was studying. She managed 
to combine the two in a satisfactory way. 
 It has its challenges, and it’s something you really need to get used 
to. When I was on maternity leave, I could concentrate on the baby. 
Now the situation has changed and I have to do other things as well, 
which is really good and it gives you a sense of purpose for the other 
part of your life. (…) Combining those things, it needs some think-
ing, it takes time. (…) But I think I’ve managed ok. (...) I don’t feel 
I’ve had to give up many friends, (…) and I don’t feel that I’ve had 
to ‘give up’ things. (…) It’s a question of attitude.
 Tiia (26, Finland)
The Finnish young women seemed rather confident and optimistic 
about managing to combine family and professional life as well as 
personal interests. By contrast, several French respondents expressed 
concerns about this aspect. They seemed less certain than their Finnish 
counterparts that they would be able to manage the situation. Sabrina 
(23, France) mentioned that many professional women choose at 
some point in their life to prioritise family life and thus to suspend 
their career (see subchapter 5.2). Indeed, Alice (23, France) spoke 
about slowing down her career and readjusting or reducing her work 
schedule when she had children. 
R:  How do you think you’ll manage to combine family life, work and 
leisure activities?
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I:  Well, that I don’t know. Sometimes I really question it. I think about 
what I’m getting involved in. I’m destined to have a job with respon-
sibilities, and I think, ‘oh, I’m gonna come home late in the evenings, 
wouldn’t I prefer to privilege family life, do I really want to privilege 
professional life over personal life?’ (…) But well, (…) I think that 
until your 30s, you can work, (…) base everything on your career, 
and after, why not [reduce your working hours]; this type of thing.
 Alice (23, France)
Coontz (2005: 267) mentions that from the early 2000s onwards, 
some of her students started to maintain that fathers could care for 
their children and do household chores, rather than holding women 
solely responsible for those roles. The issue of salary arose too. The 
students thought it was logical for the partner with the highest sal-
ary to carry on working and for the other to stay at home, regardless 
of gender. A couple of my informants addressed the issue of gender 
roles and shared responsibilities for taking care of the family. They 
expected their husband to participate in family life as much as they 
did, both in household chores and in bringing up the children.
 I haven’t really thought about [combining working and family life], 
(…) but I think it’s possible, and I’ve even thought that if I get married, 
then (…) [my] husband could also stay at home for a while, (…) I feel 
it should be that way too, that it’s not only women’s responsibility.
 Sanna (24, Finland)
 Well, I hope that my husband will help me! I’m not so sure, I haven’t 
really thought about that. It will come as it will come. (…) You always 
find solutions when the moment comes. (…) Also, I don’t want to 
sacrifice everything for my family. (…) I think I’ve integrated May 
’68 [ideologies] pretty well, and being the housewife (…) is not at all 
the model that I want to follow. (…) I believe I’ll make concessions, 
but I believe everybody does.
 Valérie (23, France)
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In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined the differences between Finland and 
France regarding the university system, integration into the labour 
market, and student support. In terms of residential independence 
and housing support, regardless of students’ sources of income, the 
situation was similar in the two countries (see subchapter 6.1). In 
terms of family-related policies, Finland and France offer very similar 
types of support. Both states offer generous assistance to families. 
However, in Finland the aid is targeted at individuals, on the basis 
of the universalist principles of the welfare regime. In France, the 
distribution of support presumes the family unit as a care provider 
for its members. Family assistance is thus underpinned by different 
ideologies, although the provision is closely comparable (for more 
detail on types of support, see Appendix 5). 
Finnish female students who become mothers have the same 
rights as other women concerning maternity leave. They are also 
allowed to receive maternity allowance. Those who receive student 
benefits can combine the allowances. Finnish students are allowed 
to interrupt their studies and register as ‘absent’. In the same way, 
student mothers can take maternity leave and interrupt their studies 
(University of Tampere 2009). In France the situation is different. 
Female students who become mothers are a minority group, and 
their status lacks recognition. They are categorised as students or as 
mothers, but not as student mothers. Therefore the university system 
does not acknowledge their specific needs, such as to postpone their 
exams because of childbirth. They can take a term off, for instance, 
or simply try to combine studies and motherhood. Some of them also 
work. Financial support, however, is comparable to that in Finland. 
They can combine student benefits, maternity and other allowances 
(such as housing allowances) (Studyrama Budget 2010). 
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Conclusion: Convergence of family ideologies
Finnish and French young women present many similarities in their 
current living arrangements and plans to start a family. The respond-
ents were divided between those hoping to have a family and combine 
it with a job, those eager to concentrate exclusively on their career 
and remain voluntarily childless, and those wishing to have children 
only after obtaining other life experiences. The young women who 
expected to combine work and family life had different strategies 
in mind. Some expected their job to enable them to combine work 
and family timetables. Others were more worried about the potential 
demands of a career, and were thinking of aiming for more modest 
professional goals. Some were confident about managing to work, 
care for their children and even carry on with most of their personal 
interests, because they already knew others who had managed to do 
so. Finally, a few mentioned using day care and sharing domestic 
chores with their husbands, thus highlighting the importance of 
gender role equality. 
However, several young women emphasised the need to calculate 
the timing of having children, entailing control over one’s own fer-
tility. Some of them held postmodern values in relation to women’s 
identity, and no longer looked to the institution of the family to 
define themselves. They drew on other socio-economic areas to gain 
a sense of identity and social position, such as a specific professional 
career, individual ethics and personal interests. 
Most informants also intended to live in a registered consensual 
union – in other words, cohabitation – rather than getting married. 
Some wished to get married, but they all directly or indirectly em-
phasised compatibility and harmony between partners over the mere 
legal contract of marriage.
Finland and France are two of the few European countries with a 
sustainable fertility rate. Although their welfare ideologies differ, their 
family-related policies converge. The two states provide equivalent 
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generous support to families. However, this support is essentially 
targeted at individuals’ well-being in Finland, whereas in France it 
is targeted at the family unit so that parents can take care of their 
children. Nevertheless, these policies seem to have a strong influence 
on the motivation to have children.
6.3 Patterns of leaving home in finland and france
The two previous subchapters (6.1 and 6.2) presented the respond-
ents’ living arrangements, means of financing their expenses, and 
attitude towards starting a family. The present subchapter offers more 
general information on Finnish and French students’ living arrange-
ments, patterns of leaving the parental home, financial resources and 
family formation.
Moving out of the parental home
Finnish and French students’ living arrangements differ (see Table 
6.1). Most French students live either with their parents or in private 
accommodation, usually a rented flat, on which parents pay the rent 
in many cases (see Galland 1996). In Finland most students live in 
rented accommodation, and a large number live in student accom-
modation. Age and relationship status are also important influencing 
factors in the choice of accommodation. 
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Table 6.1. Students’ living arrangements in Finland and France, 2005.
Finland France
Students’ living arrangements Percentages 
With parents 5 42
Student accommodation 31 16
Private accommodation 64 42
Total 100 100
The data comes from Eurostudent Report (2005). As specified in Eurostudent III 
2005–2008 (it is not stated as explicitly in the 2005 Eurostudent Report), the sample 
included university students only. Students from higher vocational institutions, doctoral 
students and exchange students were not included in the study; only national and 
permanent students were included (Orr 2008: 16–20).
Every Finnish city with a university has a student accommodation 
service (e.g. TOAS in Tampere) that manages and provides student 
lodgings. The accommodation provided can be in halls of residence, 
or in flats such as one-room apartments, individual student rooms in 
a shared flat, or larger apartments for couples with or without chil-
dren. There is not enough student accommodation for the number 
of students, so many students rent from the private sector. Many also 
prefer that option, including my informants, because it offers more 
privacy, more comfort in some cases, and more diversity in living 
arrangements. Almost all of my informants were living in private 
lodgings.
In France, the CNOUS and CROUS (Centre National and Centre 
Regional des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaires – Regional and National 
Centres for University and School Implementations) are national 
and regional networks providing services to students such as halls of 
residence, cafeterias at university, assistance with applications, and 
the distribution of government study grants (Les Services de la Vie 
Etudiante 2010). However, the amount of student accommodation 
available does not match the number of students. Moreover, students 
are victims of massive increases in housing costs. Prices vary depending 
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on the place of study, such as between provincial cities and metro-
politan areas. Thirty-five per cent of French students stated that it 
was difficult to find accommodation (including individual lodgings 
and student halls of residence) in 2006 (Observatoire National de la 
Vie Etudiante 2006). Also, students from the middle social classes 
are discriminated against, as social assistance is means-tested. They 
usually have incomes that are too high to be eligible for state study 
grants or the student lodgings provided by the regional CROUS, 
which are intended for students from low-income families. Even the 
latter do not necessary secure CROUS lodgings, which are limited in 
number (L’Etudiant 2010). Most of my French respondents were in 
this situation, and could not access study grants or student lodgings. 
Almost all were living in privately rented flats.
While Finnish student accommodation resembles private ac-
commodation in terms of services and comfort, basic French student 
accommodation often entails living in individual bedrooms in halls of 
residence, with a shared kitchen and/or bathroom. It is fairly cheap, 
but does not provide adequate privacy or quiet. Whereas 73% of 
Finnish students liked living in student accommodation, only 40% of 
French students did so (Eurostudent Report 2005: 79–80). There is 
also a small amount of more comfortable student accommodation in 
France, but the prices nearly equal those on the private market. Marie 
(24, France) felt lucky because she had never had to live in Cités U 
(university halls of residence). She had always managed to find small 
one-room flats. She described Cités U as depressing, depending on 
the cities and universities in question, with unhealthy and difficult 
living conditions, a lack of privacy, and ageing buildings. Sabrina 
(23, France) stated that she felt privileged compared to some of her 
acquaintances who had stayed in Cités U, because of the poor liv-
ing conditions in the halls of residence. Finding lodgings, let alone 
acceptable lodgings, is a battle for many students and young people 
who wish to move out of the parental home, especially in large cities. 
Many of them are compelled to live in poor accommodation, alone 
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or sharing, or even end up squatting (L’Etudiant 2010). A group 
of young people (including students) who had fallen victim to this 
situation created the Jeudi Noir – Les Galériens du Logement collective 
(Black Thursday – the Galley Slaves of Housing, a reference to the 
Wall Street crash of 1929), in order to denounce the housing crisis, 
the lack of available and affordable housing, and the explosion of 
housing prices (Jeudi Noir 2010). Being able to leave the parental 
home therefore depends on several factors, mainly on obtaining an 
adequate and stable job, but also on finding acceptable and afford-
able housing (see subchapter 3.2). Experts’ discourses convey the 
idea that young people do not wish to leave the parental home and 
voluntarily delay residential transition. However, the real situation 
that many youths face regarding the housing market should be taken 
more deeply into account. The decision to leave home is closely as-
sociated with achieving financial as well as residential independence 
(Holdsworth and Morgan 2005: 144–148).
Main financial resources
Galland stressed as early as 1996 (58–60) that many students live 
on their own or in student lodgings and are therefore residentially 
independent, but that in many cases their parents pay the rent and 
provide additional funds for living expenses. Many French students 
have an ambiguous status, being neither dependent nor independent 
and only partly autonomous. Clearly, parents are an important source 
of income in France, more so than in Finland (see Table 6.2). The 
labour market is the major financial resource for Finnish students. 
The state contributes equally to young people’s resources in the two 
countries, through grants, student benefits and housing allowances. 
French students receive income from three sources fairly equally but 
with an emphasis on parents. In Finland they rely exclusively on paid 
work and state grants. It is not specified what ‘other’ implies. 
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According to the Eurostudent Report (2005: 90), more French 
students (both those living with their parents and those living on 
their own or in a couple) than Finnish received financial support 
from their parents (see Table 6.3). A large number of Finnish stu-
dents received financial contributions from their parents too, but the 
proportion of money they received was smaller than that received 
by the French, especially for students who were running their own 
households. In Finland students received occasional help from their 
parents, while in France they received regular support, generally 
on a monthly basis. Familial support represented 43% of students’ 
monthly income in France, whereas it represented 11% in Finland 
(Kesteman 2010: 114).
In both countries, about half of students living at home and 
maintaining their own household received income from paid employ-
ment in 2005 (see Table 6.3). However, the Finns received somewhat 
higher income from work. Most Finnish students, whether living at 
home or on their own, received income from state assistance, but the 
financial support was greater for those living on their own. Those 
living at home are entitled to less financial support because they live 
with their parents (Kela 2009a; 2009b). In France, nearly one third 
of students living at home received financial support from the state. 
As in Finland, the majority of students living on their own received 
support. However, the amount was smaller than that received by 
the Finns. It is important to remember that not all French students 
have access to study grants. Their eligibility depends on their parents’ 
income and financial needs. Moreover, students are not all offered 
the same sum, depending on the eligibility criteria they fulfil. Nev-
ertheless, in 2005 the total contribution (in euros) offered both to 
students living with their parents and to those living on their own 
was higher in France than in Finland. French students living at home 
received greater family and state contributions. Those maintaining 
their own household received greater support from their family too, 
in fact, twice as much as the Finns. The current differences in income 
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between Finnish and French students thus arise from differences in 
state assistance, but primarily from parental support.
Table 6.2. Sources of students’ income (shares in percentages) for students 
living with their parents and students maintaining their own household in 
Finland and France, 2005.
Living with parents Living in own household
Finland France Finland France
Income sources Percentages
Family / Partner 14 42 11 38
Work 63 36 52 33
State 18 23 30 29
Other 5 – 7 –
Total 100 100 100 100
The data comes from Eurostudent Report (2005). As specified in Eurostudent III 
2005–2008 (it is not stated as explicitly in the 2005 Eurostudent Report), the sample 
included university students only. Students from higher vocational institutions, doctoral 
students and exchange students were not included in the study; only national and 
permanent students were included (Orr 2008: 16–20).
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Table 6.3. Financial sources (average amount per month in euros) for stu-
dents living with their parents and students maintaining their own household 
in Finland and France, 2005.
Living with parents Own household
Financial sources Finland France Finland France
- Proportion of students (%) 
receiving contributions from 
family / partner 
57 74 50 68
- Contributions in euros 120 212 122 369
- Proportion of students (%) 
receiving contributions from 
paid employment 
45 48 54 46
- Contributions in euros 411 293 581 534
- Proportion of students (%) 
receiving contributions from 
the state 
71 29 79 72
- Contributions in euros 120 304 339 270
Total contributions in euros 651 809 1042 1173
The data comes from Eurostudent Report (2005).
In Finland, the hypothesis of early independence tends to refer to the 
good welfare provision, the favourable position on the labour market 
and the good residential provision. However, Henna Isoniemi (2006: 
251) indicates that young people are expected to move out of the 
parental home in order to pursue their studies or simply to work. It is 
a cultural norm to live independently and learn to live on one’s own. 
Managing one’s own life at a young age and learning the value of 
money are strong Finnish moral and cultural principles. This is based 
on historical factors too: it is only recently that parents have been able 
to afford to financially support their adult children. Nonetheless, the 
fact that the state provides financial support to young people removes 
the burden from their parents (Kalliosaari 2010).
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Van de Velde (2008: 51–55) affirms that young people’s inde-
pendence is guaranteed by the state in Denmark and Finland, thanks 
to the principle of defamilialisation. Most young people receive a study 
grant and also work during their studies; therefore they can gain full 
financial autonomy during their studies, even with student status. 
In France the situation is different. Young people depend on their 
parents financially because they receive less support from the state, 
and the funds they get are based on their parents’ income rather than 
on their own individual needs. Students are considered their parents’ 
responsibility, and parental support is expected. This is founded on 
French corporatist-conservative ideologies, which emphasise the 
institution of the family (Van de Velde 2008: 154–156). However, 
increasing parents’ responsibilities to help and finance their children 
simultaneously reinforces young people’s economic dependence on 
their family, even after they leave the parental home (Erhel et al. 
2010: 214). Nevertheless, like Finnish students, French students are 
entitled to housing support. The allowance is based on their own 
income, not their parents’. In this case, the state encourages and 
even participates in young people’s residential independence, and 
adopts partial defamilialisation policies. Leaving home in France thus 
takes place within a hybrid system based on contradictory princi-
ples, which generates and maintains a model of semi-independence 
(Van de Velde 2008: 158). The Finnish system creates a model of 
full residential autonomy, and the French system a model of relative 
residential autonomy in which young people receive parental financial 
support that contributes to their residential independence (Bendit et 
al. 2009: 10–11). Drawing on this analysis and on my informants’ 
situations at the time of interview, Synopsis 6.1 presents the models 
of independence in the two countries. 
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Synopsis 6.1. Students’ autonomy in Finland and France. 
FINLAND FRANCE
Independence (from parents)
Residential and financial 
autonomy
Semi-independence
Residential autonomy, but financial 
dependence on parents
Market and state support
Study grants, part-time or full-time 
jobs, housing support
Family, market, and state support
Parental financial support, part-time or 
full-time jobs, selective distribution of 
study grants, housing support
In both Finland and France, young people receive housing support 
from the state. In Finland, students get Opintotuen asumislisä (Hous-
ing Supplement for Students) as part of their study grant, paid by 
Kela, the social security office. All of my Finnish informants received 
this. It covers 80% of the rent, based on a maximum rent of €252 per 
month. Any costs above that amount are not taken into account. This 
allowance is paid during the months of study and when students are 
living in student or rented accommodation. Young people who own 
their own property are not eligible. If students are living in shared 
accommodation, they can all apply and receive Housing Supplement. 
Students who are not entitled to study grants or housing supplements 
can apply for Yleinen asumistuki (General Housing Allowance), which 
is intended for low-income households. It is available for both rented 
and owner-occupied homes (Kela 2009–2011). 
Most French respondents received housing allowance, the 
amount of which differed and sometimes came to only a small sum 
because of their income. Housing support is provided by the Caisses 
d’Allocations Familiales (CAF, Family Allowances Fund). Three types 
of means-tested benefit are offered to low-income households, in-
cluding students. The funds cannot be combined: people can only 
apply for one of them at a time, depending on their situation and 
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type of accommodation. The allowance provided is calculated ac-
cording to individuals’ incomes (which must not exceed a certain 
amount), type of accommodation and rent. As in Finland, property 
owners are not eligible. Also, students cannot receive the allowance 
if the accommodation belongs to their parents. Couples must apply 
together and provide their individual incomes, and those living in 
shared accommodation can all apply and receive funds. The Allocation 
de Logement à Caractère Social (ALS, Social Housing Allowance) can 
be paid to students who live alone or in a couple without children. 
The Allocation de Logement à Caractère Familial (ALF, Housing Al-
lowance for Families) can be paid to students who live alone or in 
a couple with children. The Aide Personalisée au Logement (APL, 
Personalised Housing Assistance) can be paid to students who live 
alone or in a couple, with or without children (Caisse d’Allocations 
Familiales 2010a). These funds are not provided automatically to 
students. They need to apply to the regional CROUS to which their 
university is linked.
Conclusion: 
similarities in leaving home and plans to start a family 
Patterns of leaving home and starting a family are remarkably similar 
in Finland and France. Finnish and French young people leave home 
at similar ages, and do so younger than the European average. Yet their 
living arrangements differ. Parents are the largest source of income for 
French students. State assistance is an important source of income in 
both countries; however, the distribution differs. All Finnish students 
can receive a student grant, unlike in France, where support depends 
on eligibility criteria. Finally, students in both countries have access 
to the labour market to cover their expenses, and often have a part-
time job alongside their studies, especially in Finland. 
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 257 
6.4 leaving home in finland and france: Convergences
Convergences in patterns of leaving home and plans for starting a 
family are visible among the respondents. The age at which residential 
independence is achieved is similar in the two countries. In compari-
son with some other European countries, young people leave home 
early in Finland and France. Finnish young women appear to be 
both residentially and financially independent once they leave home. 
However, their fully autonomous status is open to question, since they 
partly depend on state assistance to achieve financial independence. 
French young women reach early residential independence too, but 
remain financially dependent on their parents. Even if they leave home 
early, their parents often pay their rent and other living expenses. They 
are thus in a position of semi-dependence on their parents. 
The Finnish informants received student allowance and hous-
ing allowance, and most worked alongside their studies. The French 
respondents did not receive student benefits, but most received a small 
housing allowance. Some had a part-time job, but their earnings were 
not sufficient to reach full financial independence. Therefore they 
needed their parents’ help. The more flexible and accessible university 
system and labour market in Finland seem to ease young people’s 
transition to autonomy. French youth have more difficulties in gain-
ing full independence, mainly because of difficulties in accessing the 
labour market during their studies, but also after they graduate. While 
most Finnish students enter working life before graduation or soon 
afterwards, French students tend to experience a period of unstable 
working life and precarity after completing their studies. Many of 
them return to the parental home during that period, or depend on 
their parents’ assistance.
Very similar measures and services are offered in the two countries 
to families with children. However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, some 
young women expressed worries concerning labour market discrimi-
nation against young women who wanted to have children. 
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The Finnish university system offers more flexibility and more 
options for students who want to work alongside their studies and 
also to have children. Finnish student mothers’ needs and status are 
recognised by the university system, while in France their needs and 
status are not acknowledged. It is therefore more difficult to combine 
having a baby with studying in France, in the same way that it is 
more difficult to work alongside one’s studies. 
In Finland, going to university, working and starting a family 
tend to be interwoven and synchronous. Young people can study, 
work and start a family practically at the same time. The various in-
stitutions and policies are sufficiently flexible to allow this. Students’ 
transitions to adulthood are thus smoothed. Discrimination against 
young women in relation to childbearing by employers and compa-
nies nonetheless still occurs, depending on the sector. The French 
institutions mainly operate independently of each other, as separate 
spheres. The education system appears to work independently of 
the labour market, and young women who want to have children 
seem to struggle with both the university system and labour market 
ideologies. Some have to compromise their careers to some extent, 
in order to combine family and work. Just as institutions in France 
seem to be separated, French students’ patterns of transition to adult-
hood are also more linear and separated. Students study and gradu-
ate, become residentially independent during or after their studies, 
seek a job and obtain stable work, achieve financial autonomy, and 
then start having a family. This is a generalisation from the patterns 
followed by the majority of students. Patterns of transition that are 
closer to the Finnish model do occur for a minority. Conversely, 
some Finnish students’ patterns of transition are closer to the French 
model. Nevertheless, most students experience a different kind of 
transition to adulthood in Finland and France, particularly because 
of the divergent ideologies and structural arrangements operating at 
the wider structural level.
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7.
 neW CrITerIa for aDulThooD
The previous chapters discussed highly educated young women’s 
opinions on the university systems in their countries, entry into the 
labour market, leaving home and becoming independent, and starting 
a family. This chapter focuses on the concept of adulthood itself. It 
examines young women’s perceptions of the meaning of adulthood, 
and of the markers of adult status. Young women from Finland and 
France shared common attitudes regarding the concept of adult-
hood. However, this could be specific to their gender, their status as 
university students, and the values acquired from their disciplines of 
study, which were in the humanities and social sciences.
The markers of adulthood include completing one’s studies, 
finding a stable job, moving out of the parental home, acquiring ac-
commodation, getting married and starting a family. The literature 
on youth transition often refers to a prolongation of youth and a 
delay in meeting those markers. Experts claim that young people are 
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studying for longer, are entering the labour market at a later age than 
their parents did, and are consequently becoming independent later. 
The process of starting a family is also being postponed. However, 
rather than being a deliberate choice, the prolongation of youth is 
rooted in socio-economic restructuring. A large number of young 
people experience precarity and difficulties in integrating into the 
labour market. As socio-economic contradictions emerge in young 
people’s lives, they are forced to face and adapt to the situation with 
the means available to them. Thus they might study for a higher 
degree in order to ensure a better and more stable position on the 
job market (see Furlong and Cartmel 1997). In addition, cultural 
transformations have affected young people’s values and aspirations. 
Jeffrey Arnett (2004), Harriet Bradley and Jacques Van Hoof (2005) 
and Heath and Cleaver (2003), among others, talk about a new stage 
in the life course: emerging adulthood, an ‘in-between’ status, or 
youth-hood. Young adulthood is increasingly a time for experimen-
tation and exploration, including engaging in hedonistic values and 
delaying commitment. 
Most studies of advanced societies analyse the transition to 
adulthood through the social markers mentioned above. However, 
we might wonder whether these are still entirely relevant in the 
context of the current restructuring, and whether adulthood is truly 
determined by these aspects alone. 
The respondents’ visions of adulthood essentially rested upon 
abstract qualities. They still considered the markers of adulthood to 
be relevant, but stated that these no longer encompassed the whole 
meaning of being an adult. They mentioned other criteria that are not 
officially recognised, such as mental and psychological development, 
as the main aspects of the process of transition to adulthood. The in-
formants addressed a particularly significant issue regarding the current 
concept of adulthood. They identified the contradiction between the 
‘social’ criteria determining the status of adulthood and the ‘subjective’ 
perception of the concept that different individuals might have. 
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7.1 Transitions in awareness
The young women discussed their own transitions during the in-
terviews, and displayed lucid understandings of their situations and 
positions in the process of transition. In particular, they gave a clear 
account of the challenges they expected to face on the road to adult-
hood. They were all highly educated at university level, mainly with 
a social sciences or humanities background, which might also explain 
their level of knowledge and awareness of the process of the transi-
tion to adulthood.
The most difficult aspect of transition: Losing temporal freedom
Most young women, especially in Finland, felt that the hardest thing 
for them and their acquaintances when they graduated and entered 
working life would be the change in lifestyle. They considered that 
starting a new life phase, moving on and, in particular, losing tem-
poral flexibility and freedom would be the most difficult steps. The 
schedule of a student lifestyle is flexible and diverse. Many students 
work alongside their studies, participate in clubs or other groups, 
have several hobbies, or belong to a sports team. To some extent 
students organise their working hours around their studies, or vice 
versa. This is strongly the case in Finland. It is probably the reason 
why more Finnish young women felt that moving on from a rather 
free and diverse lifestyle to an unyielding work schedule would be 
challenging. Student life can seem to be a free-floating lifestyle which 
ends abruptly with the rigid beginning of working life. 
 It seems to me that the most difficult thing [is] to accept that this 
is it, now. (...) As a student, when you have (...) a side job, (...) you 
know that you’re only going to have it [for] as long as you study. And 
you know that when you study, everything’s still open. Anything can 
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happen, it’s not fixed. Your life can be anything you want to. (...) But 
(...) after the transition from university, it’s (...) ‘ok, so, this is not 
actually something I do meanwhile, this is something I do, period.’ 
(...) I think the biggest thing [is] the psychological change, (...) ac-
cepting that this is the end of the (...) probation period.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
R:  What do you think will be the most difficult in your transition from 
university to working life?
I:  It will be the working hours, because [at] university it’s so free to 
choose when you want to (...) work, (...) it’s more free. And then [af-
terwards] you’ll have to adapt to working hours, five days a week and 
eight hours a day. You can’t take trips when you want, stuff like that.
 Anna (28, Finland)
Natalie (22, France) said that she knew she would enjoy working 
as a schoolteacher; however, she was in no hurry to start her profes-
sional life.
 Now as a student, I’m really lucky to get financial help, and to have 
‘time’! Usually you either get one or the other. (...) Well, (...) my 
resources are limited, but I still have some resources, which allow me 
... Yeah, I really appreciate being able to do whatever I want during 
the day, go wherever I want, be introduced to many things, decide 
when I work, etc. ...
 Natalie (22, France)
 
Alice (23, France) and Nicole (21, France) were afraid of losing the 
social networks they had built up with their fellow students. Nicole 
stressed that being able to meet many people at university was very 
enriching and brought important and stimulating intellectual oppor-
tunities. She felt that working life might be isolating in that respect. 
Alice referred to the loss of temporal flexibility, also of lifestyle diver-
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sity. She felt sad at losing the opportunity to learn and gain additional 
knowledge when studying. Finally, she stressed that she was afraid of 
losing her friends and entering an isolating lifestyle.
I:  I’m afraid to lose the friends I have right now, that I have at school. 
Because at school, you’ve got friends, you’re in a different atmosphere, 
you’re more relaxed. (...) Whereas after, I can see it in working life, 
it’s not the same any more. I laugh much less ...
R:  It’s more serious?
I:  Yes, you’re more serious. And actually, I’m afraid of losing that, afraid 
not to feel like laughing any more, or having fun any more. The at-
mosphere [in my present workplace, compared to the previous one] 
is much more serious, and it scared me [at first]. (...) I realised that 
the work sector can also be much more serious, much stricter, even 
if I work with nice, (...) decent people.
 Alice (23, France)
Networks of friends increasingly represent a family of choice for 
many young people today, involving strong emotional and social at-
tachments (Heath and Cleaver 2003: 49–50). This is a response to a 
changing society, and to experiences of insecurity and emotional flux. 
Friendships have become frameworks for negotiating everyday life 
hazards (Weeks et al., cit. Heath and Cleaver 2003: 49). Friendship 
networks provide mutual support and solidarity. Clare Holdsworth 
and David Morgan (2005: 142) also acknowledge the importance of 
such networks, and of friends as providers of emotional support.
Several young women also said that entering the labour market, 
and especially finding a job they liked, would be the most difficult 
aspect of their transition. More French than Finnish young women 
highlighted this aspect. I will not examine this issue further here, as 
it would be a repetition of a previous discussion (in Chapter 5) of 
young women’s plans, worries and hopes for their professional life. 
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Finally, a few young women said that transition itself would be 
the most difficult aspect for them. They simply worried about fac-
ing new challenges, managing and handling them, and facing the 
unknown. Tuuli (25, Finland) simply said that the uncertainty of 
the life situation between graduation and entering the labour market 
would be the most challenging aspect. 
R:  And what do you think will be the most difficult thing when you 
will end your studies and start working life?
I:  The unknown, because this [student life] is now safe. When you 
start a new year, you know what you’ll do. You have (...) work and 
you just go to lectures. (...) But if I change, if I graduate, then I don’t 
know what will happen, (...) that’s a big change. But then again, (...) 
when I get [a job] and really start that life, then change will be over 
and I’ll just start a new phase. (...) When you end your studies, you 
really don’t know what you will do next month. (...) The gap between 
studies and work (...) [is] the most stressful thing.
 Tuuli (25, Finland)
R:  What do you consider will be the most difficult thing when you end 
your studies and start working life?
I:  It’s transition actually, because it’s really about opening your eyes, 
similar to – I don’t want to exaggerate, but there’s a shock that occurs 
at birth, and I really think that there’s a shock that happens when 
you enter the labour market, because you are being challenged.
 Caroline (25, France)
living in the present: strategies to face the unknown
When I asked the informants about their future plans, few of them 
had precise ideas. Most knew the field in which they were going to 
work, but some did not know at all what they were going do in the 
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years to come, especially those in France. They hoped to have a job 
they enjoyed and that was related to their studies, to start a family, 
or to live abroad for a while. However, they stated that such plans 
were simply in line with other people’s expectations. In truth they 
felt they could not plan ahead, because it was impossible to anticipate 
what would actually occur in the future. They preferred to live in the 
‘present’ and face the immediate future without worrying too much 
about the unknown. This lifestyle, to some extent, was a strategy to 
cope with uncertainty and instability. For Päivi (25, Finland) plan-
ning too far ahead was even illogical.
R:  Do you have an idea where you see yourself in five or 10 years?
I:  No, not much. I will be doing something somewhere, we’ll see about 
it then (laughs). I hope I’ll be working, (…) but working where? I’m 
not sure. (…) I try to keep my options open. (…) That’s nice (…) 
to think ahead a little bit, (…) but I don’t want to do [it] too much 
(…) ’cause at the moment there’s nothing I can do about my future 
career. (…) It’s a bit the same [when] people ask ‘ok, in 10 years, do 
you think you’ll get married?’ How can I know? I don’t even know 
if I’m gonna meet this person … I can’t plan to meet this person. 
(…) I can’t plan to get married, and I think with working life it’s a 
bit similar, it (…) often depends what kind of jobs will be open, and 
what kind of opportunities will come my way.
 Päivi (25, Finland)
Tuuli (25, Finland) and Johanna (26, Finland) refused to build 
scenarios or plan their lives, simply because they felt from previous 
experience that to do so was ineffective. 
R:  How do you view your life in five or 10 years?
I:  I don’t know … Well, I will probably be working in some way or 
form. Not studying any more. I don’t know anything else. I think 
plans don’t work. I’ve had plans before and then years afterwards I 
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found myself in places I had never imagined! So it doesn’t work, (…) 
you can’t plan.
 Johanna (26, Finland)
Caroline (25, France) and Sanna (24, Finland) agreed that it was 
frightening to think too far ahead. Valérie (23, France) and Audrey 
(26, France) preferred to live ‘day by day’. When I asked Audrey about 
her future plans for acquiring a flat or house, she had not thought 
about it yet, and showed a lack of interest in the matter.
 Actually I don’t think about that at all (laughs). Honestly, this is the 
type of stuff I don’t think about at all, you see, I live rather day by day. 
That’s also partly the reason why I’m in this [somewhat uncertain] 
position now, because like many young people, I don’t think enough 
about the future. 
 Audrey (26, France)
Nicole (21, France) felt that she was forced to live day by day. She 
wished she could make plans, but explained that it was impossible 
to predict anything in the current socio-economic context. Work 
unpredictability and geographical uncertainty prevented her from 
anticipating her future life.
R:  How do you see your life in five or 10 years? Do you have an idea?
I:  Not at all! I don’t know where I’ll be, I don’t know what I’ll do. (…) 
That’s also the problem I think, that we can’t settle down, we can’t 
think ahead. And not necessarily 10 years ahead, but even one or two 
years ahead. (…) Even if we have a job, we can never be sure if we’ll 
keep it. (…) We can’t lead a stable life, I think it’s generally more and 
more difficult to acquire stability. 
 Nicole (21, France)
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 267 
Inglehart (1997: 37) emphasises that when people feel their survival 
is threatened, they react with stress, which stimulates coping strate-
gies. Today, structural uncertainty and new hazards prevent young 
people from planning ahead and constructing long-term projects. 
Thus highly educated young women’s preference for living day by 
day, rather than planning their future in vain, may simply be a coping 
mechanism. Robert K. Merton (1968: 204) revealed in his studies 
on crime that ‘ritualism’, or lowering one’s level of aspiration, was a 
device for alleviating social anxieties related to competition and the 
lack of access to promised social positions. The informants did not 
lower their ambitions or goals, but changed their approach to reaching 
them. Rather than actively fighting against the situation, they seemed 
to accept it, and simply dealt with any opportunities that would lead 
them to their goal. Life trajectories today are socially asynchronous, 
fragmented and individualised (Blatterer 2010: 59). Socio-economic 
restructuring has meant a curtailment of people’s long-term plans for 
social achievements, because of the impossibility of projecting one’s 
life beyond the immediate future or the here-and-now. 
More options, more questioning, more confusion
During the interviews, I asked the informants their opinions about 
the state of the world today, and whether they thought life had been 
easier or more complicated for young people 30 years ago, when their 
parents were young. I also asked whether they believed their genera-
tion was special or different, and whether they felt they belonged to 
a specific generation. In general, they answered that it was difficult 
to make comparisons, because they had not experienced those times. 
They thought that life had not necessarily been easier; people then 
had just had different kinds of worries from people today. Life cir-
cumstances and the socio-economic situation simply differed. Values 
had changed too, alongside cultural and political contexts. Päivi (25, 
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Finland) and Marie (24, France) said that it was the social context 
that had changed, rather than people themselves. However, these 
transformations in turn had influenced the way people thought, and 
had created new expectations, for instance regarding working life or 
women’s social roles. 
Almost all informants said that some things were better 30 years 
ago, mainly the ability to get a stable job. They emphasised direct and 
certain integration into the labour market in the past, which had made 
life easier. However, they felt that other aspects of life had remained 
similar, and that people in those days had had to face a variety of 
challenges too. For instance, today women with young children receive 
more social support than they did in the late 1970s. Florence (22, 
France) and Nadège (21, France) thought it had been more difficult 
back then. They described their parents’ particular cases, and how 
life circumstances had forced them to face heavy responsibilities and 
manage their own lives from an early age. However, they both men-
tioned that social background also played an important role in young 
people’s current life difficulties. Most informants displayed a rather 
realistic approach to life, even if they described the present context 
as gloomy. Moreover, socio-cultural values have evolved, and today 
the relationship between parents and grown-up children resembles 
friendship or companionship (Arnett 2004; Heath and Cleaver 2003). 
Some respondents’ parents had experienced much more pressure from 
their own parents regarding their life directions and values. Social 
norms and ideologies were more conservative in those times, while 
the current context has become generally more liberal. Rather than 
simply following a predetermined life trajectory as their parents did, 
young people today, especially highly educated youth, deeply examine 
their life possibilities and prospects. Indeed, the interviewees pointed 
out that young people questioned and assessed their own lives, and 
life in general, much more today than previously. 
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R:  [So] do you think young people back then, 20 or 30 years ago, had 
more possibilities than now?
I:  I don’t know, the number of possibilities maybe (…) is higher these 
days. (…) Maybe (…) [it was] more straightforward, they weren’t 
thinking of all the millions of possibilities around them, (…) it just 
happened, they just started to work. And they didn’t think so philo-
sophically about it; ‘is this really the right thing for me?’ (…) Maybe 
it was simpler, but I didn’t live then, so I can’t really say! (laughs)
 Johanna (26, Finland)
I: They knew that when they graduated they would have jobs. (…) The 
situation for them was much clearer. (…) It was very clear-cut, ‘this is 
what you do, and in this order.’ And I don’t think that (…) they felt 
pressure, ’cause they knew that that was what you did. There wasn’t 
as much variety as to what you did. (…)
R:  Just following the path/ 
I:  Exactly. I don’t think they felt that the path was in any way wrong 
or bad.
 Piia (24, Finland)
 In contrast with our parents, who were moving on straightforwardly 
without wondering about it, I think that young people today analyse 
things much more. 
 Sabrina (23, France)
The young women were conscious of the dilemmas brought by the 
freedom of choice and the range of possibilities with regard to life 
trajectories.
 Nowadays we have more freedom of choice, and we can do more 
things, it’s not so confined, (…) but (…) freedom brings with it the 
stress of not knowing what you want, and not knowing what you 
wanna do.
 Piia (24, Finland)
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I:  Having less options can be seen as more difficult or easier, because, 
in a way, you don’t have to think (…) so much, you don’t have all 
the pressure (…) [about] finding your way. Your way is ‘there’, (…) 
you just go!
R:  Yeah, you don’t question it (…)/
I:  Yeah, but on the other hand, if you want to do something [else], [it’s] 
not very easy [within] those limits. (…) Nowadays it’s very easy to 
find all sorts of options, but (…) you have to choose between them 
…
 Päivi (25, Finland) 
There were fewer opportunities and choices 30 or 40 years ago re-
garding life trajectories, and therefore life appeared simpler. However, 
people were not as free as they are today to follow alternative paths 
and uncommon ideologies. Building one’s identity was strongly 
embedded in the wider socio-cultural sphere. Today, identity con-
struction is still attached to the contextual structure, but with a great 
emphasis on individual reflexivity (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002; Giddens 1991; Inglehart 1997). The abundance of options 
generates freedom and endless possibilities, but also contradiction 
and confusion (Blatterer 2010: 50). On the one hand, people have 
much more choice regarding their life trajectories, but on the other 
hand, they have to choose between the numerous possibilities. This 
in turn puts pressure on young people to choose the ‘right’ options 
and make the ‘right’ choices. In addition, many youth suffer from 
disillusionment because of the impossibility of reaching their goals 
and transforming their ideas or qualifications into concrete achieve-
ments (see Bourdieu 1980). For instance, it appears democratically 
possible for any individual to become a high-status white-collar 
professional. However, this requires not only academic capabilities, 
but also a certain financial background, and sometimes even a certain 
social background, as in the case of French young people wishing to 
study in the elite Grandes Ecoles. Competition on the labour market 
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also hampers one’s aspirations. In that sense, structural factors still 
greatly shape individuals’ destinies, although the current cultural 
tendency is to believe that destiny lies solely in people’s own hands.
Conclusion: Different times, different contexts
According to most young women, moving on from the student 
lifestyle to a stable work status was the most demanding aspect of 
transition. In other words, transition itself was the greatest challenge 
they had to face. Young adults’ stances towards and personal percep-
tions of the transition process are not recognised in experts’ discourses, 
yet they are a core feature of transition. If young adults cannot cope 
with uncertainty, socio-economic fluctuations or the increasingly 
demanding labour market, how can they simply grow into adults and 
efficiently integrate into the wider social sphere? The informants were 
conscious of living in a different social context than their parents did 
at their age. They did not perceive their parents’ youth as having been 
fundamentally easier than their own. Life might have been simpler 
in some respects, but people then had had to handle life challenges 
too, which were both similar to and different from those faced today. 
For instance, finding a stable job was certain, but people had fewer 
life options. The informants could opt between a large number of 
possibilities regarding their life direction, but the freedom of choice 
brought confusion as to what option to select.
7.2 assessing the Post-War Markers of adulthood
R:  In your opinion, what is being an adult?
I:  Well, when I was a child, being adult meant turning 18. (…) But at 
18, I realised that I didn’t feel adult at all. And now I am barely starting 
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to feel adult, so, one needs time; I’m 24 already. (…) Because (…) 
even if I left home at 18, there’s the fact that I’m still dependent on 
my parents, to some extent. But at the same time, (…) being adult, 
can it only be reduced to being financially independent? I doubt 
that. 
 Marie (24, France)
The respondents made a clear distinction between being a legal adult 
on the basis of age, and becoming a social adult by meeting the social 
criteria of financial and residential independence, getting a job, being 
married or living with a partner, and having children. Their parents 
had fulfilled these roles, which had officially made them adults, at 
an earlier age. However, the young women unexpectedly questioned 
their own parents’ adulthood. They recognised they had been forced 
to become legitimate adults and take on heavy responsibilities at an 
earlier age, but they asked whether they had been equally adult on the 
moral or psychological level. The social markers of adulthood seem no 
longer sufficient to grant adult status. The informants predominantly 
discussed the notion of subjective adulthood.
Inconsequentiality of age
A person becomes a legal adult at the age of 18 in both Finland and 
France. At that age they gain new rights, such as to vote, drive or get 
married (see subchapter 3.2). I did not ask the respondents at what 
specific age they felt that one became an adult. Instead I focused 
my questions on their understandings of adult status. Only a few 
mentioned the importance of age, stating that they felt more adult 
than some of their younger acquaintances, albeit mostly because they 
had had time to accumulate more life experience and knowledge. 
Age was not mentioned as a distinctive characteristic. Marie (24, 
France) stated explicitly that this legal criterion for adulthood does 
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 273 
not turn a person into an adult. Youth might be related to age, but 
it is not necessarily determined by it (Miles 2000: 11). Regardless 
of age, some informants felt adult, some somewhat adult, others 
‘in-between’, and some not yet adult. What made them feel adult 
(or not) was their sense of responsibility, their ability (or lack of it) 
to handle their own lives, and being self-sufficient and no longer 
dependent on their parents. 
Similarly, the ESS Round 3 – 2006 data shows that the legal age 
of majority does not have a strong impact on young people’s feelings 
of adulthood. When asked to state the ‘Average age that a person 
becomes adult’, the 18–29 age group answered 21 in both Finland 
and France. Manuela Du Bois-Reymond (1998: 65–66) argues that 
there is no longer an age limit that marks the passage from adolescence 
to adulthood. The statuses can be reversible and asynchronous. For 
instance, young people might return to their parents’ home when a 
job contract ends, or they might have a family and still be studying 
at university. Rather than being considered an adult according to 
physical characteristics, one might feel adult on the basis of one’s 
life plans and feelings of adulthood (Du Bois-Reymond 1998: 75). 
Different areas of life might be blended, rather than separated and 
set in chronological order as they generally were for previous genera-
tions. Furlong and Cartmel (1997: 42) distinguish the physiological 
from the social process of maturation, and consider the concept of 
youth to be an abstract concept that lacks physiological basis. In line 
with the distinction of ‘emerging adulthood’ as a new phase in the 
life course, Arnett (2004: 207) states that this extended transitional 
phase lasts roughly from the age of 18 to 25, although the upper age 
limit is flexible. Twenty-five is an estimate, and does not necessarily 
apply to all young adults. The end of transition might occur earlier 
or later, depending on the individual, and on the way one defines 
adulthood.
Throughout history, institutions and social regulations have 
transformed ‘chronological’ age into ‘social’ age (Buchmann 1989: 
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25–29). Chronological age is based on the individual’s physical age. 
It started to be transformed into social age when age started to define 
individuals’ roles and social positions. Social age determined individu-
als’ identities, and the frameworks within which they constructed 
them, by assigning them specific roles according to their age and 
status. This arrangement generated distinct social categories such as 
childhood, youth, adulthood and old age. These assigned social roles 
guided individuals into their social destiny and status across the life 
course. However, social roles were affected by the tremendous socio-
cultural transformations at the end of the 1960s. Cultural movements 
guaranteeing women’s emancipation gave rise to new possibilities for 
and desires of women. In addition, the process of globalisation has 
engendered new opportunities and dilemmas, and accelerated socio-
economic restructuring. These profound changes have reverberated 
in people’s social roles, their positions in society, and processes such 
as the transition to adulthood. 
are young people today becoming adult 
at a later age than their parents?
Arnett (2004: 216) speculates that 40 or 50 years ago, the majority 
of young people considered themselves adults as soon as they were 
thrust into adulthood, in their early 20s, when they achieved the 
social milestones of adulthood. It was unlikely that they would go 
backwards and return to youth, as many young adults do today. 
The possibility did not even arise, because of the structural context 
of the time. The framework of adulthood, including residential, 
professional and relationship transitions, were fairly connected and 
standardised for baby boomers (Molgat 2007: 495). However, they 
became increasingly disrupted by economic restructuring and socio-
cultural movements, such as women’s emancipation and changes in 
social status. 
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Several young women, in both Finland and France, thought 
their parents had become adults at a younger age than themselves. 
However, they explained that their parents had had no choice but 
to grow up very fast. They had become adults at an earlier age as a 
result of life circumstances. They had been forced to undertake the 
adult role, and had had to face great responsibilities at an earlier age 
than young people do today. For instance, they had worked straight 
after the completion of compulsory schooling, and they had also mar-
ried and had children in their early 20s. They had been compelled 
to grow up faster by social circumstances, their own life course, and 
existing social norms. Nonetheless, the respondents stressed that 
having early responsibilities did not mean that their parents had 
necessarily been more mature psychologically, or more ready to face 
such obligations. The life course was less individualised then than 
it is today, and such challenges were more commonly experienced. 
They said that the situation was not drastically different today, but 
that the transition to adulthood now seemed to be experienced on a 
more individual basis. Today’s young people could decide their own 
life directions more easily, while their parents’ lives had been deeply 
entrenched in prevailing social norms, mores and expectations. The 
young women’s parents were either baby boomers or slightly younger. 
They had experienced their transition in the 1960s and 1970s. Some 
of the parents had received only basic education, vocational education 
or vocational higher education, and some had gone to university. Fa-
thers, especially in France, were more highly educated than mothers. 
Some of them had experienced a short transition to adulthood, and 
others a longer, even unlinear transition. Indeed, some of them had 
worked, married and had children, and had simultaneously decided 
to pursue new studies in order to gain a promotion or change their 
career. However, in general they had left home and started working, 
and hence become fully independent, at an early age. The different 
educational backgrounds of the respondents’ parents did not influ-
ence the respondents’ perceptions of adulthood or transition. They 
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provided converging answers whether their parents had had a basic 
education or been highly educated. Indeed they were astute observers 
of their own situations.
R:  So, do you feel that [your parents] were adults before, at an earlier 
age?
I:  I think they were forced (…) to be adults. (...) When I think of my 
mum, physically being 20 or 21, I don’t think she was an adult, but 
they were (…) forced to take responsibility much quicker than we 
are.
R:  Forced by what, like …?
I:  Forced by the fact, that … Well, in their case, having children. (…) 
She was 21.
 Piia (24, Finland)
 I don’t know … Well, I think that inevitably they did, because in 
any case, they had responsibilities, they got married at 20. (...) To be 
responsible for a family at the age of 21, it’s really young. So, (...) even 
if they were not necessarily … mature, (...) they had responsibilities 
that obliged them to be.
 Alice (23, France)
According to Tuuli (25, Finland), when her parents were her age they 
had not been any more adult than she was now.
 No! I think they were the same. (...)  I’ve never thought about that so 
much, because for me, they’ve always been adults (laughs). But what 
I’ve heard and what I’ve seen, they had this youth life for a long time 
too, and careless lives and all that. (...) And my father was a student, 
so he was living a student life, so I think they weren’t so adults, in a 
different way than I am now.
 Tuuli (25, Finland)
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Päivi (25, Finland) made an interesting remark. She explained that her 
parents had been adults earlier than her because they had settled down 
and started working younger than she had, but they had still been 
partly financially dependent on their own parents. By comparison, 
she had become financially autonomous at an earlier age. Suvi (25, 
Finland) highlighted that life situations and norms had made people 
appear to be adult earlier. For instance, they had had to leave the 
parental home early and work, which was typical for young people at 
the time, but that did not mean they were necessarily ‘adults’. Accord-
ing to Tiia (26, Finland), expectations were different: it was assumed 
in those days that young people would quickly undertake the adult 
role. By contrast, nowadays it is socially accepted for young people 
to stay ‘young’ for longer. Audrey (26, France) said that her mother 
had started working early, which had qualified her as an adult, but 
she had kept her child spirit for a long time. Caroline (25, France) 
recognised that her parents had had responsibilities early, because of 
their life circumstances, but she also implicitly questioned their real 
mental maturity and psychological development. 
 I think that they were confronted by the world of work; they took 
on responsibilities quite early. [But] once again, I don’t know if that 
makes you an adult, because one might handle [responsibilities] so 
much. (…) They were young when they started: 18. But yeah, I think 
they certainly became responsible earlier.
 Caroline (25, France)
In their discourse, the respondents suggested that their parents might 
have been ‘social’ adults, but not necessarily ‘mental’ adults. In other 
words, abiding by expected social norms produced ‘social’ adults, but 
not necessarily ‘mental’ or ‘psychological’ adults. Thus according to 
the informants’ interpretations, adulthood is based on individuals’ 
mental and psychological development, and on a certain level of 
maturity, rather than on fulfilling a number of external criteria and 
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predetermined social roles. Becoming and being an adult increasingly 
seems to be related to handling responsibilities and managing one’s 
independence and one’s life in general. Being adult refers to psycho-
logical development, rather than to merely fulfilling social features. 
The respondents’ reflections pointed towards a clear distinction 
between being a ‘social’ adult and being a ‘subjective’ adult, and be-
tween playing quantifiable and predetermined roles and being truly 
able to fulfil them. They argued that being mature and ‘feeling’ adult 
were the essential attributes of becoming an adult. However, they 
did not reject the social markers. Having a job and a family were 
still considered important factors in the transition process, albeit 
mainly because they increased one’s responsibilities and accelerated 
one’s level of maturity and psychological development. The statuses 
that these roles endow do not make a young person an adult as such. 
They merely round out the status of adulthood, because of the ob-
ligations they bring. Highly educated young women distinguished 
between the visible and legitimate social status of adulthood and its 
psychological meaning. In their study, Holdsworth and Morgan’s 
(2005) respondents also evaluated the concept of adulthood from a 
psychological standpoint, emphasising the capability for maturity over 
merely fulfilling social patterns. According to the current established 
notion of adulthood, one can be an adult while still lacking maturity. 
Similarly, an individual might act in a mature way and ‘feel’ adult, 
despite lacking the traditional qualifications for adulthood (Holds-
worth and Morgan 2005: 114).
The ESS Round 3 – 2006 data presented similar conclusions re-
garding the markers of adulthood. Finnish and French young people 
no longer regarded them as essential in their processes of transition. 
Nevertheless, the figures in Table 7.1 show both convergences and 
divergences between the two countries. Over half of Finnish youths 
considered having left the parental home to be an adult attribute, 
while the French were equally divided between stating that it was 
‘important’ and ‘not important’. In both countries most young peo-
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ple agreed that having lived with one’s partner was not an important 
criterion for being considered an adult. Similarly, most young Finns 
agreed that becoming a parent was not an important issue. By con-
trast, the French had equally divided opinions on that topic, stating 
it was both ‘important’ and ‘not important’. Having a full-time job 
was mostly perceived as ‘unimportant’ or ‘neither important nor 
unimportant’ by the Finns, whereas most French youth considered 
it ‘important’. 
Table 7.1. 18–29-year-olds’ opinions regarding markers of adulthood in 
Finland and France, 2006.
Finland France
‘To be considered adult, 
how important is it …?’                                                       Percentages
To have left the parental 
home
Not important 24 41
Neither important nor 
unimportant 21 14
Important 55 45
Total 100 100
To have a full-time job
Not important 41 25
Neither important nor 
unimportant 33 10
Important 27 65
Total 100 100
To have lived with 
spouse/partner
Not important 66 52
Neither important nor 
unimportant 26 19
Important 8 29
Total 100 100
To have become a 
mother/father
Not important 79 41
Neither important nor 
unimportant 16 13
Important 4 45
Total 100 100
The data is calculated on the basis of the ESS Round 3 (2006). Information by 
gender was not available.
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fading social markers of adulthood
The research informants based their concept of adulthood on the 
ability to reach a certain level of maturity and individual develop-
ment. They still viewed the post-war markers of adulthood, such as 
having a stable job and starting a family, as important, but mainly 
because of their capacity to enhance individuals’ maturity and levels 
of responsibility. 
Sanna (24, Finland), for example, considered as adults people 
who took responsibility for their own lives, but also those who were 
married and had a family and a stable job. Tiia (26, Finland), who 
had a baby, said that she had become more adult since becoming a 
mother, because of the increase in responsibilities for another person. 
Her role and status had changed too, from being a mere daughter to 
being a mother. What had made her become an adult was nonethe-
less not motherhood per se, but the responsible role it had bestowed 
upon her. Céline (23, France) also mentioned that having children 
made people become ‘more adult’. For Caroline (25, France), having 
a stable job and children undeniably changed people’s attitudes and 
increased their sense of responsibility. Valérie (23, France) added that 
having a fixed working schedule affected the transition to a more 
grown-up lifestyle. 
When I asked who the young women considered to be more 
adult among their acquaintances, such as their fellow students or 
friends who were already on the labour market, many answered that 
those who had made the transition from university to a stable work-
ing life had grown up. The change in their lifestyle had increased 
their adultness.
R:  And, which ones are more adults than the others?
I:  Maybe those who have loans and permanent jobs and children, they 
are more adult than [us] who study (laughs).
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R:  Do you feel differences in the behaviour or sense of responsibility 
(…)?
I:  I don’t think we behave differently, or that students are (...) less 
responsible. But I think it’s the life situation that makes it seem that 
they are more adult, although maybe in their thinking they are not, 
but it’s just the concept of owning your flat and having a permanent 
job; (...) this is ‘the adult life’.
 Elina (26, Finland)
However, several young women stressed that having a job and a fam-
ily did not necessarily make an individual more adult than a student 
or childless person. Having a family increases one’s responsibilities 
and transforms one’s social role, but it does not necessarily mean 
that one is an adult.
 [Having a job and being married] is not enough [to be considered 
an adult]. We can play mum and dad; we can play, there are roles 
that we can acquire.
 Caroline (25, France)
R:  The people who work, do you think they’re more adults than the 
ones that are studying?
I:  Not always, no. I don’t think work (...) makes you adult.
R:  Ok. So do you … why? (...) What’s their behaviour like, for exam-
ple?
I:  Mmm … I don’t know. It’s not just … [If ] you have regular working 
times, it doesn’t make you adult; it’s yourself and how you behave [that 
does]. And also studying can [make you] grow up and educate you 
mentally very much. You can learn a lot of things from there too. 
 Suvi (25, Finland)
Tuuli (25, Finland) agreed that one’s lifestyle could be based on 
personal decisions. She considered the decision whether to study or 
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enter the labour market to be an adult decision, or to show absence 
of maturity in some cases. She saw the choice of higher education as 
a mature adult decision. By contrast, young people who were per-
ceived as adults because they had achieved the markers of adulthood, 
such as a stable job or a family, might in fact be immature in terms 
of life choices. She added that what differed between students and 
young working people was their lifestyle, rather than their levels of 
maturity. Both groups could be either mature or immature. Florence 
(22, France) made similar observations. She remarked that some of 
her student friends were much more responsible and thoughtful than 
some of her friends who were already working. Nadège (21, France) 
emphasised too that having a family did not transform a person into 
an adult. She referred to a friend who had been with a boyfriend 
for several years, and had stopped her studies because she wanted 
to have a baby. For Nadège, ending one’s studies at a time when the 
socio-economic structure was so unstable and demanding was not 
a very wise decision at all. Emmi (25, Finland) made an interesting 
remark in this connection. She at first said that her friends who had 
children were more adult than the others, but after thinking about 
it more thoroughly, she pointed out that they could behave in the 
opposite way when they were free from their responsibilities. In that 
case they appeared more immature than her student friends.
R:  And the ones who have children, for example?
I:  Yeah, it’s really different with them, (...) I think they’re more adults. 
Or getting more adults, [being] all the time with their children.
R:  So, you can feel a difference between these friends?
I:  Yeah. But then, when you see those friends (…) without their chil-
dren, it’s a bit different than when they are with their children. (…) 
Then they seem more like you and more like young adults, or young 
people. (...) For example, my work mates, (…) many of them have 
children, [and] it’s really funny ’cause sometimes I feel more adult 
than them when we go out, ’cause they get so ‘crazy’, (laughs) ’cause 
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they don’t get out that often. (...) I’m a bit ashamed sometimes, how 
they act! (laughs) (...) So, maybe I wouldn’t say that having children 
makes you an adult.
 Emmi (25, Finland)
Parenthood partly leads to adulthood because it entails serious com-
mitments, but mostly because it involves being responsible for another 
person. Parenthood per se does not turn a person into an adult; it is 
the responsibilities placed upon them by the role that do so (Westberg 
2004: 51). Managing and coping with the new situation, rather than 
the change in social status as such, precedes the status of adulthood. 
Like my informants, Arnett’s (2004: 216) respondents felt they were 
reaching adulthood gradually, at their own pace, rather than all at 
once. They too did not consider the status of parenthood a key 
marker; the responsibilities that came with it were the true causes of 
the growth in maturity.
Conclusion: 
adulthood – a combination of social and psychological attributes
The informants highlighted a new angle for considering adulthood. 
They pointed out that reaching majority and new legal rights does 
not transform a young person into an adult. They emphasised that 
fulfilling the social markers of adulthood does not necessarily mean 
that a person is an adult. They questioned the subjective aspect of 
adulthood, arguing that a person might be a social adult but not 
necessarily a mental adult. They highlighted the importance of psy-
chological development and levels of individual maturity. They said 
that fulfilling their parents’ criteria of adulthood might reinforce 
the subjective aspects of adulthood, because it confers additional 
responsibilities, but it does not make a person into an adult. Post-
war markers thus only play a partial role in the status of adulthood. 
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Individuals’ psychological development is equally important in the 
process of transition. 
7.3 emphasis on responsibility and Maturity
As discussed in subchapter 7.2, in the informants’ opinion, the criteria 
for adulthood were essentially based on individuals’ characteristics, 
such as behaviour and mental development, rather than social quali-
fiers such as marriage, work, owning a house or becoming a parent. 
This subchapter further emphasises the less visible and more complex 
attributes of adulthood highlighted by the young women, such as 
having a sense of responsibility and maturity. The markers of transi-
tion still held an important place in their lives, but they were seen as 
enhancing adult status rather than producing it. 
are you an adult yet?
Specific markers have been used by scholars and researchers as a 
framework for youth analysis. In his work in the 1980s, Galland 
established a framework for the study of youth transition, defined by 
residential, professional and relationship transitions (Molgat 2007: 
495). These events represented the stepping-stones in people’s lives 
until the end of ‘The 30 Glorious Years’ of prosperity experienced by 
advanced societies after the end of the Second World War. However, 
since the end of the 1970s, structural factors such as socio-economic 
stagnation, fluctuation and global forces have drastically changed the 
course of those societies. In the wake of such changes, young people’s 
transitions to adulthood have become more challenging, uncertain 
and elusive. 
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The attainment of adulthood is still measured with the markers 
mentioned above. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
determine the transition to adulthood according to social criteria, 
because a growing number of young people do not – or simply cannot 
– fulfil them any more. Many experts and policymakers’ discourses 
acknowledge that these young people are extending their youth.
My informants were becoming adults within this particular 
framework. In light of the disruptions to the patterns of transition to 
adulthood, I asked how the young women perceived their own transi-
tions, what they considered being adult to consist in, and whether 
they felt adult. The current wider perception of the criteria for adult-
hood is still based on the social markers of transition experienced by 
the previous generation. Did that mean that young women felt less 
adult than their parents at the same age, who had already fulfilled 
the criteria that qualified them as adults? The interviewees displayed 
different feelings towards their own adult status. Most answered that 
they felt they were partly adult or were young adults, or showed 
awareness that they were between two phases but were approaching 
the adult side. Some were very aware of being in the middle of the 
transition process.
 I’m losing my child spirit somehow, because inevitably I’m faced with 
problems I didn’t have before, because when you’re a child, (...) you’re 
not aware of some things, some issues … (...) Now I feel I’m falling 
into the whirl, I realise, ‘wow, I’ve got responsibilities.’ (...) Now I 
handle everything, the car insurance, (...) my flat, leisure activities, 
(...) etc. … 
 Alice (23, France)
Similarly, Anna (28, Finland) felt adult, but said that she would feel 
more adult when she had acquired a stable job, her own flat and maybe 
a family. Natalie (22, France) felt rather adult, even though her father 
paid for her rent and expenses, because she could manage her own 
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life and lived on her own. Thus the post-war markers of adulthood 
still had an impact on young women’s feelings about adulthood.
I:  I feel like a ‘young adult’. (…) I’m independent, well, I live on my 
own, so I manage my everyday life, (...) I have student jobs, so I have 
some responsibilities, (...) but I know I’ll feel much more adult quite 
soon when … 
R:  ... when you’ll be working?
I:  When I’ll be, yes, fully independent.
 Natalie (22, France)
R:  Do you feel adult then?
I:  Mm … yeah! From time to time, yeah. (...)
R:  But not all the time?
I:  Not all the time, but I think it’s only because when you are a child, 
(...) you think that adults don’t worry or don’t have any suspicions 
about anything, but the truth is that it’s not easy to be an adult. And 
you can’t (...) know answers to every question, even though you are 
an adult. So, yes, I feel myself as an adult. (laughs)
 Elina (26, Finland)
Some young women, in particular in France, clearly stated that they 
did not feel adult at all when I first asked the question. But after 
discussing it, they said that they were conscious of growing up and 
taking on new responsibilities, and hence of becoming adult. They 
were negotiating their own positions within the statuses of youth and 
adulthood during the interview. For instance, Caroline (25, France) 
and Céline (23, France) mentioned that they still felt the spirit of their 
inner child, but were aware of moving forward towards adulthood. 
Audrey (26, France) clearly stated that she did not feel adult yet.
 Deep inside of me I really feel like a little girl! Well, I know I’m grow-
ing up, I realise it because I’m living (…) on my own, well, I mean, 
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I don’t live with my parents any more, and I’m trying to handle my 
life! 
 Céline (23, France)
 Not at all! (laughs) Ah not at all! (...) I don’t feel adult at all, I don’t 
necessarily even feel ready to be a teacher to be frank, because when 
I see pupils in secondary school, sometimes I feel closer to them, 
although I’m 26! (...) Actually, I haven’t changed so much since I 
turned 18. (...) Even physically, I don’t see myself changing. (…) We 
take a lot of time to become adult; in fact, we are in-between, we are 
… big kids actually. 
 Audrey (26, France)
Some young women pointed out that being partly or fully financially 
dependent on their parents hindered a fully adult status. Adulthood 
was also associated with changing one’s lifestyle and habits, such as 
calming down and having a more peaceful existence.
R:  Do you feel adult?
I:  Absolutely not! (laughs) No, because first of all, my bank account 
fills up by itself every month, (...) there’s someone who puts money 
into it every month, so of course, financially, I’m not [an adult].
 Nicole (21, France)
 No, I don’t feel adult at all! I don’t have a proper job, (...) I don’t feel 
like settling down, I don’t feel like building anything with my (…) 
boyfriend, I don’t feel like it, I don’t see any future in that … Well, 
no, I don’t feel adult; I’m not independent, my parents pay my rent 
(...) [and] I still like to party.
 Sabrina (23, France)
 I’d say 60% of me is adult and 40% is still … Well, (...) I get money 
from my mum, which basically makes me a child still, but I do think 
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that I’m an adult in the sense that (...) I’m quite responsible. (...) A 
concrete example is that a few years ago, on the weekend we’d get 
out [with friends] (...) and get drunk and (…) party. (...) And now I 
think that a nice weekend can be renting a movie on a Friday night 
and going for a jog on Saturday morning. (...) I’ve gradually moved 
into adulthood when I’ve noticed that I like doing things that don’t 
have anything to do with going out and partying … You know, just 
calming down a little bit …
 Piia (24, Finland)
Feeling ‘in-between’ is a central part of being an emerging adult 
(Arnett 2004: 227). Young adults are in an unstable phase, located 
between adolescence and adulthood yet belonging to neither. Arnett 
stresses that his respondents felt ‘in-between’ and examined their 
own positions within that status. Arnett’s respondents were from 
various backgrounds, not necessarily from the academic field. Their 
answers regarding feeling adult were often ambiguous, and oscillated 
between the affirmative and the negative, just like my informants’ 
responses. Arnett’s respondents also said that in some circumstances 
they felt adult – for instance, they were financially independent and 
could handle responsibilities – but in other situations they still felt 
insecure or childlike (Arnett 2004: 14, 217). Some of Holdsworth 
and Morgan’s (2005: 110–111) informants also hesitated between a 
negative and a positive answer when asked whether they felt adult. 
Several implied that in fact they felt ‘both’. They too spoke of still 
feeling like a child inside. They displayed a sense of moving back and 
forth between childhood and adulthood according to different situa-
tions. Many young people today do not reach adulthood by merely 
fulfilling predictable social milestones. Instead, they gradually and 
personally construct their paths to adulthood, based on their own 
perceptions of the concept. Molgat (2007: 496–497) agrees that 
adulthood is a psychological period founded on existential maturation 
and an increasing sense of personal responsibility and independence. 
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Reaching adulthood is thus a psychological process that takes several 
years to complete. The extension of the transition has been increased 
by contemporary socio-economic restructuring and uncertainty. The 
author argues that adult status today is a combination of personal 
qualities and social roles. Indeed, young adults’ biographies are sensi-
tive to external structural fluctuations, mainly in the labour market, 
policies and welfare systems. The new developments in the life course 
and the resulting prolongation of youth are both a product of the 
changing socio-economic structure and a reaction to those changes 
(Molgat 2007: 508, 511–513). The social markers of transition are 
therefore still important and partly relevant, but they can no longer 
be dissociated from young people’s subjective and psychological ex-
periences of transition. The contextual structure is unfixed, and so 
are the social concepts. Patterns of transition are therefore moveable, 
and need reconsideration in the light of contemporary structural 
fluctuations and developments.
negative clichés
Some young women – in both countries, but mainly in France – con-
tested the notion of adulthood during the interviews. They saw 
adulthood as something negative, and referred to old clichés, such as 
having a routinised, fixed and predictable lifestyle, and losing one’s 
childlike spontaneity, innocence and ingenuousness. For Céline (23, 
France), being an adult meant having constant pressure, problems and 
worries. Becoming an adult also meant growing old, which troubled 
her. Elina (26, Finland) similarly stated that the most difficult thing 
about becoming adult was having constant worries about everything 
in general. Although they felt rather adult, Sabrina (23, France) and 
Florence (22, France) had unenthusiastic perceptions of adulthood. 
In fact, Florence openly challenged the concept of adulthood as such 
when I asked her whether she considered herself an adult.
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  I don’t like the word ‘adult’. (...) I don’t like the word ‘adolescent’ 
either, actually, so maybe I simply don’t like categorisations. (...) I 
don’t consider myself to be a teenager, so … why not an adult actually? 
Maybe it’s the word itself that is too serious actually! I know I attach 
negative connotations to the word. (...) I tend to think, ‘adults don’t 
have fun any more!’ I used to think when I was little (...) ‘oh, it’s not 
fun to be an adult, we can’t play any more, we can’t laugh any more, 
we don’t have fun any more!’ And I think [this idea] remained in me 
unconsciously.
 Florence (22, France)
 To me, it’s also synonymous with having a bit of a gloomy life, (...) 
commuting, going back home and being with your husband, your 
child, your dog. I see it a bit that way: becoming sensible, becoming 
a bit boring.
 Sabrina (23, France)
 I know people who say that if you’re an adult, you’re not allowed to 
play around or laugh or do something very childish, but I don’t see 
it that way, ’cause I have sisters who are over 30, and we are always 
just playing.
 Suvi (25, Finland)
A few French young women also associated adulthood with losing 
one’s child spirit or soul.
I:  I’d like to remain a child! (...) Sometimes kids are a bit burdensome, 
but they are so enthusiastic about everything! They are always so 
happy about everything you suggest they do, and I really want to 
remain like that! 
R:  You mean, to keep on being spontaneous?
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I:  Ah, yeah! [They are] so spontaneous, well, a bit naive too, but it 
doesn’t matter! (...) As a result, for me, adult ... (...) The vision I have 
of adulthood, (...) it’s a bit old school, (...) it means there are things 
that you can’t do any more, otherwise you’ll be considered childish. 
(...) Hence, to me, it’s almost derogatory to be an adult. When you’re 
an adult, (...) you can’t laugh needlessly any more ... Well, it’s not 
fun!
 Valérie (23, France)
Some of Arnett’s (2004: 218–219) respondents also conveyed a bleak 
vision of adulthood. They saw responsibilities as burdensome, and 
adult life as synonymous with constraint. In addition, they regarded 
entering adulthood as becoming boring, beginning a stagnant period 
of life, and ceasing fun and spontaneity. Emerging adults tend to ide-
alise childhood and the inner child spirit, which they try to preserve. 
They might act like responsible grown-ups, but they do not want to 
let go of their inner child. Regarding changes in values and attitudes, 
Inglehart (1997: 41) argues that the function of some cultural pat-
terns has weakened following socio-cultural transformations after the 
Second World War. For instance, divorce and reconstituted families 
have become more accepted. However, this does not mean that the 
traditional family form is no longer a norm. It simply means that that 
particular feature has gradually weakened, opening a space for other 
social phenomena (in this case, reconstituted families) to become a new 
model that coexists with the older one. The conventional concept of 
adulthood might be similarly weakening and eroding, at least in the 
eyes of highly educated young women. Several authors (Bauman 1998; 
Calcutt 1998; Furedi 2001) observe that the concepts of fun, entertain-
ment and enjoying oneself have become major sources of pleasure in 
life. They talk about a movement of rejuvenation, with adults seeking 
to revert to rather childish and less mature behaviour. The culture of 
amusement is also strongly linked to the entertainment market, which 
promotes individual gratification, hedonism, perpetual youth and 
images of immaturity.
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Changing perceptions of adulthood
Entry into adulthood is distinguished by specific markers. But what 
are young people’s – in this case, highly educated young women’s 
– subjective conceptions of the concept of adulthood and the attain-
ment of adult status? Do they still consider the transitional milestones 
to be as crucial as society deems them? Do they still share the same 
definitions of adulthood? Finally, are those who do not follow their 
parents’ patterns of transition less ‘adult’ than those who do? 
When I asked my informants about the notion of adulthood and 
what ‘being an adult’ meant to them, the answers in both countries 
converged. Most answered straightforwardly that being an adult was 
related to taking responsibility, being mature, being both financially 
and emotionally independent, and being able to manage one’s own 
life. They viewed adulthood as a mental and individual process, rather 
than a merely social process. The respondents showed awareness of 
the definition of adulthood in terms of the social markers discussed 
above, but they emphasised that being an adult encompassed much 
more than those. Piia (24, Finland) illustrated this point clearly.
R:  According to you, what is being an adult?
I:  Well, if I say having children and having a house and being married, 
it’s a really boring answer and I’m not sure if I even think that, but I 
would say that every person that I know who has a mortgage or has 
children is an adult. But I know people who I’d call adults and they 
don’t have children or mortgages, or they’re not married. I think being 
an adult is owning up to your own actions and being responsible. (...) 
I think it’s being responsible for yourself, (...) admitting your own 
mistakes and being responsible for your actions. 
 Piia (24, Finland)
She added that moving on to a new life phase, such as graduating and 
starting to work full-time, enhanced one’s adult status, rather than 
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generating it. Florence (22, France) agreed: a change in life situation, 
such as moving in with one’s partner, might lead to further mental 
development and ‘feelings’ of adulthood, but in itself it would not 
determine adult status. In Sabrina’s opinion (23, France), some of 
the post-war markers of transition still had a strong impact on the 
process, alongside mental development and maturity.
 Actually, I really associate adulthood with the labour market. (...) 
Being adult, I think, means having a job, financially supporting 
oneself, being responsible. (...) Becoming sensible. (…) I really see it 
that way: being more autonomous.
 Sabrina (23, France)
For Tuuli (25, Finland), being an adult was related to ‘making all the 
decision mostly by yourself, (...) trying to manage on your own, and 
taking responsibility for your actions.’ She too suggested that being 
an adult was a mental process. Natalie (22, France) echoed these 
views. Several young women mentioned that being an adult implied 
being responsible not just for oneself, but also for other people, and 
considering other people more.
 [Being adult] is being aware of one’s own responsibilities, (...) being 
able to manage one’s own life, and also being aware of other people’s 
lives.
 Natalie (22, France)
Päivi’s (25, Finland) definition of adulthood encompassed ‘being inde-
pendent, taking care of oneself, (...) being self-sufficient.’ However, she 
was aware of not fitting into the post-war concept of adulthood. 
I:  I guess there’s this connotation to the word adult, that (...) also means 
(...) [that a] person (...) already knows what he or she is going to do 
two years from now … You know, (...) [a] very fixed lifestyle. (...) I 
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don’t think I’m adult in that way. (...) I think at some point [in the 
past] it might have been, but I’m not sure if [being adult] is that any 
more. (...) I think the concept is changing a little bit as well.
R:  So, you view yourself as an adult, but within a kind of different idea 
what an adult/
I:  Yeah, within my idea!
R:  You have your own definition?
I:  Yeah, yeah!
 Päivi (25, Finland)
Similarly, Tiia (26, Finland) simply stated that ‘for different people 
adulthood means different things,’ Anna (28, Finland) that ‘the 
“adult” is more in your head,’ and Johanna (26, Finland) that ‘it’s a 
“feeling” that you are an adult,’ which leads to a change within ‘the 
whole mental world’.
Annika Westberg (2004: 37) distinguishes between the social 
status of adulthood and the individual or subjective conception. Social 
adulthood is defined by achieving social milestones. However, reach-
ing independence or starting a family is being postponed by a growing 
number of young people today. They thus appear to be extending 
their youth and attaining the status of adulthood later. However, 
this is rooted in the social institutionalisation of the meanings and 
perceptions of the concept of adulthood. Westberg argues that there 
is a lack of research and knowledge about subjective and existential 
conceptions of adulthood. Rather than interpreting the transition 
in terms of external milestones, young people tend to emphasise the 
notions of responsibility and maturity as the major criteria of adult-
hood. They highlight the mental dimensions of transition (Westberg 
2004: 40–41). Psychological development, individual maturity and 
managing responsibilities are more important than social markers 
for achieving adult status. Increasingly, existing social definitions of 
adulthood do not comply with many young people’s perceptions of 
adulthood and transition (Westberg 2004: 49–50). However, the 
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current social structure does not yet recognise the mental aspect of 
adulthood as a criterion for transition. Young people’s status thus 
remains ambiguous. Socially, they are considered not as adults but as 
experiencing a prolonged youth. Nevertheless, they might feel adult 
on the subjective level, and act like mature adults. Many are indeed 
able to handle life challenges, live autonomously and, above all, take 
responsibilities and wise decisions. It is important to remember that 
transitions vary according to young people’s social backgrounds, 
gender, ethnic origins and levels of education. As a result, the process 
of transition is multidimensional (see Miles 2000). Different young 
people might perceive adulthood differently, with some focusing on 
the social markers and others more on mental aspects. 
To further the discussion, Harry Blatterer (2007b: 774–778; 
2010: 46–48) argues that the present concept of adulthood is deeply 
rooted in advanced societies’ collective imaginaries. The contempo-
rary model of adulthood and the current markers of transition gained 
normative validity after the end of the Second World War. Post-war 
economic and social prosperity, the development of welfare systems 
and access to higher education offered new possibilities for young 
people. The majority of baby boomers thus managed to achieve the 
social markers of transition at a faster pace. The fact that a significant 
number of people experienced an accelerated transition established 
new standards of transition and markers of adulthood, and led to their 
institutionalisation. Today’s expert discourses, policies and cultural 
values are still based on these standardised patterns of transition, which 
are taken for granted and considered to be fixed milestones. However, 
because of recent socio-structural transformations, a growing number 
of young people can no longer become an adult by merely achieving 
those milestones. Consequently, their status remains ambiguous: 
they are not socially validated as full adults, but they are no longer 
adolescents either. Mentally, they have attained adulthood, but the 
subjective individual dimension goes unrecognised, mainly because 
young people’s transitions are observed from an increasingly irrelevant 
perspective. 
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7.4 ‘feeling’ rather Than ‘Being’ adult
The status of adulthood, at least for highly educated young women, 
is a matter of ‘feeling’ adult, rather than of merely fulfilling expected 
social roles such as getting married, starting a family, or having 
accommodation or a stable job. The informants suggested a new 
way to look at contemporary adulthood and examine the actual 
components of that status. They had conflicting thoughts about 
the meaning of adulthood. Most of them said that being an adult 
consisted in displaying responsible and mature behaviour, rather 
than in merely fulfilling social criteria. They still valued the social 
markers of adulthood and considered them important stages in their 
processes of social integration, but they emphasised that they were 
not sufficient to make an individual an adult. In other words, they 
pointed out that being adult encompassed psychological and subjec-
tive characteristics. However, individual mental development in the 
process of transition is scarcely taken into account. Young people’s 
transitions and social progression are still measured by their ability 
to attain the markers of adult status, in other words, social criteria. 
Contemporary analysts of youth generally fail to recognise the moral 
and subjective markers of adulthood, because they continue to base 
their evaluations on a concept that was standardised in the 1960s. 
The concept of adulthood, and especially the accelerated patterns of 
transition experienced by the baby boomers in their youth, became a 
point of reference because a sufficiently large number of individuals 
had undergone such a transition (Blatterer 2007b: 775). Nevertheless, 
concepts, like the social structure itself, are not necessarily fixed for 
all time. The patterns of transition to adulthood experienced by the 
baby boomers were embedded in the social context of the time. The 
wider structure has undergone restructuring since then. Therefore 
the pathways to adulthood that applied to young people 50 or 60 
years ago do not necessary match the patterns of integration of today’s 
youth. The currently common belief that young people are delaying 
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their transition to adulthood might in fact be erroneous. Looking at 
the process from an objective angle, unbiased by the influence of the 
post-war markers of adulthood, might shed new light on the process 
of transition experienced by young people today. 
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8.
 ConTeMPorarY TransITIons To aDulThooD
This study compares Finnish and French female students’ paths 
from university to the labour market and an independent lifestyle, 
their plans for motherhood, and their subjective approaches to the 
concept of adulthood. There were both divergences and conver-
gences in the patterns of becoming an adult in the two countries. For 
instance, young women’s transitions from university to the labour 
market differed between Finland and France, while their perspectives 
on adulthood were similar across the case-countries. Differences 
and similarities also appeared within rather than between the two 
countries in relation to some issues. This implies that transitions to 
adulthood are far from similar across advanced societies, European 
Union member states, or even individual countries. Furthermore, 
this study only included young women who were university students. 
Given that even this group presented differences in their patterns of 
transition, it is even more likely that there will be divergent patterns 
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of transition between young men and women, and among youths 
from different social and ethnic backgrounds. The diversity occurs 
at different levels – internationally, nationally and within subgroups 
of individuals. Thus the experience of the transition to adulthood 
and the supposed prolongation of youth cannot be taken for granted, 
and must be understood as multiple, heterogeneous and complex 
processes. 
Different structural factors provide a framework for young peo-
ple’s transitions, such as welfare regimes, social and cultural ideolo-
gies, the socio-economic apparatus, or policies directed at young 
people. In turn, different structural dynamics shape the possibilities 
for and paths of integration into the wider social sphere (see Walther 
et al. 2006: 124). Van de Velde’s (2008) study of transition among 
young people from four different countries (Denmark, France, the 
United Kingdom and Spain) with different welfare regimes and 
socio-political ideologies also demonstrates the diversity of patterns 
of transition and integration. Dominique Anxo, Gerhard Bosch and 
Jill Rubery (2010: 6) point out that normative regulations structure 
life courses and transitions in each country. This in turn provides a 
mould within which young people’s life trajectories and pathways to 
adulthood take shape. These important findings go against the idea 
that there is a homogeneous experience of transition across all Eu-
ropean countries, let alone across all advanced societies. The Finnish 
welfare system applies social-democratic principles, with an emphasis 
on universalism and individual independence. The French system is 
conservative-corporatist, emphasising the family as the main source 
of support for its members and the selective distribution of assistance. 
My informants were undergoing transition within these different 
contexts; their experiences were therefore likely to diverge. 
The post-war model of transition to adulthood (see Figure 8.1) 
involves synchronic progress from one life stage to the next, with 
entry to adulthood being linear and predictable. This is the transi-
tional model that most young people experienced in the 1950s and 
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1960s in France, and also in most other advanced societies. Finnish 
post-war youth experienced a similar entry into adulthood, following 
rather straightforward and predictable patterns of transition. This 
model also shows a clear separation between the public and private 
spheres (Galland 2004: 137). In the public sphere, young people 
generally completed compulsory schooling, and then entered the 
labour market and simultaneously gained financial independence. 
This impacted on and activated their development in the private or 
domestic sphere. Young people could leave the parental home, settle 
down, marry and start a family. Young women usually moved out 
of the parental home into their own households when they married, 
since cohabitation was still a marginal practice. 
Figure 8.1. Post-war transition model.
School Working life
Living with parents Living as a couple
Childhood and teenagehood Adulthood
End of studies
Source: Galland (2004: 137).
However, as demonstrated both in this study and in most analyses of 
youth transition, the socio-economic and cultural transformations 
that have taken place in advanced societies in the past few decades 
have disrupted the post-war model of transition presented above. As 
a consequence, the transition to the adult stage has started to extend, 
and integration into the next life phases has been delayed. Figure 
8.2 offers an overview of the patterns of transition experienced by a 
growing number of young people in France and most other advanced 
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societies. The model partly applies to Finnish youth too. Young peo-
ple study for longer, mainly by entering higher education. However, 
graduation does not necessarily lead to direct entry into the labour 
market. A large proportion of youth face unemployment or uncertain 
and fixed-term working contracts. This situation hinders them from 
reaching autonomous status, and forces them to be financially depend-
ent for longer, on their parents or on state support. The compromises 
experienced in the public sphere simultaneously inhibit private or 
domestic transitions. The lack of stable jobs prevents young people 
from attaining residential independence and starting a family. Youth 
thus appears to be prolonged, and entry into adulthood delayed.
Figure 8.2. Extended transition model.
Prolonged schooling Period of precarity
Living alone Living as a couple
Adulthood
End of studies
Working life
Pre-adulthood stage
Living with parents  
Source: Galland (2004: 151).
I have analysed my informants’ patterns of transition through the 
post-war markers of adulthood, including integration into the labour 
market, becoming independent, leaving home and starting a family, 
as well as in terms of the subjective aspects of becoming an adult.
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Prolonging education to adapt to labour market demands
A continuously growing number of young people are engaging in 
tertiary studies. It is increasingly common to pursue higher educa-
tion. Yet policymakers regard this pattern negatively in some respects. 
In particular, young people are accused of delaying their entry into 
the labour market. However, there are concrete and justified reasons 
why young people are engaging in higher education. According to 
my respondents, studying at university or other higher-education 
institutions is a form of response to the labour market. Political and 
ideological incentives from the 1960s onwards have influenced young 
people to accumulate educational capital. Studying at university has 
become a logical step and a socio-cultural norm. Nonetheless, the 
large increase in young people with tertiary qualifications has led to 
the phenomenon of degree inflation. It is argued that the real number 
of places available on the labour market is lower than the number 
of graduates (see Chauvel 2002). Consequently, many qualifications 
have lost some of their former value, and young people are aiming 
for yet higher qualifications. Joining the world of work is increasingly 
difficult because of job competition, limited prospects, uncertainty, 
unemployment and precarity. A large number of occupations require 
specific skills provided by higher-education degrees. Diplomas simply 
provide eligibility for higher- and even lower-status professions, and 
only partly guarantee one’s position on the market. Furthermore, 
some respondents stated that many young people used university as a 
safe haven from economic uncertainty and hazardous outcomes, and 
also as a means to gain time before entering working life for good. 
Many young people do not feel psychologically ready to enter the 
labour market on a full-time basis in their early 20s, and need more 
time to mature and consider their life prospects.
Finnish and French young women’s experiences within the uni-
versity system differed, as did their perspectives on that system. In 
Finland, they arrived at university already knowing the subject they 
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wanted to study, and with a rough idea of their future professional 
field. Most chose a course on the basis of a combination of personal 
interest and labour market prospects. Finnish students are selected 
through entrance exams, and this pushes them to decide in advance 
on the degree they want to study. Once at university, they can study 
minor subjects and modify their curriculum. Many take one or sev-
eral gap years after finishing secondary school, in order to gain work 
and/or personal experience. My informants considered gap years 
essential, as they allowed them to gain maturity and work experi-
ence, and gave them time to think about their future job prospects 
and higher-education plans. Once they had entered university, their 
motivation for study was rather high, as they had a specific goal to 
aim for on basis of their own decisions. 
Most secondary-school students in France go straight to uni-
versity after graduation. Young people rarely take gap years, which 
are not a cultural norm in France as they are in Finland. Many 
students go to university because they do not know what else to do, 
in relation to either study paths or work plans. Several informants 
described French universities as a place for ‘lost’ young people. They 
claimed that many students go there without any predefined study 
objectives, choose a curriculum at random, and change their study 
path or educational institution, which entails starting all over again. 
The first university years are often a stage of experimentation, and 
indeed are experienced as disguised gap years.
The Finnish respondents showed reasonable satisfaction with the 
university system. They appreciated the system’s flexibility, the homo-
geneity and parity between types of higher-educational institutions, 
and the efforts to offer equal chances to everyone. They also valued 
the ability to choose from a variety of courses and change curriculums. 
They saw the system as an adequate service for adults seeking further 
qualifications. Above all, they greatly appreciated the opportunity 
to combine study and work, and to arrange their timetables around 
these two parallel activities. The majority of students in Finland have 
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a part-time job, whether related to their studies or otherwise. Taking 
gap years and working during one’s studies allows students to become 
familiar with and gain access to the labour market. In that sense the 
university system functions in tandem with the labour market, and 
operates as a bridge in the school-to-work transition.
By contrast, French young women displayed disappointment 
and frustration with the university system. They described it as weak 
and obsolete, and emphasised its inaptness to prepare students for 
professional life. They asserted that university offered exclusively 
theoretical knowledge and few possibilities to gain professional ex-
perience. French students rarely take gap years, and working during 
one’s studies is difficult because of the rigidity of both the educational 
system and the labour market. Both the study schedule and employ-
ers are rather inflexible towards working students, which does not 
permit an easy combination of study and work. University is like a 
tower within which students acquire academic capital, but which 
functions as a separate entity from the labour market. Furthermore, 
the French higher-education system is segmented into several divi-
sions and types of institution, which offer different educational 
qualifications. Different professional value is given to the degrees 
obtained, based on the type of institution. The system has remained 
hierarchical and selective, depending on whether students study at 
university, in vocational higher institutions, or in prestigious special-
ist schools (Grandes Ecoles) that are mainly elite institutions. The 
education system thus contributes to and perpetuates hierarchical 
social divisions and inequalities, and moulds young people’s future 
paths of integration into the labour market and their socio-economic 
destinies (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). 
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Inconsistent socio-economic integration
The informants from both countries agreed that they did not consider 
work per se the dominant feature in their lives. They undeniably 
wanted to work, but they wanted a job they would enjoy and that 
was related to their personal values and interests. This suggested 
a willingness to blend the characteristics of previously separated 
spheres, that is, of private and public life. For highly educated young 
women, work is not simply a means of subsistence that allows them 
to enjoy their private lives. It goes further. Work must have meaning, 
give sense to their lives, and be founded on personal ethics. They 
rejected the value of working for money, but not that of work per se. 
Work must still secure a living, but it equally represents a source of 
personal development and self-fulfilment. It should be an enriching 
experience that enhances individuals’ lives, rather than a burden on 
one’s private life. 
Nevertheless, accessing one’s dream job is often tremendously 
challenging. Socio-economic restructuring, uncertainty regarding job 
prospects, and precarious circumstances are well-known obstacles 
that significantly compromise young people’s integration into the 
labour market. The job market is becoming increasingly demanding 
in terms of adaptability, flexibility, and educational and professional 
qualifications. The French young women in particular perceived the 
labour market as a paradoxical and hostile place for young people, 
and especially for young women. They expressed more anxiety and 
pessimistic feelings towards their prospects for integration than their 
Finnish counterparts. They pointed out university students’ difficul-
ties in entering working life, compared with students from vocational 
higher institutions and Grandes Ecoles, because of a lack of relevant 
professional experience. The saw entry into the world of work in terms 
of being left alone to face an unwelcoming labour market. In Finland 
the university system allows students to gain better acquaintance with 
the labour market before graduation. The Finnish young women 
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expected to have some difficulties before finding the job that would 
suit them best, but they felt rather confident, since they already had 
one foot in working life. 
However, women in general remain marginalised on the labour 
market, in terms of unemployment, lower-status jobs, and more 
precarious employment. Moreover, women face more pressure than 
men to prove their value as competent, skilled and capable workers. 
Simultaneously, they experience social, political and cultural pressure 
to fulfil the domestic roles of wives and mothers taking care of the 
family. Nonetheless, many young women are implicitly discriminated 
against during the job-hunting process because of their childbearing 
capacity. The informants clearly discussed these issues. Several of them 
expressed worries about combining family life and a career. Some had 
chosen an occupation that would allow an easier combination, such 
as schoolteaching. Others clearly stated that they would lower their 
professional ambitions in order to raise their children. Many women 
adapt to the situation in similar ways. Young women’s integration 
into working life is compromised by opposing sets of ideologies that 
create dilemmas in their personal and professional lives. They need 
to negotiate between labour market requirements, family values and 
their desire for motherhood, as well as personal values linked to full 
independence and self-fulfilment.  
The informants clearly sought employability over employment, 
and were in favour of flexibility as long as it remained under their 
control. Most desired to engage in lifelong learning and a variety of 
professional experiences, rather than having to work all their lives in 
the same company or field. However, although there was a general 
acceptance of flexibility and constant change, the respondents called 
attention to the phenomenon of irrevocable destiny. They explained 
that once they had engaged in a particular field of study, they would 
have to work in that particular field, and would be unable to change 
it. The French informants insisted more on that particular aspect. 
Many French students fear making the wrong choice during their 
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studies, since it would determine their entire professional lives (see 
Van de Velde 2008). Those willing to change career must study all 
over again in order to obtain the required qualifications. The French 
young women felt trapped within the demands of both the education 
system and the labour market. Like most French people in general, 
they also had a rather pessimistic view of their socio-economic pros-
pects, even if they already had work experience. They were frightened 
by the lack of predictability and potential hazardous outcomes. 
The Finnish informants displayed a different, rather positive at-
titude. They asserted that they already knew how the labour market 
operated, through having worked prior to and/or in parallel with 
their studies. Most French university students are more at risk of 
precarity and unemployment after graduation, because they are new 
entrants, and because few of them have relevant practical experience 
(see Couppié and Mansuy 2003). Some Finns gain work in their own 
field before graduation. Obtaining their diploma helps to regularise 
and maintain their professional position. In France, graduation is a 
means to become eligible for work, and a proof of potential employ-
ability. French students complete their studies at a younger age than 
Finns, but their position as new entrants on the market and their lack 
of relevant professional experience greatly hinder their finding a stable 
job. Many undergo a rather long and tumultuous road to integration, 
with periods of precarity and unemployment (see Kivinen and Nurmi 
2003; 2011). Ultimately they start stable working life at about the 
same age as Finnish students. The Finns may study for longer, but 
their route to integration seems smoother and more direct. 
rethinking the terms of independence and family ideologies
Attaining residential and financial independence is intrinsically corre-
lated with the ability to obtain a stable position on the labour market. 
Finnish and French youth leave the parental home relatively early. 
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Those aiming to enter higher education move out after the comple-
tion of secondary school, if they are going to pursue their studies 
in a different city. However, while many students are residentially 
independent, they are not necessarily financially independent. This is 
especially the case for French students. Most receive regular financial 
support from their parents. Parental aid represents either their main 
source of income or supplementary funds. Finnish students do not 
depend so much on their parents. In general, they get occasional 
financial support when needed. There are several reasons for this 
difference. More young people can study and work in parallel in 
Finland than in France. Work is often the main source of income 
for Finnish students. In addition, all Finnish students are entitled to 
a study grant and housing support. This certainly helps to maintain 
their independent living arrangements. Many French students also 
receive study grants, although these are means-tested on the basis 
of their parents’ income. Thus not all students are entitled to this 
type of assistance. Nevertheless, most of them can receive housing 
support, regardless of their parents’ income. In that sense, similar 
policies concerning aid for residential independence operate in both 
countries. With regard to study grants, distribution in Finland is 
universal, in line with welfare principles that support individual 
independence. In France, the corporatist-conservative welfare ideolo-
gies still posit the family unit as the main source of care and support 
for its members. Nonetheless, housing support promotes residential 
independence. Leaving the parental home thus occurs within a hy-
brid system that creates contradictions and maintains young people 
in a state of of semi-independence (see Van de Velde 2008). Leaving 
home in Finland leads young people, including students, to reach 
full independent status. However, since their autonomy largely de-
pends on state intervention through the distribution of study grants, 
student accommodation or housing allowances, we might question 
their status. Are Finnish students really fully independent and more 
autonomous than their French counterparts? What would be their 
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position if state support came to a halt? One could argue that many 
Finnish students are semi-independent too, simply relying on a dif-
ferent source of support – the state, rather than their parents. 
Interesting patterns developed during the interview analysis with 
regard to plans to start a family. Young women’s positions converged 
or diverged within and between the Finnish and French respondents. 
Finnish and French young academic women largely have equally 
contrasting attitudes towards marriage and childbearing. Being a 
married wife and mother were no longer the sole determiners of 
their identity. Some young women hoped to get married, some were 
against marriage, and most thought cohabitation was the wisest 
solution. Thoughts of motherhood provoked similar reactions, with 
some respondents wishing to have children, and others preferring to 
remain childless. In most cases they did not want to have children 
before they felt psychologically ready and had obtained enough life 
experience. Most wanted to complete their studies, find a stable job, 
or spend time on personal interests, such as working abroad, before 
starting a family. They considered the age of 30 a turning point at 
which to enter a new life phase. Those hoping to start a family would 
face the challenge of successfully combining two roles and two iden-
tities, in order to be an efficient professional and simultaneously a 
caring mother and wife. This choice required negotiations, such as 
lowering one’s career ambitions, or choosing a job that would allow 
success in both areas. The Finnish and French welfare states provide 
equally generous assistance to families with children, yet the Finnish 
young women felt more confident than the French about managing 
that situation. Again, their fears were rooted in the socio-economic 
apparatus. Some informants explained that the university system and 
labour market would effectively dictate the timing of childbirth. They 
saw the labour market as demanding and discriminating against young 
women who wanted to have children. Moreover, student mothers 
are not legally recognised in France, and neither are their needs. Few 
young women in France have children during their studies, unlike 
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in Finland, where the phenomenon is fairly widespread. Student 
mothers’ requirements are acknowledged, which encourages them 
to have children during their studies. 
The transition to adulthood is often a blend of studying and 
working in Finland. Similarly, the mixture of statuses can extend to 
starting a family, which means that some young people are working 
students as well as parents. The transition to adulthood tends to 
develop in either a unlinear or a mixed pattern. In France the school-
to-work transition occurs in rather linear and clear-cut terms. Patterns 
of starting a family follow the same model. Young people tend to 
graduate, find a job that will ensure financial stability and security, 
and then start a family. Although state interventions for families are 
equivalent in the two countries, the dominant structural ideologies 
continue to strongly influence young people’s perspectives on starting 
a family and making the transition to adulthood.
acknowledging new routes of integration 
and subjective adulthood
Throughout the centuries, specific social elements have marked in-
dividuals’ transitions to adulthood. Some specific indicators gained 
influence and became standard points of reference during the 1950s 
and 1960s, when the majority of young people were suddenly able 
to complete their studies, find work, reach independence, move away 
from home, get married and start a family in a rather linear and brief 
interval of time. Since the 1980s, and even more so since the turn of 
the new century, policy discourses in advanced societies have focused 
on the extension of the transition from youth to adulthood. Young 
people now apparently postpone their entry into the adult sphere, 
and this is viewed negatively. But why consider this phenomenon a 
problem?
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The informants, whose opinions converged across the two coun-
tries, provided explanations for the transformation in transitions to 
adulthood. Many of the scholars previously discussed have identified 
economic fluctuations and restructuring, as well as socio-cultural 
change, as the main triggers for the prolongation of youth. The 
Finnish and French young women distinguished similar features. 
They indicated the impossibility of planning their future, and thus 
of establishing long-term plans, because of the uncertainty of events 
to come. In that sense, the labour market holds the key to stable 
transitions, and to the timing of transition. Acquiring a mortgage and 
having a family necessitates not just financial but also geographical 
consistency. The labour market strongly requires young people to 
adapt to geographical flexibility. This seriously compromises their 
ability to enter a couple relationship and start a family. Unemploy-
ment and sudden hazardous situations are a constant possibility. For 
the respondents, living in the present was a strategic response to the 
impossibility of planning their life ahead. They stressed the necessity 
to be constantly alert and prepared for unexpected outcomes. Living 
in the here-and-now was therefore both a choice to adapt to, and 
forced upon them by, external circumstances. 
At the same time, socio-cultural shifts that started in the 1960s 
have deeply transformed established conventional norms. The inform-
ants’ parents had become adults in a context in which conservative 
mores and values still strongly shaped individuals’ life directions. 
Today the context is more liberal, and people have more freedom 
to decide their own life trajectories. There is a large number of pos-
sibilities and opportunities. Yet the increase in choice has generated 
individual pressure and confusion regarding the ‘right’ options to 
choose, and how to reach the new goals. People’s lives were more 
entangled with norms a few decades ago. The transition to adulthood 
followed a prescribed route, and was hence simpler and smoother. 
Today, individuals are apparently the masters of their own destinies, 
but life trajectories are increasingly unpredictable and complex, and 
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are still entwined with external structural factors. As a result, the 
process of transition has become very hazy and ambiguous. The 
prevailing discourse suggests that young people are prolonging their 
youth and deliberately refusing to integrate into the wider structure. 
In truth, the prolongation of youth did not emerge as a sudden state 
of mind; rather, it is a response to the unstable contemporary situa-
tion. Young people are simply attempting to find solutions in order 
to adapt to socio-economic fluctuations. For instance, they may try 
to gain extracurricular credentials and work experience, and deeply 
consider the timing of starting a family. Postponing parenthood is 
often the result of wise reflection, rather than of fear or a refusal to 
‘grow up’. Starting a family requires financial security and the ability 
to provide for one’s children’s well-being. 
Furthermore, there are two sides to adulthood, the social and 
the subjective. The latter is generally neglected and lacks official 
recognition. Individuals are considered to be adults once they are 
able to meet the milestones of adulthood, that is, completing school, 
obtaining a stable job, becoming fully independent, settling down as a 
couple, and starting a family. However, these criteria define adulthood 
from legal, social and objective perspectives. They recognise neither 
the subjective aspects of adulthood nor the psychological aspects of 
transition (see Westberg 2004). The informants had a transparent 
perspective on the concept of adulthood. They stressed that their 
parents had become adults earlier than do most young people today; 
however, they had done so not out of choice, but because they were 
forced into it by social norms and life circumstances. They remarked 
that their parents had quickly achieved the legal and social aspects of 
adulthood, but they genuinely questioned their parents’ mental and 
psychological maturity and their abilities to be adequate adults. The 
young women strongly emphasised being mature and responsible 
as the major criteria for being adult. In their opinion, an individual 
reaches adulthood in the mental sphere. They still perceived the social 
markers of adulthood as important, but this was because of their abil-
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ity to increase one’s sense of responsibility and maturity, rather than 
because they were the foundations of adult status in themselves. Some 
respondents even considered that fulfilling the post-war roles associ-
ated with adulthood could be immature and thoughtless in certain 
circumstances. For example, they pointed out the irresponsibility of 
starting a family instead of entering higher education to guarantee 
a minimum integration into the labour market. They viewed wise 
decision-making and thoughtful behaviour as the basis of adulthood, 
regardless the markers of adulthood. 
The transition to adulthood experienced in the 1950s and 1960s 
is still considered the normative path to the status of adulthood. 
Consequently, today’s young people are suspected of sabotaging the 
supposedly sole and authentic transitional route instituted by previous 
generations. Although it is increasingly difficult for young people to 
follow this path, because of socio-economic and cultural shifts, the 
new patterns of transition they are adopting are misunderstood and 
misinterpreted. Advanced societies have undergone profound and 
complex changes that have affected their deepest structures, and which 
have simultaneously impacted on social concepts such as adulthood 
and patterns of transition. History has proven that no social edifice 
is fixed. The current social context and social concepts are malleable 
and will undergo transformations. Social concepts are deeply rooted 
in the wider social structure that shapes them, and thus flow along-
side it. This leads to the need to reconsider markers of transition and 
social concepts themselves. Young people’s transitions to adulthood 
continue to be compared to those of the previous generation, and 
measured with the same taken-for-granted standards. However, these 
are increasingly irrelevant and outdated, thanks to recent restructuring 
(see Blatterer 2007b; 2010). Understanding contemporary transitions 
requires an objective view of young people’s life trajectories, a recon-
sideration of the current markers of transition, a redefinition of the 
concept of adulthood itself, and an acknowledgement that patterns 
of transition are malleable rather than fixed. Letting go of established 
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concepts, habits and patterns of transition is difficult, partly because 
it represents one generation’s deep involvement in the construction 
of the world as we know it. Passing the reins to that generation’s suc-
cessors implies the change, deconstruction and rebuilding of society 
in ways that the previous generation might dislike, as it might no 
longer meet their needs or expectations. This is part of the genera-
tional conflict between baby boomers and young people today that 
has led to misunderstandings regarding young people’s choices of life 
trajectory (see Chauvel 2002).
finnish and french female 
university students’ models of transition
Finland and France are both European Union member states, and 
are believed to operate rather similarly. Yet on closer inspection, a 
fair number of differences appear in their internal structures. The 
divergence in welfare systems and socio-economic fluctuations offer 
a variety of responses and forms of support to citizens. As a result, 
young Finnish and French people experience fairly distinctive transi-
tions to adulthood. This study focuses on female university students 
from the fields of the humanities and social sciences; the analysis 
might not apply to all students, let alone to the wider group of 
young people in general. As mentioned previously, if the group of 
informants had belonged to a different category, the results obtained 
would have varied in many respects. Nevertheless, it provides a clear 
picture of the model of transition that a growing number of young 
people currently follow.
The generalised model of extended transitional patterns illus-
trated in Figure 8.2 does not accurately correspond to the transitional 
model followed by my informants. Data analysis has revealed that 
university students experience different routes of integration. Social 
background, parental and state support, and the type of education 
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institution, particularly in France, affect their routes to and op-
portunities for integration into the wider sphere. In this particular 
model of transition, the public and private spheres tend to merge, 
especially in Finland. Finnish students move out of home early, and 
then might study at university, live as a couple (usually cohabiting), 
have children, and work at the same time (see Figure 8.3). They are 
entitled to state provision too, depending on their situation and 
needs. The transition in Finland thus appears to be desynchronised, 
with the different markers of adulthood experienced in a non-linear 
order or even a fusion, with no straightforward trajectory or clear-
cut separation. 
In France, university students tend to follow a more linear route 
of transition, especially regarding studying, graduating and entering 
the labour market (see Figure 8.3). Nonetheless, their patterns of 
moving away from home are similar to those of the Finns. Many 
students leave the parental home early to study, and thus attain 
residential independence. Some live as a couple and cohabit, but 
they rarely have children. However, they generally continue to rely 
on their parents for financial support, even after graduation during 
the period they spend job-hunting and/or in unemployment. Some 
students also return to the parental home after graduation if they 
cannot find a job. This situation occurs frequently.
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Figure 8.3. Female university students’ patterns of transition in Finland and 
France in the late 2000s.
    
These models of transition to adulthood no longer resemble the 
paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. The public sphere still determines 
some aspects of private life, but it does so in a more indirect and 
implicit manner. Young people, especially in Finland, do not wait 
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until after graduation to work and/or start a family. In addition, as 
examined earlier, university students rarely see work as a mere means of 
survival after graduation. Their profession must give meaning to their 
personal lives too. Starting a family requires sensible arrangements 
and planning, and being an adult is a subjective state of mind rather 
than a legal and social status. The dominant discourse suggests that 
young people are extending their youth. Some authors recognise 
that young people today are pioneering an additional stage of the 
life course, referred to as emerging adulthood (see Arnett 2004). 
Nevertheless, in most discourses and analyses, contemporary youth 
transitions continue to be examined through the lens of an outdated 
model, the ‘classical’ path generated in the 1950s. From an historical 
perspective, the 1950s model was in fact new, and was produced by 
post-war conditions. However, since the majority of young people 
adopted it, it became standardised and acknowledged as a point of 
reference. The current phenomenon of the ‘prolongation’ of youth 
might thus simply indicate that what is taking place is an alternative 
pattern of transition, rather than a disruption of the ‘traditional’ 
model. In that case, the process of youth ‘extension’ might not exist in 
reality; it could simply be a misinterpretation of current phenomena 
on the basis of structural conditioning and an outdated analytical 
apparatus. An objective and concrete viewpoint will offer up-to-date 
insights. 
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9.
 eXPlorIng The neW DIMensIons of TransITIon
This chapter provides new perspectives for looking at the current 
patterns of transition to adulthood, drawing on highly educated 
Finnish and French young women’s views of their own pathways to 
adulthood. It asks primarily whether the prolongation of youth is 
truly taking place, or if an alternative model of transition, different 
from the post-war model, has started to replace it. However, this 
aspect remains to be discussed.
9.1 alternative Models of Transition
 Because things are the way they are, things will not 
stay the way they are.
 (B. Brecht in Good Reads 2011)
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Young people are expected to follow the same model of transition 
to adulthood as the previous generation. Yet contemporary young 
people are increasingly pursuing a different path of integration into 
society, which seems to be delaying their entry into adulthood. They 
also have a different perception of the concept of adulthood. Their 
new patterns of transition are misinterpreted and misunderstood. 
Experts fail to recognise that an alternative model of transition, more 
appropriate to young people today, is emerging. Young people are 
however not attempting to disrupt the ‘traditional’ paths to transi-
tion, nor are they becoming adult at a different pace. They are simply 
becoming adult in a different way. 
Is the prolongation of youth really taking place?
Social agents, including experts, the media, policymakers and even 
young people themselves, understand the concept of adulthood on 
the basis on the meaning currently attributed to it. Being an adult 
means being independent, having a stable job, settling down with a 
partner and starting a family. These ‘classic’ markers define the current 
notion of adulthood, and provide the context for moving on from 
adolescence to adult status. However, many contemporary young 
people, such as highly educated youth, are experiencing increasing 
difficulties in following this pattern. First, the current socio-economic 
situation prevents them from attaining stability and thus the full 
status of adulthood. Second, a large segment of the youth popula-
tion simply no longer wants to fulfil these markers. For instance, 
the Finnish and French interviewees said that they wanted to lead 
flexible lifestyles, and to be able to change jobs and workplaces, as 
long as they remained in control of their own decisions, rather than 
being forced to do so. Many young adults no longer seek a fixed or 
predictable lifestyle, such as working for the same company all their 
lives. However, they also reject being forced into socio-economic or 
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geographical flexibility. They wish to be able to choose and control 
that aspect. A growing number of young people in fact hope to fol-
low a flexible route, as long as it remains in accord with their life 
choices and values. Third, they have a different view of the concept 
of adulthood. They understand being an adult in distinctive terms, 
based on subjective maturity and mental development rather than 
social attributes. 
Nonetheless, the standard patterns of transition still hold sway 
in perceptions of young people’s social status, and assume that young 
people are merely defying the norms by delaying their entry into 
adulthood. Young people are suspected of experiencing a prolonged 
period of youth before attaining the ‘natural’ pattern of adulthood. 
However, they are striving for integration into a demanding economic 
apparatus that compels them to adopt innovative strategies. These 
coping strategies might postpone some developments in their life 
course, such as reaching financial autonomy and starting a family. 
Nevertheless, these tactics collide with the political and socio-cultural 
expectations that young people should move on to the next stages of 
their lives within a short interval. As a result, the general discourse 
tends to stigmatise young people, and regards them as responsible for 
their own precarity. Young people’s lives are surrounded by contradic-
tions. They are greatly encouraged to pursue tertiary education in 
order to achieve the qualifications that the labour market demands. 
At the same time, policy initiatives aim to reduce study time and ac-
celerate the school-to-work transition. Young women feel the pressure 
to be good mothers and family carers, while at the same time the 
labour market implicitly discriminates against them for childbearing. 
The natural and biological feature of parenthood becomes a source 
of conflict for many young women. They feel forced to negotiate 
whether and when they should have children, depending on their 
career and personal desires for motherhood. 
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The post-war generation’s exceptional destiny
Looking at transition from a wider and longer-term perspective offers 
much valuable evidence. The rapid, condensed and linear transition 
to adulthood experienced by young people in the 1950s and 1960s 
was in fact exceptional and specific to that particular generation. 
Societal transformations brought specific life conditions, possibilities 
and opportunities to the youth of that time. The considerable change 
in the process of transition in those decades was an outcome of the 
major structural transformations experienced by advanced societies 
after the Second World War. In earlier times, although the socio-
economic and politico-cultural apparatuses were different, the pace 
of transition and the ages for fulfilling markers of adulthood did not 
necessarily diverge much from those experienced today.
Transition has always varied among different social groups, ac-
cording to levels of education, socio-economic background and 
gender, and between rural and urban areas. Today, different sub-
groups of young people continue to experience diverse patterns of 
transition, depending for example on their educational qualifica-
tions, social origins or ethnic background. The young women in 
my study represent one subgroup of young people, mainly highly 
educated middle-class females. Analyses of other youth subcategories 
would certainly present different results and show diverse patterns 
of transition. Antoine Prost (1987: 35–39) distinguished two types 
of young people that coexisted in France between the First and 
Second World Wars. In the first group, young people from peasant 
backgrounds and the lower and middle classes had a shorter youth. 
They generally finished school at 13, after the end of compulsory 
schooling. They went to work, but continued to live in the parental 
home, gave their salary to their parents, and remained under parental 
control. Military service for men, and later marriage for both men 
and women, marked the transition to adulthood. The second group 
included youths from upper-middle and higher social classes, who 
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experienced a longer youth. They studied for longer, and some left 
home to pursue higher education or military duties. They generally 
married later. Few women went into tertiary education, but those 
who did delayed marriage as a consequence. 
In 1911 in France, the average age of marriage for men was over 
30 in the middle and upper classes, while it was around 25 in the lower 
classes. Women were generally younger: 24 in higher social classes, and 
the early 20s in lower social categories (Prost 1987: 40). In Finland, 
the average age of marriage in 1881–91 was 27 for men and 25 for 
women. This average remained fairly constant until the 1950s, when 
it started to decrease (Koskinen et al. 2007: 141). Jack Goody (2000: 
107) adds that in some parts of Italy in the 18th century, men and 
women did not marry until the age of 29–30. In some other parts of 
the country, they married younger. The age of marriage varied greatly 
across Western European countries. The main reason for marrying 
later for men was the necessity to accumulate sufficient financial and 
economic resources, so that they could provide for their wife and 
family. In pre-industrial European agricultural societies, young men 
and women would also generally leave the parental home to go into 
service, or would work while still living with their parents, and save 
up for their future household before getting married (Goody 2000: 
63–64). Young people could not marry without presenting a dowry 
in the case of women, or an inheritance in the case of men. Young 
people from lower social classes had to work to save funds so that 
they could marry. This process took time, and young people therefore 
married at a rather late age (Goody 2000: 106; Oinonen 2004: 287). 
From the 1950s, as the old apprentice and service systems disap-
peared, youth participation in education increased. The transition 
process was condensed, with young people leaving home in order 
to marry, and simultaneously becoming financially and residentially 
independent (Oinonen 2004: 289). Today’s transitions resemble those 
of pre-industrial times. To some extent, some young people are in a 
similar situation: working, saving money, and still living with their 
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parents. The societal context and ways of life are not comparable, 
yet these aspects reveal that before the Second World War, and across 
history, transitional pathways did not necessarily follow the linear or 
synchronic lines of those experienced by the post-war generation.
The median age of women at childbirth has historically never 
been consistent or confined to a specific age range. Fabienne Daguet’s 
(2002) report shows that in 1901 in France, women’s average age at 
childbirth (including all births, not only the first birth) was 29. This 
is about the same age as today in Finland and France. However, it 
should be remembered that the socio-cultural context was different 
at that time. Women did not have access to effective contraception, 
and many gave birth after the age of 40. Infant mortality was also 
high. Nonetheless, until the 1950s, most women gave birth between 
the ages of 25 and 34. After 1950 the number of women giving birth 
before 24 increased, but it never overtook the number of births among 
the 25–34 age group. From 1975 onwards, trends returned to what 
they had been before the 1950s. Mores and family values have had 
an impact, as have women rights and access to contraception, yet 
empirical data shows that the figures in the 1950s and 1960s were 
a historical exception. 
In Finland, trends were similar (Vattula 1983: 42–47). In the 
early 1800s, women aged 25–29 and 30–34 accounted in equal pro-
portions for most births. Many women also gave birth at ages 35–39 
– surprisingly, more than did women aged 20–24. In the early 1900s 
the patterns were the same. The trends started to change after the 
Second World War, as they did in France. Women aged 20–24 and 
25–29 then accounted in equal proportions for most births. From the 
1980s onwards, birth patterns returned to earlier historical tendencies, 
as in France, with most women giving birth at the ages of 25–29 and 
30–34, and the number of those having babies at the age of 20–24 
decreasing (Koskinen et al. 2007: 141; Laes 2005).
The concept of marriage underwent alterations too. Marriage 
based on love and intimacy is a fairly recent phenomenon. Tradition-
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ally, marriage was an institution to secure one’s socio-economic assets 
and social position. The Victorian era saw the emergence of unions 
based on romance (Coontz 2005). After the Second World War, the 
‘Golden Age’ witnessed a general move towards a marriage model 
that reinforced the division of gender roles, with a male breadwinner, 
a female homemaker, and generally two children. The archetype for 
the nuclear family emerged. This model, which was adopted by the 
majority, gave a new meaning to marriage. Like adulthood today, 
it became taken for granted as a fixed model that would last into 
the future. Yet since the 1970s, the institution of marriage has been 
disrupted (Coontz 2005: 228). The division of roles between men 
and women collapsed with women’s access to the labour market, and 
this disrupted the standard nuclear family, which was founded on 
fixed gender roles. Simultaneously, divorce rates have escalated, new 
family models have developed, such as lone parents and reconstituted 
families, and cohabitation rather than marriage has become a norm. 
In addition, same-sex couples can openly live together, and can even 
get married in some countries. Mores have greatly evolved towards 
acceptance regarding couple diversity and living arrangements in 
recent decades.
The age of majority in Finland and France, as in most advanced 
societies, is 18. This too tends to be taken for granted as unquestion-
able and definite. Young people legally become adults at 18, which 
endows them with new sets of legal rights, duties and opportunities. 
However, the legal transition to full citizenship has only recently 
been set at this age. The age of consent and the legal age of marriage 
have followed the same patterns (see Table 9.1). Throughout the 
centuries, they have fluctuated. In addition, surprisingly, while life 
expectancy has gradually increased, the age of majority has progres-
sively decreased. About 100 years ago, young people had to wait until 
the age of 21 to be legally recognised as fully responsible citizens in 
Finland and France. Before the French Revolution, the age of majority 
in France was even higher, at 25. Finland was a part of the Kingdom 
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of Sweden from the Middle Ages until it became a Russian duchy in 
1809, and Swedish law therefore applied in Finland. Before the end 
of the 19th century, Finnish women were not considered independent 
citizens, and were legally dependent first on their parents and then 
on their husband. The age of consent and legal marriage followed 
a parallel development in the two countries, rising throughout the 
centuries (Markkola 2003: 139–140).
The age of marriage with parents’ consent presents an interest-
ing historical difference between Finland and France. In Finland the 
Ecclesiastic Law of 1686, based on Lutheran Reformation laws and 
principles, stipulated that parents or guardians could neither force 
nor prevent marriage. Parents’ consent was necessary, but it could 
not impede the marriage (Knuutila 1990: 185, 699). This law came 
into force in 1734, when it was recognised by the Kingdom of Swe-
den (Koskinen et al 2007: 139). However, Ilmar Talve (1997: 192) 
points out that in practice young people’s choice of spouse was still 
restricted by the consent of their parents, who could withhold a dowry 
or inheritance. From 1864, people aged 21 could marry the person 
of their choice. Furthermore, although the legal age of marriage was 
fairly low, the age at which people were seen as sufficiently mature 
for marriage was 25–30 for men and 20–25 for women (Talve 1997: 
191). By contrast, in France, as in most other Western European 
countries, young people were bound by their parents’ decisions and 
approval for marriage. They could rarely choose their partner, as mar-
riages were usually arranged (see Goody 2000). However, the age of 
marriage without consent followed a parallel development with the 
age of majority. Before the French Revolution, men and women had 
to wait until the ages of 30 and 25 respectively to be able to marry 
without their parents’ consent (see Planiol 1950 [1899–1901]). The 
age decreased and then rose again throughout historical and political 
transformations.
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Table 9.1. Legal age of majority, marriage, and marriage without parents’ 
consent in Finland and France.
The table is based on information from the following sources: Finlex (2011); Legi-
france (2010); Koskinen et al. (2007); Knuutila (1990); Markkola (2003); Ministry of 
Justice, Finland (2001); Otavan Iso Tietosanakirja (1962–1965: 247); Planiol (1950 
[1899–1901]); Talve (1997).
Legal status Finland France
Age of majority
 
-Before 1700s: 15 for men on-
ly; women were the property 
of their parents, then of their 
husband (based on Swedish 
laws, as Finland belonged to 
Sweden at that time)
-1721: 21 (for men only) 
-1864: 21 for men, 
  25 for women
-1898: 21 for both men 
  and women
-1969: 20 for both
-1976: 18 for both
-Before the French Revo-
lution in 1789: 25 for both 
men and women (the 
age varied in different re-
gions)
-1792: 21 for both
-1974: 18 for both
Legal age of 
marriage (mini-
mum age by 
law)
-Before 1500s, based on 
 Roman and canonical law: 
 14 (men), 12 (women)
-1571 (ecclesiastic order) 
  and 1686 (ecclesiastic law): 
 15 (men), 14 (women)
-1721: 21 (men), 15 (women) 
(peasant men were allowed to 
marry younger, at 18)
-1911: 21 (for all men), 
 17  (women)
-1929: 18 (men), 17 (women)
-1987: 18 for both men 
  and women
-Before 1789, based on  
 Roman and canonica
 law:
 14 (men), 12 (women)
-1792: 15 (men), 
 13 (women)
-1804: 18 (men), 
 15 (women)
-2005: 18 for both men 
  and women
Legal age 
of marriage 
without parents’ 
consent
-1686 (applicable from 1734): 
theoretically, parents or guard-
ians could neither force nor 
prevent marriage under Lu-
theran law. In practice, par-
ents’ consent still strongly 
applied.
-1864: 21 for both men 
  and women
-1987: 18 for both
-1579–1792: 30 (men), 
  25 (women)
-1792–1804: 21 for both
-1804-1907: 25 (men), 
  21 (women)
-1907–1974: 21 for both
-1974: 18 for both
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Considering the low ages of consent and marriage, and the shorter 
life expectancy in earlier times, one might expect that the age of full 
entitlement to citizenship rights would have followed the same trajec-
tory. This partly reveals the historical perception of adulthood itself. 
Young people may have been working, getting married and starting a 
family, thus meeting all the qualifiers that would entitle them to social 
adulthood today, but from a legal perspective, on the basis of their 
age, they were not necessarily considered fully fledged adults, as they 
were not yet entitled to majority. Parents also wielded authority and 
control over their children for longer. Adulthood in those days was 
measured by different norms, and was different in nature. Similarly, 
adulthood has a different meaning today than in the 1950s–1960s. 
While social criteria were emphasised in those decades, young people 
nowadays increasingly emphasise the subjective aspects of adulthood. 
This shows that the various determinants of a given status are not 
fixed in time, but are liable to modifications in parallel with wider 
structural fluctuations.
In the 20th century, the age of majority became closely inter-
related with the civil rights young people gained when reaching 18. 
Today, age is still considered the denominator of specific life stages, 
such as schooling or voting. In the past, dominating factors such 
as family, mores and traditions essentially determined people’s life 
directions. However, age now seems to have lost its importance for 
the regulation of young people’s patterns of transition. New sets of 
values and expectations are increasingly replacing age in shaping 
transitions, such as getting a job one enjoys and/or finding love and 
romance in partnership. Age still influences biological aspects like 
childbearing, but more and more young people wish to have children 
when they feel ready and mature enough. These are abstract quali-
ties that cannot be solely determined by age, but must also take life 
circumstances into account. Yet age is still used as the main tool for 
measuring processes of transition. 
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Policies and youth transitions
The conventional ways of experiencing the school-to-work transi-
tion and the pathways to adulthood no longer work. In France, the 
university system and the labour market operate as separate entities 
(see Chapter 4). French young people therefore undergo a rather 
linear and predictable school-to-work transition, in which they must 
first obtain their diploma before being eligible for the corresponding 
job. However, the school-to-work transition is much more blurred in 
Finland, with young people working and studying at the same time, 
and even delaying their graduation because of commitments to their 
part- or full-time job. The recently restructured labour market is 
more demanding in terms of not only qualifications but also relevant 
professional capabilities. It seems that the rapid ‘school-then-work’ 
transition model leads to a failure of integration into the labour mar-
ket. Given current socio-economic circumstances, a slightly longer 
and more mixed ‘school-and-work’ model seems more appropriate. In 
addition, because they enter the labour market during their studies, 
Finnish young people fulfil the adult criteria of working and being 
financially independent. In fact these young people do not seem to 
experience an extended period of youth, but simply a different type 
of transition. 
However, current Finnish policy strategies aim to reduce the 
interval between studies and working life, and to return the school-to-
work transitional path to that which was experienced by the previous 
generation, and which still exists in France. Finnish policies are also 
attempting to reduce and even eliminate gap years, to restructure the 
whole higher-education system into a more rigid school-like institu-
tion, and to condense study time in line with the requirements of 
the Bologna Process. The aim is to encourage young people to start 
working earlier, and simultaneously to regularise the timing of their 
school-to-work transition. But is this really the correct strategy? Gap 
years allow young people to pause and think about their lives and 
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futures, and to gain maturity. Most then enter higher education with 
lucid and coherent views. In any case, why should young people 
lose the freedom to benefit from enriching experiences of life and 
work? The current higher-education system allows them to integrate 
into the labour market before graduation in a smoother and more 
prepared way. 
The French higher-education system, particularly university, 
resembles a large school-like institution, because of its organisation 
and its close incorporation with the wider school system. University 
is even considered a place for ‘lost’ young people who are unsure 
about their future work plans. In Finland, higher education has been 
regarded as a service for mature adults, but it seems that recent policy 
schemes are seeking to turn it into a large school-like institution 
with a business orientation. Flexibility, freedom and the provision 
of good services have been the main qualities associated with the 
Finnish higher-education system. Recent initatives will undermine 
the present system by weakening its good service provision and 
creating yet another rigid institution to monitor young people’s life 
directions and destinies. These are precisely the features of which the 
French respondents strongly disapproved, and which are considered 
a failure in France.
The Bologna Process aims to create a European Higher-Educa-
tion Area (EHEA) to facilitate staff ’s and students’ international 
academic mobility and cooperation (Bologna Process 2007–2010). 
This entails the restructuring of the higher-education systems of the 
European societies involved in the EHEA into a standardised higher-
education model. The qualifications framework has been changed into 
a threefold structure: the Bachelors, the Masters and the Doctorate. 
Both the Finnish and the French systems have already adapted to 
this structure. However, adapting to European directives is one thing, 
but restructuring the entire system into a more standardised model 
is another. The main goal of the Bologna Process is to encourage 
international cooperation. However, does a system that was working 
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efficiently, at least in the opinion of the Finnish students who have 
been using it, deserve to be eradicated? It might be sensible to ask 
the opinions of the current and future students concerned in these 
alterations. We might be led to wonder whether young people’s voices 
really count in a decision-making process that involves those young 
people themselves. 
We may further question whether the ultimate goal is genuinely 
to protect young people from precarity, or simply to ensure that their 
transition to adulthood fits established norms, even at the price of a 
more hazardous integration into the labour market. Is this an attempt 
to preserve a social system that started to disintegrate several decades 
ago? Today’s socio-economic circumstances are contrary to those of 
the 1960s in terms of stability and predictability. Why should young 
people today follow a school-to-work transition model identical with 
that of the previous generation, if this model is increasingly inap-
propriate to them? It seems reasonable to ask whether the Finnish 
higher-education system that worked so well deserves to be torn down 
and transformed into a lower-standard and inadequate institution that 
would resemble the system that many consider obsolete in France. 
Towers are much higher and more visible than bridges; however, that 
is also their weakness (see Chapter 4). The wind of change strikes 
them first and beats them more fiercely. It then takes a great deal of 
effort to hold them up straight and strong. 
aiming for mature adulthood
On the question of starting a family, young people feel the pressure to 
follow socio-cultural norms and start a family according to the ‘right’ 
timing. Yet in many cases these norms do not match young people’s 
real capabilities or desires. Gisèle Harrus-Révidi (2001) reveals the 
stories of baby boomers who went through traumatic experiences 
during their childhood because of their parents. The author suggests 
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that the institution of parenthood was emphasised by biological and 
conventional rules over a genuine desire to have children. Young 
people were implicitly forced by mores and structural norms to marry 
and start a family. As a result, parenting was in many cases a burden, 
and parents did not always provide emotional support and care for 
their children. Some people, especially women, were not necessar-
ily ready or willing to start a family. From the late 1960s onwards, 
contraception gave women the ability to control their fertility, and 
having children became a matter of desire rather than risk (see Coontz 
2005; Hakim 2000). This simultaneously changed the image of the 
child, legally, emotionally and socio-culturally. 
Most young women in this study wished to have children, but 
only when they felt mature enough to care for a child. The inform-
ants expressed different opinions regarding having children. Some 
preferred to remain childless, but those who clearly desired children 
thoughtfully affirmed that they were not ready yet, and that they 
preferred to focus on other aspects of their life before entering moth-
erhood. Many young people today share these views. Being able to 
take mature decisions is a crucial factor in adulthood. In addition, 
the sphere of the family has transformed. New family forms have 
become widespread and acceptable, such as cohabiting rather than 
getting married, living as a reconstituted family, and same-sex couples. 
Yet the general discourse disparages young women’s choice to delay 
childbirth. It is often perceived as an attempt to deny their sociobio-
logical responsibilities. One might wonder whether it is better to have 
children out of love and care when one feels ready for parenthood, 
or out of duty when emotional maturity and desire might be absent. 
Children are the future of society. The less emotional disturbance 
they suffer, the more likely they are to become healthy and balanced 
individuals. Is this not what society wants for its members?
Living in the present is a coping mechanism young people have 
adopted to tackle future contingencies, rather than being a mere self-
indulgence. This strategy is generally misunderstood by the previous 
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generation, which grew up in a stable and predictable context. After 
graduation, some informants expected to enter an undetermined 
life period when their paths would be completely unpredictable and 
unknown. Whereas the previous generation knew where the road 
would lead after their studies, today even highly educated youths 
face a void period before obtaining a stable job. They must simply 
adapt to, react to and negotiate with what lies ahead. For instance, 
the media, general discourse and several experts (e.g. Bauman 1998) 
have discussed young people’s choice to live a hedonistic lifestyle, 
and to focus exclusively on the here-and-now rather than planning 
their future. However, the informants who chose to live day by day 
claimed this was a strategic decision. In times of uncertainty, pre-
dicting future life outcomes is close to impossible. Young people are 
born within socio-economic instability and uncertainty, and have 
adapted to those circumstances. Today’s socio-economic conditions 
indeed engender situationalism, in which people cannot plan ahead 
or engage in long-term commitments (Blatterer 2007a: 45). Young 
people still develop projects and try to stick to their aspirations, but 
they equally know that their plans are likely to change along the way. 
Marlis Buchmann (1989: 187) stressed that in times of transience 
and fluidity, it is more logical for individuals to orient themselves 
towards the present than the future. 
Regarding the concept of adulthood, the research respondents 
raised an important issue: they contrasted social and subjective adult-
hood. They separated the post-war markers of adulthood (complet-
ing school, getting a stable job, reaching full independence, getting 
married and becoming a parent) from mental and psychological 
development. Fulfilling the classic markers of adulthood is one aspect 
of transition, but individual maturity and responsibility is another. 
The young women even questioned their parents’ ‘real’ maturity when 
they were the same age. Almost all of them stated that their parents 
had been forced into adulthood by life circumstances, and thus had 
had heavy responsibilities at a younger age than themselves, but this 
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had not necessarily transformed them into psychologically mature 
adults. At that time social norms and expectations had greatly shaped 
the pace of people’s objective or social development. Today, young 
people wish to focus equally on the subjective aspects of growth 
and reflexivity. In today’s context, attaining social characteristics 
according to the supposedly ‘right’ timing might simply reveal an 
absence of responsibility and maturity. Some informants pointed 
out that nowadays, not pursuing higher education and entering the 
labour market straight after compulsory schooling is unwise and 
thoughtless. Although tertiary diplomas do not guarantee employ-
ment, they nonetheless protect individuals from remaining on the 
margins of society in an endless circle of precarious low-paid jobs. 
The French respondents in particular also argued that interrupting 
one’s studies in order to have a baby ‘on time’ showed individual im-
maturity; nowadays, one should endeavour to increase one’s chances 
of integration into the socio-economic sphere. Thus social maturity 
does not necessarily match subjective maturity. Under the current 
socio-economic conditions, subjective adulthood and an attentive 
consideration of one’s commitments and conduct are more likely to 
contribute to effective integration into the wider social sphere than 
mere social adulthood.
9.2 no Prolongation of Youth, only Changing Patterns 
of Transition
The model of transition that young people follow nowadays is per-
ceived as a temporary blip that might be rectified in the future and 
changed back to the ‘norm’. Efforts to encourage young people to 
complete their studies and enter the labour market sooner rather 
than later, or to get married and become a parent before they reach 
the age of 30, constitute strong attempts to perpetuate the previous 
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generation’s pattern of transition. However, the baby boomers’ destiny 
was the destiny of one particular generation, and does not necessarily 
apply to younger generations, who live within a completely different 
social apparatus (see Chauvel 2002: 220). 
The young women interviewed for this study generated new 
perspectives for the analysis of pathways to adulthood. They high-
lighted that the post-war model of adulthood that was used to identify 
whether young people were adults is now eroding. The current model 
of adulthood took shape in advanced societies during the ‘Golden 
Age’ after the Second World War. It gave rise to a prevailing ‘com-
mon-sense’ and ‘logical’ model of adulthood that still prevails today 
(Blatterer 2007a: 6). The transition was shortened and homogenised, 
and this contributed to more rigid chronological ordering and a uni-
formity of pathways to adulthood (Kohli 1986: 279–280). Blatterer 
(2007b: 774–775) argues that a particular model of adulthood became 
institutionalised after the Second World War because a sufficient 
number of people at that time fit an identical model of transition. 
That particular model therefore became the standard reference. No 
other period in history had provided the necessary conditions for 
that model to be experienced by the majority. Coming of age became 
associated with attaining stable work, individual financial independ-
ence, marriage and parenthood within a brief period of time. These 
life stages became solidified markers of transition that then shaped 
the current definition of adulthood (Blatterer 2007b: 774–775). 
Social concepts are constructed on the basis of the socio-cultural and 
political developments of a given time. People’s current perceptions of 
adulthood are founded on a succession of mental edifices constructed 
by the previous generation that implicitly determine current thinking 
(Blatterer 2007a: 23; Chauvel 2002). The social imagination further 
perpetuates the institutionalisation of specific concepts, such as the 
current model of adulthood, until it becomes a solid part of the wider 
societal apparatus and is thought of as a permanent feature. 
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The structure within which people live clearly influences their 
interpretations of the world and the way they act. Bourdieu (1980: 
144) argues that the concepts of youth and old age are in fact socially 
materialised echoes of the struggle between younger and older genera-
tions. Youth is not a stable biological feature, but is a social feature. 
It is determined by society and historical contexts and events (Prost 
1987: 35). Carol D. Ryff also argues that reality is socially constructed. 
In other words, people’s interpretations of specific social phenomena 
are rooted in their subjective understandings of objective realities. The 
processes of institutionalisation and legitimation produce objective 
reality, and the internalisation of social parameters and socialisation 
gives rise to subjective reality. External and internal factors come into 
play with regard to the identification and comprehension of events 
and the construction of meaning. Ryff mentions that, for example, 
what seems real to a Tibetan monk is not real for an American busi-
nessman, and vice versa (Ryff 1986: 41–42). 
In the same way, what matters for young adults and what seems 
real to them might not correspond at all to the older generation’s 
preoccupations and perceptions of the world. Social concepts such 
as childhood, adulthood and the life course are products of a given 
society’s collective imagination (Blatterer 2010: 45). Individuals in-
ternalise social roles and what is associated with those roles, as well as 
the development they are supposed to follow, on the basis of socially 
shared expectations and definitions. Understanding objective real-
ity therefore involves the examination of the subjective realm from 
the individual’s point of view (Ryff 1986: 46, 63). However, as the 
interview analysis in this study has highlighted, the social structure 
continues to allocate roles to young adults that no longer necessar-
ily correspond to their needs. Indeed, socio-cultural expectations of 
adult development and the transition to adulthood are increasingly 
at odds with individuals’ subjective perspectives. 
Advanced societies’ regulations and transitional stages, from 
childhood to retirement and beyond, rely heavily on age. This has 
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generated a normative system in which most social beings feel some 
pressure to conform to norms and rules based on age, even if only 
implicitly. Age is used to allocate status; however, this also entails 
some limitations. Such classifications deny the possible discrepancies 
between societal definitions and cognitive development (Ritchies and 
Koller 1964: 15). Moreover, deviation from age norms is generally 
perceived negatively (Sugarman 1986: 50–52). Young people today are 
stigmatised for not respecting the ‘right’ timing of transition. Léonie 
Sugarman (1986: 52) explains that categorising people by age may 
prevent them from reaching their full potential. A large number of 
young adults have a pessimistic perspective on future outcomes and 
integration into the labour market; they feel that they are failing by 
comparison with the previous generation, which managed to attain 
the benefits that had been guaranteed by their educational qualifica-
tions or had simply been offered as incentives for integration (see 
Chapter 5). The judgemental prevailing discourse on the extension 
of youth contributes to a state of uneasiness among young people. A 
large proportion of the youth population is caught between dominant 
institutionalised ideologies about the pathways of transition on the 
one hand, and the inability and unwillingness to adhere to the beliefs 
of another era on the other. The objective recognition of new patterns 
of transition based on flexibility, rapid adaptability and innovative 
strategies for socio-economic integration would help to decrease not 
only the current generational conflict, but also the negative view that 
many young people have of themselves. Young people do not intend 
to sabotage old patterns of transition; they are simply establishing 
new pathways that are more suitable to their own requirements. For 
instance, they are studying and working at the same time, or waiting 
to reach economic stability and individual maturity before starting a 
family. To some extent this involves a process of social and cultural 
deconditioning; in other words, departing from conventional path-
ways and blazing a new trail. In fact it involves a certain amount of 
bravery, which has been misrecognised as individual inconsistency. 
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Young people are not prolonging their youth, but simply redefining 
the pathways to and concept of adulthood in response to contem-
porary socio-economic changes and demands. 
Today, most experts assess young people’s routes to adulthood 
within what they consider an established and permanent framework. 
The results of their analyses tend to demonstrate negative outcomes. 
However, it seems that they lack the necessary distance that would 
allow them to interpret today’s transitions more accurately. Still, 
they cannot be blamed for misunderstanding the phenomenon of 
the so-called extension of youth. It is natural for humans to evaluate 
others on the basis of their own perceptions. Older generations assess 
younger generations’ ability to integrate into the wider sphere from 
the perspective of their own subjective perceptions of the world, their 
socio-cultural values, their own experiences, and their beliefs about 
the ‘right’ way to undergo transition. Even social scientists have 
adopted the common view that young people are delaying adulthood 
(Blatterer 2007a: 20–24). 
The taken-for-granted models of youth transition and adult-
hood continue to set the timing for coming of age. Young people’s 
apparent failure to reach the ‘classic’ markers of adulthood within the 
‘right’ interval of time gives rise to the idea that they are prolonging 
their youth and rejecting adulthood. ‘Real’ adulthood is perceived 
as a fixed norm that a large segment of ‘deviant’ youths are unable 
to reach. However, members of the previous generation are failing to 
recognise the growing gap between the standard model of adulthood 
and the current reality. Rapid socio-economic changes have provoked 
a rupture between old standards and pathways and contemporary 
societal circumstances. In other words, following the ‘classic’ model 
of adulthood is rarely possible today (Blatterer 2007a: 63–64). Young 
adults grew up in a socio-economic context that radically differs 
from the world in which their parents came of age. Their visions 
and experiences of adulthood therefore diverge. Yet young people’s 
experiences are still evaluated from within the framework of the 
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previous generation, regardless of the current state of the world. 
The interpretation itself is thus biased, since it is based on an out-
dated model that represents the transition of another generation in 
another historical period (Blatterer 2007a: 112). This suggests that 
not only does the evaluative framework for patterns of transition 
need redefinition, but the present model of adulthood itself requires 
reconceptualisation. 
The social structure is malleable and permeable by wider ex-
ternal fluctuations. History has continuously proved that no socio-
economic model is fixed and unchangeable. Social concepts are 
not immune to restructuring, and they are therefore exposed to 
transformation. Whether young people are experiencing a delayed 
transition to adulthood seems to be the wrong question. Instead of 
concentrating exclusively on their difficulties in following the routes 
to adulthood established by the previous generation, a more accurate 
focus would be to ask: What are the appropriate paths of transition 
today? And what are young people’s contemporary requirements for 
integrating into the larger social structure? As every generation tends 
to do, today’s young people are exceeding the established parameters 
of the system and reshaping the structure into a more appropriate 
edifice for their own age group. The powerful baby boomer genera-
tion instituted an unprecedented social system that they thought 
would be lasting, yet it has proven to be as liable to alteration as all 
previous social apparatuses. It is certainly a challenge for the elders 
to recognise that the new generation cannot maintain that system, 
and to accept that young people have already started to lay the bricks 
of tomorrow’s social edifice.
 ‘It is demonstrable,’ said he, ‘that things cannot be otherwise than as they 
are; for as all things have been created for some end, they must necessarily 
be created for the best end.’
 (Voltaire 2006 [1759]: 4)
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Appendix 1 – Cities and their Universities
Table A1.1. Brief description of Lyon and Tampere.
Lyon (France) Tampere (Finland)
Date founded 1st century BCE 1500 (village) 1779 (city)
Population 
(rounded up) 488 000
1 213 0002
Distance from 
capital city 470 km 175 km
Ranking (size) in 
country Second Third
Main economic sectors
-Hi-tech industry
-Medical research and
 technology
-Services
-Entrepreneurship
-Tourism
-Industry, manufacturing
-Information technology
-Services
-Research and 
 development
-Entrepreneurship
1 Data from 2009.
2 Data from 2011.
The table is based on information from the following sources: INSEE (2011); Site 
Officiel de la Ville de Lyon (2012); Tampereen kaupunki (2012). 
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Appendix 2 – Information on the Interview Process Provided
 to the Informants
Information provided to the Finnish interviewees before starting 
the interview:
Information on the interview process and data protection
 
This interview is conducted for the purpose of my PhD research, 
which is being carried out in the department of sociology at the 
University of Tampere. I am doing a comparative analysis of young 
adults’ socio-economic situations in Finland and France. The re-
search concentrates on young people in their 20s who are about to 
finish their university degrees and enter working life. The study also 
focuses on the social and economic changes that have occurred in 
the past 10–20 years, and how these influence young adults’ living 
arrangements. 
Since this study concerns young people, I think it is important to 
allow them to express their opinions on the current socio-economic 
situation. Statistics offer a lot of information on young people’s living 
conditions, but they do not explain the reasons and issues behind 
them. The main goal of my research is to explain the situation of 
youth from young people’s own points of view. This is why this 
interview is taking place. 
The data provided during the interview will be used for scientific 
purposes only. Quotes will be included in my PhD thesis, in papers 
and articles written for conferences and to scientific journals, and 
also in a co-authored book on youth transition to adulthood that we 
plan to write with some colleagues from the department of sociology. 
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The same material will be used again later when the PhD thesis will 
be rewritten in publishable form. Research participants’ real names 
or very personal information will not be revealed. Instead, fictitious 
names will be used to preserve anonymity. Also, all the information 
given will be kept confidentially and no one other than me and my 
research assistant will be able to access it.
If you wish to know more about my research or about the even-
tual results, don’t hesitate to contact me!
Aurélie Mary
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
33014 University of Tampere
Finland
Email: aurelie.mary@uta.fi
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Information provided to the French interviewees before starting the 
interview:
Informations sur le processus de l’entretien et la protection 
des données transmises 
 
Je mène des interviews dans le cadre de mes études de Doctorat en 
sociologie. Je fais une étude comparative entre la France et la Finlande 
sur la situation économique et sociale des jeunes adultes qui ont la 
vingtaine, et en particulier des jeunes qui terminent leur études uni-
versitaires et vont bientôt entrer dans la vie professionnelle. L’analyse 
porte également sur les changements sociaux et économiques qui se 
sont produits ces 10–20 dernières années, par rapport aux condi-
tions des années 60–70, et comment ils influencent le mode de vie 
des jeunes.
Comme cette étude concerne les jeunes, il me semblait im-
portant de leur donner l’occasion d’exprimer leurs opinions sur la 
situation socio-économique actuelle. Les statistiques offrent beau-
coup d’informations sur les conditions de vie des jeunes, mais ils 
n’expliquent pas pourquoi ou comment certaines choses se produisent. 
Le but de ma recherche est de parler de la situation des jeunes du 
point de vue des jeunes eux-mêmes. C’est pour cette raison que cet 
entretien a lieu.
Les informations données au cours de cet entretien ne seront 
utilisées qu’à but scientifique. Des citations seront incluses dans 
des articles écrits pour des conférences et des revues sociologiques, 
dans ma thèse de doctorat et aussi dans un livre sur la transition 
des jeunes à l’âge adulte que je suis en train de préparer avec des 
collègues à l’université de Tampere en Finlande. Certaines citations 
seront réutilisées lorsque ma thèse sera réécrite pour être publiée sous 
forme d’ouvrage scientifique. Le nom d’aucun participant ne sera 
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cité, ni les informations vraiment personnelles : des pseudonymes 
seront employés pour que l’anonymat soit préservé. Aussi, toutes les 
informations transmises sont confidentielles et aucun autre chercheur 
que moi n’y aura accès.
Pour plus d’informations sur ma recherche ou sur les résultats à 
venir, n’hésitez pas à me contacter !
Voici mes coordonnées : 
Aurélie Mary
Department of Sociology and Social Psychology
33014 University of Tampere
Finland
Email : aurelie.mary@uta.fi
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Appendix 3 – Interview Questions
(The lists do not include probes and other indications, only the main 
questions.)
ENGLISH VERSION
I – Present and Future: Personal Situation
a) Education
To start with, can I ask you what you are studying? 
Are you now writing your Masters thesis?
Why did you choose to study this subject?
Are you satisfied with your choice?
And why did you choose to go to university? 
Is there anyone in your family who studied at university?
By the way, how old are you?
Did you go to university straight after secondary school?
What do you think about the Finnish university system in general?
Do you think you’ll find a job related to your level of study? And related 
to the subject you studied?
b) The labour market
Do you have ideas about the job you’d like to do?
Do you have some working experience already? Could you talk about 
that a bit? 
How do you view the world of work? 
How do you view the beginning of your working life?
Are you in a hurry to finish your studies and enter working life?
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Do you feel pressure to develop and lead a successful professional 
career?
c) Living arrangements
Can I ask you where you live at the moment?
How do you finance your rent and other living expenses?
Later on, would you like to buy your own flat or house?
d) Family
What is your priority, finding a job or starting a family?
Would you like to get married later? Or just live with your partner?
And would you like to have children?
Do you think you’ll be able to develop a professional career and have 
a family and/or children at the same time?
e) Hobbies and personal interests
Do you have any personal interest or hobbies that are important to 
you? Or are you involved in any associations?
Do you dedicate a lot of time to these? 
And how do you think you’ll manage to combine your personal activi-
ties with your future working life and family life? 
f ) Transition
In your opinion, what is ‘being an adult’? 
And do you feel ‘adult’?
What do you think will be the most difficult in your transition from 
university to working life?
And in general, are you satisfied with your life at the moment?
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II – The Youths’ Current Situation
a) Education
According to statistics, the number of students has significantly in-
creased in the last 20 years. In your opinion, what makes young people 
go to university? 
Do you know any young people who went straight into work?
Did they find a job quickly after finishing school?
How is it going for them now?
b) The labour market
How do you view your peers’ integration into the labour market?
Do you think that they feel pressured to have a successful professional 
career?
 
c) Living arrangements
Where do most of the young people that you know live at the mo-
ment?
How do they finance their rent and other living expenses?
d) Family
What is the relationship status of the young people that you know?
Do you have many friends that are living together with a partner (mar-
ried or cohabiting)? 
And do they have children, or will they have some soon?
Does that have an effect on you?
Does it put pressure on you to start a family?
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e) Hobbies and personal interests
Do your peers or friends have any personal interests or hobbies that are 
important to them? Or are they involved in associations?
How do they organise their time between studies, work, private life 
and personal activities?
f ) Transition
Do you consider your friends ‘adults’?
What do you consider the most difficult issue when university students 
enter working life?
Do you think that those who went to vocational school encounter the 
same difficulties, or are better off?
And what is the hardest thing for the young people that you know who 
entered working life recently?
Are the young people that you know, or your friends, satisfied with 
their life in general?
III – Past
a) Education
To start with, can I ask you how old your parents are?
Did your parents study?
What did they study?
b) The labour market
Did your parents managed to follow or develop a professional ca-
reer?
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How do you think it was for your parents to find work once they 
finished their studies?
Do you think that they had more opportunities and chances to suc-
ceed than you have?
Do you think it was better 30 years ago?
Have you talked about all that with your parents?
c) Living arrangements
Were your parents independent at an early age? How old were they 
when they left home?
What did they do when they finished school?
Do you know if they started working early but would have rather 
continue studying, or doing something else?
d) Family
Are your parents married? At what age did they get married or move 
in together?
Before getting married, did they spend some time living on their own 
or with friends, or did they cohabit?
How old were they when they had their first child? And how many 
children do they have?
Do you think that there was more pressure to leave the parental home, 
find a job and get married at that time?
e) Hobbies and personal interests
Did your parents have a lot of hobbies or leisure activities when they 
were young? Or were they involved in associations? 
In your opinion, do young people nowadays have more personal inter-
ests and leisure activities than young people had before?
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Do you think that young people now dedicate a bigger part of their 
lives to leisure activities, in comparison to their parents when they 
were young?
f ) Transition
Do you think that your parents became ‘adults’ at an earlier age than 
young people today? 
Do they put pressure on you sometimes to find a job (and finish study-
ing) or to lead a successful career? Or to start a family?
Do you get lots of support and understanding from your parents?
In general, do you think that life for young people was easier or more 
difficult when your parents were young?
Have you talked about that with them?
Do you think that young people were happier 30 years ago?
Conclusion
For the last part of this interview, I’d like to ask you if you have an idea 
of what you’ll be doing or how your life will be in five or 10 years?
Also, do you feel that being a woman can facilitate or complicate your 
entry into working life or life in general?
Do you consider your generation to be unique or stand apart?
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FINNISH VERSION
I – Nykyhetki ja tulevaisuus: henkilökohtainen elämäntilanne
a) Koulutus
Aluksi, voisinko kysyä, mitä opiskelet? 
Eli, kirjoitatko tällä hetkellä gradututkielmaasi?
Miksi päätit opiskella juuri tätä alaa?
Oletko tyytyväinen valintaasi?
Entä miksi päätit mennä yliopistoon opiskelemaan?
Onko perheessäsi joku, joka on opiskellut yliopistossa?
Entäpä, minkä ikäinen olet?
Mitä ajattelet suomalaisesta yliopistojärjestelmästä yleisesti?
Uskotko löytäväsi koulutustasoasi ja opintoalaasi vastaavan työn? 
b) Työmarkkinat
Onko sinulla ajatus siitä, millaista työtä haluaisit tehdä? Miksi juuri 
tämä työ?
Onko sinulla jo jotakin työkokemusta? Voisitko kertoa siitä hieman?
Millaiseksi miellät ’työn maailman’? 
Millaisena näet oman alkutaipaleesi työelämässä? 
Onko sinulla kiire saada opintosi päätökseen yliopistolla ja siirtyä 
työelämään?
Koetko, että sinuun kohdistuu paineita pyrkiä saavuttamaan hyvä 
ura?
c) Asumisjärjestelyt
Voinko kysyä, missä asut tällä hetkellä?
Kuinka rahoitat asumis- ja elinkustannuksesi?
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Haluaisitko jossakin vaiheessa ostaa oman asunnon tai talon?
d) Perhe
Kumpi on prioriteettisi, työn löytäminen vai perheen perustaminen?
Haluaisitko naimisiin myöhemmin? Vai asua avoliitossa kumppanin 
kanssa?
Haluaisitko saada lapsia?
Uskotko, että sinun on mahdollista kehittää uraasi ja olla perheenäiti 
samanaikaisesti? Kuinka?
e) Harrastukset ja henkilökohtaiset kiinnostuksen kohteet
Onko sinulla kiinnostuksen kohteita tai harrastuksia, jotka ovat sinulle 
tärkeitä? Tai oletko mukana yhdistystoiminnassa tms.?
Omistatko näille paljon aikaa?
Kuinka uskot onnistuvasi yhdistämään aktiviteetit tulevan työ- ja 
perhe-elämäsi kanssa?
f ) Siirtymä
Mitä mielestäsi on ’olla aikuinen’?
Tunnetko itsesi ’aikuiseksi’?
Minkä uskot olevan kaikkein vaikeinta siirtymässäsi yliopistomaail-
masta työelämään?
Oletko yleisesti ottaen tyytyväinen elämääsi tällä hetkellä?
II – Nuorten nykyinen tilanne
a) Koulutus
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Tilastojen mukaan opiskelijoiden määrä on kasvanut suuresti viimeisten 
kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana. Mikä sinun mielestäsi saa nuoret 
hakeutumaan yliopistoon? Tai nuoret, jotka tunnet, kuten ystäväsi?
Onko sinulla samanikäisiä ystäviä, jotka eivät ole opiskelleet yliopis-
tossa? Ovatko he töissä?
Löysivätkö he työpaikan pian päätettyään koulun/opintonsa?
Mikä heidän tilanteensa on tällä hetkellä?
b) Työmarkkinat
Millaisena näet tovereidesi integroitumisen työmarkkinoille?
Uskotko heidän kokevan paineita saavuttaa menestyksekäs ura?
c) Asumisjärjestelyt
Miten suurin osa ikätovereistasi asuu tällä hetkellä?
Kuinka he rahoittavat vuokransa sekä muut elinkustannuksensa?
d) Perhe
Mikä on ikätovereidesi siviilisääty?
Onko sinulla monta ystävää, jotka asuvat yhdessä kumppanin kanssa 
(naimisissa tai avoliitossa)? Onko heillä, tai aikovatko he lähiaikoina 
hankkia, lapsia?
Onko tällä sinuun vaikutusta?
Koetko itse paineita perheen perustamiseen?
e) Harrastukset ja henkilökohtaiset kiinnostuksen kohteet
Onko ikätovereillasi heille tärkeitä kiinnostuksen kohteita tai harras-
tuksia? Tai ovatko he mukana yhdistystoiminnassa tms.? 
Kuinka he organisoivat aikansa opintojen, työn, yksityiselämän ja 
aktiviteettien välillä?
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f ) Siirtymä
Pidätkö suurinta osaa ikätovereistasi ’aikuisina’?
Mikä on mielestäsi vaikeinta nuorille yliopisto-opiskelijoille heidän 
siirtyessään työelämään?
Uskotko, että ne, jotka valitsivat ammatillisen koulutuksen kohtaavat 
samat vaikeudet, vai ovatko asiat heille tässä suhteessa helpompia?
Entä mikä on mielestäsi tällä hetkellä vaikeinta niille ikätovereillesi, 
jotka ovat siirtyneet työelämään äskettäin?
Ovatko ikätoverisi tai ystäväsi yleisesti tyytyväisiä elämäänsä?
III – Mennyt
a) Koulutus
Aluksi, minkä ikäisiä vanhempasi ovat?
Ovatko vanhempasi opiskelleet, ja opiskelivatko he yliopistossa? 
Mitä he opiskelivat?
b) Työmarkkinat
Onnistuivatko vanhempasi kehittämään uraansa menestyksekkäästi?
Millaista uskot työnsaannin olleen vanhemmillesi kun he saivat opin-
tonsa päätökseen?
Ajatteletko, että heillä oli enemmän mahdollisuuksia ja tilaisuuksia 
menestyä kuin sinulla?
Uskotko, että tilanne oli yleisesti parempi kolmekymmentä vuotta 
sitten?
Oletko puhunut tästä kaikesta vanhempiesi kanssa?
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c) Asumisjärjestelyt
Itsenäistyivätkö vanhempasi varhain? Minkä ikäisiä he tuolloin oli-
vat?
Mitä he tekivät saatuaan opintonsa päätökseen?
Tiedätkö aloittivatko he työnteon varhain, mutta olisivat sen sijaan 
mieluummin jatkaneet opiskelua?
d) Perhe
Ovatko vanhempasi naimisissa? Minkä ikäisinä he menivät naimisiin, 
tai muuttivat yhteen?
Ennen avioitumistaan, asuivatko he jonkin aikaa itsekseen tai ystävien 
kanssa, tai asuivatko he yhdessä?
Minkä ikäisiä he olivat saadessaan ensimmäisen lapsensa? Ja kuinka 
monta lasta heillä on?
Uskotko siihen aikaan olleen enemmän painetta lähteä lapsuudenko-
dista, löytää työ ja avioitua? 
e) Harrastukset ja henkilökohtaiset kiinnostuksen kohteet
Oliko vanhemmillasi paljon harrastuksia tai vapaa-ajan aktiviteetteja, tai 
olivatko he mukana yhdistystoiminnassa tms. kun he olivat nuoria?
Onko tämän päivän nuorilla mielestäsi enemmän vapaa-ajan aktiviteet-
teja ja henkilökohtaisia kiinnostuksen kohteita kuin nuorilla aiem-
min?
Uskotko tämän päivän nuorten omistavan suuremman osan elämästään 
vapaa-ajan aktiviteetteihin verrattuna heidän vanhempiinsa, kun nämä 
olivat nuoria?
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f ) Siirtymä
Uskotko, että vanhempasi aikuistuivat varhemmin kuin nuoret tänä 
päivänä?
Painostavatko vanhempasi sinua löytämään työn ja lopettamaan 
opinnot, tai saavuttamaan menestyksekkään uran? Tai perustamaan 
perheen?
Saatko heiltä paljon tukea ja ymmärtämystä?
Yleisesti, uskotko, että nuorten elämä oli vaikeampaa tai helpompaa 
vanhempiesi ollessa nuoria? 
Oletko puhunut siitä heidän kanssaan?
Uskotko nuorten olleen onnellisempia kolmekymmentä vuotta sit-
ten?
Yhteenveto
Lopuksi kysyisin, onko sinulla ajatusta siitä, mitä teet ja millaista 
elämäsi mahdollisesti tulee olemaan viiden tai kymmenen vuoden 
kuluttua? 
Entä koetko, että naisena oleminen voi helpottaa tai hankaloittaa 
aikuis-/työelämään siirtymistäsi?
Pidätkö sukupolveasi erityisenä tai ainutkertaisena?
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FRENCH VERSION
I – Présent et Futur : Situation Personnelle 
a) Education
Est-ce que je peux te demander ce que tu étudies ?
Et tu es à quel niveau d’étude ?
Pour quelles raisons tu as choisi cette branche ? 
Est-ce que tu es satisfaite de la voie que tu as choisie ? 
Pour quelles raisons tu as décidé d’étudier à l’université ? 
Est-ce qu’il y a quelqu’un autour de toi, ou dans ta famille, qui a fait 
des études universitaires ? Qui ?
Au fait, tu as quel âge ?
Qu’est-ce que tu penses du système universitaire Français ?
Est-ce que tu penses trouver un travail à la hauteur de tes études ? Et 
dans ta branche ?
b) Le marché du travail
As-tu des idées sur le travail que tu souhaites trouver ?
Est-ce que tu pourrais me parler de tes expériences dans le monde du 
travail ?
Quelle est ta vision du monde du travail ?
Comment tu envisages tes débuts dans la vie professionnelle ?  
Est-ce que tu as hâte de finir tes études et d’entrer dans la vie active ? 
Est-ce que tu ressens de la pression autour de toi pour mener un bonne 
carrière professionnelle ? 
c) Modes de vie
Est-ce que je peux te demander où est-ce que tu vis en ce moment ?
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Comment est-ce que tu finances ton loyer et tes dépenses quotidi-
ennes ? 
Tu as l’intention de louer pendant de longues années ou tu voudrais 
éventuellement acheter un appart ou une maison plus tard ? 
d) Famille
Et qu’est-ce qui est prioritaire pour toi : de trouver un travail ou de 
fonder une famille ? 
Est-ce que tu voudrais te marier plus tard ? Ou juste vivre avec un 
partenaire en concubinage ? Ou bien être pacsée ?
Est-ce que tu voudrais avoir des enfants ? 
Est-ce que tu penses que tu pourras mener à la fois ta carrière profes-
sionnelle et être mère de famille ? 
e) Passe-temps et activités personnelles
Est-ce que tu as des passe-temps, ou des activités qui te sont chers ? 
Ou fais-tu partie d’associations ?
Est-ce que tu dédies une grande partie de ton temps libre à ces activ-
ités ? 
Est-ce que tu penses que tu devras abandonner certaines activités per-
sonnelles quand tu vas commencer ta vie active, ou changer de style 
de vie ? Et lorsque tu auras une famille ?
f ) Transition
D’après toi, c’est quoi ‘être adulte’ ? 
Et est-ce que tu te sens ‘adulte’ ?
Qu’est-ce qui est le plus difficile pour toi, quand tu considères ton 
passage de la vie d’étudiante à la vie active ? 
Est-ce que tu es satisfaite de ta vie en général, en ce moment ? 
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II – La Situation des Jeunes Actuelle
a) Education
D’après les statistiques, le nombre d’étudiants a largement augmenté 
ces 20 dernières années. Selon toi, qu’est-ce qui pousse les jeunes à 
aller à la fac ? 
Est-ce que tu connais des jeunes qui n’ont pas fait d’études et qui ont 
travaillé directement après l’école ? 
Est-ce qu’ils ont trouvé du travail rapidement après l’école ? 
Et comment ils s’en sortent maintenant ? 
b) Le marché du travail
Comment tu perçois l’insertion des jeunes que tu connais sur le marché 
du travail ? 
Tu penses qu’ils ressentent de la pression autour d’eux pour mener une 
bonne carrière professionnelle ?
c) Modes de vie
Où est-ce que la plupart des jeunes que tu connais vivent en ce mo-
ment ?
Comment est-ce qu’ils financent leurs dépenses quotidiennes ?
d) Famille
Quelle est la situation familiale de la plupart des jeunes autour de toi ? 
Est-ce que beaucoup de jeunes que tu connais vivent en couple (mariés 
ou en concubinage) ?
Et est-ce que beaucoup ont des enfants, ou vont bientôt en avoir ?
Quel effet cela a sur toi ?
Est-ce que tu ressens de la pression pour aussi fonder une famille ?
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e) Passe-temps et activités personnelles
Est-ce que les jeunes que tu connais dédient une partie importante 
de leur temps libre, ou de leur vie, à des passe-temps, ou des associa-
tions ?
Comment est-ce qu’ils organisent leur temps, entre les études, le travail, 
la vie privée et les activités personnelles ?
f ) Transition
Tu penses que la plupart des jeunes que tu connais sont ‘adultes’ ?
Selon toi, qu’est-ce qui est le plus difficile pour les étudiants en cycle 
universitaire, lorsqu’ils finissent les cours à la fac et entrent dans la vie 
active ? 
Est-ce que tu penses que ceux qui ont suivi une filière profession-
nelle connaissent les mêmes difficultés, ou s’en sortent mieux ?
Et pour ceux que tu connais et qui sont entrés dans la vie active assez 
récemment, qu’est-ce qui est le plus difficile maintenant ? 
Est-ce que tu trouves que les jeunes dans ton entourage sont satisfaits 
de leur vie en général ? 
III – Passé 
a) Education
Tout d’abord, est-ce que je peux te demander l’âge de tes parents ?
Est-ce que tes parents ont fait des études ?
Qu’est-ce qu’ils ont étudié ?  
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b) Le marché du travail
Est-ce qu’ils ont réussi à poursuivre ou développer une carrière profes-
sionnelle ?
Comment tu penses que c’était pour tes parents de trouver du travail 
une fois leurs études terminées ? 
Est-ce que tu trouves qu’ils avaient plus de possibilités et de chances 
de réussite que toi ?
Tu penses que c’était mieux il y a trente ans ? 
Tu en as déjà parlé avec tes parents ?
c) Modes de vie
Est-ce que tes parents ont été indépendant jeunes ? Quel âge ils avai-
ent quand ils sont partis de chez eux ? 
Qu’est-ce qu’ils ont fait après avoir terminé l’école ? 
Tu sais s’ils ont commencé à travailler jeunes mais auraient en fait 
préférer continuer leurs études, ou faire autre chose ?
d) Famille
Vers quel âge tes parents se sont rencontrés ? Et à quel âge ils se sont 
mariés ? 
Avant de se marier, est-ce qu’ils ont vécu quelques temps seuls, en col-
location avec des amis, ou bien en concubinage ?
Quel âge ils avaient quand leur premier enfant est né ? Et combien 
d’enfants ils ont eu ?
Est-ce que tu penses qu’il y avait plus de pression pour quitter le foyer 
familial, trouver vite un travail et se marier à l’époque ?
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e) Passe-temps et activités personnelles
Est-ce que tes parents avaient beaucoup de passe-temps ou d’activités 
particulières ? Ou est-ce qu’ils faisaient partis d’associations ?
Selon toi, est-ce que les jeunes d’aujourd’hui ont plus d’activités per-
sonnelles qu’avant ?
Est-ce que tu penses que les jeunes en général consacrent une plus 
grande partie de leur vie aux loisirs par rapport à leurs parents quand 
ceux-ci étaient jeunes ? 
f ) Transition
Est-ce que tu penses que tes parents sont devenus ‘adultes’ à un âge 
plus avancé que les jeunes d’aujourd’hui ? 
Est-ce qu’ils te mettent la pression parfois pour que tu trouves vite 
un travail, ou pour que tu développes une bonne carrière profession-
nelle ? Ou alors pour fonder une famille ?
Reçois-tu beaucoup de soutient et de compréhension de leur part ?
En général, tu trouves que la vie des jeunes était plus facile ou plus 
difficile lorsque tes parents étaient jeunes ? 
Tu en as déjà parlé avec eux ?
Est-ce que tu penses que les jeunes étaient plus heureux il y a une 
trentaine d’années ?
Conclusion
Pour la phase finale de cet entretien, j’aimerai te demander : quel genre 
de vie tu espères mener dans quelques années, disons dans cinq ou dix 
ans environ ?
Et d’après toi, est-ce que le fait d’être une femme facilite ou rend plus 
difficile ton entrée dans la vie active ? 
Est-ce que tu considères que la génération à laquelle tu appartiens est 
unique ? Ou que c’est une génération à part ? 
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Appendix 4 – The Finnish and French education systems 
Education	systems	overview
The Finnish education system is divided into three phases: basic 
education, upper-secondary education and tertiary education. Basic 
education or comprehensive schooling was established in the 1970s. 
It lasts for nine years, and pupils’ attendance is compulsory between 
the ages of seven and 16 or until completion (see Figure A4.1). Since 
1998, six-year-olds have been able to enter a one-year preschool class, 
created to smooth the transition from day care or home to school and 
develop children’s learning skills. Participation is voluntary. However, 
nearly all six-year-old children participate in the programme (Opetus-
ministeriö 2008–2009). Comprehensive school is divided into two 
stages: the lower stage and the upper stage. The lower stage lasts for 
six years, and pupils are aged seven to 12. Instruction is provided by 
a class teacher. The upper stage lasts for three years, and pupils’ ages 
range from 13 to 16. The instruction is given in the form of subject 
teaching by different teachers. Primary and secondary education is 
funded by municipalities, which receive support from the state. There 
is a limited number of private schools in Finland, which are state 
funded and supervised by school authorities. They have to follow 
the core curriculum established by the Ministry of Education, and 
cannot impose tuition fees. Most of these schools are faith-based or 
established on the basis of different approaches and ideologies, such 
as Steiner schools (Opetushallitus 2009).
When the nine-year comprehensive education syllabus is com-
pleted, Finnish pupils receive a certificate; however, this does not 
constitute a valid qualification. Students wishing to raise their study 
skills and knowledge can have an additional year of voluntary basic 
education before continuing to upper-secondary level (Opetusminis-
388 – Aurélie Mary
teriö 2008–2009). The upper-secondary education stage lasts for three 
years and is divided into two parts: general upper-secondary schools 
that offer broad and general academic knowledge (Lukio), and voca-
tional schools (Ammattikoulu) that offer vocational training and skills 
(see Figure A4.1). The general upper-secondary education curriculum 
does not qualify students for any occupation; it offers the necessary 
syllabus and eligibility to pursue study in higher-education institu-
tions, mainly at university. At the end of the three-year programme, 
students pass the national Matriculation examination. In contrast 
with general upper-secondary schools, vocational upper-secondary 
education provides students with knowledge and training in specific 
occupations and entitles them to vocational qualifications. Students 
graduating from vocational upper-secondary schools are eligible to 
study further, either in universities of applied sciences or at university 
(Opetusministeriö 2008–2009). In 1994, two competence-based 
qualification programmes, ‘Specialist vocational qualifications’ and 
‘Further vocational qualifications’ (see Figure A4.1), were designed 
to maintain lifelong learning and enhance the vocational skills and 
knowledge of the adult population. The ‘Specialist vocational quali-
fications’ scheme is especially set up to develop abilities and mastery 
in a particular field (Opetushallitus 2009).
The French education system is divided in three main stages; 
primary, secondary and higher education. These are split into five 
sub-stages: nursery school, primary school, lower-secondary school, 
upper-secondary school and higher education (see Figure A4.2). 
Nursery school (Ecole maternelle) is intended for children aged from 
two-and a half or three years to six years. It is optional, but virtu-
ally all children attend it, either part-time or in most cases full-time 
(Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 2007). They are state-funded, 
and operate similarly to day care in terms of activities organised for 
children. School is mandatory in France for all children aged six to 
16. Primary school (Ecole élémentaire) lasts for five years, from the 
ages of six to 11. Instruction is provided by class teachers. Second-
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ary education lasts for seven years and is divided into two cycles: 
lower- and upper-secondary school, which last respectively for four 
and three years. Children enter the lower stage (Collège) at the age 
of 11. The instruction is provided in the form of subject teaching 
by different teachers. Lower-secondary education is concluded by a 
national diploma, the Brevet, established in 1987. However, it does 
not provide any qualification or entitle students to a specific occupa-
tion, nor does it determine entry into the upper-level of secondary 
education. 
French pupils aged 15 to 18 attend upper-secondary school 
(Lycée). Upper-secondary school is divided in two distinct streams: 
general and technological education, and vocational education (see 
Figure A4.2). The general and technological branches lead to the 
general and technological Baccalaureate diplomas. Admission is based 
on students’ academic performance during lower-secondary educa-
tion. The first year provides a common curriculum, then pupils 
choose a stream in which they will continue. The general stream is 
divided into three series: humanities, social and economic sciences, 
and scientific studies. It prepares students to pursue longer study 
in higher education, at university or in specialised schools (Grandes 
Ecoles). The technological stream is divided into several series that all 
relate to industrial science and technology. It used to aim at direct 
entry into the labour market, but increasingly prepares students 
for short higher-education courses, in vocational and technological 
institutions. 
The vocational branch offers vocational qualifications. It used to 
be divided into three streams until the 2009 reform, which condensed 
it into two. The CAP (Certifical d’Aptitude Professionnelle – Vocational 
Training Certificate) is a two-year apprenticeship programme that 
provides precise practical skills and training in a specific field, with 
little academic knowledge, and leads to direct integration into working 
life. Vocational upper-secondary education lasts for three years and 
provides a vocational Baccalaureate diploma. Students are given both 
390 – Aurélie Mary
theoretical knowledge and practical training in a particular field. It is 
possible for first-year students to change stream and pursue a CAP. 
Simultaneously, CAP students can change branch and enter vocational 
upper-secondary education. The BEP (Brevet d’Etudes Professionnelles 
– Vocational Qualification Diploma) was an alternative stream until 
2009. It now provides an intermediate qualification for those not 
willing to study for the vocational Baccalaureate and preferring to 
enter working life without further education. After achieving the vo-
cational Baccalaureate, students can enter the labour market or carry 
on to short higher-education programmes related to their occupation 
(Kaiser 2007; Ministère de l’Education Nationale 2009).
A dual school system operates in France, with the coexistence 
of public and private schools. 13% of primary schools and 40% 
of secondary schools belong to the private sector. 21% of students 
are enrolled in private schools (Ministère de l’Education Nationale 
2009). Most private institutions are related to the Catholic church. 
They are relatively autonomous, but remain supervised by the state 
and the National Education Ministry regarding the curriculum and 
pedagogy. Teachers are paid by the state and hired by the schools. 
These institutions are financed publicly by local municipalities and 
the state, depending on the agreement established with the state. 
Pupils’ parents are required to pay tuition fees. The amount varies 
greatly from rather low to very high, depending on the contract the 
school signed (or did not sign) with the state.
Year repetition is a peculiarity of the French education system. 
Students are required to repeat one or several academic years during 
their schooling if they cannot reach the level of learning and under-
standing necessary for promotion to the next level. According to the 
OECD Economic Surveys: France 2007 (2007a), on average, about 
17% of primary school children repeat a year. This proportion rises 
to 36% when they reach upper-secondary school. Those who fail the 
Baccalaureate exam can repeat it too (OECD 2007a). In theory, year 
repetition aims to help students catch up with knowledge. However, 
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in reality, several studies have demonstrated that pupils who repeat 
tend to perform less well in future years. They tend to underestimate 
their own abilities and feel discouraged. In addition, they become 
undervalued by teachers and stigmatised by the system, considered 
lower achievers than their fellow students (Cousin 1998; OECD 
2007a). The inefficiency of the method has been acknowledged by 
the national education policy, and year repetition has declined since 
the 1990s, when over 50% of pupils finished lower-secondary school 
after having repeated at least one year (OECD 2007a). In Finland, 
repetition of a class remains rare; no more than 2% of pupils are 
affected. Rather than being stigmatised, the weaker students are pro-
vided with support and encouragement, so as not to denigrate them 
or damage their self-worth.  Special education is usually available 
part-time for students in need of specific support in some subjects. 
Special needs education, pupils’ welfare and educational guidance 
are part of the national core curriculum. Different degrees of special 
education are provided, depending on the pupils’ needs and difficul-
ties (Opetushallitus 2009).
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Figure A4.1. The Finnish education system.
The figure is based on information from the following sources: Opetushallitus (2009); 
Opetusministeriö (2009).
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Figure A4.2: The French education system.
The figure is based on information from the following sources: Ambassade de France 
en Irlande (2007); La France en Suisse (2009); Ministère de l’Education Nationale 
(2009); Site de Ressources et de Formation des Directeurs d’Ecole de la Marne 
(2008).
BEP: Brevet d’Etudes Professionnelles (Vocational Qualification Diploma)
CAP: Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (Vocational Training Certificate)
IUP: Institut Universitaire Professionnalisé (Professional University Institute)
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Historical	overview	
A brief historical analysis of the development of the education sys-
tems in Finland and France will help us to understand their present 
constitution. In Finland, the church wielded control over education 
until 1869, when the state and the church separated. Simultaneously, 
the management of educational matters was transferred to the Board 
of Education, founded in the same year. In 1966, the National Board 
of Vocational Education was created alongside the existing National 
Board of General Education. In 1991, the two boards were combined 
into the Finnish National Board of Education, which regulates both 
general and vocational education. Higher education is the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Education. In the 1980s, the management 
of educational matters underwent decentralisation, and it is today 
administrated by ministries, state provincial offices and local authori-
ties alongside the central board. The decentralisation of education 
administration has led to an increase in educational institutions’ au-
tonomy and decision-making, and in teachers’ accountability. More 
emphasis and trust is given to the schools, which are responsible for 
adequate transmission of knowledge, while the state provides for the 
schools, allowing the teaching body to fulfil its duty (Opetushallitus 
2009). Concerning the development of schooling in Finland, in 1898, 
a decree was issued stipulating the obligation on local authorities to 
provide all school-aged children with an opportunity for schooling. 
The 1921 Education Law prescribed free, compulsory basic education 
to all children. Basic education was provided by folk schools for six 
years. After four years of folk school, pupils could study in second-
ary schools, divided into the five-year lower-secondary school and 
the three-year upper-secondary school. In the 1970s, the nine-year 
comprehensive school system was established, unifying the folk school 
and the lower-secondary school (Opetushallitus 2009).
French schooling started to develop under the new educational 
reforms implemented by Charlemagne in the eighth century. The 
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Catholic church played a central role in providing instruction until 
the Jules Ferry laws constituted the modern Republican School in 
the 1880s. These laws required free, compulsory and ‘laïque’ (secular) 
schooling for all children aged six to 13, both boys and girls, the latter 
having previously had limited access to education due to the inferiority 
conferred on their gender. The secularisation of the education system 
engendered the separation of educational and religious instruction. 
The principle of ‘laïcité’ (secularisation) implies the secularisation of 
the teaching staff and the prohibition of the promotion of religion in 
public schools. In 1959 compulsory schooling was extended to the age 
of 16. The French education system was based on five main principles: 
mandatory education; free and universal transmission of knowledge; 
neutrality through secularisation; success through meritocracy rather 
than social origins; and educational freedom, with the coexistence of 
public and private institutions (Cousin 1998; Langan 2008; Ministère 
de l’Education Nationale 2009). However, the founding principles 
of the French education system applied predominantly to primary 
education, and did not take into account pupils’ diversity regarding 
learning abilities or social background. The expansion of secondary 
schooling in the 1960s and 1970s greatly challenged the principle 
of equality of opportunity. The new reforms that attempted to deal 
with this issue led to the selection of students on the basis of learning 
abilities. School has implicitly become a place for selection based on 
intellectual and economic capital, but also a provider of higher social 
positions and a weapon against unemployment (Cousin 1998).
Specialist schools (Grandes Ecoles) were created after the French 
revolution to replace universities, because of the latter’s monarchist 
foundations. Faculties and universities were restructured in the 19th 
century, as were upper-secondary schools (Lycées), which were cre-
ated by Napoléon in the early 1800s. The state had a monopoly over 
educational matters. To this day the education system has remained 
centralised, with all educational programmes being regulated by the 
Ministry of National Education. Schoolteachers and higher-educa-
396 – Aurélie Mary
tion professors and researchers are civil servants employed by the 
state (Rinne and Koivula 2008; Pugin 2008).
Different principles and ideologies shape the structure of the 
education system in different European countries. Different models 
operate in Finland and France. Rinne and Koivula (2008) distinguish 
three initial types of system that generated the present higher-educa-
tion systems in advanced societies: the Napoleonic model in France, 
the Humboldtian system in Germany, and the Anglo-Saxon model 
in Britain. While the Anglo-Saxon model was adopted in the United 
States, the Humboldtian and Napoleonic models merged and gen-
erated the Western or Continental European model. In this typol-
ogy, the Nordic model diverges. The Central and Eastern European 
model is another model altogether. The Anglo-Saxon model can be 
described as market-driven, hierarchical, and based on competition 
between higher-education institutions. The Continental model’s most 
important principle is the academic freedom of researchers, with little 
competition between universities. The Central and Eastern European 
model is going through a process of transition, simultaneously with 
those countries’ restructuring. Until the late 1980s, higher-education 
institutions were heavily under state control, and the system was 
founded on centralised and ideological principles imposed by the 
state. In the Nordic model, the principles of equal opportunities and 
homogeneity predominate. Higher education is therefore free. The 
institutions are regulated by the state and publicly funded, but remain 
largely autonomous. There is no educational market or competition 
between the institutions either (Rinne and Koivula 2008). 
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 397 
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 5
 –
 F
am
ily
 s
up
po
rt 
in
 F
in
la
nd
 a
nd
 F
ra
nc
e,
 2
01
0.
Ty
pe
 o
f s
up
po
rt
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
M
at
er
ni
ty
 s
up
po
rt
- M
at
er
ni
ty
 le
av
e
(3
0–
50
 d
ay
s 
be
fo
re
 b
irt
h,
10
5 
da
ys
 a
fte
r b
irt
h)
- M
at
er
ni
ty
 g
ra
nt
 o
r m
at
er
ni
ty
 p
ac
ka
ge
- M
at
er
ni
ty
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 (e
ar
ni
ng
s-
re
la
te
d,
 €
22
.0
4 
m
in
im
um
 
pe
r d
ay
, p
ai
d 
by
 K
el
a)
- M
at
er
ni
ty
 le
av
e
(4
2–
56
 d
ay
s 
be
fo
re
 b
irt
h,
11
2–
18
2 
da
ys
 a
fte
r b
irt
h;
lo
ng
er
 le
av
e 
if 
m
ul
tip
le
 b
irt
hs
)
- B
irt
h 
al
lo
w
an
ce
- 
M
at
er
ni
ty
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 (
ea
rn
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
, f
ro
m
 €
8.
72
 to
 €
77
.2
4 
pe
r 
da
y,
 p
ai
d 
by
 S
oc
ia
l S
ec
ur
ity
; f
or
 h
ig
he
r s
al
ar
ie
s,
 th
e 
em
pl
oy
er
 p
ay
s 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e)
Pa
te
rn
ity
 le
av
e
- 1
8 
da
ys
; 1
3–
36
 d
ay
s 
fro
m
 2
01
0 
on
w
ar
ds
- P
at
er
ni
ty
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 (e
ar
ni
ng
s-
re
la
te
d,
 €
22
.0
4 
m
in
im
um
 
pe
r d
ay
)
- 1
1–
18
 d
ay
s
- P
at
er
ni
ty
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 (e
ar
ni
ng
s-
re
la
te
d,
 s
im
ila
r t
o 
m
at
er
ni
ty
 
  a
llo
w
an
ce
)
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
(F
in
la
nd
)
E
du
ca
tio
na
l 
pa
re
nt
al
 l
ea
ve
 
(F
ra
nc
e)
- E
ith
er
 p
ar
en
t c
an
 ta
ke
 it
, o
r i
t c
an
 b
e 
sp
lit
- C
an
 b
e 
pa
rti
al
 (p
os
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
to
 w
or
k 
pa
rt-
tim
e)
- 
Le
ng
th
: 
15
8 
w
ee
kd
ay
s 
+ 
60
 w
ee
kd
ay
s 
if 
m
ul
tip
le
 
bi
rth
s
- P
ar
en
ta
l a
llo
w
an
ce
: e
ar
ni
ng
s-
re
la
te
d 
(€
22
.0
4 
m
in
im
um
 
pe
r d
ay
, p
ai
d 
by
 K
el
a)
- C
an
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
on
ly
 if
 p
ar
en
t h
as
 w
or
ke
d 
fo
r a
 m
in
im
um
 o
f o
ne
  
  y
ea
r i
n 
hi
s/
he
r c
ur
re
nt
 w
or
kp
la
ce
- C
an
 b
e 
up
 to
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s,
 if
 ta
ke
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
ch
ild
 is
 y
ou
ng
e 
th
an
  
   
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
ol
d
- O
ne
 y
ea
r l
on
g,
 if
 ta
ke
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
ch
ild
 is
 a
ge
d 
th
re
e 
to
 1
6
- C
an
 b
e 
pa
rti
al
 (p
os
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
to
 w
or
k 
pa
rt-
tim
e)
- E
ith
er
 p
ar
en
t c
an
 ta
ke
 it
- E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ec
ur
ity
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
d 
w
he
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
 re
tu
rn
s 
to
  
  w
or
k
- U
np
ai
d 
fo
r t
he
 fi
rs
t c
hi
ld
- E
ar
ni
ng
s-
re
la
te
d 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 p
ai
d 
by
 C
AF
 (F
am
ily
 A
llo
w
an
ce
s 
 F
un
d)
 
on
ly
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 c
hi
ld
, a
nd
 if
 p
ar
en
t h
as
 w
or
ke
d 
tw
o 
ye
ar
s 
m
in
im
um
 p
rio
r t
he
 b
irt
h
C
hi
ld
ca
re
 le
av
e
- C
an
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
un
til
 th
e 
ch
ild
 re
ac
he
s 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
ol
d
- U
np
ai
d,
 b
ut
 fa
m
ili
es
 a
re
 e
nt
itl
ed
 to
 c
hi
ld
 h
om
e-
ca
re
 a
l-
lo
w
an
ce
 d
ur
in
g 
th
at
 p
er
io
d
- E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t s
ec
ur
ity
 g
ua
ra
nt
ee
d 
w
he
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
  r
et
ur
ns
 to
 w
or
k
398 – Aurélie Mary
E
ar
ly
 c
hi
ld
ho
od
 b
en
efi
ts
- 
B
as
ic
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 p
ai
d 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
ag
ed
 z
er
o 
to
 th
re
e 
(e
ar
ni
ng
s-
re
la
te
d)
- 
S
up
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 fo
r 
fre
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f w
or
ki
ng
 ti
m
e 
(n
on
 
m
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
) 
(p
ay
ab
le
 fr
om
 th
e 
fir
st
 c
hi
ld
, f
or
 s
ix
 m
on
th
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
fir
st
 c
hi
ld
 a
nd
 u
p 
to
 th
e 
th
ird
 b
irt
hd
ay
 o
f a
dd
iti
on
al
 c
hi
ld
re
n)
 
C
hi
ld
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s
- 
B
en
efi
ts
 fo
r 
ea
ch
 c
hi
ld
, f
ro
m
 th
e 
fir
st
 c
hi
ld
; t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 
va
rie
s,
 a
nd
 g
ra
du
al
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
ith
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f c
hi
l-
dr
en
- S
up
po
rt 
of
fe
re
d 
un
til
 th
e 
ch
ild
 re
ac
he
s 
17
 y
ea
rs
 o
ld
- T
he
 b
en
efi
ts
 o
nl
y 
st
ar
t a
fte
r t
he
 b
irt
h 
of
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 c
hi
ld
; t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 
va
rie
s,
 a
nd
 g
ra
du
al
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
w
ith
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n
- S
up
po
rt 
of
fe
re
d 
un
til
 th
e 
ch
ild
 re
ac
he
s 
20
 y
ea
rs
 o
ld
C
hi
ld
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
llo
w
an
ce
Fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
w
ho
 c
an
no
t r
ec
ei
ve
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
fro
m
 th
ei
r 
pa
re
nt
s;
 a
im
s 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 e
co
no
m
ic
 s
ec
ur
ity
 
to
 c
hi
ld
re
n
H
ou
si
ng
 s
up
po
rt
H
ou
si
ng
 a
llo
w
an
ce
; d
iff
er
en
t m
ea
su
re
s 
fo
r f
am
ili
es
 w
ith
 
ch
ild
re
n
Fa
m
ily
 h
ou
si
ng
 a
llo
w
an
ce
A
dd
iti
on
al
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s
- F
la
t-r
at
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 (p
ai
d 
fo
r o
ne
 y
ea
r t
o 
fa
m
ilie
s 
w
ith
 a
t l
ea
st
 th
re
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
fa
m
ily
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 is
 r
ed
uc
ed
 w
he
n 
th
e 
ch
ild
re
n 
re
ac
h 
th
e 
ag
e 
of
 2
0)
- F
am
ily
 in
co
m
e 
su
pp
le
m
en
t (
m
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
 b
en
efi
t f
or
 fa
m
ili
es
 w
ith
 
at
 le
as
t t
hr
ee
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ag
ed
 th
re
e 
to
 2
1)
D
ay
 c
ar
e
- T
hr
ee
 ty
pe
s 
of
 p
ub
lic
ly
 s
ub
si
di
se
d 
da
y 
ca
re
: m
un
ic
ip
al
, 
pr
iv
at
e 
an
d 
ho
m
e 
da
y 
ca
re
- 
U
nc
on
di
tio
na
l r
ig
ht
 t
o 
m
un
ic
ip
al
 d
ay
 c
ar
e 
fo
r 
ev
er
y 
ch
ild
- M
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
 fe
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
fa
m
ily
 s
iz
e 
an
d 
in
co
m
e
- 
C
hi
ld
 h
om
e-
ca
re
 a
llo
w
an
ce
: 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
no
t 
in
 d
ay
 
ca
re
- P
riv
at
e 
da
y-
ca
re
 a
llo
w
an
ce
: f
or
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
in
 p
riv
at
e 
ch
ild
-
ca
re
 c
en
tre
s,
 fa
m
ily
 c
hi
ld
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 o
r p
riv
at
e 
hi
re
d 
ca
re
gi
ve
rs
- S
ev
er
al
 ty
pe
s 
of
 p
ub
lic
 a
nd
 p
riv
at
e 
da
y 
ca
re
- N
ur
se
rie
s 
(C
rè
ch
es
): 
pu
bl
ic
 o
r p
riv
at
e,
 m
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
 fe
es
- 
Q
ua
lifi
ed
 n
an
ni
es
 (
as
si
st
an
te
s 
m
at
er
ne
lle
s)
: c
ar
e 
fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n 
in
 
th
ei
r h
om
e
- P
riv
at
e 
da
y 
ca
re
 (p
riv
at
e 
na
nn
y)
- N
ur
se
ry
 s
ch
oo
l (
E
co
le
 M
at
er
ne
lle
): 
fre
e 
fo
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
ag
ed
 tw
o 
to
 
fiv
e,
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 s
ch
oo
l s
ys
te
m
. W
or
ks
 li
ke
 d
ay
 c
ar
e 
an
d 
sc
ho
ol
, w
ith
 
th
e 
te
ac
hi
ng
 o
f a
 s
ta
te
-m
an
da
te
d 
cu
rr
ic
ul
um
- S
up
pl
em
en
t f
or
 fr
ee
 c
ho
ic
e 
of
 c
hi
ld
ca
re
 (i
f u
si
ng
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
es
 o
f a
 
ch
ild
m
in
de
r, 
an
d 
ba
se
d 
on
 p
ar
en
ts
’ i
nc
om
e)
St
ar
t o
f s
ch
oo
l y
ea
r 
al
lo
w
an
ce
M
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 p
ay
ab
le
 to
 a
ny
 c
hi
ld
 o
f s
ch
oo
l a
ge
 (s
ix
–1
8)
 
an
d 
at
te
nd
in
g 
sc
ho
ol
 (f
or
 th
os
e 
ol
de
r t
ha
n 
16
)
Sc
ho
ol
 m
ea
ls
Fr
ee
 s
ch
oo
l m
ea
ls
 to
 p
up
ils
 fr
om
 c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 
sc
ho
ol
s,
 u
pp
er
-s
ec
on
da
ry
 s
ch
oo
ls
 a
nd
 v
oc
at
io
na
l 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
The Illusion of the Prolongation of Youth – 399 
The table is based on information from the following sources: Caisses d’Allocations 
Familiales, CAF (2010b); Centre des Liaisons Européennes et Internationales de 
Sécurité Sociale, CLEISS (2010); Kela (2009–2011); Ministère de la Solidarité et 
de la Cohésion Sociale (2010a; 2010b; 2010c); Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
(2006). Families can receive different types of support and allowances for disabled 
children, and if they are single parents. In addition, in France, families with children 
receive tax deductions. This applies until the children turn 21, or 25 if they study 
(Administration Fiscale: Impôts 2011). 
